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SANS Tip-of-the-Day - Mon, 09/01/2014 - 22:49

Internet predators

Malware Alerts - Mon, 09/01/2014 - 06:30

Anyone using the Internet is at risk, regardless of age and regardless of what they like to do online. Cybercriminals can deploy an impressive arsenal, targeting everyone from schoolchildren to pensioners and following them whether they are logged on to social networks, checking the latest headlines or watching their favorite videos. Internet scammers want access to our money, our personal data and the resources of our computer systems. In short, they want anything that they can profit from.

There are a huge range of different attacks facing us on the net: users can get caught by ransomware like Gimeno or Foreign, become part of the Andromeda botnet, see ZeuS/Zbot drain the cash from their bank accounts, or have their passwords compromised by Fareit spyware. Usually web attacks try to download and install an infected executable file on the target computer, but there are some exceptions, for instance XSS or CSRF, which execute embedded HTML code.

Attack mechanism

For an attack to succeed, first of all users need to connect to a malicious site that downloads an executable file onto their computers. To tempt users to the resource, scammers might send them a link by email, SMS or via a social network. They might also try to promote their site via search engines. One further technique is to hack a popular legitimate resource and turn it into an instrument to attack its visitors.

Downloading and installing malware can be done in one of two ways. The first, a hidden drive-by download, relies on using a vulnerability in the user's software. The user of the infected site is often completely unaware that the computer is installing the malware, as usually there are no indications that this is happening.

The second method uses social engineering, where users are tricked into downloading and installing malware themselves, believing it is an updated flash player or some similar popular software.

Diagram of Internet attacks showing how executable malware files can be downloaded

Malicious links and banners

The simplest way to lure victims to malicious sites is simply to display an attractive banner with a link. As a rule sites with illegal content, pornography, unlicensed software, films etc. are used as a host. Such sites can work "honestly" for a long time to build up an audience before they start hosting banners with links to malicious resources.

One popular infection method is malvertising, or the redirecting the user to a malicious site with the help of hidden banners. Dubious banner networks attract site administrators with high payments for 'click-throughs' on their ads and frequently earn money "on-the-side" by spreading malware.

When users enter the site displaying these banners, a so-called "pop-under" opens in the victim's browser. This is similar to a pop-up window, but it appears either under the main window of the site, or on an otherwise inactive neighboring tab. The contents of these "pop-unders" often depend on the location of the visitor to the site - the inhabitants of different countries are redirected to different resources. The visitors of one country might simply be shown an advert for example

Site sends American visitors to the resource watchmygf[]net

Site sends Russian visitors to the resource runetki[]tv\

…whereas visitors from other countries will be attacked by exploit packs.

An inhabitant of Japan is attacked by an exploit and infected with the Zbot spyware Trojan

On occasion these malicious banners can even penetrate into honest banner networks, despite careful scrutiny by administrators. Cases like this have affected the Yahoo Advertising banner network and even YouTube.


Spam is one of the most popular means of attracting victims to malicious resources. It includes messages sent by email, SMS and instant communications systems, via social networks, private messages on forums and comments in blogs.

A dangerous message might contain a malicious file or a link to an infected site. To encourage the user to click on a link or a file social engineering is used, for example:

  • the name of a real organization or person is used as the sender's name,
  • the letter pretends to be part of a legitimate mailshot or even a personal communication,
  • the file is presented as a useful program or document.

During targeted attacks, when cybercriminals specifically attack a certain organization, the malicious letter might mimic a letter from a regular correspondent: the return address, content and signature could be the same as a genuine letter, for example from a partner of the company. By opening the attached document with a name like "invoice.docx" users put their computers at risk of infection.

Black Search Engine Optimization

SEO or Search Engine Optimization is a collection of techniques to raise the position of a site in the results given by search engines. Modern users often go to search engines to find necessary information or services, so the easier it is to find a given site the more visitors it will get.

In addition to legitimate methods of optimization, those that are permissible in the eyes of the search engines, there are forbidden techniques that fool search engines. A site might "promote itself" with the help of a botnet - thousands of bots make certain search requests and select the malicious site, raising its rating. The site itself may adopt a different appearance depending on who has entered it: if it is a search robot it will be shown a page relevant to the request, if it is a normal user it will be redirected to a malicious site.

Also links to the site are distributed in forums and other sites known to search engines using special utilities, which raise the rating of the site and, consequently, its position in search results.

As a rule, sites that use black search optimization are actively blocked by search engine administrators. For this reason they are created by the hundred using automatic instruments.

Infected legitimate sites

Sometimes cybercriminals infect popular legitimate sites in order to spread their programs. These might be high-traffic news resources, internet shops or portals and news aggregators.

There are two common ways to infect sites. If a software vulnerability was detected on the target site, malicious code can be inserted (for instance an SQL injection). In other cases the malefactors obtain authentication data from the site administrator's computer using one of the many Trojan spyware programs or using phishing and social engineering and seize control of the site. Once under the control of the criminals, the site can be infected in one way or another. The simplest approach is to use a hidden iframe tag with a link to the malicious resource added to the HTML code of the page.

Kaspersky Lab registers thousands of legitimate sites every day that download malicious code to their visitors with them being aware of it. Among the most prominent cases were the Lurk Trojan found on the site of the RIA Novosti news agency and and the infection of PHP.Net

Visitors to an infected site are attacked with the use of hidden drive-by-downloads. The infection goes unnoticed by the users and does not require them to download or activate anything. An exploit, or set of exploits, is automatically downloaded from the page and, if the targeted machine has vulnerable software, a malicious executable is launched.

Exploit packs

The most effective tool to infect a victim's computer is an exploit pack, such as Blackhole. These are hot products on the black market: exploit packs are developed to order or for widespread sale and are supported and updated. The price depends on the quantity and "freshness" of the exploits included, the ease of administration, the quality of the support, the regularity of updates and the greed of the seller.

As these attacks take place through the browser, the exploits have to use a vulnerability in either the browser itself, add-ons to it or third party software loaded by the browser to handle content. If one of these exploits is used successfully, a malicious file will be launched on the victim's machine.

Typical set of add-ons for the Internet Explorer browser that have permission to run by default. Add-ons the vulnerabilities in which are often used to attack a system are underlined in red.

An effective pack will contain exploits for useful vulnerabilities in popular browsers and their add-ons, and also for Adobe Flash Player and other popular programs. Often exploit packs have tools for fine tuning and collecting infection statistics.

Styx exploit pack control panel

Direct download by users

Quite often cybercriminals don't need ingenious and expensive tools to insert their malicious programs onto users' computers. Users can simply be fooled into downloading and running malware themselves.

For instance, on entering a malicious site a user sees a preview video "for adults only". Clicking on this brings up a message to update Adobe Flash Player, and at the same time the site immediately offers him a file to download with an authentic sounding name. By installing the "update" the user infects the computer with a Trojan.

