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TeamXRat: Brazilian cybercrime meets ransomware

Thu, 09/29/2016 - 12:42

Brazilian cybercriminals are notorious for their ability to develop banking trojans but now they have started to focus their efforts in new areas, including ransomware. We discovered a new variant of a Brazilian-made ransomware, Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Xpan, that is being used to infect local companies and hospitals, directly affecting innocent people, encrypting their files using the extension “.___xratteamLucked” and asking to pay the ransom.

The Kaspersky Anti-Ransom team decrypted the Xpan Trojan, allowing them to rescue the files of a Hospital in Brazil that had fallen victim to this Ransomware family.

Actually, this is not the first ransomware to come out of Brazil. In the past, we investigated TorLocker and its flawed encryption, which was created and negotiated worldwide by a Brazilian cybercriminal. We also saw a lot of copycats use HiddenTear in local attacks. Trojan Ransom Xpan was created by an organized gang, which used targeted attacks via RDP that abused weak passwords and wrong implementations.

In this post, we’ll explain this new Ransomware family and how Brazilian coders are creating new ransomware from scratch.

The group behind the attack

The group identifies itself as “TeamXRat“and “CorporacaoXRat“.
(Translating from Portuguese to English as “CorporationXRat”)

Their first ransom trojan consisted of using a simple XOR based encryption, described by some victims here (most of the victims are from Brazil). The new version of Xpan Ransomware shows that the cybercriminals behind it have improved the code to make it more complex, also switching the encryption scheme.

The ransom texts used by the group are written in Portuguese from Brazil. The messages do not inform how much the victim has to pay to retrieve their files, nor the payment method required (which is usually Bitcoins). Instead, they instruct the victim to send an email to one of the anonymous email services Mail2Tor or For example,, and providing the public key used by the ransomware to encrypt the files. Older versions of this ransomware also used e-mail accounts from another Email service – Protonmail, such as, currently deactivated.

When the victim gets in touch with the group, they start to negotiate the ransom payment. All communication is in Portuguese and they request 1 btc (about 603 USD) to decrypt the files. The group also claims that the payment is a “donation” arguing that “they exploited flaws in your system and carried out the attack in order to make sure you increase your security”. Finally, the cybercriminals also offer to decrypt one file for free:

“For me only the ‘donation’ is important. Not your files. If your files are important to you, I advise you to make the donation; otherwise, you’ll lose all your files”

Xpan, how it works

The sample is UPX packed. Once executed it checks the default language of the infected system set in the following registry key: HKLM\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\NLS\LOCALE

In addition, it’s able to query local time and obtain the computer name from the registry using several commands like net.exe, sc.exe, and taskkill.exe. Interestingly, it also deletes any Proxy setting defined in the system, located in: HKCU\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\INTERNET SETTINGS\ZONEMAP.

Since the targets are companies and corporations, the group might use proxies blocking access to certain Web resources. It is highly probable that this technique is used to “set victim’s free” while emailing the attackers or accessing BTC resources online.

After completing its execution, the ransomware displays the following image in the affected system:

“All your files were encrypted using a RSA 2048 bits encryption”

The sample is written in C++ and uses STL, being built as a console application. During the lenght of its execution, it logs all its actions to the console, only to clear it once the encryption process has finished.

The operation of this malware is ‘guided’ by the configuration data block stored inside the body of the Trojan:

Decrypted configuration block

The configuration contains the following details:

  • Drive letters which will be processed;
  • Blacklisted substrings: the files whose path contain any of these strings will not be encrypted;
  • Ransomware text message for the victim;
  • Extension of the encrypted files (in this case, .____xratteamLucked);
  • Name of the file with ransom notes;
  • Console commands to be executed prior to the process of file encryption;
  • Console commands to be executed after the encryption;
  • A public RSA-2048 key in the MSBLOB format.

Part of the pseudocode of the main procedure

From Xorist to Xpan

A previous ransomware sample that was believed to be part of the TeamXRat ransomware campaign used a simple encryption algorithm known as TEA (or Tiny Encryption Algorithm). After comparing this original version (dubbed Xorist) against this new Xpan variant, we could observe that now they are using an AES-256 encryption scheme.

Xorist ransomware TEA constant

Xpan ransomware now has evolved to use AES-256 encryption

Xorist Xpan Will automatically start when user is logged in. It uses the following registry key for persistence: SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run No persistence used. Tiny Encryption Algorithm AES-256 ASM, MS Linker C++, MinGW compiler Includes a list of files that are to be encrypted. Will encrypt everything except .exe and .dll files and files with blacklisted substrings in the path.

The developers have clearly shifted their development procedures in the Xpan malware. It’s typical for cybercriminals to evolve their techniques once a decryption method has been found for their ransomware, or that specific variant is widely detected.

List of file extensions that Xorist ransomware will search and encrypt

File Encryption

The trojan uses the implementation of cryptographic algorithms provided by MS CryptoAPI. The files are encrypted by AES-256 in CBC mode.

There are 2 known versions of this trojan that can be distinguished by their extensions. The 1st one uses “___xratteamLucked” (3 ‘_’ symbols) and the second one – “____xratteamLucked” (4 ‘_’ symbols).

These 2 versions employ different techniques to encrypt the files, which we will describe in more detail.

Version 1 (3 ‘_’ symbols in the extension)

The trojan generates a single 255-symbol password for all files. This password is encrypted by RSA-2048 and put into the ransom note (concatenated with the public key). Then the trojan produces a 256-bit key from this password using the API CryptDeriveKey; this key will be used to encrypt all files.

When processing each file, the malware adds the string ‘NMoreira’ to the beginning of the original file and encrypts the file content by 245-byte blocks using the AES-256 algorithm in CBC mode. Each block is additionally XOR’ed with a random byte which is stored before the padding of the corresponding block.

Version 2 (4 ‘_’ symbols in the extension)

For each file, the trojan generates a new 255-symbol password, encrypts this password by RSA-2048 and puts this data into the beginning of each encrypted file. Then, the trojan produces a 256-bit key from this password using the API CryptDeriveKey, and uses this key to encrypt the original file content (AES-256 CBC).

File search and encryption is carried out by multiple threads, each thread processes its disk.

Ransomware in action: console output inform the files encrypted

After encryption is completed, the malware will change the wallpaper in the desktop and display this file, with the ransom note:

The ransom note, in Portuguese

Before encrypting the data in the affected system, the ransomware executes the following commands, aiming to stop popular database services, to be sure that database files will be encrypted as well, so they cause a greater damage to the victim:

echo Iniciando pre comandos

echo Parando Firbird
sc config FirebirdServerDefaultInstance start=disabled
taskkill /IM fb_inet_server.exe /F
net stop FirebirdServerDefaultInstance

echo parando SQL SERVE

taskkill /IM sqlservr.exe /F
sc config MSSQLSERVER start=disabled
sc config MSSQL$SQLEXPRESS start=disabled

echo parando poostgree
taskkill /IM pg_ctl.exe /F
sc config postgresql-9.0 start=disabled
net stop postgresql-9.0

After the execution, the ransomware deletes itself from the system, to remove the original infector:

@echo off
  goto Delete
  @timeout 5
  @del “path\sample_name.exe”
  if exist “path\sample_name.exe”
  goto WaitAndDelete
  @del %0

After the encryption has finished, the trojan modifies the registry to add a custom handler for the action of double-clicking on any of the encrypted files. As a result, when the victim clicks on a file with the extension “.____xratteamLucked“, the command stored in the registry is executed, and this command shows the ransom notes in a new window using msg.exe (a standard utility which is a part of Windows distribution).

Windows Registry modified by the ransom

How they attack

Most of the attacks performed by TeamXRat are performed manually, installing the ransomware in the hacked server. To achieve that, they perform RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) brute force attacks. Connecting remote desktop servers directly to the Internet is not recommended and brute forcing them is nothing new; but without the proper controls in place to prevent or at least detect and respond to compromised machines, brute force RDP attacks are still relevant and something that cybercriminals enjoy. Once the server is compromised, the attacker manually disables the Antivirus product installed on the server and proceeds with the infection itself.

We are also aware that vulnerabilities such as MS15-067 and MS15-030 in the RDP protocol, which allow remote code execution if an attacker sends a specially crafted sequence of packets to a targeted system, can be used by cybercriminals if a server is not patched and exposed to attacks.

As we saw in the recent xDedic research, vulnerable servers with exposed RDP connections are very valuable assets in the hands of cybercriminals. Not surprisingly, Brazil was the country with the most compromised servers being offered in the underground market to any cybercriminal.

xDedic: compromised Brazilian RDP servers were available in the underground market

Decryption: we can help!

If the victim pays the ransom, the cybercriminals will send this tool to decrypt the files:

Decryption tool sent by the bad guy after payment

But the good news is that the Kaspersky Anti-Ransom team was able to break the encryption used by the Xpan Trojan. This effort made possible the decryption of files belonging to a Hospital in Brazil, which was hit by this Ransomware family.

If you’re a victim of this new Ransomware family and need help to decrypt your files, please DON’T PAY the ransom. Instead, contact us via support.


As we can see, Brazilian bad guys are now diversifying their “business” with new ransomware families developed from scratch, abandoning older versions that used XOR encryption and adopting new, more robust encryption algorithms. This is a clear signal that they have started to explore new schemes with new targets and newer types of attacks.

As we forecasted in the beginning of this year, we expect ransomware attacks to gain ground on banking trojans and to transition into other platforms. Ransomware has two advantages over traditional banking threats: direct monetization using an anonymous payment system (usually Bitcoin), and relatively low cost per victim. Certainly, this is very attractive to Brazilian crooks, well-known for their banking trojans development. Brazilian law enforcement is very good at catching criminals (although they are not always convicted and imprisoned) by “following the money”, something that we know it’s not entirely possible for Bitcoin payments.

We detect this new threat as
Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Xpan.a and PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic.

We’ll keep an eye out or new variants, which surely will appear from same or other threat actors.

MD5 reference: 34260178f9e3b2e769accdee56dac793

Future attack scenarios against ATM authentication systems

Thu, 09/22/2016 - 05:57

A lot has already been said about current cyber threats facing the owners of ATMs. The reason behind the ever-growing number of attacks on these devices is simple: the overall level of security of modern ATMs often makes them the easiest and fastest way for fraudsters to access the bank’s money. Naturally, the banking industry is reacting to these attacks by implementing a range of security measures, but the threat landscape is continually evolving. In order to prepare banks for what they should expect to see from criminals in the near future, we’ve prepared an overview report of future cyberthreats to ATMs. The report will – we hope – help the industry to better prepare for a new generation of attack tools and techniques.

The report comprises two papers in which we analyze all existing methods of authentication used in ATMs and those expected to be used in the near future, including: contactless authentication through NFC, one-time password authentication and biometric authentication systems, as well as potential vectors of attacks using malware, through to network attacks and attacks on hardware components.

We looked into what is going on underground around these technologies and were surprised to discover that there are twelve manufacturers out there that are already offering fake fingerprint scanners, otherwise known as biometric skimmers. There are also at least three other vendors researching devices that will be able to illegally obtain data from palm vein and iris recognition systems.

This is a major trend, because the problem with biometrics is that, unlike passwords or pin codes which can be easily modified in the event of compromise, it is impossible to change your fingerprint or iris image. Thus if your data is compromised once, it won’t be safe to use in the future. That is why it is extremely important to keep such data secure and transmit it in a secure way. Biometric data is also recorded in modern passports – called e-passports – and visas. So, if an attacker steals an e-passport, they not only steal the document, but also that person’s biometric data. As a result they steal a person’s identity.

The biometric data can also be accessed by criminals as a result of hacking into a bank’s infrastructure, which is also a major issue: if you lose the biometric database of your clients it won’t be possible to solve this problem just by recalling compromised payment cards. This is an unrecoverable loss and thus it is a kind of threat that the industry has never experienced before.

In general, network-based attacks against ATMs will be a headache for the security personnel of financial organizations in the coming years simply because, based on our penetration testing experience, the network infrastructure of a bank is very often built in a way that a hacker can exploit to gain access and take control of some critical parts of the network, including the network of ATMs. And this situation is not going to change any time soon, due to many reasons, one of which is the sheer size of financial organizations’ networks and the time-consuming and expensive task of upgrading them.

Nevertheless, by publishing this report we’d like to draw attention to the problem of ATM security now and in the near future, and to speed up the development of a truly secure ecosystem around these devices.

Read the full report here

Read the description of attacks here

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The banker that can steal anything

Tue, 09/20/2016 - 06:58

In the past, we’ve seen superuser rights exploit advertising applications such as Leech, Guerrilla, Ztorg. This use of root privileges is not typical, however, for banking malware attacks, because money can be stolen in numerous other ways that don’t require exclusive rights. However, in early February 2016, Kaspersky Lab discovered Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Tordow.a, whose creators decided that root privileges would come in handy. We had been watching the development of this malicious program closely and found that Tordow’s capabilities had significantly exceeded the functionality of most other banking malware, and this allowed cybercriminals to carry out new types of attacks.


A Tordow Infection begins with the installation of a popular app, such as VKontakte, DrugVokrug, Pokemon Go, Telegram, Odnoklassniki or Subway Surf. In this particular case, we’re not talking about the original apps but copies that are distributed outside the official Google Play store. Malware writers download legitimate applications, disassemble them and add new code and new files.

Code added to a legitimate application

Anyone who possesses even a little knowledge of Android development can do it. The result is a new app that is very similar to the original, performs all the stated legitimate functions, but that also has the malicious functionality that the attackers need.

How it works

In the case in question, the code embedded in the legitimate app decrypts the file added by the cybercriminals in the app’s resources and launches it.

The launched file calls the attacker’s server and downloads the main part of Tordow, which contains links to download several more files – an exploit to gain root privileges, new versions of malware, and so on. The number of links may vary depending on the criminals’ intentions; moreover, each downloaded file can also download from the server, decrypt and run new components. As a result, the infected device is loaded with several malicious modules; their number and functionality also depend on what the Tordow owners want to do. Either way, the attackers get the chance to remotely control the device by sending commands from the C&C.

As a result, cybercriminals get a full set of functions for stealing money from users by applying the methods that have already become traditional for mobile bankers and ransomware. The functionality of the malicious app includes:

  • Sending, stealing, deleting SMS.
  • Recording, redirecting, blocking calls.
  • Checking the balance.
  • Stealing contacts.
  • Making calls.
  • Changing the C&C.
  • Downloading and running files.
  • Installing and removing applications.
  • Blocking the device and displaying a web page specified by a malicious server.
  • Generating and sending a list of files contained on the device; sending and renaming of files.
  • Rebooting a phone.
Superuser rights

In addition to downloading modules belonging to the banking Trojan, Tordow (within the prescribed load chain of modules) also downloads a popular exploit pack to gain root privileges, which provides the malware with a new attack vector and unique features.

Firstly, the Trojan installs one of the downloaded modules in the system folder, which makes it difficult to remove.

Secondly, using superuser rights the attackers steal the database of the default Android browser and the Google Chrome browser if it’s installed.

Code for sending data from browsers to the server

These databases contain all the logins and passwords stored by the user in the browser, browsing history, cookies, and sometimes even saved bank card details.

Login and password from a specific site in the browser database

As a result, the attackers can gain access to several of the victim’s accounts on different sites.

And thirdly, the superuser rights make it possible to steal almost any file in the system – from photos and documents to files containing mobile app account data.

These attacks can result in the theft of huge amounts of critical user data. We recommend that users do not install apps from unofficial sources and use antivirus solutions to protect Android-based devices.

Fooling the ‘Smart City’

Thu, 09/15/2016 - 04:59

The concept of a smart city involves bringing together various modern technologies and solutions that can ensure comfortable and convenient provision of services to people, public safety, efficient consumption of resources, etc. However, something that often goes under the radar of enthusiasts championing the smart city concept is the security of smart city components themselves. The truth is that a smart city’s infrastructure develops faster than security tools do, leaving ample room for the activities of both curious researchers and cybercriminals.

Smart Terminals Have Their Weak Points Too

Parking payment terminals, bicycle rental spots and mobile device recharge stations are abundant in the parks and streets of modern cities. At airports and passenger stations, there are self-service ticket machines and information kiosks. In movie theaters, there are ticket sale terminals. In clinics and public offices, there are queue management terminals. Even some paid public toilets now have payment terminals built into them, though not very often.

Ticket terminals in a movie theater

However, the more sophisticated the device, the higher the probability that it has vulnerabilities and/or configuration flaws. The probability that smart city component devices will one day be targeted by cybercriminals is far from zero. Сybercriminals can potentially exploit these devices for their ulterior purposes, and the scenarios of such exploitation come from the characteristics of such devices.

  • Many such devices are installed in public places
  • They are available 24/7
  • They have the same configuration across devices of the same type
  • They have a high user trust level
  • They process user data, including personal and financial information
  • They are connected to each other, and may have access to other local area networks
  • They typically have an Internet connection

Increasingly often, we see news on another electronic road sign getting hacked and displaying a “Zombies ahead” or similar message, or news about vulnerabilities detected in traffic light management or traffic control systems. However, this is just the tip of the iceberg; smart city infrastructure is not limited to traffic lights and road signs.

We decided to analyze some smart city components:

  • Touch-screen payment kiosks (tickets, parking etc.)
  • Infotainment terminals in taxis
  • Information terminals at airports and railway terminals
  • Road infrastructure components: speed cameras, traffic routers

Smart City Terminals

From a technical standpoint, nearly all payment and service terminals – irrespective of their purpose – are ordinary PCs equipped with touch screens. The main difference is that they have a ‘kiosk’ mode – an interactive graphical shell that blocks the user from accessing the regular operating system functions, leaving only a limited set of features that are needed to perform the terminal’s functions. But this is theory. In practice, as our field research has shown, most terminals do not have reliable protection preventing the user from exiting the kiosk mode and gaining access to the operating system’s functions.

Exiting the kiosk mode

Techniques for Exiting the Kiosk Mode

There are several types of vulnerabilities that affect a large proportion of terminals. As a consequence, there are existing attack methods that target them.

The sequence of operations that can enable an attacker to exit the full-screen application is illustrated in the picture below.

Methodology for analyzing the security of public terminals

Tap Fuzzing

The tap fuzzing technique involves trying to exit the full-screen application by taking advantage of incorrect handling when interacting with the full-screen application. A hacker taps screen corners with his fingers and tries to call the context menu by long-pressing various elements of the screen. If he is able to find such weak points, he tries to call one of the standard OS menus (printing, help, object properties, etc.) and gain access to the on-screen keyboard. If successful, the hacker gets access to the command line, which enables him to do whatever he wants in the system – explore the terminal’s hard drive in search of valuable data, access the Internet or install unwanted applications, such as malware.

Data Fuzzing

Data fuzzing is a technique that, if exploited successfully, also gives an attacker access to the “hidden” standard OS elements, but by using a different technique. To exit the full-screen application, the hacker tries filling in available data entry fields with various data in order to make the ‘kiosk’ work incorrectly. This can work, for example, if the full-screen application’s developer did not configure the filter checking the data entered by the user properly (string length, use of special symbols, etc.). As a result, the attacker can enter incorrect data, triggering an unhandled exception: as a result of the error, the OS will display a window notifying the user of the problem.

Once an element of the operating system’s standard interface has been brought up, the attacker can access the control panel, e.g., via the help section. The control panel will be the starting point for launching the virtual keyboard.

Other Techniques

Yet another technique for exiting the ‘kiosk’ is to search for external links that might enable the attacker to access a search engine site and then other sites. Due to developer oversight, many full-screen applications used in terminals contain links to external resources or social networks, such as VKontakte, Facebook, Google+, etc. We have found external links in the interface of cinema ticket vending machines and bike rental terminals, described below.

One more scenario of exiting the full-screen application is using standard elements of the operating system’s user interface. When using an available dialog window in a Windows-based terminal, an attacker is sometimes able to call the dialog window’s control elements, which enables him to exit the virtual ‘kiosk’.

Exiting the full-screen application of a cinema ticket vending terminal

Bike Rental Terminals

Cities in some countries, including Norway, Russia and the United States, are dotted with bicycle rental terminals. Such terminals have touch-screen displays that people can use to register if they want to rent a bike or get help information.

Status bar containing a URL

We found that the terminal system shown above has a curious feature. The Maps section was implemented using Google maps, and the Google widget includes a status bar, which contains “Report an Error”, “Privacy Policy” and “Terms of Use” links, among other information. Tapping on any of these links brings up a standard Internet Explorer window, which provides access to the operating system’s user interface.

The application includes other links, as well: for example, when viewing some locations on the map, you can tap on the “More Info” button and open a web page in the browser.

The Internet Explorer opens not only a web page, but also a new opportunity for the attacker

It turned out that calling up the virtual keyboard is not difficult either. By tapping on links on help pages, an attacker can access the Accessibility section, which is where the virtual keyboard can be found. This configuration flaw enables attackers to execute applications not needed for the device’s operation.

Running cmd.exe demonstrates yet another critical configuration flaw: the operating system’s current session is running with administrator privileges, which means that an attacker can easily execute any application.

The current Windows session is running with administrator privileges

In addition, an attacker can get the NTLM hash of the administrator password. It is highly probable that the password used on this device will work for other devices of the same type, as well.

Note that, in this case, an attacker can not only obtain the NTLM hash – which has to be brute-force cracked to get the password – but the administrator password itself, because passwords can be extracted from memory in plain text.

