Malware Alerts

Subscribe to Malware Alerts feed Malware Alerts
Online headquarters of Kaspersky Lab security experts.
Updated: 2 hours 54 min ago

Threats posed by using RATs in ICS

Thu, 09/20/2018 - 06:00

While conducting audits, penetration tests and incident investigations, we have often come across legitimate remote administration tools (RAT) for PCs installed on operational technology (OT) networks of industrial enterprises. In a number of incidents that we have investigated, threat actors had used RATs to attack industrial organizations. In some cases, the attackers had stealthily installed RATs on victim organizations’ computers, while in other cases, they had been able to use the RATs that were installed in the organization at the time of the attacks. These observations prompted us to analyze the scope of the threat, including the incidence of RATs on industrial networks and the reasons for using them.

Methodology

The statistical data presented in this paper was collected using the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) from ICS computers protected by Kaspersky Lab products that Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT categorizes as part of the industrial infrastructure at organizations. This group includes Windows computers that perform one or several of the following functions:

  • supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) servers;
  • data storage servers (Historian);
  • data gateways (OPC);
  • stationary workstations of engineers and operators;
  • mobile workstations of engineers and operators;
  • Human Machine Interface (HMI).

As part of our research, we considered and analyzed all popular RATs for Windows, with the exception of Remote Desktop, which is part of the Windows operating system. Our research into this RAT is ongoing and will be presented in the next paper of the series.

The use of RATs in ICS

According to KSN data, in the first half of 2018, legitimate RATs (programs categorized as not-a-virus: RemoteAdmin) were installed and used on one ICS computer in three.

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

Percentage of ICS computers that have RATs legitimately installed on them (download)

The statistics support our observations: RATs are indeed often used on OT networks of industrial enterprises. We believe this could be due to attempts to reduce costs associated with maintaining ICS and minimize the response time in the event of malfunction.

As we were able to find out, remote access to computers on the OT network is not restricted to administrators and engineers inside the enterprise network’s perimeter. It can also be made available via the internet to users outside the enterprise network perimeter. Such users can include representatives of third-party enterprises – employees of system integrators or ICS vendors, who use RATs for diagnostics, maintenance and to address any ICS malfunctions. As our industrial network security audits have shown, such access is often poorly supervised by the enterprise’s responsible employees, while remote users connecting to the OT network often have excessive rights, such as local administrator privileges, which is obviously a serious issue in terms of ensuring the information security of industrial automation systems.

From interviews with engineers and operators of various industrial systems that we have audited, and based on an analysis of ICS user documentation, we have determined that RATs are most commonly used on industrial networks according to the following scenarios:

  1. To control/monitor HMI from an operator workstation (including displaying information on a large screen);
  2. To control/maintain HMI from an engineering workstation;
  3. To control SCADA from an operator workstation;
  4. To provide SCADA maintenance from an engineering workstation or a computer of a contractor/vendor (from an external network);
  5. To connect multiple operators to one operator workstation (thin client-like architecture used to save money on licenses for the software used on operator workstations);
  6. To connect to a computer on the office network from the OT network via HMI and perform various tasks on that computer (access email, access the internet, work with office documents, etc.).

Some of the scenarios listed above indicate that the use of RATs on the OT network can be explained by operational requirements, which means that giving up the use of RATs would unavoidably entail modifications to work processes. At the same time, it is important to realize that an attack on a poorly protected RAT could easily cause disruptions to the industrial process and any decisions on using RATs on the OT network should be made with this in mind. Tight controls on the use of RATs on the OT network would help to reduce the attack surface and the risk of infection for systems administered remotely.

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

TOP 20 countries by percentage of ICS computers on which RATs were used at least once during the first half of 2018 (to all ICS computers in each country) (download)

Scenarios of RAT installation on ICS computers

According to our research, there are three most common scenarios of RAT installation on ICS computers:

  1. Installation of ICS software distribution packages that include RATs (using separate distribution packages or ICS software installers). RATs included in ICS software distribution packages make up 18.6% of all RATs we have identified on ICS computers protected by Kaspersky Lab products.