Message appearing when trying to view an "adult" video on a malicious site

Or a web-page might appear imitating the "My Computer" window, saying that a large number of viruses have been detected on the computer. And nearby a window opens offering a free "antivirus" program to cure the problems.

An apparent offer to install a free antivirus program hiding a Trojan

Infection via social networks

Inexperienced users of social networks are open to attack by so-called semi-automatic worms. The future victim receives a message apparently from a virtual acquaintance with the offer of some attractive feature that is missing from the social network (to "dislike" a post, obtain confidential data on other users, etc.). To obtain this attractive feature the user is told to open a JavaScript terminal and enter certain code there.

Instructions for the installation of a semi-automatic Facebook worm

After these actions are carried out the worm activates and begins collecting data on the user, sending links to itself to the victim's contacts, awarding "likes" to various posts. This last option is a paid service that the owner of the worm offers to customers. And so we come to the reason why cybercriminals go to all this trouble and break the law.

Money, money, money

Naturally nobody is attacking our computers for the intellectual challenge — the aim is money. One very popular way of illegally making money from victims is the use of Trojan ransom-ware, making it impossible to use the computer until a certain sum has been paid.

Having penetrated the user's computer the Trojan determines the country where the infected computer is and shows the victim the corresponding disable screen, containing threats and instructions on how to pay the ransom. The language of the message and the payment method suggested by the cybercriminals both depend on the user's country.

Usually the evildoers accuse the user of looking at child pornography or some other illegal action and then threaten a criminal investigation or to make the matter public. The assumption is that the victim will take these threats seriously and won't risk seeking help from law enforcement agencies. In some cases the Trojan ransom-ware may threaten to destroy the contents of the hard disk if the ransom is not paid quickly.

The disable screen that Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Foreign shows users in the USA

The cybercriminals offer the option of paying this "fine" by sending an SMS to a premium number or making a money transfer using one of the payment systems. In return the user should receive an unblocking key to deactivate the Trojan, but in practice this doesn't always happen.

Maintaining a communication channel with the victim can lead law enforcement agencies to the criminals and they frequently prefer not to take the risk, leaving the victim with a practically useless computer.

Another common method of illegal moneymaking is the collection and sale of users' confidential data. Contact details and personal data are tradable commodities that can be sold on the black market, albeit not for a great deal of money. However, it can be a profitable sideline, especially as the collection of information does not necessarily require any malware infection. Often the victims themselves supply all the necessary information — the important thing is for the site hosting the form for the entry of data to appear reliable and authentic.

A false site collecting contact details and personal information of visitors and then signing them up for paid mobile services

Banking Trojans bring their operators large profits. These programs are designed to steal money from users' bank accounts using distance banking systems. Malware of this type steals users' authentication data for online banking systems. Usually this is not enough as almost all banks and payment systems require authentication using several factors - entering an SMS code, inserting a USB key etc. In these cases the Trojan waits until the user makes a payment using internet banking and then changes the payment details, diverting the money to special accounts from which the criminal can cash out. There are other ways around two factor authentication: the Trojan might intercept messages with single use passwords or freeze the system at the moment the USB key is inserted, leaving the user powerless while the criminals hijack the operation and steal the money.

Finally, another profitable business is running botnets. The infected computers in a botnet can, unnoticed, be used by the evildoers for various money-making activities: mining bitcoins, sending spam, carrying out DDOS attacks, and boosting sites' ratings through search requests.

Counteracting threats

As we have already shown, internet threats are diverse and can threaten users almost anywhere — when reading their mail, interacting on social networks, checking the news or simply surfing. There are also many ways to protect against these threats, but they can be summarized in four keys pieces of advice:

  • Always pay attention to what you are doing on the Internet: which sites you visit, which files you download and what you run on your computer.
  • Do not trust messages from unknown users and organizations, do not click on links and do not open attachments.
  • Regularly update frequently-used software, especially software that works with your browser
  • Install up-to-date defenses and keep anti-virus databases current.

It all sounds very simple, but the growing number of infections clearly demonstrates that too many users fail to take their safety seriously and neglect to follow this advice. We hope that our overview of current internet threats will help improve the situation.

Sinkholing the Backoff POS Trojan

Malware Alerts - Fri, 08/29/2014 - 05:55

There is currently a lot of buzz about the Backoff point-of-sale Trojan that is designed to steal credit card information from computers that have POS terminals attached.

Trustwave SpiderLab, which originally discovered this malware, posted a very thorough analysis in July.  The U.S. Secret Service, in partnership with DHS, followed up with an advisory.

Although very thorough, the existing public analyses of Backoff are missing a very relevant piece of information: the command-and-control (C&C) servers. However, if you have access to the samples it isn't hard to extract this information. At the end of this document, you can find a full list together with other IOCs (indicators of compromise).

Backoff malware configuration, with C&Cs

We sinkholed two C&C servers that Backoff samples used to communicate with their masters. These C&C servers are used by certain samples that were compiled from January - March 2014. Over the past few days, we observed over 100 victims in several countries connecting to the sinkhole.


There were several interesting victims among them:

  • A global freight shipping and transport logistics company with headquarters in North America.
  • A U.K.-based charitable organization that provides support, advice and information to local voluntary organizations and community groups.
  • A payroll association in North America.
  • A state institute connected with information technology and communication in Eastern Europe.
  • A liquor store chain in the U.S.
  • An ISP in Alabama, U.S.
  • A U.S.-based Mexican food chain.
  • A company that owns and manages office buildings in California, U.S.
  • A Canadian company that owns and operates a massive chain of restaurants.

There are also a lot of home user lines, mostly in the U.S. and Canada, connecting to the sinkhole. This is to be expected as many smaller businesses generally tend to run those rather than dedicated corporate connections.


The success of Backoff paints a very bleak picture of the state of point-of-sale security. Our sinkhole covers less than 5% of the C&C channels and the sinkholed domains only apply to certain Backoff samples that were created in the first quarter of this year. Yet, we've seen more than 85 victims connecting to our sinkhole.

Most of these victims are located in North America and some of them are high profile. Taking into account the U.S. Secret Service statement, it's a pretty safe bet that the number of Backoff infections at businesses in North America is well north of 1,000.

Since its appearance last year, Backoff has not changed dramatically. The author created both non-obfuscated and obfuscated samples. This was likely done to defeat the security controls on the targeted networks. However, the defenses running on a PoS terminal and/or network should not have been affected by this. This speaks volumes about the current state of PoS security, and other cybercriminals are sure to have taken note.

It's very clear that PoS networks are prime targets for malware attacks. This is especially true in the US, which still doesn't support EMV chip-enabled cards. Unlike magnetic strips, EMV chips on credit cards can't be easily cloned, making them more resilient. Unfortunately, the US is adopting chip and signature, rather than chip and PIN. This effectively negates some of the added security EMV can bring.