An attacker can also make a dump of the application that collects information on people who wish to rent a bicycle, including their full names, email addresses and phone numbers. It is not impossible that the database hosting this information is stored somewhere nearby. Such a database would have an especially high market value, since it contains verified email addresses and phone numbers. If it cannot be obtained, an attacker can install a keylogger that will intercept all data entered by users and send it to a remote server.

Given that these devices work 24/7, they can be pooled together to mine cryptocurrency or used for hacking purposes seeing as an infected workstation will be online around the clock.

Particularly audacious cybercriminals can implement an attack scenario that will enable them to get customer payment data by adding a payment card detail entry form to the main window of the bike rental application. It is highly probable that users deceived by the cybercriminals will enter this information alongside their names, phone numbers and email addresses.

Terminals at Government Offices

Terminals at some government offices can also be easily compromised by attackers. For example, we have found a terminal that prints payment slips based on the data entered by users. After all fields have been filled with the relevant data, the user taps the “Create” button, after which the terminal opens a standard print window with all the print parameters and control tools for several seconds. Next, the “Print” button is automatically activated.

A detail of the printing process on one of the terminals

An attacker has several seconds to tap the Change [printer] button and exit into the help section. From there, they can open the control panel and launch the on-screen keyboard. As a result, the attacker gets all the devices needed to enter information (the keyboard and the mouse pointer) and can use the computer for their own mercenary purposes, e.g., launch malware, get information on printed files, obtain the device’s administrator password, etc.

Public Devices at Airports

Self-service check-in kiosks that can be found at every modern airport have more or less the same security problems as the terminals described above. It is highly probable that they can be successfully attacked. An important difference between these kiosks and other similar devices is that some terminals at airports handle much more valuable information that terminals elsewhere.

Exiting the kiosk mode by opening an additional browser window

Many airports have a network of computers that provide paid Internet access. These computers handle the personal data that users have to enter to gain access, including people’s full names and payment card numbers. These terminals also have a semblance of a kiosk mode, but, due to design faults, exiting this mode is possible. On the computers we have analyzed, the kiosk software uses the Flash Player to show advertising and at a certain point an attacker can bring up a context menu and use it to access other OS functions.

It is worth noting that web address filtering policies are used on these computers. However, access to policy management on these computers was not restricted, enabling an attacker to add websites to the list or remove them from it, offering a range of possibilities for compromising these devices. For example, the ability to access phishing pages or sites used to distribute malware potentially puts such computers at risk. And blacklisting legitimate sites helps to increase the chances of a user following a phishing link.

List of addresses blocked by policies

We also discovered that configuration information used to connect to the database containing user data is stored openly in a text file. This means that, after finding a way to exit kiosk mode on one of these machines, anyone can get access to administrator credentials and subsequently to the customer database – with all the logins, passwords, payment details, etc.

A configuration file in which administrator logins and password hashes are stored

Infotainment Terminals in Taxicabs

In the past years, Android devices embedded in the back of the front passenger seat have been installed in many taxicabs. Passengers in the back seat can use these devices to watch advertising, weather information, news and jokes that are not really funny. These terminals have cameras installed in them for security reasons.

The application that delivers the content also works in kiosk mode and exiting this mode is also possible.

Exiting the kiosk mode on a device installed in a taxi makes it possible to download external applications

In those terminals that we were able to analyze, there was hidden text on the main screen. It can be selected using standard Android tools using a context menu. This leads to the search option being activated on the main screen. As a result, the shell stops responding, terminates and the device is automatically restarted. While the device is starting, all the hacker needs to do is exit to the main menu at the right time and open the RootExplorer – an Android OS file manager.

Android interface and folder structure

This gives an attacker access to the terminal’s OS and all of its capabilities, including the camera. If the hacker has prepared a malicious application for Android in advance and hosted it on a server, that application can be used to remotely access the camera. In this case, the attacker can remotely control the camera, making videos or taking photos of what is going on in the taxi and uploading them to his server.

Exiting the terminal’s full-screen application in a taxi gives access to the operating system’s functions

Our Recommendations

A successful attack can disrupt a terminal’s operation and cause direct financial damage to its owners. Additionally, a hacker can use a compromised terminal to hack into others, since terminals often form a network. After this, there are extensive possibilities for exploiting the network – from stealing personal data entered by users and spying on them (if the terminal has a camera or document scanner built into it) to stealing money (if the terminal accepts cash or bank cards).

To prevent malicious activity on public devices that have a touch interface, the developers and administrators of terminals located in public places should keep the following recommendations in mind:

  • The kiosk’s interactive shell should have no extra functions that enable the operating system’s menu to be called (such as right mouse click, links to external sites, etc.)
  • The application itself should be launched using sandboxing technology, such as jailroot, sandbox, etc. This will help to keep the application’s functionality limited to the artificial environment
  • Using a thin client is another method of protection. If a hacker manages to ‘kill’ an application, most of the valuable information will be stored on the server rather than the compromised device if the device is a thin client
  • The current operating system session should be launched with the restricted privileges of a regular user – this will make installing new applications much more difficult
  • A unique account with a unique password should be created on each device to prevent attackers who have compromised one of the terminals from using the password they have cracked to access other similar devices
Elements of the Road Infrastructure

The road infrastructure of modern cities is being gradually equipped with a variety of intelligent sensors, regulators, traffic analyzers, etc. All these sensors collect and send traffic density information to data centers. We looked at speedcams, which can be found everywhere these days.

Speed Cameras

We found speedcam IP addresses by pure chance, using the Shodan search engine. After studying several of these cameras, we developed a dork (a specific search request that identifies the devices or sites with pinpoint accuracy based on a specific attribute) to find as many IP addressed of these cameras as possible. We noticed a certain regularity in the IP addresses of these devices: in each city, all the cameras were on the same subnet. This enabled us to find those devices which were not shown in Shodan search results but which were on the same subnets with other cameras. This means there is a specific architecture on which these devices are based and there must be many such networks. Next, we scanned these and adjacent subnets on certain open ports and found a large number of such devices.

After determining which ports are open on speed cameras, we checked the hypothesis that one of them is responsible for RTSP – the real-time streaming protocol. The protocol’s architecture enables streaming to be either private (accessible with a login and password) or public. We decided to check that passwords were being used. Imagine our surprise when we realized there was no password and the entire video stream was available to all Internet users. Openly broadcast data includes not only the video stream itself, but additional data, such as the geographical coordinates of cameras, as well.

Direct broadcast screenshot from a speed camera

We found many more open ports on these devices, which can also be used to get many interesting technical details, such as a list of internal subnets used by the camera system or the list of camera hardware.

We learned from the technical documentation that the cameras can be reprogrammed over a wireless channel. We also learned from documentation that cameras can detect rule violations on specified lanes, making it possible to disable detection on one of the lanes in the right place at the right time. All of this can be done remotely.

Let’s put ourselves in criminals’ shoes and assume they need to remain undetected in the car traffic after performing certain illegal actions. They can take advantage of speed camera systems to achieve this. They can disable vehicle detection on some or all lanes along their route or monitor the actions of law-enforcement agents chasing them.

In addition, a criminal can get access to a database of vehicles registered as stolen and can add vehicles to it or remove them from it.

We have notified the organizations responsible for operating speed cameras in those countries where we identified the above security issues.


We also analyzed another element of the road infrastructure – the routers that transfer information between the various smart city elements that are part of the road infrastructure or to data centers.

As we were able to find out, a significant part of these routers uses either weak password protection or none at all. Another widespread vulnerability is that the network name of most routers corresponds to their geographic location, i.e., the street names and building numbers. After getting access to the administration interface of one of these routers, an attacker can scan internal IP ranges to determine other routers’ addresses, thereby collecting information on their locations. After this, by analyzing road load sensors, traffic density information can be collected from these sensors.

Such routers support recording traffic and uploading it to an FTP server that can be created by an attacker. These routers can also be used to create SSH tunnels. They provide access to their firmware (by creating its backup copy), support Telnet connections and have many other capabilities.

These devices are indispensable for the infrastructure of a smart city. However, after gaining access to them, criminals can use them for their own purposes. For example, if a bank uses a secret route to move large amounts of cash, the route can be determined by monitoring information from all sensors (using previously gained access to routers). Next, the movements of the vehicles can be monitored using the cameras.

Our Recommendations

To protect speed cameras, a full-scale security audit and penetration testing must first be carried out. From this, well-thought-out IT security recommendations be prepared for those who provide installation and maintenance of such speed monitoring systems. The technical documentation that we were able to obtain does not include any information on security mechanisms that can protect cameras against external attacks. Another thing that needs to be checked is whether such cameras are assigned an external IP address. This should be avoided where possible. For security reasons, none of these cameras should be visible from the Internet.

The main issue with routers used in the road infrastructure is that there is no requirement to set up a password during initial loading and configuration of the device. Many administrators of such routers are too forgetful or lazy to do such simple things. As a result, gaining access to the network’s internal traffic is sufficiently easy.


The number of new devices used in the infrastructure of a modern city is gradually growing. These new devices in turn connect to other devices and systems. For this environment to be safe for people who live in it, smart cities should be treated as information systems whose protection requires a custom approach and expertise.

This article was prepared as part of the support provided by Kaspersky Lab to “Securing Smart Cities”, an international non-profit initiative created to unite experts in smart city IT security technologies. For further information about the initiative, please visit

Rooting Pokémons in Google Play Store

Wed, 09/14/2016 - 07:50

A few days ago we reported to Google the existence of a new malicious app in the Google Play Store. The Trojan presented itself as the “Guide for Pokémon Go”. According to the Google Play Store it has been downloaded more than 500,000 times. Our data suggests there have been at least 6,000 successful infections, including in Russia, India and Indonesia. However, since the app is oriented towards English-speaking users, people in such geographies, and more, are also likely to have been hit.

Analysis reveals that the app contains a malicious piece of code that downloads rooting malware – malware capable of gaining access to the core Android operating system, in this case for the purposes of unsolicited app install and adware.

Kaspersky Lab products detect the Trojan as

At least one other version of this particular app was available through Google Play in July 2016. Further, we have tracked back at least nine other apps infected with this Trojan and available on Google Play Store at different times since December 2015.

Trojan characteristics

The Trojan has many layers of defense in place to help it bypass detection. This includes a commercial packer that decrypts the original executable file to make it harder to analyze. The unpacked executable file contains useful code related to the malicious Pokémon Go guide, and one small and obfuscated module.

Process of infection

This small module doesn’t start when the user launches the app. Instead, it waits for the user to install or uninstall another app, then checks to see if that app runs on a real device or on a virtual machine. If it turns out that it’s dealing with a device, the Trojan will wait for a further two hours before starting its malicious activity.

The first thing it does is connect to its command-and-control (CnC) server and upload data about the device, including country, language, device model and OS version.

If the server wants the Trojan to continue it will respond with an ID string. Only if the Trojan receives this ID string will it make its next request to the CnC. If it doesn’t receive anything, it will wait for two hours and then resubmit the first request. This feature is included so that the control server can stop the attack from proceeding if it wants to – skipping those users it does not wish to target, or those which it suspects are a sandbox/virtual machine, for example. Among other things, this provides an additional layer of protection for the malware.

Upon receiving the second request, the CnC server will send the Trojan a JSON file with urls. The Trojan will download this file, decrypt it and execute. In our case the Trojan downloaded a file detected as HEUR:Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.a. This file is obfuscated too.

After execution, the Trojan will drop and download some more files. All downloaded files are encrypted and most of them are local root exploit packs for vulnerabilities dating from 2012 to 2015, including one that was previously used by Hacking Team.

These other files represent additional modules of the Trojan and are detected by Kaspersky Lab as:

HEUR:Backdoor.AndroidOS.Ztorg.c, HEUR:Trojan.AndroidOS.Muetan.b,, HEUR:Backdoor.AndroidOS.Ztorg.h, HEUR:Backdoor.AndroidOS.Ztorg.j,, HEUR:Trojan.AndroidOS.Hiddad.c. And a few clean tools like busybox and chattr.

Using these exploit packs the Trojan will gain root access rights to the device.

With rooting rights enabled, the Trojan will install its modules into the system folders, silently installing and uninstalling other apps and displaying unsolicited ads to the user.

Most of the other apps with this Trojan module available in Google Play had about 10,000 downloads (according to Google Play), but one – “Digital Clock” had more than 100,000 downloads.

MD5 of Malicious Files Mentioned in Article

Gugi: from an SMS Trojan to a Mobile-Banking Trojan

Mon, 09/12/2016 - 04:59

In the previous article, we described the mechanisms used by Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi.c to bypass a number of new Android 6 security features. In this article, we review the entire Gugi mobile-banking Trojan family in more detail.

The use of WebSocket by Gugi

The mobile-banking Trojan family, Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi is interesting due to its use of the WebSocket protocol to interact with its command-and-control servers. This protocol combines the advantages of HTTP with those of commonly used sockets: there is no need to open extra ports on a device, as all the communication goes through standard port 80. At the same time, real-time data exchange is possible.

It is worth noting that even though this technology is user-friendly, it is not that popular among attackers. Among all the mobile Trojans that utilize WebSocket technology, more than 90% are related to the Gugi family.

WebSocket Usage in Mobile SMS Trojans

We registered the first case of WebSocket technology use in mobile Trojans at the end of December 2013. It was Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.fn. Judging by the code, the Trojan was created by the same malefactors who created the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi family.

During the initial registration, the FakeInst.fn Trojan uploads a large amount of device-related data to its server. The data includes the telephone number, the carrier information, IMEI, IMSI, etc.

From the server, the malware may receive a JSON file with the following commands (and data for the commands):

  • SMS – send a text message with specified text to a specified number;
  • intercept – enable or disable the interception of incoming SMS messages;
  • adres – change a command-and-control server address;
  • port – change a command-and-control server port;
  • contacts – send a bulk SMS message with specified content to all the contact numbers listed on the infected device.

In addition, the Trojan steals all outgoing SMS messages.

In the middle of January 2014, just a couple of weeks after discovering FakeInst.fn, a new version of the Trojan appeared. The malware was no longer using WebSocket; instead the communication was performed with the help of the HTTP protocol (GET and POST requests). Among all the installation packages of the Trojan, we could discover only two (dating back to the middle of March 2014) that utilized WebSocket. Everything seemed to indicate that the attackers decided to drop the technology for a while. They started to use it again almost two years later, in the Gugi family.

From SMS Trojans to Mobile Banking Trojans

Two years after finding the first version of Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.fn, which utilized WebSocket, a new Websocket-using Trojan appeared, Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi.a.

There are multiple matches in the Gugi code (variable and method names) with the Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.fn code. The major changes within Gugi were the addition of a phishing window to steal the device user’s credit-card data and the use of WebSocket. Within all the Gugi mobile-banking Trojan family installation packages detected by us, WebSocket technology is used to communicate with the command-and-control server. Thus, the attackers had switched from Trojan-SMS to Trojan-Banker.

Evolution of the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi

The evolution of the Gugi Trojan can be split into two stages:


The first stage started in the middle of December 2015. The word “Fanta” is used within the name of all versions of the Trojan related to this stage, for example, “Fanta v.1.0”.

On request from the command-and-control server, Gugi Trojan version 1.0 could perform the following actions:

  • stop its operation;
  • steal all the contacts from the device;
  • steal all the SMS messages from the device;
  • send an SMS message with specified text to a specified number;
  • send a USSD request;
  • steal SMS messages from a specified group/conversation.

In late December 2015, we spotted the next version of Gugi, “Fanta v.1.1”. Its major difference from the previous version was that the code had a way of disabling the phishing window (we would like to remind you that Gugi can also be used as an SMS Trojan). Another new feature allowed contacts to be added to the infected device at the request of the server. This version was spread much more actively than the first one.

At the beginning of February 2016, we detected two new versions of Gugi, “Fanta v2.0” and “Fanta v2.1”. These versions had an increased focus on banking. First, they came with a new phishing window for stealing the username and password from the mobile banking software of one of the largest Russian banks. Secondly, the Trojan code introduced the list of phone numbers of two Russian banks. All incoming SMS messages from these numbers were not only sent to the malefactors’ server (like other SMS messages) but were hidden from the user.

These versions had a phishing window, shown either on request from the server or right after the smartphone had booted up. The window would not close until the user had entered their data.

Then, in the middle of March 2016, we found “Fanta v.2.2”. This became the most popular version of al, accounting for more than 50% of all of the installation packages related to the “Fanta” stage. Starting from this version, phishing windows were drawn over banking applications and Google Play.

Phishing window over Google Play Store

One more phishing window started to appear, right before the window for stealing credit-card data. This window read: “Link your credit card to Google Play Store and get 200 rubles for any apps!”

Additionally, starting from this version, the Trojan actively fights its removal. If the malware has Device Administrator rights, then its removal is possible only after disabling those rights. Therefore, whenever the Trojan does not have Device Administrator rights, it aggressively demands such permission, drawing its window over the device settings window.

In April 2016, we found the most recent “Fanta” version to date, “Fanta v.2.3”. That version had only one significant change: if the user disables the Device Administrator rights for the Trojan, then the malware changes the device password, effectively blocking the device.

All versions of “Fanta” are detected by the Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi.a.


The first file related to the second stage, “Lime”, was found a week before “Fanta v2.3” appeared, at the beginning of April 2016.

The installation package code for “Lime” seems to have been rewritten from the Fanta stage. The code, as well as the version names, had the word “Fanta” excluded and replaced with “Lime” in some lines. The same Trojan name, “Lime”, is seen in the administration panel through which the malefactors control this malware.

Trojan’s administration panel

Versions of the Trojan relating to the “Lime” stage do not change the device password when Device Administrator rights are disabled.

The first file discovered by us in April 2016 was version 1.1 and, judging by the code, was a test file. The next installation package related to the “Lime” stage was discovered in the middle of May 2016. It had the same version number, 1.1, but improved functionality.

The major change in version 1.1 of the “Lime” stage was that it showed new phishing windows. At that time, the Trojan could attack five banking apps of various Russian banks. Additionally, it had a new command to get the list of rules for processing incoming SMS messages. These rules define which messages should be hidden from the user and which messages should be replied to with specific messages.

Further, during the course of May 2016, we discovered files labelled 1.2 and 1.5 by the authors, even though the features of the files had not been changed.

Meanwhile, a new version of the Android OS, version 6.0, was released with security features that did not let the Trojan function properly. In June, we found a new version of the Trojan, 2.0, in which the malefactors had added support for Android 6. On Android 6 devices, the Trojan first requests permission to draw over other apps. Then, using the permission to its own advantage, it practically blocks the device, forcing the user to give Device Administrator rights to the malicious application as well as permission to read and send SMS messages and make calls.

Versions 3.0 and 3.1, which were found in July, have the same features as version 2.0 and utilize the same command-and-control server but different ports. Only one installation package for each version has been found by us. At the same time, version 2.0 continues to be actively spread.

All of the “Lime”-stage versions are detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi.b and Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi.c.


The Trojan is actively transmitted via SMS spam, with a link to phishing web pages that show a message indicating that the user has, supposedly, received an MMS picture.

Information about MMS message on phishing website

If the “show” button in the message is clicked, then the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi will be downloaded onto the device. It is highly likely that the name of the Trojan downloaded from such a websi фte will be similar to img09127639.jpg.apk.

As we have written in a previous post, we have encountered an explosive growth of Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi attacks. August revealed 3 times as many users attacked by Gugi as in July, and almost 20 times as many as in June.

An amount of Kaspersky Lab mobile product users attacked by Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi mobile-banking Trojan family

Today, the biggest number of attacks is performed by Lime version 2.0. All of the known active command-and-control servers of this Trojan are related to Lime versions 1.5 – 3.1. Not a single “Fanta” server known to us has been accessible since the middle of August 2016.

More than 93% of attacked users were located in Russia.

MD5 of Malicious Files Mentioned in Article


A malicious pairing of cryptor and stealer

Fri, 09/09/2016 - 04:59

We have already seen some cryptor attacks where malicious programs with different functions have been used in combination. For example, one version of the Shade cryptor checks victim computers for signs of accounting activity; if it finds any, it doesn’t encrypt the files, but instead installs remote control tools in the infected system. The bot can then be used by cybercriminals to steal money, a much more profitable outcome than just receiving a ransom to decrypt some files.

The owners of the RAA cryptor, however, took a different tack. The Trojan is delivered in emails that mostly target corporate users. After a successful infection, RAA executes its main task, i.e. encrypts the user’s files. However, it doesn’t stop there: some versions of RAA also include a Pony Trojan file, which steals confidential information from the infected computer. Using the stolen data, the cybercriminals can gain access to the victim’s mail clients and other resources. We can assume that the owners of RAA use these resources to carry out targeted attacks – sending out emails with the cryptor malware to the addresses on the victim’s contact list. This substantially improves the probability of subsequent infections.

In this article, we will provide details of how a pair of malicious programs – a new version of the RAA cryptor and the Pony stealer Trojan – work in unison.

The RAA cryptor

The RAA cryptor (Kaspersky Lab verdict: Trojan-Ransom.JS.RaaCrypt) was first detected in June 2016. It caught the attention of researchers and analysts due to the fact that it was written entirely in JavaScript, which is a rarity when it comes to ransomware cryptor Trojans.

We recently detected a new version of this Trojan that has a few differences from earlier known modifications. Let’s have a closer look at this particular sample, which has been assigned the verdict


The body of this new version of RAA is a script in JScript (with a .js file extension). The malicious script is sent to potential victims attached to a spam message in a ZIP file with the password ‘111’.

