

**The “connecting principle” of
David Hume’s *History of England***

Mark G. Spencer
Department of History
Brock University
St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada
L2S 3A1
mspencer@brocku.ca
tel: 905-688-5550, ext. 3506

**“Hume in Iceland”
35th Annual Hume Society Conference**

**University of Akureyri
Iceland**

August 6-10, 2008

**The “connecting principle” of
David Hume’s *History of England***

I

My talk today is concerned with Hume as historian in the History of England (1754-1762). Much of my time will be given to the historiography of interpretations of the History, including its early reception which - when read in the right way - has useful things to tell us about Hume’s aims as historian. With the evidence in that historiography and in Hume’s own writings, this paper will hint at a shift in how we think about Hume’s overall intentions in the History of England.

The first volume of the six volumes that would comprise Hume’s History of England, from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688 was first published in 1754 as The History of Great Britain, Volume I. Containing the reigns of James I and Charles I. That book took as its subject matter the period of the reigns of the early Stuart kings, encompassing the rise of the Parliament and the English Civil Wars that brought the life of Charles I to an abrupt end in 1649. In many ways Volume I remains at the center of Hume’s historical enterprise, even if as modern scholars we most often read it as Volume 5 in the Liberty Classics edition, edited by William B. Todd, the standard modern edition since its publication in 1983 (all references in this paper to Hume’s History are to that edition). I will return to that volume at the conclusion of my paper.

Hume’s first Stuart volume was published only two years after he had been elected Keeper of the Advocates’ Library in Edinburgh, a post which gave Hume access to a fine collection of books, totaling almost thirty thousand volumes in all. As Hume put it in his autobiographical “My Own Life,” a document that can not always be trusted for its historical accuracy: “In 1752, the Faculty of Advocates chose me their Librarian, an

office from which I received little or no emolument, but which gave me the command of a large library. I then formed the plan of writing the History of England.”¹ In that passage Hume puts the cart before the horse in that he probably took the post because he had already formed the plan of writing the history of England, as other references show and other historians have convincingly argued. With the assistance of the Faculty of Advocates’ book collection, the second volume of Hume’s History was published shortly after the first, in 1757. That volume looked forward from the perspective of the early Stuarts, bringing Hume’s readers closer to their own times, giving the history of the Commonwealth, the Stuart Restoration of 1660, and concluded with the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89. In his next installment, published in 1759, Hume looked backwards from the early Stuarts to the reign of the Tudor monarchs, including Elizabeth. And then in his final volumes he sketched England’s ancient and medieval history. Hume’s curious approach – writing his History by going back in time - led one of Hume’s early critics to comment in a line that has been often quoted since: as witches say their prayers, so David Hume writes his history, backwards.²

I can not hope in a short paper such as this one to give a complete account of Hume’s aims as historian in those several volumes totaling well over one million words. But by concentrating on the reception of Hume’s History, I intend to sketch the parameters of a key aspect of Hume’s historiographical goals therein - one which has been overlooked by Hume’s contemporaries and modern commentators alike.

II

It seems to me that the study of Hume’s thought -- historical, philosophical, and otherwise -- has only just begun to benefit from scholars turning some of their attention

from what Hume wrote in his books to the early reception of Hume's books, an historical context that offers useful insight to better understanding Hume's text.³ I would not argue that Hume's early readers offer a privileged interpretation of Hume's writings, for clearly they do not. Early readers of Hume were not always perceptive - although they sometimes were (Charles Carroll of Carolina is a good example of one who was) - but even Hume's less perceptive early readers may help us, Hume's current readers, by better illuminating the context in which Hume himself wrote. We are fortunate to have new tools such as James Fieser's multi-volume collection of Early Responses to Hume which, despite its unfortunate transcription errors, has begun to have a positive impact on the direction of Hume historiography.⁴ Also, and unlike scholars of only a generation ago, we can now benefit from searchable electronic databases such as Eighteenth-Century Collections Online and the Early American Imprints series, commonly known as the Digital Evans Collection. The Hume historiography has increasingly turned to Hume's wider reception, and that trend has not ignored the reception of the History in particular. My own book on Hume's impact in eighteenth-century America took that tact, as has Peter Jones' recently edited book on Hume's Reception in Europe.⁵ In short, we have begun to right the imbalance that one commentator identified only a few years ago, writing in 2005: "In spite of its great popularity, the early responses to Hume's History have been among the least explored areas of Hume scholarship."⁶ While looking forward from the text of Hume's History to its early reception has important things to tell us about Hume's aims as historian, let's begin by first looking backwards. That is, backwards to some of Hume's statements about the subject of history penned even before any of the volumes of his own History were published, written, or formulated.