This may prove another costly mistake. Not adopting EMV along with the rest of the world is really haunting retail in the U.S. and the situation is not likely to change anytime soon.

IOCs / C&Cs: Trojan file paths:


Kaspersky names for the Trojans:




C&C domains and hostnames:


C&C IPs:

Make your password long.

SANS Tip-of-the-Day - Thu, 08/28/2014 - 23:16

Spam in July 2014

Malware Alerts - Thu, 08/28/2014 - 07:00
Spam in the spotlight

Festive spam in July was largely dedicated to the holy month of Ramadan. Unwanted correspondence also included offers to send promotional messages to users' phones and email boxes. We also came across fraudulent emails asking for help with investments. There were offers of beauty products and services too.


In July, spammers continued to exploit the holy month of Ramadan by offering mass mailing services. The emails were written in English. The subject and the text of the emails attracted readers with special offers and discounts in honor of the main Muslim holiday. Mass mailings advertising SMS distribution to residents of the United Arab Emirates were sent from free email services and designed in the same style. The emails used different text fonts and provided different contact details: for example, the phone numbers in the body of the message and in the subject of the email were different. Some emails indicated the site of a company engaged in SMS-marketing.

"Nigerian" scammers did not bother to invent anything new either and tried to attract users' attention by wishing them a Happy Ramadan both in the subject of the email and in the body of the message. Fraudulent emails that offered impressive rewards for help in investing money in a business project were circulated in both English and Arabic.

Current spam flows often include emails in different languages. In particular there has been an increase in the number of messages in Semitic languages, including Arabic, over the year. At the same time the scammers use English in the subject of the emails rather than Arabic. This is probably because English is more widespread and they hope an English subject will attract more readers.

One of the emails was written allegedly on behalf of a Muslim mother. It mentioned the complicated political situation in Syria and explained that this made it impossible to safely invest money at home. In this case, the content of the message suggests the author must know Arabic so a text in this language can be used to make it look more credible.

Spam beautiful

Among July's major mailings there was a notable campaign offering a variety of skin care products for women as well as promotions for beauty clinics. Spam mailings were used to sell different cleansers, anti-wrinkle creams, "elixirs of youth" and other cosmetic products. The scammers offered product samples to convince the user of their merits and promised to return the money if the results were unsatisfactory. The fraudsters tried to encourage potential customers by promising quick and free shipping to any country.

Beauty clinics were actively offering laser hair removal procedures at considerable discounts or even free of charge to supposed lottery winners. The sales pitch, complete with pictures, focused on the pressing need for this procedure before relaxing on the beach. Sometimes these emails were "noised" with texts that had nothing to do with the advertised goods and services. In some cases, this "noise" took up half the message (see the example below). The senders' names in these emails were a randomly generated combination of letters and numbers. The names of advertised centers and clinics were also mentioned in the body of the message to make it easier to find them via the search engine. However the links in the emails led to spammer parked sites registered on newly created domains. Sometimes they offered similar goods or services; sometimes they promoted completely different ones.

Heat-busting spam

The heat of the summer has warmed up the market for products that help us to cool down: spam traffic actively promoted sun-protected foil for windows, fans and air conditioners, including repair and maintenance services. We often came across emails advertising water coolers and bottled water. Water was offered with special summer discounts and free delivery to homes and offices, while an extra bonus promised a free basket of fruit with every order in July or August. Making an order is as simple as calling the number in the advert.

Sunglasses were among the most popular summer offers. Knock-offs of designer sunglasses were offered at huge discounts compared to the original. Such emails often contained the designer logos and included icons of different social networks where the company is officially represented. However, these icons were merely decorative and offered no link to these sites. They were simply intended to make the email seem more realistic. Once users clicked on the link in the email, they were redirected to a newly created online sunglasses store. The names of the sites often included the words 'glasses' or 'sunglasses'. Sometimes you could even visually identify the distorted name of the glasses brand in the random set of letters and numbers which comprised the address of the site.

Statistics The percentage of spam in email traffic

The percentage of spam in email traffic averaged 67%, which is 2.2 percentage points up from June. The highest spam levels were seen during the second week of the month (67.6%), and the lowest levels were seen in the first week (66%).

Percentage of spam in email traffic

The geographical distribution of spam sources

In July, the list of the most popular sources of spam around the world looked like this:

Sources of spam around the world

The USA took first place (15.3%) after its percentage increased 2.2 percentage points from the previous month. Next, Russia came in second place with 5.6%; the amount of spam originating in that country was down 1.4 percentage points. China was in third place with 5.3% having produced 0.3 pp less spam than in June.

Argentina was in 4th position with 4.2% of all distributed spam; its contribution remained practically unchanged but the country still climbed one place in the rankings. It is followed by Ukraine (4.1%) with a 0.9 pp rise compared to June.

In July, we saw the 1.8 pp reduction in the amount of spam from Vietnam (3.5%) which pushed this country from 4th to 8th place.

France rounded up the Top 10 with 2.63% of all distributed spam having pushed India (2.59%) to 11th position.

Malicious attachments in email

The graphic below shows the Top 10 malicious programs spread by email in July.

The Top 10 malicious programs spread by email

This time the rating was topped by Trojan.Win32.Yakes.fize, the Trojan downloader Dofoil. This program downloads a malicious file on the victim computer, runs it, steals the user's personal information (especially passwords) and forwards it to the fraudsters.

The notorious Trojan-Spy.HTML.Fraud.gen dropped out of top spot for the first time in many months. Readers may remember that this is the threat that appears as an HTML phishing website and sends emails disguised as important notifications from banks, online stores, and other services.

Next came Trojan.JS.Redirector.adf which is the HTML page containing code to redirect users to a scammer site offering downloads of Binbot, the service for automatic sales of binary options which are currently very popular in the Internet. This malicious program is distributed via email attachments.

It is followed by Backdoor.Win32.Androm.enji. This malicious program is a modification of Andromeda – Gamarue, a universal modular bot which is a basis for building a botnet with a variety of features. The functionality of the bot can be expanded using a system of plugins that are loaded by the criminals as required.

Fifth position is occupied by This downloader appears in the form of a CPL applet (a component of the control panel) and, as is typical for this type of malware, it downloads Trojans developed to steal bank information and passwords. These banking Trojans mainly target online customers of Brazilian and Portuguese banks.

Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryptodef.ny ended 8th in July. This malicious program encrypts files on computers, blocks the screen and asks the user to pay to restore the files.

Rounding off the Top 10 was Trojan.Win32.Bublik.cran. The main functionality of the Bublik malware family is the unauthorized download and installation of new versions of malware onto victim computers.

Distribution of email antivirus detections by country

July's Top 3 remained unchanged from June. Germany accounted for 11.7% of all antivirus detections and topped the rating (+4.71 percentage points). The USA was second with 9.82% (+0.28 pp). The UK was third with 6.9% (+0.10 percentage points).