The attack is aimed primarily at corporate users: the message mimics finance-related business correspondence, and the script’s name is similar to those shown below:

Счета на оплату _ август 2016 согласовано и отправлено контрагенту для проведения оплаты _aytOkOTH.doc.js (Invoice_August 2016 approved and sent to contractor for payment _aytOkOTH.doc.js)

Счета на оплату _ август 2016 согласовано и отправлено контрагенту для проведения оплаты _EKWT.doc.js (Invoice_August 2016 approved and sent to contractor for payment _ EKWT.doc.js)

“Let’s presume we made a concession when we allowed you to postpone your due payment.

“We understand you may have difficulties, but do we have to wait for another two months? To be honest, we don’t really want to go to court. Please make all the payments in next few days.”

The message includes a notice saying:

“The company… notifies you that in line with internal security regulations, all outgoing emails are subject to asymmetric encryption. Dear client, your password for this message is 111.”

People who know what ‘asymmetric encryption’ is will probably just smile at this; however, the message is obviously targeting a different audience.

It should be noted that sending malicious content in a password-protected archive is a well-known trick used by cybercriminals to prevent anti-malware systems installed on mail servers from unpacking the archive and detecting any malicious content. To unpack an archive like this, the anti-malware product must automatically retrieve the password from the message, which isn’t always possible.

For an infection to occur, users have to unpack the archive themselves and launch the .js file.

Script obfuscation

The code of the malicious script was deliberately obfuscated to complicate things for malware analysts. The content of the script looks like this in the source code:

Fragment of the obfuscated code

If we restore the line breaks and indents, it becomes obvious that the obfuscation involves renamed variables and functions, as well as strings hidden in the global array. After de-obfuscation and function renaming, the same section of code becomes much easier to read.

Fragment of de-obfuscated code

The script is nearly 3,000 lines long. Most of this is taken up by an implementation of the legitimate DLL CryptoJS, and an implementation of the RSA encryption procedure, which was also taken from public sources by the cybercriminals.

How the Trojan works

To lull the victim into a false sense of security, the RAA cryptor demonstrates a fake Microsoft Word document immediately after it launches. This document is in fact an RTF file specially crafted by the cybercriminals. (The document is contained in the Trojan’s body encoded in Base64 format.)

The fake document displayed to the victim

While the user is reading the message about a document that’s supposedly not being displayed properly, the Trojan is doing its dirty work:

  • Registers itself to be autostarted with Windows;
  • Deletes the registry key associated with the VSS service (to prevent the restoring of files from shadow copies);
  • Sends a request to the C&C server (unlike all previous versions of this Trojan, this version doesn’t wait for the delivery of keys from the server – the request is only sent so the cybercriminals can collect statistics);
  • Proceeds to search for files and encrypts them.
Key generation

Unlike earlier RAA modifications, this version of the cryptor does not request an encryption key from the C&C. Instead, the Trojan generates a session key on the client. To do so, it calls the WinAPI function RtlGenRandom which is considered a cryptographically secure generator of pseudorandom numbers.

To ensure it can call WinAPI functions from JS code, the Trojan uses a legitimate third-party OCX component called DynamicWrapperX. The Trojan stores it in its body in a Base64-encoded format, and installs it in the infected system. RAA has both 32-bit and 64-bit versions of DynamicWrapperX so it can attack systems running under both Windows architectures.

The Trojan encrypts the generated session key with an RSA algorithm (the public RSA-2048 key is contained within the script) and saves it to a file with the name “KEY-…”, where the multiple periods stand for a unique 36-character infection ID.

File encryption

RAA searches for and encrypts files with the extensions .doc, .xls, .rtf, .pdf, .dbf, .jpg, .dwg, .cdr, .psd, .cd, .mdb, .png, .lcd, .zip, .rar, .csv whose names do not contain the substrings “.locked”, “~”, “$”.

When searching for files, the Trojan skips folders named “WINDOWS”, “RECYCLER”, “Program Files”, “Program Files (x86)”, “Windows”, “Recycle.Bin”, “RECYCLE.BIN”, “Recycler”, “TEMP”, “APPDATA”, “AppData”, “Temp”, “ProgramData”, and “Microsoft”.

When processing each file, RAA uses the session key to generate a file key and initialization vector (IV). The contents of the files are encrypted in different ways depending on the file size:

  • 0 to 6,122 bytes: the file is encrypted in full.
  • 6,123 to 4,999,999 bytes: three fragments are selected for encryption in different sections of the file. The first, 2000- to 2040-byte fragment is selected at the beginning of file; the location and size of the two other fragments depend on the size of the first fragment and the overall size of the file.
  • 5,000,001 to 500,000,000 bytes: two fragments of 90000-125000 bytes are selected for encryption (from the beginning and end of the file).
  • 500,000,001 bytes and larger: not encrypted.

A string is added at the end of the encrypted file that contains “IDNUM” (infection ID), “KEY_LOGIC” (indexes to construct the file key from the session key), “IV_LOGIC” (indexes to construct the IV from the session key), and “LOGIC_ID” (possible values are “1”, “2” or “3” – the selected encryption method depending on the file size). The encrypted file is given the additional extension .locked.

The string added to the end of the encrypted file

Ransom demand

When the files are encrypted, RAA displays a file with the cybercriminals’ demands and contacts in WordPad. The Trojan fills the text template with a 36-character ID which is unique for each case.

The file containing the cybercriminals’ demands

The cybercriminals suggest that the victims purchase a file decryption key and software from them. Two methods of communication are available: email and the Bitmessage service. The victim is expected to pay for the decryption key in bitcoins.

Plus a stealer Trojan

The damage caused by the Trojan is not limited to encrypting files. Like some of the earlier versions of RAA, the version we are examining has some added features. The Trojan contains an executable file encoded in Base64, which it writes to the hard drive at ‘C:\Users\<username>\Documents\ii.exe’ and launches after it has finished encrypting files. Analysis revealed that ‘ii.exe’ is none other than Pony, a known password-stealing Trojan (detection verdict: Trojan-PSW.Win32.Tepfer.gen).

Pony has proved to be an unusually long-lived Trojan. Its early versions supposedly emerged back in 2011, while in December 2013, as reported by the mass media, it stole the credentials of over 2 million users.

Naturally, after all that time Pony’s source code appeared on the web at some point. Analysis showed that the executable file we are analyzing here was constructed using Pony source code.

Pony: confidential data theft

To recap, Pony’s main task is to collect confidential information from an infected computer and then send it to the cybercriminals.

Step 1. Stealing information

Below is a short list of the information that Pony hunts for.

  • Passwords stored in web browsers
Microsoft Internet Explorer Google Chrome Opera Mozilla Firefox K-Meleon Яндекс.Браузер Flock
  • Credentials to dozens of the most popular FTP clients
CuteFTP 6\7\8\9\Pro\Lite FTP Navigator FlashFXP 3\4 FileZilla FTP Commander Bullet Proof FTP Client SmartFTP TurboFTP FFFTP COREFTP FTP Explorer ClassicFTP FTPClient LeapFTP FTP CONTROL FTPVoyager LeechFTP WinFTP FTPGetter ALFTP BlazeFtp Robo-FTP 3.7 NovaFTP FTP Surfer LinasFTP Cyberduck WiseFTP
  • Accounts with the most widespread mail clients
Microsoft Outlook Mozilla Thunderbird The Bat! Windows Live Mail Becky! Internet Mail Pocomail IncrediMail
  • Various cryptocurrency wallet files
PPCoin Primecoin Feathercoin ProtoShares Quarkcoin Worldcoin Infinitecoin Fastcoin Phoenixcoin Craftcoin

The Trojan also has the following capabilities:

  • Pony steals the user’s digital certificates.
  • Pony stores a list of the most widespread combinations that users use as passwords. Using this list, it attempts to gain access to the accounts on an infected computer.

Step 2. Data encryption and sending

Before sending the collected information to cybercriminals, Pony encrypts it using the RC4 algorithm. When doing so, the Trojan keeps records of the checksums for the obtained data (slightly modified results of the CRC32 algorithm are used.) The sequence is as follows:

  1. Calculate the checksum of the non-encrypted data.
  2. Write the obtained value next to the input data.
  3. Encrypt input data with the RC4 algorithm using the key that the cybercriminals specified when they compiled the Trojan.
  4. Calculate the checksum of the encrypted data.
  5. Write the obtained value next to the input data.
  6. Generate a random 4-byte key
  7. Encrypt the input data with the RC4 algorithm using the generated key.
  8. Generate a data package ready for sending that can be described with a ToSend structure (see below)
struct ToSend { dword random_key; byte* double_encrypted_data; };

A non-encrypted fragment of the generated report

Fragment of the report that is ready for sending. The encryption key is highlighted in red

When the data is brought up to the required form, Pony sends it to the cybercriminals.


Trojan-PSW.Win32.Tepfer.gen (Pony):

The Missing Piece – Sophisticated OS X Backdoor Discovered

Wed, 09/07/2016 - 09:19

In a nutshell
  • Backdoor.OSX.Mokes.a is the most recently discovered OS X variant of a cross-platform backdoor which is able to operate on all major operating systems (Windows,Linux,OS X). Please see also our analysis on the Windows and Linux variants.
  • This malware family is able to steal various types of data from the victim’s machine (Screenshots, Audio-/Video-Captures, Office-Documents, Keystrokes)
  • The backdoor is also able to execute arbitrary commands on the victim’s computer
  • To communicate it’s using strong AES-256-CBC encryption

Back in January this year we found a new family of cross-platform backdoors for desktop environments. After the discovery of the binaries for Linux and Windows systems, we have now finally come across the OS X version of Mokes.A. It is written in C++ using Qt, a cross-platform application framework, and is statically linked to OpenSSL. This leads to a filesize of approx. 14MB. Let’s have a look into this very fresh sample.

“Unpacked” Backdoor.OSX.Mokes.a

Its filename was “unpacked” when we got our hands on it, but we’re assuming that in-the-wild it comes packed, just like its Linux variant.


When executed for the first time, the malware copies itself to the first available of the following locations, in this order:

  • $HOME/Library/App Store/storeuserd
  • $HOME/Library/
  • $HOME/Library/Dock/
  • $HOME/Library/Skype/SkypeHelper
  • $HOME/Library/Dropbox/DropboxCache
  • $HOME/Library/Google/Chrome/nacld
  • $HOME/Library/Firefox/Profiles/profiled

Corresponding to that location, it creates a plist-file to achieve persistence on the system:

After that it’s time to establish a first connection with its C&C server using HTTP on TCP port 80:

The User-Agent string is hardcoded in the binary and the server replies to this “heartbeat” request with “text/html” content of 208 bytes in length. Then the binary establishes an encrypted connection on TCP port 443 using the AES-256-CBC algorithm.

Backdoor functionality

Its next task is to setup the backdoor features:

  • Capturing Audio
  • Monitoring Removable Storage
  • Capturing Screen (every 30 sec.)
  • Scanning the file system for Office documents (xls, xlsx, doc, docx)

The attacker controlling the C&C server is also able to define own file filters to enhance the monitoring of the file system as well as executing arbitrary commands on the system.

Just like on other platforms, the malware creates several temporary files containing the collected data if the C&C server is not available.

  • $TMPDIR/ss0-DDMMyy-HHmmss-nnn.sst (Screenshots)
  • $TMPDIR/aa0-DDMMyy-HHmmss-nnn.aat (Audiocaptures)
  • $TMPDIR/kk0-DDMMyy-HHmmss-nnn.kkt (Keylogs)
  • $TMPDIR/dd0-DDMMyy-HHmmss-nnn.ddt (Arbitrary Data)

DDMMyy = date: 070916 = 2016-09-07
HHmmss = time: 154411 = 15:44:11
nnn = milliseconds

If the environment variable $TMPDIR is not defined, “/tmp/” is used as the location (

Hints from the author

The author of this malware again left some references to the corresponding source files:


We detect this type of malware as HEUR:Backdoor.OSX.Mokes.a



$HOME/LibraryApp Store/storeuserd


Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_9_3) AppleWebKit/537.75.14 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/7.0.3 Safari/7046A194A

Banking Trojan, Gugi, evolves to bypass Android 6 protection

Tue, 09/06/2016 - 05:58

Almost every Android OS update includes new security features designed to make cybercriminals’ life harder. And, of course, the cybercriminals always try to bypass them.

We have found a new modification of the mobile banking Trojan, Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi.c that can bypass two new security features added in Android 6: permission-based app overlays and a dynamic permission requirement for dangerous in-app activities such as SMS or calls. The modification does not use any vulnerabilities, just social engineering.

Initial infection

The Gugi Trojan is spread mainly by SMS spam that takes users to phishing webpages with the text “Dear user, you receive MMS-photo! You can look at it by clicking on the following link”.

Clicking on the link initiates the download of the Gugi Trojan onto the user’s Android device.

Circumventing the security features

To help protect users from the impо, неact of phishing and ransomware attacks, Android 6 introduced a requirement for apps to request permission to superimpose their windows/views over other apps. In earlier versions of the OS they were able to automatically overlay other apps.

The Trojan’s ultimate goal is to overlay banking apps with phishing windows in order to steal user credentials for mobile banking. It also overlays the Google Play Store app to steal credit card details.

The Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi.c modification gets the overlay permission it needs by forcing users to grant this permission. It then uses that to block the screen while demanding ever more dangerous access.

The first thing an infected user is presented with is a window with the text “Additional rights needed to work with graphics and windows” and one button: “provide.”

After clicking on this button, the user will see a dialog box that authorizes the app overlay (“drawing over other apps”).

System request to permit Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi.c to overlay other apps

But as soon as the user gives Gugi this permission, the Trojan will block the device and show its window over any other windows/dialogs.

Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi.c window that blocks the infected device until it receives all the necessary rights

It gives the user no option, presenting a window that contains only one button: “Activate”. Once the user presses this button they will receive a continuous series of requests for all the rights the Trojan is looking for. They won’t get back to the main menu until they have agreed to everything.

For example, following the first click of the button, the Trojan will ask for Device Administrator rights. It needs this for self-defense because it makes it much harder for the user to uninstall the app.

After successfully becoming the Device Administrator, the Trojan produces the next request. This one asks the user for permission to send and view SMS and to make calls.

It is interesting that Android 6 has introduced dynamic request capability as a new security features

Earlier versions of the OS only show app permissions at installation; but, starting from Android 6, the system will ask users for permission to execute dangerous actions like sending SMS or making calls the first time they are attempted, or allows apps to ask at any other time – so that is what the modified Gugi Trojan does.

TSystem request for dynamic permission

The Trojan will continue to ask the user for each permission until they agree. Should the user deny permission, subsequent requests will offer them the option of closing the request. If the Trojan does not receive all the permissions it wants, it will completely block the infected device. In such a case the user’s only option is to reboot the device in safe mode and try to uninstall the Trojan.

TRepeating system request for dynamic permission

A standard banking Trojan

With the exception of its ability to bypass Android 6 security features, and its use of the Websocket protocol, Gugi is a typical banking Trojan. It overlays apps with phishing windows to steal credentials for mobile banking or credit card details. It also steals SMS, contacts, makes USSD requests and can send SMS by command from the CnC.

The Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi family has been known about since December 2015, with the modification Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi.c first discovered in June 2016.

Victim profile

The Gugi Trojan mainly attacks users in Russia: more than 93% of attacked users to date are based in that country. Right now it is a trending Trojan – in the first half of August 2016 there were ten times as many victims as in April 2016.

TUnique number users attacked by Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi.

We will shortly be publishing a detailed report into the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi malware family, its functionality and its use of the Websocket protocol.

All Kaspersky Lab products detect all modifications of the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi malware family.

How Trojans manipulate Google Play

Wed, 08/31/2016 - 04:57

For malware writers, Google Play is the promised land of sorts. Once there, a malicious application gains access to a wide audience, gains the trust of that audience and experiences a degree of leniency from the security systems built into operating systems. On mobile devices, users typically cannot install applications coming from sources other than the official store, meaning this is a serious barrier for an app with malicious intent. However, it is far from easy for the app to get into Google Play: one of the main conditions for it is to pass a rigorous check for unwanted behavior by different analysis systems, both automatic and manual.

Some malware writers have given up on their efforts to push their malicious creations past security checks, and instead learned how to use the store’s client app for their unscrupulous gains. Lately, we have seen many Trojans use the Google Play app during promotion campaigns to download, install and launch apps on smartphones without the owners’ knowledge, as well as leave comments and rate apps. The apps installed by the Trojan do not typically cause direct damage to the user, but the victim may have to pay for the created excessive traffic. In addition, the Trojans may download and install paid apps as if they were free ones, further adding to the users’ bills.

Let us look into the methods how such manipulations with Google Play happen.

Level 1. N00b

The first method is to make the official Google Play app store undertake the actions the cybercriminal wants. The idea is to use the Trojan to launch the client, open the page of the required app in it, then search for and use special code to interact with the interface elements (buttons) to cause download, installation and launch of the application. The misused interface elements are outlined with red boxes in the screenshots below:

The exact methods of interaction with the interface vary. In general, the following techniques may be identified:

  1. Use of the Accessibility services of the operating system (used by modules in Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg).
  2. Imitation of user input (used by Trojan-Clicker.AndroidOS.Gopl.c).
  3. Code injection into the process of Google Play client to modify its operation (used by Trojan.AndroidOS.Iop).

To see how such Trojans operate. Let us look at the example of Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.n. This malicious program uses Accessibility services originally intended to create applications to help people with disabilities, such as GUI voice control apps. The Trojan receives a job from the command and control server (C&C) which contains a link to the required application, opens it in Google Play, and then launches the following code:

This code is needed to detect when the required interface element appears on the screen, and to emulate the click on it. This way, the following buttons are clicked in a sequence: “BUY” (the price is shown in the button), “ACCEPT” and “CONTINUE”. This is sufficient to purchase the app, if the user has a credit card with sufficient balance connected to his/her Google account.

Level 2. Pro

Some malware writers take roads less traveled. Instead of using the easy and reliable way described above, they create their own client for the app store using HTTPS API.

The difficult part about this approach is that the operation of the self-made client requires information (e.g. user credentials and authentication tokens) which is not available to a regular app. However, the cybercriminals are very fortunate that all required data are stored on the device in clear text, in the convenient SQLite format. Access to the data is limited by the Android security model, however apps may abuse it e.g. by rooting the device and thus gaining unlimited access.

For example, some versions of the Trojan.AndroidOS.Guerrilla.a have their own client for Google Play, which is distributed with the help of the rooter Leech. This client successfully fulfils the task of downloading and installing free and paid apps, and is capable of rating apps and leaving comments in the Google store.

After launch, Guerrilla starts to collect the following required information:

  1. The credentials to the user’s Google Play account.

    Activities in Google Play require special tokens that are generated when the user logs in. When the user is already logged in to Google Play, the Trojan can use the locally cached tokens. They can be located through a simple search through the database located at /data/system/users/0/accounts.db:

    With the help of the code below, the Trojan checks if there are ready tokens on the infected device, i.e. if the user has logged on and can do activities in Google Play:

    If no such tokens are available, the Trojan obtains the user’s username and hashed password, and authenticates via OAuth:

  2. Android_id is the device’s unique ID.
  3. Google Service Framework ID is the device’s identifier across Google services.

    First, the Trojans attempts to obtain this ID using regular methods. If these fail for whatever reason, it executes the following code:

  4. Google Advertising ID is the unique advertising ID provided by Google Play services.

    Guerrilla obtains it as follows:

  5. In a similar way, the Trojan obtains hashed data about the device from the file “/data/data/“.

    When the Trojan has collected the above data, it begins to receive tasks to download and install apps. Below is the structure of one such task:

The Trojan downloads the application by sending POST requests using the links below:

  1. a search is undertaken for the request sent by the cybercriminals. This request is needed to simulate the user’s interaction with the Google Play client. (The main scenario of installing apps from the official client presupposes that the user first does the search request and only then visits the app’s page).
  2. with this request, additional information needed to download the app is collected.
  3. the token and purchase details are downloaded, used in the next request.
  4. the Trojan receives the URL and the cookie-files required to download the Android application package (APK) file.
  5. the download is confirmed (so the download counter is incremented.)
  6. the app is rated and a comment is added.

When creating the requests, the cybercriminals attempted to simulate most accurately the equivalent requests sent by the official client. For example, the below set of HTTP headers is used in each request:

After the request is executed, the app may (optionally) get downloaded, installed (using the command ‘pm install -r’ which allows for installation of applications without the user’s consent) and launched.


The Trojans that use the Google Play app to download, install and launch apps from the store to a smartphone without the device owner’s consent are typically distributed by rooters – malicious programs which have already gained the highest possible privileges on the device. It is this particular fact that allows them to launch such attacks on the Google Play client app.

This type of malicious program pose a serious threat: in Q2 2016, different rooters occupied more than a half of the Top 20 of mobile malware. All the more so, rooters can download not only malicious programs that compromise the Android ecosystem and spend the user’s money on purchasing unnecessary paid apps, but other malware as well.

The Hunt for Lurk

Tue, 08/30/2016 - 04:58

In early June, 2016, the Russian police arrested the alleged members of the criminal group known as Lurk. The police suspected Lurk of stealing nearly three billion rubles, using malicious software to systematically withdraw large sums of money from the accounts of commercial organizations, including banks. For Kaspersky Lab, these arrests marked the culmination of a six-year investigation by the company’s Computer Incidents Investigation team. We are pleased that the police authorities were able to put the wealth of information we accumulated to good use: to detain suspects and, most importantly, to put an end to the theft. We ourselves gained more knowledge from this investigation than from any other. This article is an attempt to share this experience with other experts, particularly the IT security specialists in companies and financial institutions that increasingly find themselves the targets of cyber-attacks.