III

In his pre-History of England published writings and surviving correspondence Hume at several places speaks to what we might call the aims of historians in general.⁷ For instance, we have Hume's essay "Of the Study of History," first published in 1741. That essay demonstrates Hume, even before he published as an historian, writing about the task of an historian in terms that closely linked the historian's craft to the historian's audience. That is, Hume there - but also elsewhere - referred to history's writers at the same time that he referred to history's readers. Hume concluded his essay "Of the Study of History": "The writers of history, as well as the readers, are sufficiently interested in the characters and events, to have a lively sentiment of blame or praise; and, at the same time, have no particular interest or concern to pervert their judgment."⁸ The balance to which Hume here referred - one between "lively sentiment" on one hand and "no particular interest" on the other -- is an important one informing Hume's historical attitude.

Moreover, the balance Hume strives for in this passage strikes me as somewhat different from the tensions that Mark Phillips points to in his influential discussion of Hume in Society and Sentiment: Genres of Historical Writing in Britain, 1740-1820, a book that aims, in part, to suggest the limits of Enlightenment historiography. Phillips identifies a tension between "engagement" and "disengagement" in histories of the Enlightenment in general and in Hume's History in particular.⁹ While Phillips' notion of "engagement" nicely approaches Hume's position of "lively sentiment," Hume's stance of "no particular interest" does not, I will argue, suggest "disengagement," or "distancing," or to quote Phillips, "looking back over an epochal divide."¹⁰

For Phillips' Hume, the present belonged to a different world than the past.¹¹ Phillips quoted Hume's summary of the manners of England's political parties as they appeared after the polarizing effects of the Civil Wars:

No people could undergo a change more sudden and entire in their manners than did the English nation during this period. From tranquility, concord, submission, sobriety, they passed in an instant to a state of faction, fanaticism, rebellion, and almost frenzy. The violence of the English parties exceeded any thing which we can now imagine. No social intercourse was maintained between the parties; no marriages or alliances contracted ... The manners of the two factions were as opposite as those of the most distant nations. (History of England, Vol. 6: 141)

Arguing that for Hume these seventeenth-century factions "served as a constant reminder that those days were very different from his own"¹², Phillips concludes:

The only way to understand the profound transformations of the past century, [Hume] seems to be saying, is to work in the very widest terms available, to adopt, in fact, the anthropological framework with which Enlightenment writers had learned to understand remote civilizations or barbaric tribes. How else to think about a habit of violence that he finds beyond present imagination? How else to imagine a social divide so deep that the English seemed split not merely into two nations, but distant ones at that?(76)

However, reading Hume's account of the English Civil Wars within the context of his wider discussion of faction suggests Hume thought those barbaric manners may not have been as distant as he wished or Phillips supposes. It is true that for Hume the negative effects of factions were especially prominent when any society became divided into

polarized parties. But Hume did not consider violent anti-social factions to be a thing of the distant historical past. Moreover, Hume thought that basic human actions and motives were constant over time. As he put it: “Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular [human actions and motives].” “Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the GREEKS and ROMANS? Study well the temper and actions of the FRENCH and ENGLISH: You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former *most* of the observations, which you made with regard to the latter.”¹³ That is not Hume approaching history as Phillips sees it, “looking back over an epochal divide,” and Phillips is not the only modern commentator to see things that way.

Nicholas Phillipson concluded his influential book on Hume (1989), published in the series “Historians on Historians,” by highlighting what he saw as Hume’s primary achievement as historian. Phillipson writes on his final page that Hume had shown human beings “how to distance themselves from their past and devote themselves to the peaceful pursuit of their interests in the material world in which they found themselves.”¹⁴ In other words, for Phillipson, Hume the historian had shown that history didn’t really matter. [One wonders if Hume might have tried to make that point in a different way than by spending several years writing over a million words of polished historical prose!]