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

Percentage of RATs bundled with ICS products to all RATs found on ICS computers (download)

  1. Deliberate installation of RATs by personnel or suppliers – network administrators, engineers, operators, or integrator companies. We do not undertake to judge whether these installations are legitimate. Based on our experience of industrial network audits and incident investigation, we can state that many such installations do not comply with the organization’s information security policy and some are installed without the knowledge of respective enterprises’ responsible employees.
  2. Stealthy installation of RATs by malware. An example of this is a recent attack that we have investigated (see below).
RAT-related threats to ICS

Threats associated with the use of RATs on industrial networks are not always obvious, nor are the reasons for which RATs are used.

Most of the RATs we have identified on industrial systems have the following characteristics that significantly reduce the security level of the host system:

  • Elevated privileges – the server part of a RAT is often executed as a service with system privileges, i.e., NT SYSTEM;
  • No support for restricting local access to the system / client activity;
  • Single-factor authentication;
  • No logging of client activity;
  • Vulnerabilities (our report on zero-day vulnerabilities identified in popular RAT systems that are used, among other applications, in products by many ICS vendors, will be published by the end of the year);
  • The use of relay servers (for reverse connections) that enable RATs to bypass NAT and firewall restrictions on the network perimeter.

The most critical RAT-related problem is the use of elevated privileges and the absence of any means to limit these privileges (or to restrict a remote user’s local access). In practice, this means that if attackers (or malware) gain access to a remote user’s computer, steal authentication data (login/password), hijack an active remote administration session or successfully attack a vulnerability in the RAT’s server part, they will gain unrestricted control of the ICS system. By using relay servers for reverse connections, attackers can also connect to these RATs from anywhere in the world.

There are also other issues that affect RATs built into ICS software distribution packages:

  • RAT components and distribution packages are rarely updated (even if new versions of ICS distribution packages are released). This makes them more likely to contain vulnerabilities;
  • In the vast majority of cases, the default password is used – it is either hardcoded into the RAT by the ICS software vendor or specified in the documentation as “recommended”.

RATs are legitimate software tools that are often used on industrial networks, which means it can be extremely difficult to distinguish attacks involving RATs from legitimate activity. In addition, since the information security service and other employees responsible for ICS security are often unaware that a RAT is installed, the configuration of RATs is in most cases not analyzed when auditing the security of an industrial network. This makes it particularly important to control by whom, when and for what purposes RATs are used on the industrial network and to ensure that it is completely impossible to use RATs without the knowledge of employees responsible for the OT network’s information security.

Attacks of threat actors involving RATs

Everything written above applies to potential threats associated with the use of RATs.

Based on our analysis of KSN statistics, we were able to identify a number of attacks and malware infection attempts involving RATs installed on ICS computers. In most cases, attacks were based on the following scenarios (in the descending order of attack incidence):

  1. A brute force network attack from the local network or the internet designed to crack logins/passwords;
  2. An attacker or malware using a RAT to download and execute malware using stolen or cracked authentication credentials;
  3. A remote user (probably a legitimate user deceived by attackers) using a RAT to download a Trojan to an ICS computer and then executing it; the Trojan can be disguised as an office document, non-industrial software (a game, multimedia software, etc.), a crack/keygen for office, application or industrial software, etc.;
  4. A network attack from the local network or the internet on the server part of the RAT using exploits.

Brute force type network attacks (designed to crack logins/passwords) are the most common: their implementation does not require any special knowledge or skills and the software used in such attacks is publicly available.

It cannot be determined based on available data who connects to a RAT’s server part installed on an ICS computer – a legitimate user, an attacker or malware – or why. Consequently, we can only guess whether this activity represents a targeted attack, sabotage attempts or a client’s error.