When we first encountered Lurk, in 2011, it was a nameless Trojan. It all started when we became aware of a number of incidents at several Russian banks that had resulted in the theft of large sums of money from customers. To steal the money, the unknown criminals used a hidden malicious program that was able to interact automatically with the financial institution’s remote banking service (RBS) software; replacing bank details in payment orders generated by an accountant at the attacked organization, or even generating such orders by itself.

In 2016, it is hard to imagine banking software that does not demand some form of additional authentication, but things were different back in 2011. In most cases, the attackers only had to infect the computer on which the RBS software was installed in order to start stealing the cash. Russia’s banking system, like those of many other countries, was unprepared for such attacks, and cybercriminals were quick to exploit the security gap.

We participated in the investigation of several incidents involving the nameless malware, and sent samples to our malware analysts. They created a signature to see if any other infections involving it had been registered, and discovered something very unusual: our internal malware naming system insisted that what we were looking at was a Trojan that could be used for many things (spamming, for example) but not stealing money.

Our detection systems suggest that a program with a certain set of functions can sometimes be mistaken for something completely different. In the case of this particular program the cause was slightly different: an investigation revealed that it had been detected by a “common” signature because it was doing nothing that could lead the system to include it in any specific group, for example, that of banking Trojans.

Whatever the reason, the fact remained that the malicious program was used for the theft of money.

So we decided to take a closer look at the malware. The first attempts to understand how the program worked gave our analysts nothing. Regardless of whether it was launched on a virtual or a real machine, it behaved in the same way: it didn’t do anything. This is how the program, and later the group behind it, got its name. To “lurk” means to hide, generally with the intention of ambush.

We were soon able to help investigate another incident involving Lurk. This time we got a chance to explore the image of the attacked computer. There, in addition to the familiar malicious program, we found a .dll file with which the main executable file could interact. This was our first piece of evidence that Lurk had a modular structure.

Later discoveries suggest that, in 2011, Lurk was still at an early stage of development. It was formed of just two components, a number that would grow considerably over the coming years.

The additional file we uncovered did little to clarify the nature of Lurk. It was clear that it was a Trojan targeting RBS and that it was used in a relatively small number of incidents. In 2011, attacks on such systems were starting to grow in popularity. Other, similar, programs were already known about, the earliest detected as far back as in 2006, with new malware appearing regularly since then. These included ZeuS, SpyEye, and Carberp, etc. In this series, Lurk represented yet another dangerous piece of malware.

It was extremely difficult to make Lurk work in a lab environment. New versions of the program appeared only rarely, so we had few opportunities to investigate new incidents involving Lurk. A combination of these factors influenced our decision to postpone our active investigation into this program and turn our attention to more urgent tasks.

A change of leader

For about a year after we first met Lurk, we heard little about it. It later turned out that the incidents involving this malicious program were buried in the huge amount of similar incidents involving other malware. In May 2011, the source code of ZeuS had been published on the Web and this resulted in the emergence of many program modifications developed by small groups of cybercriminals.

In addition to ZeuS, there were a number of other unique financial malware programs. In Russia, there were several relatively large cybercriminal groups engaged in financial theft via attacks on RBS. Carberp was the most active among them. At the end of March 2012, the majority of its members were arrested by the police. This event significantly affected the Russian cybercriminal world as the gang had stolen hundreds of millions of rubles during a few years of activity, and was considered a “leader” among cybercriminals. However, by the time of the arrests, Carberp’s reputation as a major player was already waning. There was a new challenger for the crown.

A few weeks before the arrests, the sites of a number of major Russian media, such as the agency “RIA Novosti”, and others, had been subjected to a watering hole attack. The unknown cybercriminals behind this attack distributed their malware by exploiting a vulnerability in the websites’ banner exchange system. A visitor to the site would be redirected to a fraudulent page containing a Java exploit. Successful exploitation of the vulnerability initiated the launch of a malicious program whose main function was collecting information on the attacked computer, sending it to a malicious server, and in some cases receiving and installing an extra load from the server.

The code on the main page of that is used to download additional content from

From a technical perspective, the malicious program was unusual. Unlike most other malware, it left no traces on the hard drive of the system attacked and worked only in the RAM of the machine. This approach is not often used in malware, primarily because the resulting infection is “short-lived”: malware exists in the system only until the computer is restarted, at which point the process of infection need to be started anew. But, in the case of these attacks, the secret “bodiless” malicious program did not have to gain a foothold in the victim’s system. Its primary job was to explore; its secondary role was to download and install additional malware. Another fascinating detail was the fact that the malware was only downloaded in a small number of cases, when the victim computer turned out to be “interesting”.

Part of the Lurk code responsible for downloading additional modules

Analysis of the bodiless malicious program showed that it was “interested” in computers with remote banking software installed. More specifically, RBS software created by Russian developers. Much later we learned that this unnamed, bodiless module was a mini, one of the malicious programs which used Lurk. But at the time we were not sure whether the Lurk we had known since 2011, and the Lurk discovered in 2012, were created by the same people. We had two hypotheses: either Lurk was a program written for sale, and both the 2011 and 2012 versions were the result of the activity of two different groups, which had each bought the program from the author; or the 2012 version was a modification of the previously known Trojan.

The second hypothesis turned out to be correct.

Invisible war with banking software

A small digression. Remote banking systems consist of two main parts: the bank and the client. The client part is a small program that allows the user (usually an accountant) to remotely manage their organization’s accounts. There are only a few developers of such software in Russia, so any Russian organization that uses RBS relies on software developed by one of these companies. For cybercriminal groups specializing in attacks on RBS, this limited range of options plays straight into their hands.

In April 2013, a year after we found the “bodiless” Lurk module, the Russian cybercriminal underground exploited several families of malicious software that specialized in attacks on banking software. Almost all operated in a similar way: during the exploration stage they found out whether the attacked computer had the necessary banking software installed. If it did, the malware downloaded additional modules, including ones allowing for the automatic creation of unauthorized payment orders, changing details in legal payment orders, etc. This level of automation became possible because the cybercriminals had thoroughly studied how the banking software operated and “tailored” their malicious software modules to a specific banking solution.

The people behind the creation and distribution of Lurk had done exactly the same: studying the client component of the banking software and modifying their malware accordingly. In fact, they created an illegal add-on to the legal RBS product.

Through the information exchanges used by people in the security industry, we learned that several Russian banks were struggling with malicious programs created specifically to attack a particular type of legal banking software. Some of them were having to release weekly patches to customers. These updates would fix the immediate security problems, but the mysterious hackers “on the other side” would quickly release a new version of malware that bypassed the upgraded protection created by the authors of the banking programs.

It should be understood that this type of work – reverse-engineering a professional banking product – cannot easily be undertaken by an amateur hacker. In addition, the task is tedious and time-consuming and not the kind to be performed with great enthusiasm. It would need a team of specialists. But who in their right mind would openly take up illegal work, and who might have the money to finance such activities? In trying to answer these questions, we eventually came to the conclusion that every version of Lurk probably had an organized group of cybersecurity specialists behind it.

The relative lull of 2011-2012 was followed by a steady increase in notifications of Lurk-based incidents resulting in the theft of money. Due to the fact that affected organizations turned to us for help, we were able to collect ever more information about the malware. By the end of 2013, the information obtained from studying hard drive images of attacked computers as well as data available from public sources, enabled us to build a rough picture of a group of Internet users who appeared to be associated with Lurk.

This was not an easy task. The people behind Lurk were pretty good at anonymizing their activity on the network. For example, they were actively using encryption in everyday communication, as well as false data for domain registration, services for anonymous registration, etc. In other words, it was not as easy as simply looking someone up on “Vkontakte” or Facebook using the name from Whois, which can happen with other, less professional groups of cybercriminals, such as Koobface. The Lurk gang did not make such blunders. Yet mistakes, seemingly insignificant and rare, still occurred. And when they did, we caught them.

Not wishing to give away free lessons in how to run a conspiracy, I will not provide examples of these mistakes, but their analysis allowed us to build a pretty clear picture of the key characteristics of the gang. We realized that we were dealing with a group of about 15 people (although by the time it was shut down, the number of “regular” members had risen to 40). This team provided the so-called “full cycle” of malware development, delivery and monetization – rather like a small, software development company. At that time the “company” had two key “products”: the malicious program, Lurk, and a huge botnet of computers infected with it. The malicious program had its own team of developers, responsible for developing new functions, searching for ways to “interact” with RBS systems, providing stable performance and fulfilling other tasks. They were supported by a team of testers who checked the program performance in different environments. The botnet also had its own team (administrators, operators, money flow manager, and other partners working with the bots via the administration panel) who ensured the operation of the command and control (C&C) servers and protected them from detection and interception.

Developing and maintaining this class of malicious software requires professionals and the leaders of the group hunted for them on job search sites. Examples of such vacancies are covered in my article about Russian financial cybercrime. The description of the vacancy did not mention the illegality of the work on offer. At the interview, the “employer” would question candidates about their moral principles: applicants were told what kind of work they would be expected to do, and why. Those who agreed got in.

A fraudster has advertised a job vacancy for java / flash specialists on a popular Ukrainian website. The job requirements include a good level of programming skills in Java, Flash, knowledge of JVM / AVM specifications, and others. The organizer offers remote work and full employment with a salary of $2,500.

So, every morning, from Monday to Friday, people in different parts of Russia and Ukraine sat down in front of their computer and started to “work”. The programmers “tuned” the functions of malware modifications, after which the testers carried out the necessary tests on the quality of the new product. Then the team responsible for the botnet and for the operation of the malware modules and components uploaded the new version onto the command server, and the malicious software on botnet computers was automatically updated. They also studied information sent from infected computers to find out whether they had access to RBS, how much money was deposited in clients’ accounts, etc.

The money flow manager, responsible for transferring the stolen money into the accounts of money mules, would press the button on the botnet control panel and send hundreds of thousands of rubles to accounts that the “drop project” managers had prepared in advance. In many cases they didn’t even need to press the button: the malicious program substituted the details of the payment order generated by the accountant, and the money went directly to the accounts of the cybercriminals and on to the bank cards of the money mules, who cashed it via ATMs, handed it over to the money mule manager who, in turn, delivered it to the head of the organization. The head would then allocate the money according to the needs of the organization: paying a “salary” to the employees and a share to associates, funding the maintenance of the expensive network infrastructure, and of course, satisfying their own needs. This cycle was repeated several times.

Each member of the typical criminal group has their own responsibilities.

These were the golden years for Lurk. The shortcomings in RBS transaction protection meant that stealing money from a victim organization through an accountant’s infected machine did not require any special skills and could even be automated. But all “good things” must come to an end.

The end of “auto money flow” and the beginning of hard times

The explosive growth of thefts committed by Lurk and other cybercriminal groups forced banks, their IT security teams and banking software developers to respond.

First of all, the developers of RBS software blocked public access to their products. Before the appearance of financial cybercriminal gangs, any user could download a demo version of the program from the manufacturer’s website. Attackers used this to study the features of banking software in order to create ever more tailored malicious programs for it. Finally, after many months of “invisible war” with cybercriminals, the majority of RBS software vendors succeeded in perfecting the security of their products.

At the same time, the banks started to implement dedicated technologies to counter the so-called “auto money flow”, the procedure which allowed the attackers to use malware to modify the payment order and steal money automatically.

By the end of 2013, we had thoroughly explored the activity of Lurk and collected considerable information about the malware. At our farm of bots, we could finally launch a consistently functioning malicious script, which allowed us to learn about all the modifications cybercriminals had introduced into the latest versions of the program. Our team of analysts had also made progress: by the year’s end we had a clear insight into how the malware worked, what it comprised and what optional modules it had in its arsenal.

Most of this information came from the analysis of incidents caused by Lurk-based attacks. We were simultaneously providing technical consultancy to the law enforcement agencies investigating the activities of this gang.

It was clear that the cybercriminals were trying to counteract the changes introduced in banking and IT security. For example, once the banking software vendors stopped providing demo versions of their programs for public access, the members of the criminal group established a shell company to receive directly any updated versions of the RBS software.

Thefts declined as a result of improvements in the security of banking software, and the “auto money flow” became less effective. As far as we can judge from the data we have, in 2014 the criminal group behind Lurk seriously reduced its activity and “lived from hand to mouth”, attacking anyone they could, including ordinary users. Even if the attack could bring in no more than a few tens of thousands of rubles, they would still descend to it.

In our opinion, this was caused by economic factors: by that time, the criminal group had an extensive and extremely costly network infrastructure, so, in addition to employees’ salaries, it was necessary to pay for renting servers, VPN and other technical tools. Our estimates suggest that the network infrastructure alone cost the Lurk managers tens of thousands of dollars per month.

Attempts to come back

In addition to increasing the number of “minor” attacks, the cybercriminals were trying to solve their cash flow problem by “diversifying” the business and expanding their field of activity. This included developing, maintaining and renting the Angler exploit pack (also known as XXX). Initially, this was used mainly to deliver Lurk to victims’ computers. But as the number of successful attacks started to decline, the owners began to offer smaller groups paid access to the tools.

By the way, judging by what we saw on Russian underground forums for cybercriminals, the Lurk gang had an almost legendary status. Even though many small and medium-sized groups were willing to “work” with them, they always preferred to work by themselves. So when Lurk provided other cybercriminals with access to Angler, the exploit pack became especially popular – a “product” from the top underground authority did not need advertising. In addition, the exploit pack was actually very effective, delivering a very high percentage of successful vulnerability exploitations. It didn’t take long for it to become one of the key tools on the criminal2criminal market.

As for extending the field of activity, the Lurk gang decided to focus on the customers of major Russian banks and the banks themselves, whereas previously they had chosen smaller targets.

In the second half of 2014, we spotted familiar pseudonyms of Internet users on underground forums inviting specialists to cooperate on document fraud. Early the following year, several Russian cities were swamped with announcements about fraudsters who used fake letters of attorney to re-issue SIM cards without their owners being aware of it.

The purpose of this activity was to gain access to one-time passwords sent by the bank to the user so that they could confirm their financial transaction in the online or remote banking system. The attackers exploited the fact that, in remote areas, mobile operators did not always carefully check the authenticity of the documents submitted and released new SIM cards at the request of cybercriminals. Lurk would infect a computer, collect its owner’s personal data, generate a fake letter of attorney with the help of “partners” from forums and then request a new SIM card from the network operator.

Once the cybercriminals received a new SIM card, they immediately withdrew all the money from the victim’s account and disappeared.

Although initially this scheme yielded good returns, this didn’t last long, since by then many banks had already implemented protection mechanisms to track changes in the unique SIM card number. In addition, the SIM card-based campaign forced some members of the group and their partners out into the open and this helped law enforcement agencies to find and identify suspects.

Alongside the attempts to “diversify” the business and find new cracks in the defenses of financial businesses, Lurk continued to regularly perform “minor thefts” using the proven method of auto money flow. However, the cybercriminals were already planning to earn their main money elsewise.

New “specialists”

In February 2015, Kaspersky Lab’s Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) released its research into the Carbanak campaign targeting financial institutions. Carbanak’s key feature, which distinguished it from “classical” financial cybercriminals, was the participation of professionals in the Carbanak team, providing deep knowledge of the target bank’s IT infrastructure, its daily routine and the employees who had access to the software used to conduct financial transactions. Before any attack, Carbanak carefully studied the target, searched for weak points and then, at a certain moment in time, committed the theft in no more than a few hours. As it turned out, Carbanak was not the only group applying this method of attack. In 2015, the Lurk team hired similar experts.

How the Carbanak group operated.

We realized this when we found incidents that resembled Carbanak in style, but did not use any of its tools. This was Lurk. The Lurk malware was used as a reliable “back door” to the infrastructure of the attacked organization rather than as a tool to steal money. Although the functionality that had previously allowed for the near-automatic theft of millions no longer worked, in terms of its secrecy Lurk was still an extremely dangerous and professionally developed piece of malware.

However, despite its attempts to develop new types of attacks, Lurk’s days were numbered. Thefts continued until the spring of 2016. But, either because of an unshakable confidence in their own impunity or because of apathy, day-by-day the cybercriminals were paying less attention to the anonymity of their actions. They became especially careless when cashing money: according to our incident analysis, during the last stage of their activity, the cybercriminals used just a few shell companies to deposit the stolen money. But none of that mattered any more as both we and the police had collected enough material to arrest suspected group members, which happened early in June this year.

No one on the Internet knows you are a cybercriminal?

My personal experience of the Lurk investigation made me think that the members of this group were convinced they would never be caught. They had grounds to be that presumptuous: they were very thorough in concealing the traces of their illegal activity, and generally tried to plan the details of their actions with care. However, like all people, they made mistakes. These errors accumulated over the years and eventually made it possible to put a stop to their activity. In other words, although it is easier to hide evidence on the Internet, some traces cannot be hidden, and eventually a professional team of investigators will find a way to read and understand them.

Lurk is neither the first nor the last example to prove this. The infamous banking Trojan SpyEye was used to steal money between 2009 and 2011. Its alleged creator was arrested 2013, and convicted in 2014.

The first attacks involving the banking Trojan Carberp began in 2010; the members of the group suspected of creating and distributing this Trojan were arrested in 2012 and convicted in 2014. The list goes on.

The history of these and other cybercriminal groups spans the time when everyone (and members of the groups in particular) believed that they were invulnerable and the police could do nothing. The results have proved them wrong.

Unfortunately, Lurk is not the last group of cybercriminals attacking companies for financial gain. We know about some other groups targeting organizations in Russia and abroad. For these reasons, we recommend that all organizations do the following:

  • If your organization was attacked by hackers, immediately call the police and involve experts in digital forensics. The earlier you apply to the police, the more evidence the forensics will able to collect, and the more information the law enforcement officers will have to catch the criminals.
  • Apply strict IT security policies on terminals from which financial transactions are made and for employees working with them.
  • Teach all employees who have access to the corporate network the rules of safe online behavior.

Compliance with these rules will not completely eliminate the risk of financial attacks but will make it harder for fraudsters and significantly increase the probability of their making a mistake while trying to overcome these difficulties. And this will help law enforcement agencies and IT security experts in their work.

P.S.: why does it take so long?

Law enforcement agencies and IT security experts are often accused of inactivity, allowing hackers to remain at large and evade punishment despite the enormous damage caused to the victims.

The story of Lurk proves the opposite. In addition, it gives some idea of the amount of work that has to be done to obtain enough evidence to arrest and prosecute suspects. Unfortunately, the rules of the “game” are not the same for all participants: the Lurk group used a professional approach to organizing a cybercriminal enterprise, but, for obvious reasons, did not find it necessary to abide by the law. As we work with law enforcement, we must respect the law. This can be a long process, primarily because of the large number of “paper” procedures and restrictions that the law imposes on the types of information we as a commercial organization can work with.

Our cooperation with law enforcement in investigating the activity of this group can be described as a multi-stage data exchange. We provided the intermediate results of our work to the police officers; they studied them to understand if the results of our investigation matched the results of their research. Then we got back our data “enriched” with the information from the law enforcement agencies. Of course, it was not all the information they could find; but it was the part which, by law, we had the right to work with. This process was repeated many times until we finally we got a complete picture of Lurk activity. However, that was not the end of the case.

A large part of our work with law enforcement agencies was devoted to “translating” the information we could get from “technical” into “legal” language. This ensured that the results of our investigation could be described in such a way that they were clear to the judge. This is a complicated and laborious process, but it is the only way to bring to justice the perpetrators of cybercrimes.

Wildfire, the ransomware threat that takes Holland and Belgium hostage

Tue, 08/23/2016 - 14:00

While ransomware is a global threat, every now and then we see a variant that targets one specific region. For example, the Coinvault malware had many infections in the Netherlands, because the authors posted malicious software on Usenet and Dutch people are particular fond of downloading things over Usenet. Another example is the recent Shade campaign, which targets mostly Russia and CIS.

Today we can add a new one to the list: Wildfire.

Infection vector

Wildfire spreads through well-crafted spam e-mails. A typical spam e-mail mentions that a transport company failed to deliver a package. In order to schedule a new delivery the receiver is asked to make a new appointment, for which a form has to be filled in, which has to be downloaded from the website of the transport company.

Three things stand out here. First, the attackers registered a Dutch domain name, something we do not see very often. Second, the e-mail is written in flawless Dutch. And thirdly, they actually put the address of the targeted company in the e-mail. This is something we do not see very often and makes it for the average user difficult to see that this is not a benign e-mail.

However, when we look at who registered the domain name, we immediately see that something is suspicious:

The registration date (registered a few days before the spam campaign started), as well as the administrative contact person seem to be very suspicious.

The Word document

After the user downloaded and opened the Word document, the following screen is shown:

Apparently the document has some macros, containing pieces of English text, which clearly show the intent of the attackers (actually it is the lyrics of the famous Pink Floyd song Money), but also has several variables in the Polish language.

The ransomware itself

The macros download and execute the actual Wildfire ransomware which consists in the case we analyzed of the following three files:

  1. Usiyykssl.exe;
  2. Ymkwhrrxoeo.png;
  3. Iesvxamvenagxehdoj.xml

The exe file is an obfuscated .net executable that depends on the other two files. This is exactly similar to the Zyklon ransomware that also consists of three files. Another similarity is that, according to some sources (,, Wildfire, GNLocker and Zyklon mainly target the Netherlands. In addition, the ransom notes of Wildfire and Zyklon look quite similar. Also note that Wildfire and Zyklon increase the amount you have to pay three-fold if you don’t pay within the specified amount of time.