India (5.16%) overtook Brazil (3.94%) and came fourth having increased its share by 0.54 percentage points. Italy moved up two steps to 5th in the rating (+1.2 pp).

Russia increased its contribution by 1.37 percentage points averaging 3.40% of all antivirus detections and climbing from 13th to 8th position.

The UAE saw a noticeable drop in antivirus detections – a 1.09 pp fall saw it lose six places on the ranking.

The July Top 20's newcomer was Poland which occupied 19th place with 1.42% of all antivirus detections.

The percentage of email antivirus detections in other countries did not change significantly in June.

Special features of malicious spam

In July, we saw an increase in the number of fake Portuguese language notifications = sent on behalf of the popular smartphone messenger WhatsApp.

One example featured messages warning users that they had violated the terms of use and were in danger of having their accounts blocked. The message claimed another user had reported prohibited content coming from the recipients' accounts. The authors of the email claimed that in response to an increasing number of these complaints they could temporarily suspend the offending account for up to 90 days while the sender's IP address was confirmed. At the end of the email the user was invited to view the terms and conditions of using the application by clicking on the appropriate button. This link downloaded Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Genome.a , a downloader appearing in the form of a .cpl applet (a component of the control panel) which in turn downloaded a Trojan-Banker.Win32.ChePro modification. In addition, the banker could download Virus.Win32.Hidrag.a to infect executable files in the system.

In another case, the fake message notified the recipient that after months of hard work WhatsApp for PC could now enable users to chat with friends in real time via their computer. To add to the intrigue the message claimed that 11 people had already sent friend request to the recipient. To find out who these 11 people were, the user had to download the latest version of the Messenger for PC by clicking on the link in the email. Noticeably, we have been registering different versions of this message since the beginning of 2014.

As in the previous cases, instead of the desired program the user received a ZIP-archive which contained the dropper Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Dapato.egel. Its task is to connect to a remote Brazilian host then download and run a Trojan banker designed to steal the user's financial data. The dropper also copies itself to C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Application Data\ under the name of BaRbEcuE.exe. There it creates a file called windataup.inf, in which it indicates its presence and states the current date. Finally it writes itself into the AutoRun, ensuring it is launched automatically.


In July 2014, Kaspersky Lab's anti-phishing component registered 20,157,877 detections.

Phishers attacked users in Brazil most often: at least once during the month the Anti-Phishing component of the system was activated on computers of 18.17% of Brazilian users. This surge in activity is probably related to the football World Cup that took place in the country in June and July.

The geography of phishing attacks*, June 2014

* The percentage of users on whose computers the Anti-Phishing component was activated, from the total number of all Kaspersky Lab users

Top 10 countries by the percentage of attacked users:

  Country % of users 1 Brazil 18.17 2 India 12.99 3 Australia 11.10 4 France 10.73 5 Kazakhstan 10.62 6 UK 10.15 7 UAE 10.14 8 Dominican Republic 10.11 9 Canada 9.61 10 Ukraine 9.53 Targets of attacks by organization

The statistics on phishing targets is based on detections of Kaspersky Lab's anti-phishing component. It is activated every time a user enters a phishing page while information about it is not included in Kaspersky Lab databases. It does not matter how the user enters this page – by clicking the link contained in a phishing email or in the message in a social network or, for example, as a result of malware activity. After the activation of the security system, the user sees a banner in the browser warning about a potential threat.

In our previous reports we referred to the Top 100 organizations when analyzing the most attractive targets for phishing attacks. In July, we analyzed the statistics for all organizations that were attacked.

In July, the Global Internet portals category continued to top the rating of organizations most often attacked by phishers (29.49%) although its share decreased by 2.67 pp. Social networks came second with 14.61%, a 3.2 pp decline from the previous month.

Organizations most frequently targeted by phishers, by category – July 2014

Below is a similar chart for the previous month:

Organizations most frequently targeted by phishers, by category – June 2014

Financial phishing accounted for 41.85% of all attacks, a 7.86 pp growth compared with the previous month. The percentage of detections affecting Banks, Online stores and E-payment systems was up 2.25, 2.64 and 2.29 pp respectively. The most significant spike affected PayPal (3.24%) up 2.27 pp in July.

We came across an interesting example of PayPal phishing at the end of the month. The fraudulent email informed the recipient about an incoming payment from a Craiglist user (most likely, it is the incorrect spelling of Craigslist, the site of e-ads) but the money could not be transferred because of an error with a PayPal account.

The email arrived from the address which does not belong to PayPal. In addition, it is impersonal which is a typical feature of a phishing email

To solve the problem, the user was asked to immediately download the attached form, open it and fill it in.

The form was created using the design elements of the PayPal site

The attackers are phishing for the user's email address and a password for it, his full name and date of birth, his mother's maiden name, his address, his credit card number, its expiry date and CVV as well as any passwords for Verified by Visa or MasterCard SecureCode. This detailed personal information would make it easy for fraudsters to rob the user of all electronic savings.

If you look at the HTML code of the page, you can see that all the data entered in the form will be sent to a page that has nothing to do with PayPal.

Top 3 most organizations most frequently targeted by phishers   Organization % detections 1 Google Inc 11.64% 2 Facebook 9.64% 3 Windows Live 6.28%

In July, Google services were most heavily targeted by phishing links: their share made up 11.64% of all Anti-Phishing component detections.

The number of fraudulent links to Windows Live, the global portal of the Microsoft services (including Outlook), grew significantly in July. The attractiveness of this resource for fraudsters is easily explained because of the popularity of the MS services and especially with the fact that they are accessed from a single account. Phishing pages are usually designed as an entry page to Outlook (currently there is also a fake login page to

An example of the phishing page imitating the Outlook entry page

Interestingly, many recent phishing pages still use the old Hotmail design despite the fact that Outlook replaced it as far back as the beginning of 2012. However, it does not seem to worry users very much: they still jump at the bait of such phishing pages.

An example of phishing on using the outdated Hotmail design


The proportion of spam in global email traffic in July increased 2.2 percentage points and averaged 67%.

Spam emails advertising services that would send messages to users' phones and emails tried to capitalize on the Ramadan festivities while new customers were lured with holiday discounts and favorable offers. "Nigerian" scammers spread emails in English and Arabic asking for assistance in investing money. There were also offers of beauty products and services.

In July, the list of the most popular sources of spam around the world was topped by the US (15.3%), Russia (%5.6%) and China (5.3%).

In July 2014, Kaspersky Lab's anti-phishing component registered 20,157,877 detections. Phishers attacked users in Brazil most often: 18.2% Brazilian computers flagged at least one phishing alert during the month. The Global Internet portals category continued to top the rating of organizations most often attacked by phishers (29.5%). Financial phishing accounted for 41.85% of all attacks, a 7.86 pp growth compared with the previous month.

