Ethics Series, 2005-06
"Cyborg Ethics and Cognition Enhancing
Evan Selinger (Philosophy, RIT)
4 p.m. Imaging Science (76), 1116
December 8, 2005
“Zealous Advocacy or Racism?
A Practicing Attorney's Dilemma”
Bobby Colón, Esq.
2005 RIT Minett Professor
Assistant Attorney General in Charge, Rochester
The United States Supreme Court in Batson
v. Kentucky held that an attorney was prohibited from precluding
members of a particular race when selecting a jury in a criminal
trial. But an attorney is required by the Canons of Ethics to be
a zealous representative of his client. If the attorney represents
a white defendant and believes that his client's chances of success
would be greater with an all white jury, don't the Canons require
conduct in contradiction of Batson? What’s a good lawyer
4 p.m. Xerox Auditorium (09-2580)
March 23, 2006
"Human Genetic Enhancement: On Our
Way to the Post-Human?"
Inma de Melo Martin
Cornell College of Medicine
As with many other biomedical
technologies, the progress of research on genetic enhancement
technologies has been received with both dismay and excitement
because of its implications for human beings and their communities.
For some, the enhancement of human beings is repugnant, while
others see it as a way to solve many of the problems that plague
us. Some see this new biomedical technique as a challenge to
our human dignity, while others see it as a way to improve the
human species. We will be reflecting here on whether there are
good grounds for these fears and hopes.
4 p.m. Carlson Imagining Science,
April 13, 2006
"Nature and Culpability"
Department of Philosophy
University of Colorado
It was not so terribly long ago that nature stood as an imposing
reminder of an external world over which humans had little control.
In recent years, environmental ethicists have sought to better
understand the nature of nature, carving it up into cultural
constructs, metaphysical states, ontological furniture, and even,
at times, an interactive subject. Yet with all of this theoretical
exploration, philosophers have come to no agreement about what
nature is. In this paper I take a different, and somewhat divergent,
tack on the nature of nature. I argue that determinations of
naturalness ought not to be tied to the ontological status (or
lack thereof) of the surrounding environment. I argue instead
that talk of the naturalness of things is talk, in the end, about
what we humans are responsible for. Acknowledging this, I believe,
can bear the right sort of fruit for an environmental ethics.
If nature is viewed not so much as some real object or metaphysical
construct, as much as a component of the question of what we
should do, then questions about the value of nature fall into
place without the cumbers of ontology.
4 p.m. Carlson Imaging Science,
Conference on Adam Smith's
The Theory of Moral Sentiments
Location to be announced
Copyright © 2002, Hale Chair. All rights reserved.
Last modified September 5, 2005
Tuesday, 22-Jan-2008 09:34:27 EST