Anyway, back to Wildfire. The binary is obfuscated, meaning that when there is no deobfuscator available reversing and analyzing it can take a lot of time. Therefore we decided to run it and see what happens. Just as we hoped, this made things a bit easier, because after a while Usiyykssl.exe launched Regasm.exe, and when we looked into the memory of Regasm.exe, we clearly saw that some malicious code had been injected into it.

Dumping it gave us the binary of the actual Wildfire malware. Unfortunately for us, this binary is also obfuscated, this time with Confuserex 0.6.0. Even though it is possible to deobfuscate binaries obfuscated with Confuserex, we decided to skip that for now. Why? Well it takes a bit of time, and because by working together with the police on this case, we had something much better in our hands: The botnetpanel code!

Inside the botnetpanel code

When you are infected with Wildfire, the malware calls home to the C2 server where information such as the IP, username, rid and country are stored. The botnetpanel then checks whether the country is one of the blacklisted countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Estonia and Moldova). It also checks whether the “rid” exists within a statically defined array (we therefore expect the rid to be an affiliate ID).

If the rid is not found, or you live in one of the blacklisted countries, the malware terminates and you won’t get infected.

Each time the malware calls home, a new key is generated and added to the existing list of keys. The same victim can thus have multiple keys. Finally the botnetpanel returns the bitcoin address to which the victim should pay, and the cryptographic key with which the files on the victim’s computer are encrypted. We don’t quite understand why a victim can have multiple keys, especially since the victim only has one bitcoin address.

Also interesting is the encryption scheme. It uses AES in CBC mode but the key and the IV are both derived from the same key. This doesn’t add much security and defeats the sole purpose of having an IV in the first place.


Even though Wildfire is a local threat, it still shows that ransomware is effective and evolving. In less than a month we observed more than 5700 infections and 236 users paid a total amount of almost 70.000 euro . This is also due to the fact that the spam e-mails are getting better and better.

We therefore advise users to:

  • Be very suspicious when opening e-mails;
  • Don’t enable Word macro’s;
  • Always keep your software up-to-date;
  • Turn on Windows file extensions;
  • Create offline backups (or online backups with unlimited revisions);
  • Turn on the behavioral analyzer of your AV.

A decryption tool for Wildfire can be downloaded from the website.

P.S. the attackers agree with us on some points:

Threat intelligence report for the telecommunications industry

Mon, 08/22/2016 - 04:56

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The telecommunications industry keeps the world connected. Telecoms providers build, operate and manage the complex network infrastructures used for voice and data transmission – and they communicate and store vast amounts of sensitive data. This makes them a top target for cyber-attack.

According to PwC’s Global State of Information Security, 2016, IT security incidents in the telecoms sector increased 45% in 2015 compared to the year before. Telecoms providers need to arm themselves against this growing risk.

In this intelligence report, we cover the main IT security threats facing the telecommunications industry and illustrate these with recent examples.

Our insight draws on a range of sources. These include:

  • The latest telecoms security research by Kaspersky Lab experts.
  • Kaspersky Lab monitoring systems, such as the cloud antivirus platform, Kaspersky Security Network (KSN), our botnet tracking system and multiple other internal systems including those used to detect and track sophisticated targeted (advanced persistent threat, APT) attacks and the corresponding malware.
  • Underground forums and communities.
  • Centralized, specialized security monitoring systems (such as Shodan).
  • Threat bulletins and attack reports.
  • Newsfeed aggregation and analysis tools.

Threat intelligence is now a vital weapon in the fight against cyber-attack. We hope this report will help telecoms providers to better understand the cyber-risk landscape so that they can develop their security strategies accordingly.

We can provide more detailed sector and company-specific intelligence on these and other threats. For more information on our Threat Intelligence Reporting services please email

Executive summary

Telecommunications providers are under fire from two sides: they face direct attacks from cybercriminals intent on breaching their organization and network operations, and indirect attacks from those in pursuit of their subscribers. The top threats currently targeting each of these frontlines feature many classic attack vectors, but with a new twist in terms of complexity or scale that place new demands on telecoms companies.

These threats include:

  • Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. DDoS attacks continue to increase in power and scale and, according to the 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report, the telecommunications sector is hit harder than any other. Kaspersky Lab’s research reveals that in Q2, 2016, the longest DDoS attack lasted for 291 hours (or 12.1 days) – significantly longer than the previous quarter’s maximum (8.2 days), with vulnerable IoT devices increasingly used in botnets. Direct DDoS attacks can reduce network capacity, degrade performance, increase traffic exchange costs, disrupt service availability and even bring down Internet access if ISPs are hit. They can be a cover for a deeper, more damaging secondary attack, or a route into a key enterprise subscriber or large-scale ransomeware attack.
  • The exploitation of vulnerabilities in network and consumer devices. Our intelligence shows that vulnerabilities in network devices, consumer or business femtocells, USBs and routers, as well as root exploits for Android phones, all provide new channels for attacks – involving malware and technologies that individuals, organisations and even basic antivirus solutions cannot always easily remove.
  • Compromising subscribers with social engineering, phishing or malware. These classic techniques remain popular and can easily be mastered by entry-level cybercriminals, although 2016 sees changes in how more sophisticated attackers conduct their campaigns. Growing numbers of cyber-attackers now combine data sets from different sources, including open sources, to build up detailed pictures of potential targets for blackmail and social engineering purposes.
  • Insider threat is growing. Detailed profiles of targets are also used to recruit insiders to help perpetrate cybercrime. Some insiders help voluntarily, others are cooerced through blackmail. Insiders from cellular service providers are recruited mainly to provide access to data, while staff working for Internet service providers are chosen to support network mapping and man-in-the-middle attacks.

Other threats facing telecommunications companies include targeted attacks; poorly configured access controls, particularly where interfaces are publicly available to any Internet user; inadequate security for 2G/3G communications; and the risk of telecoms providers being drawn into unrelated attacks that exploit telecoms resources, and suffering collateral damage as a result.

Typical threats targeting telecoms Overview

We can divide the main threats facing the telecommunications industry into two, interrelated, categories:

  • Threats targeting telecommunication companies directly. These include DDoS attacks, targeted attacks (APT campaigns), network device vulnerabilities and human-related threats like insider access, social engineering and the risk of allowing third parties to access information.
  • Threats targeting subscribers of telecoms services – particularly the customers of cellular service providers (CSPs) and Internet service providers (ISPs). These include malware for mobile devices, subscriber data harvesting, end-user device vulnerabilities, and more.
Threats directed at telecoms companies DDoS

DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks remain a serious threat to telecoms providers around the world as attackers discover ever more ways of boosting the power and scale of attacks. Kaspersky Lab’s DDoS intelligence report for Q2, 2016 notes that websites in 70 countries were targeted with attacks. By far the most affected country was China, with South Korea and the US also among the leaders. 70.2% of all detected attacks were launched from Linux botnets, with cybercriminals paying close attention to financial institutions working with cryptocurrency. Another trend observed in Q2 was the use of vulnerable IoT devices in botnets to launch DDoS attacks.

The telecommunications sector is particularly vulernable to DDoS attacks. According to the 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report, the telecommunications sector was hit around twice as hard as the second placed sector (financial exchanges), with a median DDoS packet count of 4.61 million packets per second (compared to 2.4 Mpps for exchanges.)

The impact of a DDoS attack should not be underestimated. Direct attacks can reduce network capacity, degrade performance, increase traffic exchange costs, disrupt service availability and even bring down Internet access if ISPs are affected. With a growing number of connected devices and systems supporting mission-critical applications in areas such as healthcare and transport, unexpected downtime could be life threatening.

Further, DDoS attacks can be a cover for a deeper, more damaging secondary attack, or a route into a key enterprise subscriber or large-scale ransomeware attack.

A good example of the first is the 2015 cyber-attack on the UK telecoms company, TalkTalk. The hack, alledgedly perpetrated by a couple of teenagers, resulted in the loss of around 1.2 million customers’ email addresses, names and phone numbers, as well as many thousands of customer dates of birth and financial information – all ideal for use in financially-motivated social engineering campaigns. The forensic investigation revealed that the hackers had used a smokescreen DDoS attack to conceal their main activities.

DDoS attacks are also evolving. 2015 saw attackers amplify the power of DDoS attacks by turning them into DrDoS (Distributed reflection Denial of Service) attacks through the use of standard network protocols like NTP, RIPv1, NetBIOS (Network Basic Input/Output System) and BGP (Border Gateway Patrol). Another approach that is becoming more commonplace is the compromise of end-user routers via network-scanning malware and firmware vulnerabilities. Today’s faster mobile data transfer speeds and the growing adoption of 4G are also making smartphone-based botnets more useful for implementing DDoS attacks.

The worrying thing is that even inexperienced attackers can organize quite an effective DDoS campaign using such techniques.

Targeted attacks

The core infrastructure of a telecommunications company is a highly desirable target for cybercriminals, but gaining access is extremely difficult. Breaking into the core requires a deep knowledge of GSM architecture, rarely seen except among the most skilled and resourced cybercriminals. Such individuals can generally be found working for advanced, international APT groups and nation-state attackers, entities that have a powerful interest in obtaining access to the inner networks of telecommunication companies. This is because compromised network devices are harder to detect by security systems and they offer more ways to control internal operations than can be achieved through simple server/workstation infiltration.

Once inside the core infrastructure, attackers can easily intercept calls and data, and control, track and impersonate subscibers.

Other APTs with telecommunications on their radar

The Regin APT campaign, discovered in 2014, remains of the most sophisticated ever seen and has the ability to infiltrate GSM networks, while the Turla group, has developed the ability to hijack satellite-based Internet links as part of it’s Command & Control process, successfully obscuring its actual location.

Others, such as Dark Hotel and a new cyber-espionage threat actor likely to be of Chinese origin, exploit telecoms networks in their targeted campaigns. In these cases, the telecoms providers often suffer collateral damage even though they are not directly related to the attack. Further details on these can be found on Kaspersky Lab’s expert Securelist blog or through a subscription to the Kaspersky APT Threat Intelligence Reporting service.

Unaddressed software vulnerabilities

Despite all the high profile hacks and embarrassing data leaks of the last 12 months, attackers are still breaching telecoms defenses and making off with vast quantities of valuable, personal data. In many cases, attackers are exploiting new or under-protected vulnerabilities. For example, in 2015, two members of the hacker group, Linker Squad gained access to Orange Spain through a company website vulnerable to a simple SQL injection, and stole 10 million items of customer and employee data.

SQL injection vulnerability on Orange Spain web site

The impact of service misconfiguration

In many cases, the hardware used by by the telecommunications industry carries configuration interfaces that can be accessed openly via HTTP, SSH, FTP or telnet. This means that if the firewall is not configured correctly, the hardware in question becomes an easy target for unauthorized access.

The risk presented by publicly exposed GTP/GRX (GPRS Tunneling Protocol/GPRS Roaming Exchange) ports on devices provides a good example of this.

As CSPs encrypt the GPRS traffic between the devices and the Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN), it is difficult to intercept and decrypt the transferred data. However, an attacker can bypass this restriction by searching on for devices with open GTP ports, connecting to them and then encapsulating GTP control packets into the created tunnel.

Table 1. Top 10 countries with GTP/GRX ports exposed to Internet access

# Country Number of GTP/GRX 1 China 52.698 2 Turkey 8.591 3 United States of America 6.403 4 Canada 5.807 5 Belgium 5.129 6 Colombia 2.939 7 Poland 2.842 8 Morocco 1.585 9 Jamaica 862 10 United Arab Emirates 808

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the routing protocol used to make decisions on routing between autonomous systems. Acceptance and propagation of routing information coming from other peers can allow an attacker to implement man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks or cause denial of service. Any route that is advertised by a neighboring BGP speaker is merged in the routing database and propagated to all the other BGP peers.

Table 2. Top five countries with BGP protocol exposed to Internet access

# Country Number of devices
(end of 2015)
1 Republic of Korea 16.209 2 India 8.693 3 United States of America 8.111 4 Italy 2.909 5 Russian Federation 2.050

An example of such an attack took place in March 2015, when Internet traffic for 167 important British Telecom customers, including a UK defense contractor that helps to deliver the country’s nuclear warhead program, was illegally diverted to servers in Ukraine before being passed along to its final destinations.

To avoid probable attacks against BGP from unauthorized remote malefactors, we recommend that companies provide network filtering, allowing only a limited number of authorized peers to connect to BGP services. To protect against malicious re-routing and hijacking initiated through authorized autonomous systems we recommend that they monitor anomalies in BGP communications (this can be done through specialized software solutions or by subscribing to alerts from vendors providing this kind of monitoring.)

Vulnerabilities in network devices

Routers and other network devices are also primary targets for attacks against telecommunications companies.

In September 2015, FireEye researchers revealed the router malware “SYNful knock”, a combination of leaked privilege (root) credentials and a way of replacing device firmware that targets Cisco 1841, 2811 and 3825 routers (see Cisco advisory here).

Put simply, SYNful knock is a modified device firmware image with backdoor access that can replace the original operating system if the attacker has managed to obtain privileged access to the device or can physically connect to it.

SYNful is not a pure software vulnerability, but a combination of leaked privileged credentials combined with a certain way of replacing device firmware. Still, it is a dangerous way of compromising an organization’s IT infrastructure.

SYNful knock backdoor sign-in credentials request

Worldwide distribution of devices with the SYNful knock backdoor

The latest information on the number of potentially compromised devices is available through the link

A second Cisco vulnerability, CVE-2015-6389 enables attackers to access some sensitive data, such as the password file, system logs, and Cisco PCA database information, and to modify data, run internal executables and potentially make the system unstable or inaccessible. Cisco Prime Collaboration Assurance Software releases prior to 11.0 are vulnerable. Follow this Cisco bulletin for remediation actions.

For further information on Cisco fixes for its devices see

Juniper, another network device manufacturer has been found to carry vulnerabilities in its operating system for its NetScreen VPN appliances, enabling third-party access to network traffic. The issue was reported by the vendor in the security advisory JSA10713 on December 18th, 2015, along with the release of the patch.

It appears that the additional code with hardcoded password was planted in the source code in late 2013. The backdoor allows any user to log in with administrator privileges using hard-coded password “<<< %s(un=’%s’) = %u”.This vulnerability has been identified as CVE-2015-7755 and is considered highly critical.

Top countries where ScreenOS devices are used are the Netherlands, the United States, China, Italy and Mexico.

Juniper ScreenOS-powered devices worldwide

Another Juniper backdoor, CVE-2015-7756, affects ScreenOS 6.2.0r15 through 6.2.0r18 and 6.3.0r12 through 6.3.0r20 and allows a third party to monitor traffic inside VPN connections due to security flaws in the Dual_EC PRNG algorithm for random number generation.

To protect the organization from misconfiguration and network device vulnerabilitiy, Kaspresky Lab recommendats that companies pay close attention to vulnerabilities in the network services of telecommunication equipment, establish effective vulnerability and configuration management processes, and regularly perform security assessments, including penetration testing for different types of attackers (a remote intruder, a subscriber, a contractor, etc.).

Malicious insiders

Even if you consider your critical systems and devices protected and safe, it is difficult to fully control some attack vectors. People rank at the very top of this list. Their motivations are often hard to predict and anticipate, ranging from a desire for financial gain to disaffection, coercion and simple carelessness.

While insider-assisted attacks are uncommon, the impact of such attacks can be devastating as they provide a direct route to the most valuable information.

Examples of insider attacks in recent years include:

  • A rogue telecoms employee leaking 70 million prison inmate calls, many breaching client-attorney privilege.
  • An SMS center support engineer who had intercepted messages containing OTP (One-Time Passwords) for the two-step authentication required to login to customer accounts at a popular fintech company. The engineer was found to be freely offering his services on a popular DarkNet forum.

For attackers, infiltrating the networks of ISPs and CSPs requires a certain level of experience – and it is often cheaper and easier to stroll across the perimeter with the help of a hired or blackmailed insider. Cybercriminals generally recruit insiders through two approaches: enticing or coercing individual employees with relevant skills, or trawling around underground message boards looking for an appropriate employee or former employee.

Employees of cellular service providers are in demand for fast track access to subscriber and company data or SIM card duplication/illegal reissuing, while staff working for Internet service providers are needed for network mapping and man-in-the-middle attacks.

A particularly promising and successful attack vector for recruiting an insider for malicious intrusion is blackmail.

Data breaches, such as the 2015 Ashley Madison leak reveal information that attackers can compare with other publically available information to track down where people work and compromise them accordingly. Very often, these leaked databases contain corporate email addresses, including those of telecommunication companies.

Further information on the emerging attack vectors based on the harvesting of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) can be obtained using Kaspersky Lab’s customer-specific Intelligence Reporting services.

Threats targeting CSP/ISP subscribers Overview

Attacks targeting the customers of cloud and Internet service providers remain a key area of interest for cybercriminals. We’ve revealed a number of malware activities and attack techniques based on internal information and incidents that were caught in our scope. As a result of analyzing this data the following main threats were identified:

  • Obtaining subscribers’ credentials. This is growing in appeal as consumers and businesses undertake ever more activity online and particularly on mobile. Further, security levels are often intentionally lowered on mobile devices in favor of usability, making mobile attacks even more attractive to criminals.
  • Compromising subscribers’ devices. The number of mobile malware infections is on the rise, as is the sophistication and functionality of the malware. Experienced and skilled programmers are now focusing much of their attention on mobile – looking to exploit payment services as well as low-valued assets like compromised Instagram or Uber accounts, collecting every piece of data from the infected devices.
  • Compromising small-scale telecoms cells used by consumers and businesses. Vulnerabilities in CSP-provided femtocells allow criminals to compromise the cells and even gain access to the entire cloud provider’s network.
  • Successful Proof-Of-Concept attacks on USIM cards. Recent research shows that the cryptography of 3G/4G USIM cards is no longer unbreakable. Successful attacks allow SIM card cloning, call spoofing and the interception of SMS.
Social engineering, phishing and other ways in

Social engineering and phishing remain popular activities and they continues to evolve and improve, targeting unaware or poorly aware subscribers and telecoms employees.

The attackers exploit trust and naiivity. In 2015, the TeamHans hacker group penetrated one of Canada’s biggest communications groups, Rogers, simply by repeatedly contacting IT support and impersonating mid-ranking employees, in order to build up enough personal information to gain access to the employee’s desktop. The attack provided hackers with access to contracts with corporate customers, sensitive corporate e-mails, corporate employee IDs, documents, and more.

Both social engineering and phishing approaches are worryingly successful. The Data Breach Investigations Report 2016 found that 30% of phishing emails were opened, and that 12% clicked on the malicious attachment – with the entire process taking, on average, just 1 minute and 40 seconds.

Social engineers and phishers also use multiple ways for increasing the likeness of authenticity in their attacks, enriching their data with leaked profiles, or successfully impersonating employees or contractors. Recently criminals have successfully stolen tens of thousands of euros from dozens of people across Germany after finding a way around systems that text a code to confirm transactions to online banking users. After infecting their victims with banking malware and obtaining their phone numbers, they called the CSP’s support and, impersonating a retail shop, asked for a new SIM card to be activated, thus gaining access to OTP (One Time Passwords) or “mTan’s” used for two-factor authentication in online banking.

Kaspersky Lab recommends that telecommunications providers implement notification services for financial organizations that alert them when a subscriber’s SIM card has been changed or when personal data is modified.

Some CSPs have also implemented a threat exchange service to inform financial industry members when a subscriber’s phone is likely to have been infected with malware.

Vulnerable kit

USBs, modems and portable Wi-Fi routers remain high-risk assets for subscribers, and we continue to discover multiple vulnerabilities in their firmware and user interfaces. These include:

  • Vulnerabilities in web interfaces designed to help consumers configure their devices. These can be modified to trick a user into visiting a specially crafted page.
  • Vulnerabilities that result from insufficient authentication. These can allow for the modification of device settings (like DNS server addresses), and the interception, sending and receiving of SMS messages, or USSD requests, by exploiting different XSS and CSRF vulnerabilities.
  • RCE (Remote Code Execution) vulnerabilities based on different variants of embedded Linux that can enable firmware modification and even a complete remote compromise.

Built-in “service” backdoor allowing no-authentication access to device settings

Examples of these kind of vulnerabilities were demonstrated in research by Timur Yunusov from the SCADAStrangeLove team. The author assessed a number of 3G/4G routers from ZTE, Huawei, Gemtek and Quanta. He has reported a number of serious vulnerabilities:

  • Remote Code Execution from web scripts.
  • Arbitrary device firmware modification due to insufficient consistency checks.
  • Cross Site Request Forgert and Cross Site Scripting attacks.

All these vectors can be used by an external attacker for the following scenarios:

  • Infecting a subscriber’s computer via PowerShell code or badUSB attack.
  • Traffic modification and interception.
  • Subscriber account access and device settings modification.
  • Revealing subscriber location.
  • Using device firmware modification for APT attack persistence.

Most of these issues exist due to web interface vulnerabilities (like insufficient input validation or CSRF) or modifications made by the vendor during the process of branding its devices for a specific telecommunications company.

The risk of local cells

Femtocells, which are essentially a personal NodeB with an IP network connection, are growing in popularity as an easy way to improve signal coverage inside buildings. Small business customers often receive them from their CSPs. However, unlike core systems, they are not always submitted to suitably thorough security audits.

Femtocell connection map

Over the last year, our researchers have found a number of serious vulnerabilities in such devices that could allow an attacker to gain complete control over them. Compromising a femtocell can lead to call interception, service abuse and even illegal access to the CSP’s internal network.