The rating of the most popular malicious attachments distributed via email was topped by Trojan.Win32.Yakes.fize. Germany remains the country with the highest number of antivirus detections (11.7%).

A significant number of malicious attachments imitated fake notifications in Portuguese allegedly sent on behalf of the popular smartphone messenger WhatsApp. These attachments targeted the financial data of users in Brazil and Portugal.

4th Latin American Security Analysts Summit in Cartagena

Malware Alerts - Wed, 08/27/2014 - 12:45

Casco Historico, Cartagena, Colombia

Last week, GReAT LatAm had the pleasure of participating in the Fourth Latin American Security Analysts Summit in Cartagena, Colombia. We were joined by 29 journalists from 12 different countries throughout the region and a guest speaker. This is one of our favorite events as it presents a rare opportunity to discuss ongoing research with journalists one-on-one and address security concerns at a regional level. The LatAm focus of the event allows us to examine the 'latin flavor' of cybercrime and cyberespionage originating within our borders.

The Summit was divided into two days. The first day involved presentations ranging from the evolution of the threat landscape to issues involving wearable devices, the disturbing trend of 'camfecting', and new tendencies in Brazilian trojan bankers now aided by cooperation with Eastern European cybercriminals. The second day largely revolved around APTs and cyberespionage campaigns as well as mobile threats affecting integration with the cloud.

Hyperconnected Threats

The ever-charismatic Fabio Assolini discussed a favorite topic of his, the development of banking trojans in his native Brazil. The country is known for its carder culture and widespread cybercrime. Interesting figures presented included the correlation between the cost of Zeus and Caberp and their infection rates in the region, as we witness an exhorbitant rise in the rate of infection once their respective source codes leak and effectively eliminate the initial investment on the part of the criminals. Fabio also unveiled the link between Brazilian and Eastern European cybercriminals who are now exchanging knowledge through online resources to enhance their crimes.

Our very own Santiago Pontiroli took to the stage to discuss mobile- and cloud-based attack vectors in a presentation rife with Orwellian parallels and forewarnings. Santiago discussed Latin America's proclivity for piracy and pornography as presenting massive opportunities for cybercriminals fully willing to exploit them.

Android, a platform enjoying wide-adoption in the region is also an increasingly appealing target for cybercriminals as evidenced by the fact that 98% of mobile malware detected in 2013 were aimed at Android devices –a number that doubled in the first quarter of 2014! Many of these devices are now integrated with the cloud which breathes new life into old phishing schemes whose pay-off now includes extensive access to personal data, storage, and even real-time location information. Some criminals have gone so far as to misuse manufacturer recovery services to act as pre-installed ransomware.

Roberto Martinez and I took on the topic of wearable technologies, increasingly popular devices that collect all kinds of stats about their users, store personal information, and are designed to be worn continuously. I focused on the Samsung Galaxy Gear 2 smartwatch and the ease with which it can be misused by deviants in the 'creepshots' community, as rooting and executing a handful of commands disables camera alerts and recording limitations. Roberto focused on Google Glass whose integrated wifi capability leaves it susceptible to tried-and-true sniffing to expose some of the traffic being relayed to the device.

Emphasizing that the design itself of wearable devices has a propensity to embolden well-known methods of attack as users have limited access to information regarding altered applications or suspicious connections. As wearable devices function by linking with a mobile device, they can eventually become an interesting means for persistent attacks as they are capable of interacting with the information on our phones without being subject to the security measures of their master devices.

Evolving Threats in Cyberespionage

On the cyberespionage front, we saw two thought-provoking and exciting presentations:

We were joined by Jaime Blasco, Director of Research at Alienvault and a close friend of GReAT. Jaime discussed an overview of APT campaigns over the past decade, the measures developed to understand them, and traits that help categorize the work of recurring nationstate players.

Dmitry Bestuzhev announced GReAT's discovery of the first ever cyberespionage campaign of Latin American origin! The Machete campaign affected military, diplomatic, and governmental institutions in 15 countries, primarily Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia. Interestingly, though LatAm has been considered by many as lacking the infrastructure for sustained cyberespionage, research revealed that the campaign has been active since 2010.

Finally, no Kaspersky event would be complete without an active entertainment day for all participants. We retreated to the Cartagena Golf Club for an afternoon of activities ranging from kayaking and beach volleyball to cocktail-making, dance lessons, and guided flower arrangements, as well as a massage area. The evening concluded with a gala dinner accompanied by the traditional music and dances of Colombia and closing words from our thoughtful organizers. I hope you can join us next year!

For more follow me on twitter: @juanandres_gs

NetTraveler APT Gets a Makeover for 10th Birthday

Malware Alerts - Wed, 08/27/2014 - 07:00

We have written about NetTraveler before HERE and HERE.

Earlier this year, we observed an uptick in the number of attacks against Uyghur and Tibetan supporters using an updated version of the NetTraveler backdoor.

Here's an example of a targeted spear-phishing e-mail directed at Uyghur activists in March 2014.

The e-mail has two attachments, a non-malicious JPG file and a 373 KB Microsoft Word .DOC file.

File name "Sabiq sot xadimi gulnar abletning qeyin-Qistaqta olgenliki ashkarilanmaqta.doc" MD5 b2385963d3afece16bd7478b4cf290ce Size 381,667 bytes

The .DOC file, which in reality is a "Single File Web Page" container, also known as "Web archive file", appears to have been created on a system using Microsoft Office - Simplified Chinese.

It contains an exploit for the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability, detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2012-0158.db.

If run on a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office, it drops the main module as "net.exe" (detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Agent.lifr), which in turn installs a number of other files. The main C&C module is dumped into "%SystemRoot%\system32\Windowsupdataney.dll", (detected by Kaspersky as Trojan-Spy.Win32.TravNet.qfr).

Name WINDOWSUPDATANEY.DLL MD5 c13c79ad874215cfec8d318468e3d116 Size 37,888 bytes

It is registered as a service (named "Windowsupdata") through a Windows Batch file named "DOT.BAT" (detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan.BAT.Tiny.b):

@echo off @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost" /v Windowsupdata /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d Windowsupdata /f @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" /v ImagePath /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d %SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k Windowsupdata /f @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" /v DisplayName /t REG_SZ /d Windowsupdata /f @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" /v ObjectName /t REG_SZ /d LocalSystem /f @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" /v ErrorControl /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata\Parameters" /v ServiceDll /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d %SystemRoot%\system32\Windowsupdataney.dll /f

To make sure the malware isn't running multiple times, it uses the mutex "SD_2013 Is Running!" to mark its presence in the system. Other known mutexes used by older and current variants include:

  • Boat-12 Is Running!
  • DocHunter2012 Is Running!
  • Hunter-2012 Is Running!
  • NT-2012 Is Running!
  • NetTravler Is Running!
  • NetTravler2012 Is Running!
  • SH-2011 Is Running!
  • ShengHai Is Running!
  • SD2013 is Running!