It seems to me that in the essay “Of the Study of History,” in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and also in the History of England, Hume did not argue to “distance” the past in this way, but rather he strove to find a way to bring the past into sharper focus; to find a more appropriate perspective from which to judge it. He did not aim to demonstrate an “epochal divide” between those who lived in the

seventeenth century and writers and readers of history in the eighteenth century. Rather, he aimed to show that to understand the English Civil Wars, or any other historical event or person, meant looking forward, and backwards, in an effort to situate the event (or person) in a proper historical context. It meant looking at things and people from different perspectives. And it also meant resting content when the judgments from those various points of view did not seem to agree. Hume's character sketch of Sir Robert Walpole comes to mind:

As I am a man, I love him. As I am a scholar, I hate him. As I am a Briton, I calmly wish his fall. And were I a member of either house, I would give my vote for removing him from St. James, but should be glad to see him retire to Houghton-Hall, to pass the remainder of his days in ease and pleasure (Hume, "A Character of Sir Robert Walpole," Essays, 576).

Not unrelated to my argument here is another passage Hume wrote about history in general.

In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, a book first published in 1748, and at a time in which Hume had begun to think seriously about his own historical enterprise, he again linked writers and readers of history when he remarked on the importance of presenting to the history reading audience an historical narrative that was a connected chain of events. Hume wrote that historians were led by what he called a "connecting principle." He elaborated:

the most usual species of connexion among the different events, which enter into any narrative composition, is that of cause and effect; while the historian traces the series of actions according to their natural order, remounts to their secret

springs and principles, and delineates their most remote consequences. He chooses for his subject a certain portion of that great chain of events, which compose the history of mankind: Each link in this chain he endeavours to touch in his narration.

Hume concluded: always the historian “is sensible, that the more unbroken the chain is, which he presents to his reader, the more perfect is his production.”¹⁵ Given that Hume wrote in this way about the role of an historian, it is interesting to ask: What was the “connecting principle” that provided the links of the chain that was Hume’s History of England? Over the years, Hume’s readers have suggested shockingly wide-ranging answers to that question.

IV

Many of Hume’s contemporaries and near contemporaries, especially those living in eighteenth-century Britain, saw the connecting principle of Hume’s History of England in negative terms. They saw Hume’s work as being ideologically suspect because Hume’s narrative was thought to be connected by the principle of religious scepticism – history written by “The Great Infidel” - or, even more so, because Hume’s story was thought to be one dictated by a political bias towards Toryism. That is, Hume was thought to be an apologist for the early Stuarts, and especially Charles I. He was the historian who had denied the existence of the ancient constitution and the historical importance of Parliament. The earliest recorded responses to Hume’s first volume saw things in just that way. Hume was accused of “Tory” leanings in Roger Flexman’s review of the first volume published in The Monthly Review in 1754 and by William Rose in his review of the second volume in 1757, as he was by others, such as Thomas Birch, or Daniel

MacQueen whose Letters on Hume's History was published in 1756, or Owen Ruffhead who criticized Hume as a Tory in 1759.

With the publication of the History as a finished story in 1762, the accusation that Toryism was its connecting principle became louder yet. That was the case in works such as Joseph Towers' Observations on Mr. Hume's 'History of England (1778), John Millar's An historical view of the English government (1787), John Pinkerton's Letters of Literature (1785), and Joseph Priestley's Lecture on History and General Policy (1788). There would be important exceptions to these early readings of a Tory Hume, especially in early America where Hume was more often read - at least before 1800 - as providing a story of the growth of constitutional liberty. But by the early years of the nineteenth century - and in both Britain and America - Hume was most commonly portrayed as a Tory historian who falsely aimed to defend Charles I. That is the way that Thomas Jefferson eventually came to read the History, as did George Brodie in A History of the British Empire (1822) and others such as John Stuart Mill, Francis Palgrave, and T. B. Macaulay.

The History was constantly in print during the nineteenth century, coming out in edition after edition, some illustrated others abridged, but also in expurgated editions, such as the Students Hume or Hume's History of England Revised for Family Use (1816), books which suggest the unsettled and uncomfortable nature of Hume's reception in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Hume's immense popularity -- David Fate Norton and Richard Popkin document some 175 posthumous pre-1900 imprints -- was not missed by Hume's critics who were convinced that Hume's success was to be explained by the smoothness of his pen. As a result, several critics in the late

eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries thought it best to offer guidance to the unwary readers of Hume, lest they be sucked in by his beauties.

One English critic, William Smyth, sought to educate the general reader of Hume; to protect the naive from Hume's sophistry. As Smyth put it, he would follow Hume, "step by step, through the whole of his account; and showing what were his fair, and what his unfair inferences; what his just representations, and what his improper colourings; what his mistakes, above all, what his omissions; in short what were the dangers, and what the advantages, that must attend the perusal of so popular and able a performance."¹⁶ In other words, Smyth aimed to run interference with what he took to be Hume's connecting principle of Toryism.