At the moment, a successful attack on a femtocell requires a certain level of engineering experience, so risks remain low – but this is likely to change in the future.

USIM card vulnerabilities

Research presented at BlackHat USA in 2015 revealed successful attacks on USIM card security. USIMs had previously been considered unbreakable thanks to the AES-based MILENAGE algorithm used for authentication. The reseachers conducted differential power analysis for the encryption key and secrets extraction that allowed them to clone the new generation of 3G/4G SIM cards from different manufacturers.

Right byte guess peak on differential power analysis graph


Telecommunications is a critical infrastructure and needs to be protected accordingly. The threat landscape shows that vulnerabilities exist on many levels: hardware, software and human, and that attacks can come from many directions. Telecoms providers need to start regarding security as a process – one that encompasses threat prediction, prevention, detection, response and investigation.

A comprehensive, multi-layered security solution is a key component of this, but it is not enough on its own. It needs to be complemented by collaboration, employee education and shared intelligence. Many telecommunications companies already have agreements in place to share network capability and capacity in the case of disruption, and now is the time to start reaping the benefit of shared intelligence.

Our Threat Intelligence Reporting services can provide customer-specific insight into the threats facing your organization. If you’ve ever wondered what your business looks like to an attacker, now’s the time to find out. Contact us at

Brazilian banking Trojans meet PowerShell

Thu, 08/18/2016 - 11:43

Crooks are always creating new ways to improve the malware they use to target bank accounts, and now Brazilian bad guys have made an important addition to their arsenal: the use of PowerShell. Brazil is the most infected country worldwide when it comes to banking Trojans, according to our Q1 2016 report, and the quality of the malware is evolving dramatically. We found Trojan-Proxy.PowerShell.Agent.a in the wild a few days ago, marking a new achievement by Brazil’s cybercriminals.

The malware is distributed using a malicious email campaign disguised as a receipt from a mobile operator with a malicious .PIF file. After the file is executed it changes the proxy configuration in Internet Explorer to a malicious proxy server that redirects connections to phishing pages for Brazilian banks. It’s the same technique used by malicious PACs that we described in 2013, but this time no PACs are used; the changes in the system are made using a PowerShell script. As Windows 7 and newer OS versions are now the most popular in Brazil, the malware will not face a problem running on victims’ computers.

The malware has no C&C communication. After execution it spawned the process “powershell.exe” with the command line “-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File %TEMP%\599D.tmp\599E.ps1” aiming to bypass PowerShell execution policies. The .ps1 file in the temp folder uses random names. It’s a base64 encoded script capable of making changes in the system.

After some deobfuscation we can see the goal of the script: to change the Internet Settings key and enable a proxy server on it:

And this is the result in the browser of the victim – a small change in the proxy settings:

This change will not only affect IE but all other browsers installed in the system as well, as they tend to use the same proxy configuration set on IE. The proxy domains used in the attack are listed below. All of them use dynamic DNS services and their goal is to redirect all traffic to a server located in the Netherlands (, where there are several phishing pages for Brazilian banks:


The malware also has other features of interest: it checks for the language of the OS and aborts if it’s not PTBR, a clever trick to avoid infecting Windows versions in languages other than Brazilian Portuguese.

To protect a network against malware that uses PowerShell, it is important to modify its execution, using administrative templates that only allow signed scripts. We are sure this is the first of many that Brazil’s bad guys will code.

Hash of the malware: cancelamento.pif -> MD5: 9419e7cd60487532313a43559b195cb0

Spam and phishing in Q2 2016

Thu, 08/18/2016 - 06:58

 Download the full report (PDF)

Spam: quarterly highlights The year of ransomware in spam

Although the second quarter of 2016 has only just finished, it’s safe to say that this is already the year of ransomware Trojans. By the end of Q2 there was still a large number of emails with malicious attachments, most of which download ransomware in one way or other to a victim’s computer. However, in the period between 1 June and 21 June the proportion of these emails decreased dramatically.

The majority of malicious attachments were distributed in ZIP archives. The decline can therefore be clearly seen in the following graph showing spam with ZIP attachments that arrived in our traps:

Number of emails with malicious ZIP archives, Q2 2016

In addition to the decline, June saw another interesting feature: this sort of spam was not sent out on Saturdays or Sundays.

The same situation could be observed in KSN: the number of email antivirus detections dropped sharply on 1 June and grew on 22 June.

Number of email antivirus detections by day, Q2 2016

This decline was caused by a temporary lull in activity by the Necurs botnet, which is mostly used to distribute this type of malicious spam. After the botnet resumed its activity, the spam email template changed, and the malicious attachments became even more sophisticated.

As in the previous quarter, the spam messages were mainly notifications about bills, invoices or price lists that were supposedly attached to the email. The attachments actually contained a Trojan downloader written in Javascript, and in most cases the malware loaded the Locky encryptor.

For example, some emails (see the screenshot above) contained an attachment with a Trojan downloader. When run, it downloaded Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Locky.agn, which encrypts the data on a victim’s computer and demands a ransom, to be paid in bitcoin.


The second quarter saw spammers continue to mask links using various Unicode ranges designed for specific purposes. This tactic became especially popular in 2015, and is still widely used by spammers.

The link in this example looks like this:

If you transfer the domain from UTF-8 into the more familiar HTML, it becomes . The characters, which look quite ordinary, in fact belong to the Mathematical Alphanumeric Symbols UTF range used in highly specific mathematical formulas, and are not intended for use in plain text or hyperlinks. The dot in the domain is also unusual: it is the fullwidth full stop used in hieroglyphic languages. The rest of the hyperlink, as well as the rest of the text in these spam messages, is written using the Latin alphabet.

Spam in APT attacks

In Q2, we came across a number of APT attacks in the corporate sector. Emails were made to look as if they came from representatives of the targeted company, and contained a request to immediately transfer money to a specific account. The text was fairly plausible and hinted at a personal acquaintance and previous communication. In some cases, the emails included the logo of the attacked company. All the messages conveyed a sense of urgency (“ASAP”, “urgent”, “must be completed today”) – scammers often use this trick in an attempt to catch people off guard, so that they act rather than think.

Below is an example:

Hello NNNNN,

How are you doing! Are you available at the office? I need you to process an overdue payment that needs to be paid today.



The emails were sent selectively – to individual employees, usually connected to the finance department. The knowledge shown by the scammers suggests the attack was carefully prepared.

The most suspicious aspect of the attack was the domain used in the ‘From’ field – myfirm.moby – that differed from the corporate one. Perhaps the attackers hope that some email clients only show the sender’s name by default, while concealing the address.

It is not that difficult to write any domain in the ‘From’ field, and in the future we can expect more well-prepared attacks.

Sporting events in spam

Spam mailings exploiting real-life events have long become an integral part of junk email. Sporting events are not as popular among spammers as political events, although their use is increasing with every year. There is a continuous stream of emails mentioning various political figures, while sport-related spam messages usually only appear in the run-up to an event. However, we have noticed that mass mailings can now be launched long before an event starts. For instance, emails exploiting the Olympic Games in Brazil were discovered over a year ago, in the second quarter of 2015. The majority of them were fraudulent emails designed to trick recipients and steal their personal information and money.

The classic scenario involves false notifications about lottery wins related to 2016 Olympics. The messages claim that the lottery was held by the official organizers of the games and the recipient was selected at random from millions of addresses. In order to claim the cash, the recipient has to reply to the email and provide some personal information.

The text of the message was often contained in an attached file (.pdf, .doc, .jpg), while the body of the message only displayed a short text prompting the recipient to open the attachment.

There were also more traditional messages where the spammer text was included directly in the body of the message.

In addition to fraudulent messages, advertising spam was also sent out.

Unlike the Olympics, football tournaments have long been used by scammers to grab people’s attention to their spam. Q2 2016 saw the long-awaited UEFA European Championship, and in the run-up to the tournament spam traffic included fake notifications of lottery wins. The content was no different from that dedicated to the Olympic Games, and the emails also contained attachments explaining why the message was sent.

The football theme was also exploited by ‘Nigerian’ scammers. They sent out emails supposedly on behalf of the former FIFA president, and used the infamous corruption scandal associated with his name to make their messages look more realistic. They believed that a fabricated story about how Sepp Blatter had supposedly received money and secretly transferred it to an account in a European bank would not arouse suspicion. In return for keeping the money in their bank accounts, the recipients were promised a 40% cut of the total sum.

In order to convince recipients that the message was genuine, the authors even went to the trouble of using the correct name and domain in the ‘From’ field.

US politicians in spam

The presidential election campaign is now in full swing in the United States and the nominees and their entourages are under close media scrutiny. Of course, spammers couldn’t resist using the names of high-profile politicians in their advertising and fraudulent emails. For example, numerous ‘Nigerian’ letters were sent in the name of current president Barack Obama and his wife Michelle. In their ‘official’ emails, the ‘President’ and the ‘First lady’ assured the recipient that a bank card or a check for a very large sum of money had already been issued in their name. The only thing the recipient had to do was complete some formalities, and the money would be delivered shortly afterwards. In order to get the instructions from the White House the recipient had to send some personal information, including their email address and the password for their email account, as well as detailed passport information to spoofed email addresses.

Another politician whose name regularly cropped up in spam was Donald Trump, one of the contenders for the US presidency. Spammers offered a unique Trump technique for earning money online: anyone who wanted to know how to get rich, had to click a link in the emails which were designed to look like news reports from CNN and Fox News.

The links led to fake news sites also in the style of major media outlets and news networks. The sites contained a story about a simple method for earning money – the publication of links, which is basically another kind of spam distribution. In order to participate in the program, a user had to register by providing their phone number and email address.

Statistics Proportion of spam in email traffic

Percentage of spam in global email traffic, Q2 2016

The largest percentage of spam in the second quarter – 59.46% – was registered in May and was 3 p.p. more than in April. The average percentage of spam in global email traffic for Q2 amounted to 57.25%.

Sources of spam by country

Sources of spam by country, Q2 2016

In Q2 2016, the biggest three sources of spam remained the same as in the previous quarter – the US (10.79%), Vietnam (10.10%) and India (10.01%). However, the figures for each country changed: the gap between them narrowed to within a single percentage point.

China (6.52%) moved up to fourth with an increase of 1.43 p. p. compared to Q1. Mexico (4.55%) came fifth, followed by Russia (4.07%) and France (3.60%). Brazil (3.28%), which was fourth in the previous quarter, lost 2.2 p.p. and dropped to eighth place. Germany (2.97%) and Turkey (2.30%) completed the TOP 10.

Spam email size

Breakdown of spam emails by size, Q1 and Q2 2016

Traditionally, the most commonly distributed emails are very small – up to 2 KB (72.26%), although the proportion of these emails dropped by 9.6 p.p. compared to the previous quarter. Meanwhile, the share of emails sized 10-20 KB increased by 6.76 p.p. The other categories saw minimal changes.

Malicious email attachments

Currently, the majority of malicious programs are detected proactively by automatic means, which makes it very difficult to gather statistics on specific malware modifications. So we have decided to turn to the more informative statistics of the TOP 10 malware families.

TOP 10 malware families

The three most popular malware families remained unchanged from the previous quarter – Trojan-Downloader.JS.Agent (10.45%), Trojan-Downloader.VBS.Agent (2.16%) and Trojan-Downloader.MSWord.Agent (1.82%).

The Trojan.Win32.Bayrob family moved up to fourth place (1.68%), while the Backdoor.Win32.Androm family fell from fourth to ninth place with 0.6%.

TOP 10 malware families in Q2 2016

A newcomer to this ranking was the Trojan.Win32.Inject family (0.61%). The malicious programs from this family embed their code in the address space of other processes.

The Trojan-Spy.HTML.Fraud family (0.55%) rounded off the TOP 10 in Q2 2016.

Countries targeted by malicious mailshots

Distribution of email antivirus verdicts by country, Q2 2016

Germany (14.69%) topped the ranking of countries targeted by malicious mailshots, although its share decreased 4.24 p.p. It was followed by China (13.61%) whose contribution grew 4.18 p.p. Japan (6.42%) came third after ending the previous quarter in seventh with a share of 4.29%.

Fourth place was occupied by Brazil (5.57%). Italy claimed fifth with a share of 4.9% and Russia remained in sixth (4.36%).

The US (4.06%) was the seventh most popular target of malicious mailshots. Austria (2.29%) rounded off this TOP 10.


In Q2 2016, the Anti-Phishing system was triggered 32,363,492 times on the computers of Kaspersky Lab users, which is 2.6 million less than the previous quarter. Overall, 8.7% of unique users of Kaspersky Lab products were attacked by phishers in Q2 of 2016.

Geography of attacks

The country where the largest percentage of users is affected by phishing attacks was China (20.22%). In Q2 2016, the proportion of those attacked increased by 3.52 p.p.

Geography of phishing attacks*, Q2 2015

* Number of users on whose computers the Anti-Phishing system was triggered as a percentage of the total number of Kaspersky Lab users in the country

The percentage of attacked users in Brazil decreased by 2.87 p.p. and accounted for 18.63%, placing the country second in this ranking. Algeria (14.3%) came third following a 2.92 p.p. increase in its share compared to the previous quarter.

TOP 10 countries by percentage of users attacked:

China 20.22% Brazil 18.63% Algeria 14.3% United Kingdom 12.95% Australia 12.77% Vietnam 11.46% Ecuador 11.14% Chile 11.08% Qatar 10.97% Maldives 10.94% Organizations under attack

The statistics on phishing targets are based on detections of Kaspersky Lab’s heuristic anti-phishing component. It is activated every time a user attempts to open a phishing page while information about it has not yet been included in Kaspersky Lab’s databases. It does not matter how the user attempts to open the page – by clicking a link in a phishing email or in a message on a social network or, for example, as a result of malware activity. After the security system is activated, a banner is displayed in the browser warning the user about a potential threat.

In Q2 of 2016, the share of the ‘Global Internet portals’ category (20.85%), which topped the rating in the first quarter, decreased considerably – by 7.84 p.p. The share of the ‘Financial organizations’ category grew 2.07 p.p. and accounted for 46.23%. This category covers ‘Banks’ (25.43%, +1.51 p.p.), ‘Payment systems’ (11.24%, -0.42 p.p.) and ‘Online stores’ (9.39%, +0.99 p.p.).

Distribution of organizations affected by phishing attacks by category, Q2 2016

The share of attacks on the ‘Social networking sites’ category increased by 2.65 p.p. and reached 12.4%. The ‘Online games’ category was also attacked more often (5.65%, + 1.96 p.p.). Meanwhile, the ‘Telephone and Internet service providers’ (4.33%) and the ‘IMS’ (1.28%) categories lost 1.17 p.p. and 2.15 p.p. respectively.

Hot topics this quarter The Olympics in Brazil

For a number of years now Brazil has been among the countries with the highest proportion of users targeted by phishing. In 2015 and 2016 phishers have focused on the Rio Olympic Games in Brazil. Last quarter showed that as well as ordinary users, the potential victims of phishing included the organizers of the Olympic Games.

The Olympic theme remained popular in Q2, with phishers working overtime to send out fake notifications about big cash wins in a lottery that was supposedly organized by the Brazilian government and the Olympic Committee.

‘Porn virus’ for Facebook users

Facebook users are often subjected to phishing attacks. During one attack in the second quarter, a provocative video was used as bait. To view it, the user was directed to a fake page imitating the popular YouTube video portal, and told to install a browser extension.

This extension requested rights to read all the data in the browser, potentially giving the cybercriminals access to passwords, logins, credit card details and other confidential user information. The extension also distributed more links on Facebook that directed to itself, but which were sent using the victim’s name.

Phisher tricks Compromising domains with good reputation

To bypass security software filters, fraudsters try to place phishing pages on domains with good reputations. This significantly reduces the probability of them being blocked and means potential victims are more trusting. The phishers can strike it big if they can use a bank or a government agency domain for their purposes. In Q2, we came across a phishing attack targeting the visitors of a popular Brazilian e-commerce site: the fake page was located on the domain of a major Indian bank. This is not the first time fraudsters have compromised the domain of a large bank and placed their content on it.

Phishing pages targeting the users of the Brazilian store

When trying to purchase goods on the fake pages of the store, the victim is asked to enter lots of personal information. When it’s time to pay, the victim is prompted to print out a receipt that now shows the logo of a Brazilian bank.

The domains of state structures are hacked much more frequently by phishers. In Q2 2016, we registered numerous cases where phishing pages were located on the domains belonging to the governments of various countries. Here are just a few of them:

Phishing pages located on the domains of government authorities

The probability of these links being placed on blacklists is negligible thanks to the reputation of the domain.

TOP 3 organizations attacked

Fraudsters continue to focus most of their attention on the most popular brands, enhancing their chances of a successful phishing attack. More than half of all detections of Kaspersky Lab’s heuristic anti-phishing component fall on phishing pages hiding behind the names of fewer than 15 companies.

The TOP 3 organizations attacked most frequently by phishers accounted for 23% of all phishing links detected in Q2 2016.

Organization % of detected phishing links 1 Microsoft 8.1 2 Facebook 8.03 3 Yahoo! 6.87

In Q2 2016, this TOP 3 ranking saw a few changes. Microsoft was the new leader with 8.1% (+0.61 p.p.), while Facebook (8.03%, +2.32 p.p.) came second. The share of attacks targeting Yahoo! (6.87%) fell 1.46 p.p., leaving last quarter’s leader in third.

Q2 leader Microsoft is included in the ‘Global Internet portals’ category because the user can access a variety of the company’s services from a single account. This is what attracts the fraudsters: in the event of a successful attack, they gain access to a number of services used by the victim.

Example of phishing on, a Microsoft service


In the second quarter of 2016, the proportion of spam in email traffic increased insignificantly – by 0.33 p.p. – compared to the previous quarter and accounted for 57.25%. The US remained the biggest source of spam. As in the previous quarter, the top three sources also included Vietnam and India.

Germany was once again the country targeted most by malicious mailshots, followed closely by China. Japan, which was seventh in the previous quarter’s ranking, completed the TOP 3 in Q2.

Trojan-Downloader.JS.Agent remained the most popular malware family distributed via email. Next came Trojan-Downloader.VBS.Agent and Trojan-Downloader.MSWord.Agent. A significant amount of malicious spam was used to spread ransomware Trojans such as Locky. For almost a month, however, cybercriminals did not distribute their malicious spam, but then the Necurs botnet began working again. We don’t expect to see any significant reduction in the volume of malicious spam in the near future, although there may be changes in email patterns, the complexity of the malware, as well as the social engineering methods used by attackers to encourage a user to launch a malicious attachment.

The focus of phishing attacks shifted slightly from the ‘Global Internet portals’ to the ‘Financial organizations’ category.

The theme of the Olympic Games was exploited by both phishers and spammers to make users visit fake pages with the aim of acquiring their confidential information or simply to get their money.

Events in the political arena, such as the presidential election in the US, also attracted spammers, while the sites of government agencies were compromised in phishing attacks.

As we can see, the overriding trend of the quarter is that of fraud and making quick money from victims using direct methods such as Trojan cryptors that force unprotected users to pay a ransom, or phishing attacks that target financial organizations, rather than long drawn-out scams. All of this once again highlights the need for both comprehensive protection on computers and increased vigilance by Internet users.

Operation Ghoul: targeted attacks on industrial and engineering organizations

Wed, 08/17/2016 - 04:56


Kaspersky Lab has observed new waves of attacks that started on the 8th and the 27th of June 2016. These have been highly active in the Middle East region and unveiled ongoing targeted attacks in multiple regions. The attackers try to lure targets through spear phishing emails that include compressed executables. The malware collects all data such as passwords, keystrokes and screenshots, then sends it to the attackers.

#OpGhoul targeting industrial, manufacturing and engineering organizations in 30+ countries


We found that the group behind this campaign targeted mainly industrial, engineering and manufacturing organizations in more than 30 countries. In total, over 130 organizations have been identified as victims of this campaign. Using the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) and artifacts from malware files and attack sites, we were able to trace the attacks back to March 2015. Noteworthy is that since the beginning of their activities, the attackers’ motivations are apparently financial, whether through the victims’ banking accounts or through selling their intellectual property to interested parties, most infiltrated victim organizations are considered SMBs (Small to Medium size businesses, 30-300 employees), the utilization of commercial off-the-shelf malware makes the attribution of the attacks more difficult.

In total, over 130 organizations have been identified as victims of Operation Ghoul #OpGhoul


In ancient Folklore, the Ghoul is an evil spirit associated with consuming human flesh and hunting kids, originally a Mesopotamian demon. Today, the term is sometimes used to describe a greedy or materialistic individual.

Main infection vector: malicious emails

The following picture represents emails that are being used to deliver malware to the victims, in what looks like a payment document. The e-mails sent by attackers appear to be coming from a bank in the UAE, the Emirates NBD, and include a 7z file with malware. In other cases, victims received phishing links. A quick analysis of the email headers reveals fake sources being utilised to deliver the emails to victims.