The malware configuration file is written to the "SYSTEM" folder (as opposed to SYSTEM32) and has a slightly new format compared to "older" NetTraveler samples:

For the record, here's what an older NetTraveler config file looks like:

Obviously, the developers behind NetTraveler have taken steps to try to hide the malware's configuration. Luckily, the encryption is relatively simple to break.

The algorithm is as follows:

for (i=0;i<string_size;i++)
decrypted[i]=encrypted[i] - (i + 0xa);

Once decrypted, the new config looks like this:

One can easily see the command-and-control (C&C) server in the screenshot above, which is "uyghurinfo[.]com".

We identified several samples using this new encryption scheme. A list of all the extracted C&C servers can be found below:

C&C server IP IP location Registrar ssdcru[.]com Hong Kong, Albert Heng, Trillion Company SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY uygurinfo[.]com United States, Los Angeles, Integen Inc TODAYNIC.COM
INC. samedone[.]com Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hongkong Dingfengxinhui Bgp Datacenter SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY gobackto[.]net Hong Kong, Sun Network (hong Kong) Limited SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY worksware[.]net N/A N/A SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY jojomic[.]com was Hong Kong, Sun Network (hong Kong) Limited SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY angellost[.]net was hong kong hung tai international holdings SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY husden[.]com was hong kong hung tai international holdings SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY

We recommend blocking all these hosts in your firewall.


This year, the actors behind NetTraveler celebrate 10 years of activity. Although the earliest samples we have seen appear to have been compiled in 2005, there are certain indicators that point to 2004 as the year when their activity started.

For 10 years NetTraveler has been targeting various sectors, with a focus on diplomatic, government and military targets.

NetTraveler victims by industry

Most recently, the main focus of interest for cyber-espionage activities revolved around space exploration, nano-technology, energy production, nuclear power, lasers, medicine and communications.

The targeting of Uyghur and Tibetan activists remains a standard component of their activities and we can assume it will stay this way, perhaps for another 10 years.

Internet Law Summer School 2014

Malware Alerts - Mon, 08/25/2014 - 06:54

The end of each summer always gets me excited, because one of my favorite events is taking place: the Internet Law Summer School organized by ELSA - The European Law Students' Association. This summer school is the perfect opportunity to meet young, smart and talented law students and discuss privacy, security or internet threats with them.

These students will become the lawyers, prosecutors and judges of tomorrow - so it's very important for them to get them in touch with the real world problems of fighting cyber-crime and ensuring the security and privacy of personal data.

Law students from 12 European countries

Fighting cyber-crime through all means possible has always been our mission here at Kaspersky Lab. But we can't do this alone. Sure, our products and technologies are protecting hundreds of millions of users worldwide, but stopping cyber-crime is something we can not do just by ourselves.

Cyber-crime is a huge problem worldwide and it is always very frustrating to see that those persons responsible for cyber-attacks very rarely have to face the consequences of their actions. In the last 24 hours, we've discovered more than 300.000 new viruses, trojans and worms. How many cyber-criminals have received prison sentences in the same 24 hours period?

The reason why cyber-criminals usually get away with their crimes is that both law enforcement and judicial systems around the world are having a hard time trying to keep up with the evolution of technology, or threats on the internet specifically. This is why it's so important to train law enforcement officers. This is why it's so important to train judges and prosecutors. At the end of the day, they are the ones actually fighting cyber-crime by sending cyber-criminals to jail.

This year, the main focus of the summer school was on freedom of media and private life. I focused on the privacy and security side, of course - with a workshop titled "Private life in cyberspace - securing your personal data online".

My main message? Trust and use encryption in order to thwart prying eyes - but don't forget that no matter how good the encryption you're using is, an insecure operating system will always offer the attacker the chance of accessing your data before it gets encrypted. You can't have privacy without first having good security.


Look before you click

SANS Tip-of-the-Day - Fri, 08/22/2014 - 22:47

IoT: How I hacked my home

Malware Alerts - Thu, 08/21/2014 - 06:55

Very often new terms get over-hyped in the IT security industry. At the moment we can find articles about how hackers and researchers find vulnerabilities in for example cars, refrigerators, hotels or home alarm systems. All of these things go under the term IoT (Internet of Things), and it's one of the most hyped topics in the industry. The only problem with this kind of research is that we cannot really relate to it all: it's pretty cool, detailed research, but if you as a reader cannot relate to the attacks, the research is not understood in the proper way.

We often try to predict the future with proactive research, and I think it can be important to try to predict the future and conduct proactive security research. But I think it's even more important to talk about what's relevant, and talk about threats that people can relate to. I started to think about this topic, and figured that if we can't secure ourselves against current threats, what good will it do to identify potential new future threats?

Threats are around us right now, while you're reading this document. As users in a connected digital environment we need to ask ourselves; 'What's the current threat level?' and 'How vulnerable am I?' – Especially when we start building small home office networks. A typical modern home can have around five devices connected to the local network which aren't computers, tablets or cellphones. I'm talking about devices such as a smart TV, printer, game console, network storage device and some kind of media player/satellite receiver.

I decided to start a research project and conduct research which I thought was relevant, trying to identify how easy it would be to hack my own home. Are the devices connected to my network vulnerable? What could an attacker actually do if these devices were compromised? Is my home 'hackable?'. Before I started my research I was pretty sure that my home was pretty secure; I mean, I've been working in the security industry for over 15 years, and I'm quite paranoid when it comes to applying security patches, etc. I reckoned there must be other homes that are much more hackable than mine, because I don't really have a lot of 'hi-tech' kit at home.

During my research I didn't focus on computers, tablets or cellphones, but rather on all the other devices I have connected to my network at home. To my surprise it turns out that I actually have quite a lot of different things connected to my network. Most of them were home entertainment devices: smart TV, satellite receiver, DVD/Blu-ray player, network storage devices and gaming consoles. I'm also at the moment relocating to a new house, and I've been talking with my local security company. They're suggesting I get the latest alarm system, which connects to the network and can be controlled with my mobile device… After this research, I'm not so sure it's a good idea.

Some of the devices on my network were for example:

  • Network-attached storage (NAS) from famous vendor #1
  • NAS from famous vendor #2
  • Smart TV
  • Satellite receiver
  • Router from my ISP
  • Printer

Before conducting the research I had all devices update with the latest firmware version. During this process I also noticed that not all devices had automated update checks, which made the entire process quite tedious. As a consumer I had to manually download and install the new firmware on some of the devices, which was actually not that simple because the new firmware files were not that easy to find, and the entire update process wasn't very suitable for a normal computer user. Another interesting observation was that most of the products were discontinued  more than a year back or simply didn't even have any updates available. This got me thinking… do these home business and entertainment products only 'live' for about a year before they get discontinued?