Smyth's approach was similar to that of others in the late eighteenth century. John Baxter, for instance, whose History of England (London, 1796) Thomas Jefferson praised and aimed to have reprinted in America in 1807, at the same time that Jefferson aimed to have Hume's History banned from the University of Virginia Library. Jefferson wrote that Baxter "has performed a good operation" on Hume. "He has taken the text of Hume as his ground work, abridged it by the omission of some details of little interest, and wherever he has found him endeavoring to mislead, by either the suppression of a truth or by giving it a false coloring, he has changed the text to what it should be, so that we may properly call it Hume's history republicanised."¹⁷ By the latter part of the nineteenth-century, there were no dissenting voices to the chant of a Tory Hume. And by the 1940s, that the "connecting principle" of Hume's History was its Toryism had become such a standard way of seeing things that Ernest C. Mossner felt compelled to provide "An Apology for David Hume, Historian."¹⁸

Since the mid 1970s, there is a different trend. Historians have searched for other “connecting principles” to replace the Tory explanation of Hume’s History.¹⁹ For Duncan Forbes, in Hume’s Philosophical Politics, a book first published in 1975, Hume was not a Tory historian, but a scientific or sceptical Whig, a voice of “moderation”.²⁰ For Victor Wexler and John J. Burke, Hume strove to attack the Whig myth of an ancient constitution, to “Wake the English from a Dogmatic Slumber;”²¹ he was not Tory but anti-Whig. Several others see the connecting principle of Hume’s History to be its account of the growth of constitutional liberty. That is the case with several of the contributors to Nicholas Capaldi and Donald Livingston’s edited collection, Liberty in Hume’s ‘History of England’,²² as it is with J.G.A. Pocock’s account of Hume’s History in his recent Narratives of Civil Government.²³ These readings correct, in significant ways, the long standing account of Hume as Tory historian. They provide a much more nuanced account of Hume’s political narrative. But do they get to the “connecting principle” of Hume’s historical account? To begin to tease out an answer to that question it is useful to consider what, if anything, Hume himself said about the “connecting principle” of his History of England.

V

Hume’s letters contain many references to the goals of the History as well as a surprising number of instances in which Hume comments on the reception of the work. Hume wrote to John Clephane in 1753:

You know that there is no post of honour in the English Parnassus more vacant than that of History. Style, judgement, impartiality, care - everything is wanting to our historians.

In 1754, Hume wrote to a friend (Mrs. Dysart of Eccles), sending her a copy of volume one of the History:

Whether am I Whig or Tory? Protestant or Papist? Scotch or English? I hope you do not all agree on this head; & that there [are] disputes among you about my principles.

Hume's correspondence, then, suggests that Hume strove, actively, to make sure that the connecting principle of his History was not dictated by the interests of any particular party. Rather, Hume aimed to challenge the agenda that historians of various parties had brought with them to their telling of the history of England. Indeed, it was for that historiographical reason that Hume began the History where he did. He wrote in "My Own Life" that: "I commenced with the accession of the House of Stuart, an epoch when, I thought, the misrepresentations of faction began chiefly to take place."²⁴

And it was precisely because Hume had aimed to write as an impartial spectator, taking no party line, that he was so perturbed by the early reception of the History and attempts to cast him as a party writer. Those early responses to Hume's History also help us to see how foreign and strange Hume's approach appeared to his contemporaries.

Hume wrote of the reception of his first Stuart volume, suggesting what he took to be the limits of the Enlightenment in Britain:

I thought that I was the only historian, that had at once neglected present power, interest, and authority, and the cry of popular prejudices; and as the subject was suited to every capacity, I expected proportional applause. But miserable was my disappointment: I was assailed by one cry of reproach, disapprobation, and even detestation; English, Scotch, and Irish, Whig and Tory, churchman and sectary,

freethinker and religionist, patriot and courtier, united in their rage against the man, who had presumed to shed a generous tear for the fate of Charles I. According to Hume, every good history needed to have a connecting principle. So if his History was not connected by a party line, then by what? We know that Hume intended writers of history to judge the past. We also know that Hume thought those judgments ought not to be made from the perspective of any “particular interest”. So, from what perspective to judge?