Malicious attachments

In the case of spear phishing emails with an attachment, the 7z does not contain payment instructions but a malware executable (EmiratesNBD_ADVICE.exe). We have observed executables with the following MD5s:

Malware MD5 hashes


Email file MD5 hashes


The spear phishing emails are mostly sent to senior members and executives of targeted organizations, most likely because the attackers hope to get access to core intelligence, controlling accounts and other interesting information from people who have the following positions or similar:

  • Chief Executive Officer
  • Chief Operations Officer
  • General Manager
  • General Manager, Sales and Marketing
  • Deputy General Manager
  • Finance and Admin Manager
  • Business Development Manager
  • Manager
  • Export manager
  • Finance Manager
  • Purchase manager
  • Head of Logistics
  • Sales Executive
  • Supervisor
  • Engineer
Technical details Malware functionality

The malware is based on the Hawkeye commercial spyware, which provides a variety of tools for the attackers, in addition to malware anonymity from attribution. It initiates by self-deploying and configuring persistence, while using anti-debugging and timeout techniques, then starts collecting interesting data from the victim’s device, including:

  • Keystrokes
  • Clipboard data
  • FileZilla ftp server credentials
  • Account data from local browsers
  • Account data from local messaging clients (Paltalk, Google talk, AIM…)
  • Account data from local email clients (Outlook, Windows Live mail…)
  • License information of some installed applications

#OpGhoul malware collects all data such as #passwords, keystrokes and screenshots


Data exfiltration

Data is collected by the attackers using primarily:

Http GET posts

  • Sent to hxxp://

Email messages

  • mail.ozlercelikkapi[.]com (, mail to info@ozlercelikkapi[.]com
  • mail.eminenture[.]com (, mail to eminfo@eminenture[.]com

Both ozlercelikkapi[.]com and eminenture[.]com seem to belong to compromised organisations operating in manufacturing and technology services.

Malware command center

The malware connects to to deliver collected information from the victim’s PC. This information includes passwords, clipboard data, screenshots…


The IP address seems to belong to a compromised device running multiple malware campaigns.

Victim information

Victim organizations are distributed in different countries worldwide with attackers focused on certain countries more than others:

Number of Victim Organisations by Country

Countries marked as “others” have less than three victim organizations each, they are: Switzerland, Gibraltar, USA, Sweden, China, France, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Turkey, Romania, Iran, Iraq and Italy.

Victim industry information

Victim industry types were also indicators of targeted attacks as attackers were looking to infiltrate organizations that belong to the product life cycle of multiple goods, especially industrial equipment.

#Manufacturing #transportation #travel targets of #OpGhoul


Number of Victim Organizations by Industry Type

Victim industry description

Industrial Petrochemical, naval, military, aerospace, heavy machinery, solar energy, steel, pumps, plastics Engineering Construction, architecture, automation, chemical, transport, water Shipping International freight shipping Pharmaceutical Production/research of pharmaceutical and beauty products Manufacturing Furniture, decor, textiles Trading Industrial, electronics and food trading Education Training centers, universities, academic publishing Tourism Travel agencies Technology/IT Providers of IT technologies and consulting services Unknown Unidentified victims The last attack waves

Kaspersky Lab user statistics indicate the new waves of attacks that started in June 2016 are focused on certain countries more than others.

#opghoul highly active in #MiddleEast


Hundreds of detections have been reported by Kaspersky Lab users; 70% of the attacked users were found in the United Arab Emirates alone, the other 30% were distributed in Russia, Malaysia, India, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Algeria, Germany, Iran, Egypt, Japan, Switzerland, Bahrain and Tunisia.

Other attack information

Phishing pages have also been spotted through, and although they are taken down quickly, more than 150 user accounts were identified as victims of the phishing links sent by the attackers. Victims were connecting from the following devices and inserting their credentials, a reminder that phishing attacks do work on all platforms:

  • Windows
  • Mac OS X
  • Ubuntu
  • iPhone
  • Android

The malware files are detected using the following heuristic signatures:



Operation Ghoul is one of the many attacks in the wild targeting industrial, manufacturing and engineering organizations, Kaspersky Lab recommends users to be extra cautious while checking and opening emails and attachments. In addition, privileged users need to be well trained and ready to deal with cyber threats; failure in this is, in most cases, the cause behind private or corporate data leakage, reputation and financial loss.

Indicators of Compromise

The following are common among the different malware infections; the presence of these is an indication of a possible infection.

Filenames and paths related to malware


List of malware related MD5 hashes


List of malware related domains


Observed phishing URLs


Other malware links

Malware links observed on dating back to March and April 2016:


For more information on how you can protect your business from similar attacks, please visit this post from Kaspersky Business.

The Equation Giveaway

Tue, 08/16/2016 - 15:22

Rare implementation of RC5/RC6 in ‘ShadowBrokers’ dump connects them to Equation malware

August 13, 2016 saw the beginning of a truly bizarre episode. A new identity going under the name ‘ShadowBrokers’ came onto the scene claiming to possess files belonging to the apex predator of the APT world, the Equation Group [PDF]. In their initial leak, the ShadowBrokers claimed the archive was related to the Equation group, however, they didn’t provide any technical details on the connections.

Along with some non-native rants against ‘Wealthy Elites’, the ShadowBrokers provided links to two PGP-encrypted archives. The first was provided for free as a presumptive show of good faith, the second remains encrypted at the time of writing. The passphrase is being ‘auctioned’, but having set the price at 1 million BTC (or 1/15th of the total amount of bitcoin in circulation), we consider this to be optimistic at best, if not ridiculous at face value.

The first archive contains close to 300MBs of firewall exploits, tools, and scripts under cryptonyms like BANANAUSURPER, BLATSTING, and BUZZDIRECTION. Most files are at least three years old, with change entries pointing to August 2013 the newest timestamp dating to October 2013.

As researchers continue to feast on the release, some have already begun to test the functional capabilities of the exploits with good results.

Having originally uncovered the Equation group in February 2015, we’ve taken a look at the newly released files to check for any connections with the known toolsets used by Equation, such as EQUATIONDRUG, DOUBLEFANTASY, GRAYFISH and FANNY.

While we cannot surmise the attacker’s identity or motivation nor where or how this pilfered trove came to be, we can state that several hundred tools from the leak share a strong connection with our previous findings from the Equation group.

The Devil’s in the Crypto

The Equation group uses the RC5 and RC6 encryption algorithms quite extensively throughout their creations. RC5 and RC6 are two encryption algorithms designed by Ronald Rivest in 1994 and 1998. They are very similar to each other, with RC6 introducing an additional multiplication in the cypher to make it more resistant. Both cyphers use the same key setup mechanism and the same magical constants named P and Q.

The particular RC5/6 implementation from Equation group’s malware is interesting and deserves special attention because of its specifics. Inside the Equation group malware, the encryption library uses a subtract operation with the constant 0x61C88647. In most publicly available RC5/6 code, this constant is usually stored as 0x9E3779B9, which is basically -0x61C88647. Since an addition is faster on certain hardware than a subtraction, it makes sense to store the constant in its negative form and adding it instead of subtracting. In total, we’ve identified 20 different compiled versions of the RC5/6 code in the Equation group malware.

Encryption-related code in a DoubleFantasy (actxprxy32.dll) sample

In the screenshot above, one can observe the main loop of a RC6 key setup subroutine extracted from one of the Equation group samples. The ShadowBrokers’ free trove includes 347 different instances of RC5/RC6 implementations. As shown in the screenshot below, the implementation is functionally identical including the subtraction of the inverted constant 0x61C88647.

Specific RC6 implementation from “BUSURPER-2211-611.exe” (md5: 8f137a9100a9fcc8b512b3729878a373

Comparing the older, known Equation RC6 code and the code used in most of the binaries from the new leak we observe that they are functionally identical and share rare specific traits in their implementation.

In case you’re wondering, this specific RC6 implementation has only been seen before with Equation group malware. There are more than 300 files in the Shadowbrokers’ archive which implement this specific variation of RC6 in 24 different forms. The chances of all these being faked or engineered is highly unlikely.

This code similarity makes us believe with a high degree of confidence that the tools from the ShadowBrokers leak are related to the malware from the Equation group. While the ShadowBrokers claimed the data was related to the Equation group, they did not provide any technical evidence of these claims. The highly specific crypto implementation above confirms these allegations.

More details about the ShadowBrokers leak and similarities with Equation group are available to Kaspersky Intelligence Services reports’ subscribers. For more information, email

Good morning Android!

Mon, 08/15/2016 - 06:13

This morning, we encountered a gratuitous act of violence against Android users. By simply viewing their favorite news sites over their morning coffee users can end up downloading last-browser-update.apk, a banking Trojan detected by Kaspersky Lab solutions as Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.q. There you are, minding your own business, reading the news and BOOM! – no additional clicks or following links required. And be careful – it’s still out there!

Download of a malicious application while viewing a news site using AdSense

It turns out the malicious program is downloaded via the Google AdSense advertising network. Be warned, lots of sites use this network – not just news sites – to display targeted advertising to users. Site owners are happy to place advertising like this because they earn money every time a user clicks on it. But anyone can register their ad on this network – they just need to pay a fee. And it seems that didn’t deter the authors of the Svpeng Trojan from pushing their creation via AdSense. The Trojan is downloaded as soon as a page with the advert is visited.

A similar case was registered in mid-July by the Meduza news portal. As a result, they disabled advertising from AdSense on their pages. At that time the technique was used to distribute an earlier version of the Trojan.

Screenshot from the Meduza news site (

The Svpeng family of banking Trojans has long been known to Kaspersky Lab and possesses a standard set of malicious functions. After being installed and launching, it disappears from the list of installed apps and requests the device’s admin rights (to make it harder for antivirus software or the user to remove it). Svpeng can steal information about the user’s bank cards via phishing windows, intercept, delete, and send text messages (this is necessary for attacks on remote banking systems that use SMS as a transport layer). Also, the malware can counteract mobile security solutions that are popular in Russia by completeing their processes.

In addition, Svpeng collects an impressive amount of information from the user’s phone – the call history, text and multimedia messages, browser bookmarks and contacts.

Be careful and use antivirus solutions!

Special thanks to our colleague Stanislav Zaytsev for the video.

Conference Report: HITCON 2016 in Taipei

Sun, 08/14/2016 - 21:25

Hacks in Taiwan Conference (HITCON) 2016 was held on 22 – 23 July 2016 in Taipei, Taiwan. The theme of HITCON Community this year is “Security or Nothing”, focusing on hacking techniques and information security.

About 1,500 participants attended to the event coming from the United States, India, Korea, China, Japan and Taiwan. The attendees enjoyed their opportunities to meet security experts, security researchers and malware analysts from each country to discuss information security, APT research and malware analysis. Among them, more than 20 percent were students who possess high skills and promising futures.

This conference agenda included various topics: a 0-day exploit of the Windows 10 built-in browser “Edge”, research regarding an attempt to break the key of an IoT intelligent electric network, and talks on ransomware.

The following are summaries of a few of the impressive presentations:

  1. BLE authentication design challenges on IoT Devices: Analyzing Gogoro Smart Scooter

Mr. GD (Team T5) introduced how to analyze Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) and provided details of communication protocols between IoT devices and a smartphone that controls them. He explained a problem in authentication mechanism and application protocol of the Gogoro smart scooter. He demonstrated that other people were able to unlock the scooter and proposed a better authentication mechanism to solve the problem.




2. Bug Bounty: The story of a bug hunter

Mr. Orange Tsai (student) explained what a bug bounty program is, including how to get ready and cautions for participating in a bug bounty. He shared his point of view over finding bugs, as well as examples from his own experiences. Some remote code executions on Facebook, Uber, Apple and Yahoo! were introduced. In addition, he talked about eBay’s SQL Injection and several cross-site scripting cases on Facebook, Apple and Google by showing sample code for each.



If you are interested, you can see the HITCON 2016 presentations at

The last session of the 2nd day was a “Lightning talk show” which included technical short presentations that covered recent topics. For example, the first speaker talked about how to communicate with an APT operator and showed the attributions in a recent incident. Another speaker introduced how to crack and hack “Pokémon GO” and they demonstrated how to hook the GPS and control it. They published their code as an open source project on GitHub.



This conference did not consist only of briefings, but also some fun events: a hacker board game, a Raspberry Pi Wargame challenge and the Wall of Sheep. One funny thing that occurred was when some captured traffic indicated someone made a connection to a Japanese dating site via the HITCON public Wi-Fi. It was a window of opportunity for attendees to learn their own vulnerabilities.

The official language of this conference was Chinese, but there were no worries; The event staff wearing an “ask me anything” (何でも聞いて) -sticker with a cute-smile-emoji helped attendees with English and Japanese translations.

In conclusion, HITCON 2016 was really interesting and exciting. We really enjoyed this conference and plan to attend in years to come. The HITCON community has another event, HITCON Pacific ( from 28 November to 3 December 2016. Hopefully we will be in attendance for that one as well:)

IT threat evolution in Q2 2016. Statistics

Thu, 08/11/2016 - 06:57

 Download the full report (PDF)

All the statistics used in this report were obtained using Kaspersky Security Network (KSN), a distributed antivirus network that works with various anti-malware protection components. The data was collected from KSN users who agreed to provide it. Millions of Kaspersky Lab product users from 213 countries and territories worldwide participate in this global exchange of information about malicious activity.

Q1 figures
  • According to KSN data, Kaspersky Lab solutions detected and repelled 171,895,830 malicious attacks from online resources located in 191 countries all over the world.
  • 54,539,948 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by web antivirus components.
  • Kaspersky Lab’s web antivirus detected 16,119,489 unique malicious objects: scripts, exploits, executable files, etc.
  • Attempted infections by malware that aims to steal money via online access to bank accounts were registered on 1,132,031 user computers.
  • Crypto ransomware attacks were blocked on 311,590 computers of unique users.
  • Kaspersky Lab’s file antivirus detected a total of 249,619,379 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.
  • Kaspersky Lab mobile security products detected:
    • 3,626,458 malicious installation packages;
    • 27,403 mobile banker Trojans (installation packages);
    • 83,048 mobile ransomware Trojans (installation packages).
Mobile threats

In Q2 2016, Kaspersky Lab detected 3,626,458 malicious installation packages – 1.7 times more than in the previous quarter.

Number of detected malicious installation packages (Q3 2015 – Q2 2016)

Distribution of mobile malware by type

As of this quarter, we will calculate the distribution of mobile malware by type based on the number of detected malicious installation packages rather than modifications, as was the case in earlier reports.

Distribution of new mobile malware by type (Q1 2016 and Q2 2016)

In Q2 2016, RiskTool software, or legal applications that are potentially dangerous to users, topped the ranking of detected malicious objects for mobile devices. Their share increased from 31.6% in Q1 to 45.1% this quarter.

Adware occupies second place. The share of these programs fell 1.4 p.p. compared to the previous quarter, and accounted for 14.2%.

The share of SMS Trojans fell from 18.5% to 10.8%, pushing this category of malicious programs down from second to third place in the ranking. Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.qu and Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.f accounted for most of the detected SMS Trojans, with both accounting for approximately 30% of all malicious files in this category.

The Trojan-Dropper share also fell – from 14.5% in Q1 to 9.2%. Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Agent.v led the way: we detected more than 50,000 installation packages related to this Trojan.

TOP 20 mobile malware programs

Please note that this ranking of malicious programs does not include potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or adware.

Name % of attacked users* 1 DangerousObject.Multi.Generic 80.87 2 Trojan.AndroidOS.Iop.c 11.38 3 7.71 4 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob.h 6.59 5 Backdoor.AndroidOS.Ztorg.a 5.79 6 Backdoor.AndroidOS.Ztorg.c 4.84 7 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob.pac 4.41 8 Trojan.AndroidOS.Iop.t 4.37 9 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Gorpo.b 4.3 10 Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.a 4.30 11 Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.i 4.25 12 4.00 13 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Triada.d 3.10 14 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Rootnik.f 3.07 15 Trojan.AndroidOS.Hiddad.v 3.03 16 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Rootnik.h 2.94 17 Trojan.AndroidOS.Iop.o 2.91 18 Trojan.AndroidOS.Rootnik.ab 2.91 19 Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.e 2.85 20 Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec.a 2.83

* Percentage of unique users attacked by the malware in question, relative to all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile security product that were attacked.

First place is occupied by DangerousObject.Multi.Generic (80.87%), the classification used for malicious programs detected by cloud technologies. Cloud technologies work when the antivirus database contains neither the signatures nor heuristics to detect a malicious program, but the cloud of the antivirus company already contains information about the object. This is basically how the very latest malware is detected.

As in the previous quarter, 16 Trojans that use advertising as their main means of monetization (highlighted in blue in the table) made it into the TOP 20. Their goal is to deliver as many adverts as possible to the user, employing various methods, including the installation of new adware. These Trojans may use superuser privileges to conceal themselves in the system application folder, from which it will be very difficult to delete them.

Trojan.AndroidOS.Iop.c (11.38%) moved from third to second in the TOP 20 and became the single most popular malicious program of the quarter. Over the reporting period we detected this Trojan in 180 countries, but the majority of attacked users were in Russia, India and Algeria. Iop.c can exploit a variety of vulnerabilities in the system to gain superuser privileges. The main method of monetization is displaying advertising and installing (usually secretly) various programs on the user’s device, including other malicious programs.

In Q2 2016, @kaspersky repelled 172M malicious attacks via online resources located in 191 countries #KLreport #Infosec


Representatives of the Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob ransomware family claimed fourth and seventh places. These Trojans demand a ransom of $100-200 from victims to unblock their devices. Attacks using this Trojan were registered in over 120 countries worldwide in Q2, with a substantial number of victims located in Germany and the US.

Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec.a (2.83%) has now spent over a year in the mobile malware TOP 20, although it is starting to lose ground. It used to be an ever-present in the TOP 5 mobile threats, but for the second quarter in a row it has only made it into the bottom half of the ranking. Its functionality has remained practically unchanged; its main means of monetization is to subscribe users to paid services.

The geography of mobile threats

The geography of attempted mobile malware infections in Q2 2016 (percentage of all users attacked)

TOP 10 counties attacked by mobile malware (ranked by percentage of users attacked)

Country* % of users attacked ** 1 China 36.31 2 Bangladesh 32.66 3 Nepal 30.61 4 Uzbekistan 22.43 5 Algeria 22.16 6 Nigeria 21.84 7 India 21.64 8 Indonesia 21.35 9 Pakistan 19.49 10 Iran 19.19

* We eliminated countries from this ranking where the number of users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile security product is lower than 10,000.
** Percentage of unique users attacked in each country relative to all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile security product in the country.

China topped the ranking, with more than 36% of users there encountering a mobile threat at least once during the quarter. China also came first in this ranking in Q1 2016.

In all the countries of this ranking, except China, the most popular mobile malware was the same – advertising Trojans that appeared in the TOP 20 mobile malware, and AdWare. The most popular malicious program was Trojan.AndroidOS.Iop.c. In China, a significant proportion of attacks also involved advertising Trojans, but the majority of users there encountered the Backdoor.AndroidOS.GinMaster and Backdoor.AndroidOS.Fakengry families, while Trojan.AndroidOS.Iop.c only occupied sixteenth place.

Russia (10.4%) was 26th in this ranking, Germany (8.5%) 38th, Italy (6.2%) 49th, and France (5.9%) 52th. The US (5.0%) came 59th and the UK (4.6%) 64th.

The safest countries were Austria (3.6%), Sweden (2.9%) and Japan (1.7%).

Mobile banking Trojans

As of this quarter, we will calculate the distribution of mobile malware by type based on the number of detected malicious installation packages rather than modifications, as was the case in earlier reports. Over the reporting period, we detected 27,403 mobile Trojans, which is 1.2 times less than in Q1.

Number of mobile banking Trojans detected by Kaspersky Lab solutions (Q3 2015 – Q2 2016)

The TOP 5 most popular mobile banking Trojans in Q2 consisted of representatives from just two families – Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub and Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.

Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.i was the most popular mobile banking Trojan of the quarter. It uses different methods to trick users and bypass system constraints. In Q1 we identified a modification of this mobile Trojan that overlaid the regular system window requesting device administrator privileges with its own window containing buttons. The Trojan thereby conceals the fact that it is gaining elevated privileges in the system from the user, and tricks the user into approving these privileges. In Q2, we detected a modification that requested the user’s permission to become the main SMS application.

Dialog window of Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.i asking for the user’s approval to become the main SMS application

This allows the Trojan to bypass the system constraints introduced in Android 4.4, and to hide incoming SMSs from the user (as a rule, it hides messages from banks and payment systems). In order to make users save this malicious program in the settings as the main SMS application, the Trojan authors had to, among other things, implement a messenger interface.

The Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.i interface used to create and send messages

Asacub is actively distributed via SMS spam.

Russia and Germany lead in terms of the number of users attacked by mobile banking Trojans:

Geography of mobile banking threats in Q2 2016 (percentage of all users attacked)

The number of attacked users depends on the overall number of users within each individual country. To assess the risk of a mobile banker Trojan infection in each country, and to compare it across countries, we created a country ranking according to the percentage of users attacked by mobile banker Trojans.

TOP 10 counties attacked by mobile banker Trojans (ranked by percentage of users attacked)

Country* % of users attacked** 1 Russia 1.51 2 Australia 0.73 3 Uzbekistan 0.45 4 Korea 0.35 5 China 0.34 6 Ukraine 0.33 7 Denmark 0.28 8 Germany 0.24 9 Turkey 0.23 10 Kyrgyzstan 0.17

* We eliminated countries from this ranking where the number of users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile security product is lower than 10,000.
** Percentage of unique users in each country attacked by mobile banker Trojans, relative to all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile security product in the country.

In Q2 2016, first place was occupied by Russia (1.51%) where the majority of affected users encountered the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub, Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng and Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Faketoken families of mobile banker Trojans.

China, last quarter’s leader, fell to fifth place this quarter.

In second place again was Australia where the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Acecard family was replaced by the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Marcher family as the most popular threat.

Banking Trojans were especially popular with attackers in Russia and Australia. The percentage of users attacked by this malware in the two countries relative to all attacked users accounted for 14%.