The goal

So what am I trying to prove with this research? Let me explain why I think this is important research. When I started this project I soon noticed that I could take several different approaches to the research, but for me the main goal I wanted to achieve was to see how vulnerable our homes really are, and also identify real, practical and relevant attack vectors to prove just that.

In general we're quite good at protecting our endpoints and use security software to help us do so. We also become aware from newspapers and blogs about how to raise our security level. Most people today know what a computer virus is, that we should have strong passwords, and that it's important to install the latest security patches; but do we really think about all aspects? It's quite common for a security researcher to talk about a locked door on a glass house, and I wanted to have a similar approach with this research. I wanted to demonstrate that even with an IT-security mindset we focus on protecting our endpoints, and tend to forget that there are other devices connected to our networks. We want to prevent people hacking or infecting our computers because we don't want our data to be stolen, but we then go home and do a full backup of our data to a device that's even more vulnerable than our computer.

The audience for this research is not only consumers but also companies. We need to understand that EVERYTHING we connect to the network might be a stepping stone for an attacker, or may even become an attacker's invisible 'base' that he/she will use to regain access to your network after its been compromised. Just imagine a scenario where you notice you've been compromised, you do everything in the book to bring it back to normal again, you backup your data, re-install your devices and make sure that the new installation is protected against malicious code and all updates are installed; but then six months later you get compromised again, and all your new data is stolen again… How would that even be possible?

The attacker might have compromised your network storage device and turned it into a backdoor. The malicious software is undetected because there's no protection against malicious code running on that device, and the malicious software cannot be deleted because you don't have permission to access the file system on the device; not even a factory reset would solve the problem. Or it might be that the attacker actually used your compromised smart TV to regain network access to your corporate network, since the TV is connected to the same network as your employees, and there are no network restrictions for the smart TV.

The goal with my research was to try to be the baddie, to use my home entertainment devices for malicious intentions, to actually compromise them and use them as either stepping stones to launch further attacks or as a backdoor in my own network.

What I did not try to do in this report is bash or criticize any vendor; the devices that were tested during this research were my own personal devices, and that's the reason those devices were chosen for this project. All vulnerabilities have been reported to the respective vendors, and they're working on solutions for these products. I will not disclose all the vulnerabilities that were identified in this research or any technical details about the vulnerabilities because that will only help the bad guys. If you want further technical details regarding the research project feel free to contact us.

The impact

So, I had all these different devices connected to my network, but where was I to I start? I decided to begin by defining the different attack scenarios I would include in my research rather than just attacking these devices without any criteria. One or all of the following criteria had to be achieved to consider the test successful:

  • To obtain access to the device; for example, to get access to files on the network storage devices;
  • To obtain administrative access to the device, not just in the administrative interface, but also at the OS level;
  • To be able to transform/modify the device for my personal interest (backdoor, stepping stone, etc.).

There are probably loads of other scenarios that could be useful to test, but my time was limited and I simply needed to prove a point. I started out by just fooling around with the web interfaces for the different devices and to my surprise it didn't take long before I had found remotely exploitable command execution vulnerabilities with full administrative permissions at the OS level on both network storage devices.

At this point I asked myself, 'is it really that easy?' I then thought about the two newly discovered vulnerabilities and realized both were in the administrative interface after authenticating as the administrative user. I needed to have the same preconditions as the attacker. So I tried to find vulnerabilities without using any of my access credentials. At this point it was a little bit harder, but after some poking around I found the main configuration file – it was available remotely to any user on the network. In the configuration file all the password hashes were stored, which made it real easy to obtain the administrative interface again and then use the vulnerabilities I found before to execute system commands on the device.

After further poking around I found more vulnerabilities, which could also be exploited without authentication to execute system commands as root (highest privileges) on the device. At this point it was more or less game over for both of the network storage devices; I didn't just have access to the entire file system of the devices, it was also very easy for me to infect the devices with some Trojan or backdoor that would turn the devices into zombies in a botnet – or give the attacker a backdoor to, for example, carry out further attacks from the device.

Both compromised devices where running a Linux 2.6.x kernel, and a lot of interpreters such as perl and python. One of them also had the GNU C compiler installed, which would make the attackers' life much easier. Since one of my attack scenarios was to transform the compromised device into a backdoor, I simply used one of the public IRC bots as my test case. Within seconds I had turned my network storage device into a zombie in a botnet.

This was extremely easy because the compromised network storage device is used to store files, so I could simply upload my malicious file and place it outside the shared folders somewhere else on the file system, which results in the owner of the device not being able to delete the file without using the same vulnerabilities we used to both upload and execute our IRC Trojan.

After researching the network storage devices I found over 14 vulnerabilities that would allow an attacker to remotely be able to execute system commands with the highest administrative privileges. The two devices did not just have a vulnerable web interface, but the local security on the devices was also very poor. The devices had very weak passwords, a lot of configuration files had incorrect permissions, and they also contained passwords in clear text.

To give you another example on how bad the local security was, I can tell you that on one of the storage devices the administrative root password was '1'. I do understand that these devices are not built with Fort Knox security in mind, but to have a one character-long password is against all reasonable rules.

Due to the poor security, and the fact that I had access to the file system, it was also very simple to identify several scripts which enabled features in the device that weren't documented anywhere. Functions which allowed an external user to enable services and other interesting things on the devices such as remote admin interfaces (telnetd, sshd). I might write more about these 'hidden' features in a different post because I need to conduct deeper research regarding these files.

During the research project I stumbled upon some other devices that had 'hidden' features; one of those devices was my DSL router which was provided by my ISP. After I logged in using the admin credentials I received from the ISP I could navigate around the web interface. The interface was pretty simple to use, and I quickly noticed how the URL changed when I navigated through the menu. Each function in the menu was assigned a number; the first function in the menu had the numeral 0, and then it incremented with one for each option. The interesting thing was that sometimes a function jumped to an unexpected number and a few numbers were missed, but when you then entered the missed numbers in the URL address bar you were prompted with a menu option that didn't exist in the menu list, but the name of that 'hidden' function was displayed in the web interface.

I started to brute force these numbers, and found that there were tons of functions I didn't have access to. I just assume that my ISP or the vendor have FULL CONTROL over the device, and can do anything they want with it and access all these functions I don't have permission to use. By just looking at the 'hidden' function names it seems that the ISP can for example create tunnels so as to connect to any device on the network. Just imagine if these functions fell into the hands of the wrong people? I understand that these functions are most likely supposed to be helping the ISP perform support functions, but when you log in using the administrative account you don't have full control over what you consider is your own device, and thus it becomes quite scary. Especially when some of the names have equally scary names like 'Web Cameras', 'Telephony Expert Configure', 'Access Control', 'WAN-Sensing' and 'Update'.