Hume aimed, more than most of his contemporaries could appreciate and more than modern commentators have yet sketched out, to judge historical actors and actions within the context of their times. But as the details of the story Hume aimed to tell from the perspective of no particular interest became clearer, Hume the historian became concerned - even worried - that his readers would see his judgment as being a contrived middle ground. Hume worried that “moderation” would be seen as his “particular interest.” He wrote in 1753:

The more I advance in my undertaking, the more am I convinced that the History of England has never been written, not only for style, which is notorious to all the world, but also for matter; such is the ignorance and partiality of all our historians. ... I may be liable to the reproach of ignorance, but I am certain of escaping that of partiality: The truth is, there is so much reason to blame and praise alternately King and Parliament, that I am afraid the mixture of both in my composition, being so equal, may pass sometimes for an affectation, and not the result of judgement and evidence.

Hume did not actively aim for a middle ground, as Duncan Forbes and Nicholas Phillipson would have it. Rather, his evidence led him there.

To conclude, what does our perspective suggest about the first Stuart volume that was at the heart of Hume's story and has been at the heart of attempts to see Hume as a Tory historian? For Hume, James I did not grasp for monarchical powers when he claimed to command "as an *absolute* king."²⁵ James was only speaking in a language to which the English "had already been somewhat accustomed from the mouth of Elizabeth."²⁶ Moreover, the House of Commons in "the former periods of the English government had been "of so small weight in the balance of the constitution, that little attention had been given, either by the crown, the people, or the house itself, to the choice and continuance of the members."²⁷ James' political troubles, as characterized by Hume, were not brought on by his supposed attempts to expand the powers of the monarchy, but largely resulted from the kings' over-bearing personality, a character trait that Hume fleshed out. The "leading members" of the house, "men of an independent genius and large views" who "began to regulate their opinions, more by the future consequences which they foresaw, than by the former precedents which were set before them; and they less aspired at maintaining the ancient constitution, than at establishing a new one, and a freer, and a better."²⁸ During James' reign, "the constitution of England was, at that time, an inconsistent fabric, whose jarring and discordant parts must soon destroy each other, and from the dissolution of the old beget some new form of civil government, more uniform and consistent".²⁹

Charles I inherited that same "ambiguous" English constitution. Charles' conduct and reign, Hume aimed to judge from the context of the times, not from an illusionary

context of an ancient, unchanging, and well-defined English constitutional settlement.

Hume summed up in the form of a question: “I shall only ask, whether it be not sufficiently clear from all these transactions that in the two succeeding reigns [James I and Charles I] it was the people who encroached upon the sovereign, not the sovereign, who attempted, as is pretended, to usurp the people?” Hume wrote to John Clephane in September 1757:

I am now very busily engaged in writing another volume of History, and have crept backwards to the reign of Henry VII. I wish, indeed, that I had begun there: For by that means, I should have been able, without making any digression, by the plain course of the narration, to have shown how absolute the authority was, which the English kings then possessed, and that the Stuarts did little or nothing more than continue matters in the former tract, which the people were determined no longer to admit.

While that is a statement about England’s constitutional development, it is also a statement about the value of context for understanding and assessing historical events and people. For that reason we may say that historical context is the connecting principle of Hume’s History of England.

NOTES

Early versions of this paper have been presented at the Center for the Study of Scottish Philosophy, Princeton Theological Seminary (Princeton, 9 September 2007); the North American Conference on British Studies (San Francisco, 10 November 2007) and the annual meeting of the Northeast American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies (Dartmouth College, 27 October 2007). I would like to thank my commentators and others in the audiences for their helpful comments, as I would Roger Emerson and Frits van Holthoon for reading an earlier draft. I am grateful for funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

¹ David Hume, "My Own Life," in Eugene F. Miller, ed., David Hume: Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary (Indianapolis, revised edition 1987), xxxvi.

² See E.C. Mossner, The Life of David Hume (Austin, 1954), 302.

³ Others, too, have noted this recent trend; see the forward to Emilio Mazza and Emanuele Ronchetti, eds., New Essays on David Hume (Milan, 2007), 12.

⁴ James Fieser, Early Responses to Hume, 10 volumes (Bristol, 1999-2003; Second Edition, Revised, 2005); see also James Fieser, "The Eighteenth-Century British Reviews of Hume's Writings," Journal of the History of Ideas, 57 (1996): 645-57. For the American side of things see Mark G. Spencer, ed. Hume's Reception in Early America, 2 volumes (Bristol, 2002).

⁵ See Mark G. Spencer, David Hume and Eighteenth-Century America (Rochester, 2005) and Peter Jones, ed. Hume's Reception in Europe (London and New York, 2005). Of particular relevance in Jones' collection for the concerns of the present essay is Mark Salber Phillips and Dale R. Smith, "Canonization and Critique: Hume's reputation as a Historian," 299-313.