Mobile Trojan-Ransomware

As of this quarter, we will calculate the distribution of mobile malware by type based on the number of detected malicious installation packages rather than modifications, as was the case in earlier reports.

In Q2 2016, we detected 83,048 mobile Trojan-Ransomware installation packages, which is about the same number as the previous quarter and seven times more than in Q4 2015.

Number of mobile Trojan-Ransomware installation packages detected by Kaspersky Lab
(Q3 2015 – Q2 2016)

The sharp rise in the number of mobile Trojan-Ransomware installation packages in 2016 was caused by the active proliferation of the Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob family of Trojans. In the first quarter of 2016, this family accounted for 96% of users attacked by mobile ransomware. In Q2 its share was 85%.

In Q2 2016, 54.5M unique malicious URLs were recognized by @kaspersky web antivirus components #KLreport #IT


Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob.h became the most popular mobile Trojan-Ransomware in the second quarter – it accounted for nearly 60% of users attacked by mobile ransomware. Once run, the Trojan requests administrator privileges, collects information about the device, including the GPS coordinates and call history, and downloads the data to a malicious server. After that, it may get a command to block the device. In the second quarter we registered a growth in the number of installation packages related to Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Congur.b: their share grew from 0.8% to 8.8%. This Trojan, targeting Chinese-speaking users, changes the system password (PIN), or installs it if no password was installed earlier, thus making it impossible to use the device. The notification containing the ransom demand is displayed on the screen of the blocked device.

Germany, the US and Russia had the highest number of users attacked by Trojan-Ransomware this quarter:

Geography of mobile Trojan-Ransomware in Q2 2016 (percentage of all users attacked)

To assess the risk of a mobile banker Trojan infection in each country, and to compare it across countries, we created a country ranking according to the percentage of users attacked by mobile Trojan-Ransomware.

TOP 10 counties attacked by mobile Trojan-Ransomware (ranked by percentage of users attacked)

Country* % of users attacked** 1 Canada 2.01 2 Germany 1.89 3 US 1.66 4 Switzerland 1.63 5 Mexico 1.55 6 UK 1.51 7 Denmark 1.35 8 Italy 1.35 9 Kazakhstan 1,35 10 Netherlands 1.15

* We eliminated countries from this ranking where the number of users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile security product is lower than 10,000.
** Percentage of unique users in each country attacked by mobile Trojan-Ransomware, relative to all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile security product in the country.

In all the countries of the TOP 10, except for Kazakhstan, the most popular Trojan-Ransom family was Fusob. In the US, the Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng family was also popular. These Trojans demand a ransom of $100-500 from victims to unblock their devices.

In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the main threat to users originated from representatives of the Small mobile Trojan-Ransom family. This is a fairly simple ransomware program that blocks operation of a device by overlaying all the windows on the device with its own window and demanding $10 to unblock it.

Vulnerable applications exploited by cybercriminals

In Q2 2016, exploits for Adobe Flash Player remained popular. During the reporting period two new vulnerabilities were discovered in this software:

  • СVE-2016-4117
  • CVE-2016-4171

An exploit for CVE-2016-4117 was added to the Magnitude and Neutrino exploit kits. The CVE-2016-4171 vulnerability was used by the ScarCruft group to carry out targeted attacks. We wrote a more detailed account of this group’s activities in a blog published in mid-June.

In Q2 2016, @kaspersky web #antivirus detected 16,119,489 unique malicious objects #KLreport #netsec


The main event this quarter was the demise of the long-term market leaders – the Angler and Nuclear exploit kits. Angler’s departure resulted in market players shifting to other kits to distribute malware. In particular, we registered a dramatic growth in the popularity of the Neutrino exploit kit.

This is how the overall picture for the use of exploits in the second quarter looks:

Distribution of exploits used in attacks by the type of application attacked, Q2 2016

The chart shows that despite the exit of the market leaders the breakdown of exploits was almost unchanged from the previous quarter: the proportion of exploits for Microsoft Office (14%) and Java (7%) fell by 1 p.p., while the share for Android grew 2 p.p. and reached 24%. This suggests that demand for exploit kits has been spread among the remaining players: RIG, Magnitude and Neutrino. The latter was the undisputed leader this quarter in terms of the number of attempts to download malware.

Online threats (Web-based attacks)

The statistics in this section were derived from web antivirus components that protect users from attempts to download malicious objects from a malicious/infected website. Malicious websites are created deliberately by malicious users; infected sites include those with user-contributed content (such as forums), as well as compromised legitimate resources.

In the second quarter of 2016, Kaspersky Lab’s web antivirus detected 16,119,489 unique malicious objects: scripts, exploits, executable files, etc. 54,539,948 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by web antivirus components.

Online threats in the banking sector

These statistics are based on the detection verdicts of Kaspersky Lab products, received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who have consented to provide their statistical data.

Number of users attacked by malware targeting finances<

Due to the constant emergence of new representatives of banking Trojans and functional changes in existing banking Trojans, in the second quarter of 2016 we have significantly updated the list of verdicts classed as banking risks. This means the number of financial malware victims has changed significantly compared to the data published in previous quarters. As a comparison, we have recalculated the statistics for the previous quarter, taking into account all the malware from the updated list.

Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked attempts to launch malware capable of stealing money via online banking on 1,132,031 computers in Q2 2016. The quarter saw an increase in financial malware activity: the figure for Q2 is 15.6% higher than that for the previous quarter (979, 607).

Number of users attacked by malware targeting finances, Q2 2016

Geography of attack

To evaluate and compare the risk of being infected by banking Trojans worldwide, we calculate the percentage of Kaspersky Lab product users who encountered this type of threat during the reporting period in the country, relative to all users of our products in the county.

Geography of banking malware attacks in Q2 2016 (percentage of attacked users)

TOP 10 countries by percentage of attacked users

Country* % of attacked users** 1 Turkey 3.45 2 Russia 2.92 3 Brazil 2.63 4 Pakistan 2.60 5 Venezuela 1.66 6 Tunisia 1.62 7 Japan 1.61 8 Singapore 1.58 9 Libya 1.57 10 Argentina 1.48

These statistics are based on the detection verdicts returned by the antivirus module, received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who have consented to provide their statistical data.
* We excluded those countries in which the number of Kaspersky Lab product users is relatively small (less than 10,000).
** Unique users whose computers have been targeted by banking Trojan attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

The highest percentage of Kaspersky Lab users attacked by banking Trojans was in Turkey. One of the reasons for the growth in financial threats there was a burst of activity by the Gozi banking Trojan whose developers have joined forces with the creators of the Nymaim Trojan.

In Russia, 2.92% of users encountered a banking Trojan at least once in Q2, placing it second in this ranking.

Brazil rounds off the top three. We expect a surge in financial threats in Latin America in the next quarter due to the Olympic Games in Brazil. This event is just too tempting for cybercriminals to ignore – they regularly use the theme of major sporting events in their attacks to lure potential victims.

The top five countries where users were least affected by banking Trojans were Canada (0.33%), the US (0.4%), the UK (0.4%), France (0.43%) and the Netherlands (0.5%).

The percentage of banking Trojan victims in Italy was 0.62%, in Spain it was 0.83%, while in Germany the figure was 1.03%.

The TOP 10 banking malware familie>

The table below shows the top 10 malware families most commonly used in Q2 2016 to attack online banking users (as a percentage of users attacked):

Name* Percentage of users attacked** 1 Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot 15.72 2 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Gozi 3.28 3 Trojan.Win32.Qhost 2.35 4 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Shiotob 2.27 5 Trojan-Banker.Win32.BestaFera 2.12 6 Trojan.Win32.Nymaim 1.98 7 Trojan-Banker.Win32.ChePro 1.90 8 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Banbra 1.77 9 Trojan.Win32.Neurevt 0.67 10 Backdoor.Win32.Shiz 0.66

* The detection verdicts of Kaspersky Lab products, received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who have consented to provide their statistical data.
** Unique users whose computers have been targeted by the malware in question as a percentage of all users attacked by financial malware.

Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot in first place is a permanent fixture in the leading positions of this ranking, and it is no coincidence: the source codes of this Trojan became publicly available back in 2012. This has resulted in the emergence of new banking Trojans that have adopted fragments of the Zbot code.

The second quarter of 2016 saw a surge in malicious activity by Trojan.Win32.Nymaim. As a result, this Trojan made it into the top 10 for the first time, going straight in at sixth place. Nymaim was initially designed to block access to valuable data and then demand a ransom (ransomware) to unblock it, but the latest version now also includes banking Trojan functionality for stealing financial information. This can be explained by the fact that the creators of Nymaim and Gozi (which also appears in the Q2 TOP 10 financial risks) have joined forces. Nymaim’s source code now includes fragments of Gozi code that provide attackers with remote access to infected computers.

In Q2 2016, Attempted infections by financial #malware were registered on 1.1M user computers #KLreport #banking


A permanent resident in this ranking and one of the reasons financial threats are so prominent in Brazil is the Trojan-Banker.Win32.ChePro family. This banking malware lets cybercriminals take screenshots, register keystrokes, and read the contents of the clipboard, i.e., it possess functionality capable of attacking almost any online banking system. Criminals are trying to implement new techniques to avoid detection for as long as possible. Some of the Trojans from this family use geolocation or ask for the time zone and the Windows version from the system in order to infect users in a particular region.

Yet another newcomer to the top 10 most active financial threats in Q2 was the Trojan.Win32.Neurevt family. Representatives of this family were first discovered in 2013 and are used by cybercriminals not only to steal user payment data in online banking systems but also to send out spam (some versions, for example, sent spam messages on Skype) and implement DDoS attacks (with the addition of functionality capable of performing the Slowloris HTTP flooding scenario).

Ransomware Trojans

The overall number of cryptor modifications in our virus collection to date is approximately 26,000. A total of 28 new cryptor families and 9,296 new modifications were detected in Q2.

The following graph shows the rise in the number of newly created cryptor modifications over the last two quarters.

Number of Trojan-Ransom cryptor modifications (Q1 2016 vs Q2 2016)

Some of the more high-profile or unusual Trojans detected in Q2 2016 are listed below:

  • CryptXXX (Trojan-Ransom.Win32.CryptXXX)

    This cryptor has been widely distributed via exploit kits since April 2016. Its earlier versions contained gaps in the file encryption algorithm which allowed Kaspersky Lab to release a utility to decrypt them. Unfortunately, the attackers have made adjustments to subsequent versions, making it impossible to decrypt the files affected by later CryptXXX modifications.

  • ZCryptor (Trojan-Ransom.MSIL.Zcryptor)

    This malware combines cryptor functionality and a worm distribution method. Trojan ransomware does not usually include tools for self-propagation, and ZCryptor just happens to be an exception to this rule. Like a classic worm, while infecting, it creates copies of its body on removable media and generates the autorun.inf file to implement the automatic launch of its executable file once the media is connected to another system (if, of course, autorun is not disabled).

  • RAA (Trojan-Ransom.JS.RaaCrypt)

    Sometimes we come across cryptors that differ from their peers in terms of functionality, and sometimes an unusual implementation will catch the attention of an analyst. In the case of RAA, the choice of programming language was curious: it was written entirely in JavaScript. The whole body of the program was included in a single .js file delivered to the victim as an attachment in a spam message. When run, it displays a fake error message, and in the meantime, encrypts the user’s files.

  • Bart (Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Bart)

    This cryptor puts the victim’s files in password-protected ZIP archives; and it creates passwords using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm on an elliptic curve. The design of the ransom note and the payment site is an exact copy of that used by the notorious Locky.

  • Satana (Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Satan)

    This is a combination of MBR blocker and file cryptor, probably inspired by similar functionality in the notorious Petya + Mischa Trojans. Satana, unlike Petya, does not encrypt MFT; in fact, its MBR module is obviously incomplete because the process of checking the password entered by the victim results in nothing more than a continuous cycle. Below is a fragment of the code demonstrating this.

The number of users attacked by ransomware

Number of users attacked by Trojan-Ransom cryptor malware (Q2 2016)

In Q2 2016, 311,590 unique users were attacked by cryptors, which is 16% less than the previous quarter. Approximately 21% of those attacked were in the corporate sector.

It is important to keep in mind that the real number of incidents is several times higher: the statistics reflect only the results of signature-based and heuristic detections, while in most cases Kaspersky Lab products detect encryption Trojans based on behavior recognition models and issue the Generic verdict, which does not distinguish the type of malicious software.

Top 10 countries attacked by cryptors Country* % of users attacked by cryptors** 1 Japan 2.40 2 Italy 1.50 3 Djibouti 1.46 4 Luxembourg 1.36 5 Bulgaria 1.34 6 Croatia 1.25 7 Maldives 1.22 8 Korea 1.21 9 Netherlands 1.15 10 Taiwan 1.04

* We excluded those countries where the number of Kaspersky Lab product users is relatively small (less than 10,000).
** Unique users whose computers have been targeted by ransomware as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

In Q2, half of the top 10 were European countries – one less than the previous quarter.

Japan, which came ninth in Q1, topped the ranking of countries attacked by cryptors with 2.40%: the most widespread cryptor families in the country were Teslacrypt, Locky and Cryakl.

Newcomers to this ranking were Djibouti (1.46%), Korea (1.21%) and Taiwan (1.04%).

Top 10 most widespread cryptor families Name Verdict* Percentage of users** 1 CTB-Locker Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Onion/Trojan-Ransom.NSIS.Onion 14.59 2 Teslacrypt Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Bitman 8.36 3 Locky Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Locky 3.34 4 Shade Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Shade 2.14 5 Cryrar/ ACCDFISA Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryrar 2.02 6 Cryptowall Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryptodef 1.98 7 Cryakl Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryakl 1.93 8 Cerber Trojan-Ransom.Win32. Zerber 1.53 9 Scatter Trojan-Ransom.BAT.Scatter/Trojan-Downloader.JS.Scatter/Trojan-Dropper.JS.Scatter/Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Scatter 1.39 10 Rakhni Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Rakhni/Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Rakhni 1.13

* These statistics are based on detection verdicts received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who have consented to provide their statistical data.
** Unique users whose computers have been targeted by a specific Trojan-Ransom family as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab products attacked by Trojan-Ransom malware.

First place in Q2 was occupied by the CTB-Locker (Trojan-Ransom.Win32/NSIS.Onion) family. In second place was the TeslaCrypt family represented by one verdict: Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Bitman. The Trojan-Ransom.JS.Cryptoload verdict, which in the past downloaded malware and was associated with TeslaCrypt, is no longer characteristic of this family only. TeslaCrypt was earlier a major contributor to the statistics, but fortunately ceased to exist in May 2016 – the owners disabled their servers and posted a master key to decrypt files.

In Q2 2016, #crypto #ransomware attacks were blocked on 311,590 computers of unique users #KLreport


Cerber and Cryrar are the only changes to this ranking compared to the previous quarter.

The Cerber cryptor spreads via spam and exploit kits. The cryptor’s site on the Tor network is translated into lots of languages. Cerber’s special features include the following:

  • It explores the infected system meticulously: checks for the presence of an antivirus, if it is running under a virtual machine (Parallels, VmWare, QEMU, VirtualBox) or Wine, checks for utilities from various researchers and analysts (it does this by searching for certain processes and files on the disk drive), it even has a blacklist of system drive serial numbers.
  • It checks the keyboard layout and the IP address of the infected system. If it detects that the machine is located in a CIS country, it stops infecting it.
  • It attempts to bypass antivirus protection by terminating their processes, interrupting services, deleting files.
  • In addition to notifying users about encryption in the form of TXT and HTML files, as is the case with other families, it also runs the VBS script which reproduces the following voice message: “Attention! Attention! Attention! Your documents, photos, databases and other important files have been encrypted!”

The Cryrar cryptor also known as the Anti Cyber Crime Department of Federal Internet Security Agency (ACCDFISA), Anti-Child Porn Spam Protection, etc. first appeared back in 2012. It has the distinctive feature of placing the victim’s files in password-protected self-extracting RAR archives. According to KSN statistics, it shows no signs of conceding its position to newer rivals.

Top 10 countries where online resources are seeded with malware

The following statistics are based on the physical location of the online resources that were used in attacks and blocked by our antivirus components (web pages containing redirects to exploits, sites containing exploits and other malware, botnet command centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web attacks.

In order to determine the geographical source of web-based attacks, domain names are matched against their actual domain IP addresses, and then the geographical location of a specific IP address (GEOIP) is established.

In Q2 2016, Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked 171,895,830 attacks launched from web resources located in 191 countries around the world. 54,539,948 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by web antivirus components.

81% of notifications about blocked web attacks were triggered by attacks coming from web resources located in 10 countries.

Distribution of web attack sources by country, Q2 2016

The US (35.44%) returned to the top of this ranking in the second quarter. Russia (10.28%) moved up one place to second. The previous quarter’s leader, the Netherlands, dropped to fourth place after its share fell by 17.7 percentage points. Germany completed the Top 3 with a share of 8.9%. Bulgaria left the Top 10, while Canada was a newcomer in ninth place with 0.96%.

Countries where users faced the greatest risk of online infection

In order to assess the risk of online infection faced by users in different countries, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky Lab users in each country who encountered detection verdicts on their machines during the quarter. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers work in different countries.

Country* % of unique users attacked** 1 Azerbaijan 32.10 2 Russia 30.80 3 China 29.35 4 Slovenia 27.54 5 Ukraine 27.46 6 Kazakhstan 27.03 7 Vietnam 26.02 8 Algeria 25.63 9 Armenia 25.09 10 Belarus 24.60 11 Brazil 24.05 12 France 22.45 13 Moldova 22.34 14 Kyrgyzstan 22.13 15 Bulgaria 22.06 16 Italy 21.68 17 Chile 21.56 18 Qatar 20.10 19 India 20.00 20 Portugal 19.84

These statistics are based on the detection verdicts returned by the web antivirus module, received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who have consented to provide their statistical data.

* These calculations excluded countries where the number of Kaspersky Lab users is relatively small (fewer than 10,000 users).
** Unique users whose computers have been targeted by web attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

In Q2, Azerbaijan moved up from fourth to first place and became the new leader of this ranking with 32.1%. Russia (30.8%) dropped from first to second, while Kazakhstan (27.03%) fell from second to sixth place.

Since the previous quarter, Spain, Lithuania, Croatia and Turkey have all left the TOP 20. The newcomers to this ranking were Bulgaria (22.06%), Chile (21.56%), Qatar (20.10%) and Portugal (19.84%).

The countries with the safest online surfing environments included Canada (15%), Romania (14.6%), Belgium (13.7%), Mexico (13.2%), the US (12.8%), Switzerland (12. 4%), New Zealand (12.1%), Czech Republic (12%), Argentina (9.9%), Japan (9.5%), the Netherlands (8.3), Sweden (8.2%) and Germany (8%).

On average, 19.4% of computers connected to the Internet globally were subjected to at least one web attack during the three months. This is a fall of 1.8 p.p. compared to Q1 2016.

Local threats

Local infection statistics for user computers are a very important indicator: they reflect threats that have penetrated computer systems by infecting files or removable media, or initially got on the computer in an encrypted format (for example, programs integrated in complex installers, encrypted files, etc.).

Data in this section is based on analyzing statistics produced by antivirus scans of files on the hard drive at the moment they were created or accessed, and the results of scanning removable storage media.

In Q2 2016, Kaspersky Lab’s file antivirus detected 249,619,379 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.

Countries where users faced the highest risk of local infection

For each of the countries, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky Lab product users on whose computers the file antivirus was triggered during the quarter. These statistics reflect the level of personal computer infection in different countries.

Top 20 countries with the highest levels of computer infection

Country* % of unique users** 1 Somalia 65.80 2 Vietnam 63.33 3 Tajikistan 62.00 4 Russia 61.56 5 Kyrgyzstan 60.80 6 Bangladesh 60.19 7 Afghanistan 60.00 8 Armenia 59,74 9 Ukraine 59.67 10 Nepal 59.66 11 Ethiopia 59.63 12 Laos 58.43 13 Kazakhstan 57.72 14 Rwanda 57.33 15 Djibouti 56.07 16 Yemen 55.98 17 Venezuela 55.76 18 Algeria 55.58 19 Cambodia 55.56 20 Iraq 55.55

These statistics are based on the detection verdicts returned by on-access and on-demand antivirus modules, received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who have consented to provide their statistical data. The data include detections of malicious programs located on users’ computers or on removable media connected to the computers, such as flash drives, camera and phone memory cards, or external hard drives.

* These calculations exclude countries where the number of Kaspersky Lab users is relatively small (fewer than 10,000 users).
** The percentage of unique users in the country with computers that blocked local threats as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products.

Somalia remained the leader of this ranking in Q2 2016 with 65.8%. Yemen (55.98%) fell from second to sixteenth place, while Vietnam (63.33%) jumped from eighth to second. Tajikistan (62%) rounded off the TOP 3. Russia moved up one place from fifth to fourth, although the figure for that country declined by 2.62 percentage points to 61.56%.

In Q2 2016, 27,403 #mobile #banking Trojans were detected by @kaspersky mobile security products #KLreport


Newcomers to this ranking are Djibouti in fifteenth place (56.07%), Venezuela in seventeenth (55.76%), and Cambodia in nineteenth (55.56%).

The safest countries in terms of local infection risks were Croatia (29%), Singapore (28.4%), Germany (28.1%), Norway (27.6%), the US (27.1%), Switzerland (26.3%), Japan (22.1%), Denmark (21.4%) and Sweden (21.3%).

An average of 43.3% of computers globally faced at least one local threat during Q2 2016, which is 1.2 p.p. less than in the previous quarter.