Below are some screenshots of these hidden functions.

I'm currently still researching these things to see what the functions really do. If I find anything interesting I'm pretty sure there'll be another blog post.

Meantime, I started to examine the other devices connected to my home network; for example, my Dreambox: it still had the default username and password, which was also the administrative root account on the device! The device runs Linux, which would be an easy target for an attacker. Most of the other devices were pretty secure but an entire audit of these kinds of devices would be difficult because you need to find alternative ways to determine if an attack was successful or not since you don't have full access to most of the devices.

After a few days of poking around I still hadn't found anything that would cover the three scenarios – nothing really worth mentioning. The research project was also quite difficult to perform because I was auditing my personal devices, and I didn't want to break anything. I had naturally paid for all these devices out of my own pocket!

I had to take a different approach and at this point I had to get creative. I had to play with the idea that I'm the attacker, and I've already compromised the two network storage devices, and so what can I do next?' My first thought was to see if I could do something with the media players (smart TV and DVD player) because they're most likely reading information from the storage devices (which I'd already compromised). At this point I was researching potential code execution vulnerabilities with the smart TV and DVD player, but due to the high price I paid for the devices I wasn't able to investigate this further. It wasn't only a question of the wasted money if I were to break my brand new LED smart TV, but also I had no idea of how I would explain my wrecking the telly to the kids; how were they going to watch Scooby Doo?

I decided to stop researching them, and spent some time contacting the different vendors to see if the vulnerabilities were actually exploitable and work together with the vendors to verify these potential security issues. It's much easier for them to do it since they have access to the source code and can confirm if the vulnerability is valid or not much quicker (and I guess they don't really care of they break any devices).

At first I had some trouble contacting these vendors because on the websites there's little useful contact information for the engineers or C-level people who would be able to help me get through to the appropriate people. After some lurking around and asking people in my professional network I was finally able to get in contact with the people I needed and they were very grateful for the information I could share regarding the vulnerabilities and research approaches.

We are now trying to identify if we would be able to transform the smart TV and DVD/Blu-ray player into the same type of stepping stone and backdoor as the compromised storage devices. More information will be shared on this topic later since this research project is ongoing.

I did identify one curious security issue with the smart TV. When the user accesses the main setup menu on the TV, all the thumbnails and widgets get downloaded from the vendor's servers if the device has network access. The TV didn't use any kind of authentication or encryption when it was downloading the content, which means that an attacker could perform a man-in-the-middle attack on the TV and modify the images in the administrative interface; the attacker could also have the TV load any JavaScript file, which isn't a good thing. A potential attack vector is to use JavaScript to read local files from the device, and use the content of the files to find even more vulnerabilities. But this is something I'm working on with the vendor to see if it's possible or not. As a proof of concept for my attack, I changed the thumbnail of a widget to a picture of everyone's favorite, Borat. Yakshemash!


For the most of my life I was a total security junkie, doing everything from working as a penetration tester to a public speaker and adviser for law enforcement agencies. IT security is really one of my biggest passions in life, but for the last few years I seem to have reached a point in my life where I'm actually quite tired of reading the same security bulletins year after year. It's time we start doing something about the problems, and one thing we can do is start talking about security threats that are relevant, and also in a language that will make everyone understand them. We as security experts need to take more responsibility and talk about threats that are relevant today – threats that affect you and me. We also need to come up with smart and simple suggestions, conclusions and solutions on how to mitigate those threats by using the software and technology that we already have.

I've always been fascinated by new vulnerabilities and exploitation techniques, but to be honest, what good does it do only releasing vulnerability information when we're not making people understand the bigger picture. We think that IT security is all about software vulnerabilities and I know that half of this post is only talking about vulnerabilities, but the goal with this research is not to brag about all the undiscovered vulnerabilities I found, or that there are big security problems in the home entertainment product line. There will always be vulnerabilities, and we need to understand that; however, by understanding I don't mean accepting. What I mean is that we need to actually do something about it; we need to know what the impact is and assume that our devices can be, or are already, compromised. We need to start assuming that products are vulnerable and that attackers can and will gain access to them.

I would like to conclude this research by saying that we as individuals and also companies need to understand the risks with network devices. We also need to understand that our information is not secure just because we have a strong password or are running some protection against malicious code. We also need to understand that there are so many things that we do not have control over, and that we are largely in the hands of the software and hardware vendors. It took me less than 20 minutes to find and verify extremely serious vulnerabilities in a device considered to be secure – a device we trust and on which we store all the information we don't want stolen.

I remember when I proposed this research to my boss; he asked me what I thought the outcome would be. I was not developing new security solutions for home entertainment devices; I was only identifying security problems, so the only answer I could give him was that I wanted to conduct this research to make people aware that there is a problem, and that we as individuals need to try and improve our personal security in different ways to how it was done in the past; we need to change our mindset and the whole game!

I would also like to give some feedback to all the vendors out there: we need to come up with a better way to support and secure your products. It's not really acceptable that a product is considered as discontinued after only 12 months; it's not okay to have one character passwords; and it's not okay to think of these devices just as 'entertainment' devices. It's not okay to have a readable configuration file containing all user credentials – especially on a network storage device.

We need to come up with alternative solutions that can help individuals and companies improve their security. This is not a problem you simply can fix by installing a product or security patch; therefore, I would like to end this post by saying that even though the home entertainment industry might not be focused on security, we at KL do, and with just a few simple tips I think we can raise the security level a little bit higher. Hopefully some of the vendors will read this research and improve their software security; but until then, here are some simple tips from my side:

  • Make sure all your devices are up to date with all the latest security and firmware updates. This is a problem for a lot of home business and entertainment devices, but it is still the best thing you can do to avoiding being at the mercy of known vulnerabilities. It also gives you an indication of whether the devices have any updates at all to install, or if it's considered to be a 'dead' product.
  • Make sure that the default username and password are changed; this is the first thing an attacker will try when attempting to compromise your device. Remember that even if it's a 'stupid' product such as a satellite receiver or a network hard drive, the administrative interfaces are often vulnerable to serious vulnerabilities.
  • Use encryption, even on the files you store in your network storage device. If you do not have access to an encryption tool, you can simply put your files in a password-protected ZIP file; it's still better than not doing anything at all.
  • Most home routers and switches have the possibility to set up several different DMZ/VLAN. This means that you can setup your own 'private' network for your network devices, which will restrict network access to and from this device.
  • Use common sense and understand that everything can be hacked, even your hardware devices.
  • If you're really paranoid you can always monitor the outbound network traffic from these devices to see if there's anything strange going on, but this does require some technical knowledge. Another good tip is to restrict network devices from accessing sites they're not supposed to access, and only allow them to pull updates and nothing else.

Don't make that call!

SANS Tip-of-the-Day - Wed, 08/20/2014 - 22:03


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