⁶ James Fieser, "Introduction," to Early Responses to Hume's History of England (2003; Second Edition, Revised, Bristol, 2005), xiii. At the same time, scholars have also begun to tap the "book history" side of Hume, including his work as historian. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton have given us The David Hume Library (Edinburgh, 1996). Roger Emerson has been compiling a bibliography of Hume's sources in the History of England and piecing together what we know about the intellectual development of Hume as historian. Frits van Holthoon, Graeme Slater and others have sketched the revisions that Hume made to his History. See, for instance, Frederic L. van Holthoon, "Hume and the 1763 Edition of His History of England: His Frame of Mind as a Revisionist," Hume Studies, 23 (1997): 133-52 and Graeme Slater, "Hume's Revisions of the History of England," Studies in Bibliography 45 (1992): 130-57. Richard B. Sher's large volume on The Enlightenment and the Book (Chicago, 2006) gives significant attention to Hume and his History of England, placing it within the larger context of the British Enlightenment and the history of the book in the Atlantic World. All of this helps us to see more clearly, as David Wootton put it in an essay published in the Cambridge Companion to Hume, that "[i]n writing history, Hume was partly creating, partly responding to, a new market" (281).

⁷ As well, several scholars of Hume's philosophical thought, including David Fate Norton and Richard Popkin, Donald Livingston, Spencer K. Wertz, and most recently, Claudia Schmidt, have demonstrated, in fine books and in scholarly ways, aspects of the historical nature of Hume's philosophical thought. See, for instance, David Fate Norton and Richard H. Popkin, eds., David Hume: Philosophical Historian (Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); Donald W. Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago, 1984); Spencer K. Wertz, Between Hume's Philosophy and History, Historical Theory and Practice (Lanham, 2000); Claudia M. Schmidt, David Hume, Reason in History (University Park, 2003)

⁸ Hume, "Of the Study of History," in Miller, ed., David Hume: Essays, 568.

⁹ Mark Salber Phillips, Society and Sentiment: Genres of Historical Writing in Britain, 1740-1820 (Princeton, 2000), chapter 2, *passim*. See my review of Phillips in Hume Studies, vol. 27 (April 2001), 186-190.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 76.

¹¹ Even more recently, Phillips writes in "Canonization and Critique: Hume's reputation as a Historian": "As Francis Palgrave put it in a comprehensive attack on Hume, 'The historian should consider himself as an interpreter, standing between two nations, and he cannot well execute his tasks, unless he has lived with

both' (Palgrave 1844, 557). This was not, needless to say, the way in which Hume or the other historians of his time had conceived their role, and their work was sure to fail its requirements"(310).

¹² Phillips, Society and Sentiment, 74.

¹³ David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), T.L. Beauchamp ed., 64.

¹⁴ Nicholas Phillipson, Hume (New York, 1989), 141.

¹⁵ Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, T.L. Beauchamp ed., 18-19. See also Treatise Book 1, Part 3, Section 4, and other places.

¹⁶ William Smyth, Lectures on Modern History (5th edition, 2 volumes, London, 1848), 1: 128, cited in Phillips and Smith, "Canonization and Critique: Hume's Reputation as a Historian," 301.

¹⁷ Merrill D. Peterson, ed. Thomas Jefferson: Writings (New York, 1984): 1177.

¹⁸ Ernest Campbell Mossner, "An Apology for David Hume, Historian," Modern Language Association Publications, 16 (1941), 657-90.

¹⁹ Although some, L. Okie, for instance, aim to hold on to parts of the Tory Hume.

²⁰ Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge, 1975). Phillipson's conception of Hume's "philosophical history" (Hume, 141) is close to this too.

²¹ Victor G. Wexler, "David Hume's Discovery of a New Science of Historical Thought," Eighteenth Century Studies, 10 (1977): 185-203; John J. Burke, "Hume's History of England: Waking the English from a Dogmatic Slumber," in Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, ed. Roseann Runte (Madison, 1978), 235-51.

²² (Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1990)

²³ (Cambridge, 1999), volume 2 of Barbarism and Religion

²⁴ Hume, "My Own Life," xxxvi.

²⁵ Hume, History, V:17.

²⁶ Hume, History, V:17.

²⁷ Hume, History, V:14.

²⁸ Hume, History, V:42.

²⁹ Hume, History, V:60.