Network attacks from the internet were most probably conducted by threat actors using malware, penetration testing tools or botnets.

Network attacks from the local network could indicate the presence of attackers (possibly including an insider) on the network. Another possibility is that there is a compromised computer on the local network that is either infected with malware or is used by the attacker as a point of presence (if the authentication credentials were compromised earlier).

Attacks on industrial enterprises using RMS and TeamViewer

In the first half of 2018, Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT identified a new wave of phishing emails disguised as legitimate commercial offers. Although the attacks targeted primarily industrial companies within the territory of Russia, the same tactics and tools can be used in attacks on industrial companies in any country of the world.

The malware used in these attacks installs legitimate remote administration software on the system — TeamViewer or Remote Manipulator System/Remote Utilities (RMS). In both cases, a system DLL is replaced with a malicious library to inject malicious code into a legitimate program’s process. This provides the attackers with remote control of the infected systems. Various techniques are used to mask the infection and the activity of the software installed on the system.

If necessary, the attackers download an additional malware pack to the system, which is specifically tailored to the attack on each individual victim. This set of malware may contain spyware, additional remote administration tools that extend the threat actor’s control of infected systems, malware to exploit vulnerabilities in the operating system and application software, as well as the Mimikatz utility, which makes it possible to obtain account data for Windows accounts.

According to available data, the attackers’ main goal is to steal money from victim organizations’ accounts, but possible attack scenarios are not limited to the theft of funds. In the process of attacking their targets, the attackers steal sensitive data belonging to target organizations, their partners and customers, carry out surreptitious surveillance of the victim companies’ employees, and record audio and video using devices connected to infected machines. Clearly, on top of the financial losses, these attacks result in leaks of victim organizations’ sensitive data.

Multiple attacks on an auto manufacturer

A characteristic example of attacks based on the second scenario was provided by attacks on the industrial network of a motor vehicle manufacturing and service company, in particular, on computers designed to diagnose the engines and onboard systems of trucks and heavy-duty vehicles. Multiple attempts to conduct such attacks were blocked by Kaspersky Lab products.

A RAT was installed and intermittently used on at least one of the computers in the company’s industrial network. Starting in late 2017, numerous attempts to launch various malicious programs using the RAT were blocked on the computer. Infection attempts were made regularly over a period of several months – 2-3 times a week, at different times of the day. Based in part on other indirect indicators, we believe that RAT authentication data was compromised and used by attackers (or malware) to attack the enterprise’s computers over the internet.

After gaining access to the potential victim’s infrastructure via the RAT, the attackers kept trying to choose a malicious packer that would enable them to evade antivirus protection.

The blocked programs included modifications of the malware detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Net-Worm.Win32.Agent.pm. When launched this worm immediately begins to proliferate on the local network using exploits for the MS17-010 vulnerabilities – the same ones that were published by ShadowBrokers in the spring of 2017 and were used in attacks by the infamous WannaCry and ExPetr cryptors.

The Nymaim Trojan family was also blocked. Representatives of this family are often used to download modifications of botnet agents from the Necus family, which in turn have often been used to infect computers with ransomware from the Locky family.

Conclusion

Remote administration tools are widely used on industrial networks for ICS monitoring, control and maintenance. The ability to manipulate the ICS remotely significantly reduces maintenance costs, but at the same time, uncontrolled remote access, the inability to provide 100% verification of the remote client’s legitimacy, and the vulnerabilities in RAT code and configuration significantly increase the attack surface. At the same time, RATs, along with other legitimate tools, are increasingly used by attackers to mask malicious activity and make attribution more difficult.

To reduce the risk of cyberattacks involving RATs, we recommend the following high-priority measures:

  • Audit the use of application and system remote administration tools on the industrial network, such as VNC, RDP, TeamViewer, and RMS / Remote Utilities. Remove all remote administration tools that are not required by the industrial process.
  • Conduct an audit and disable remote administration tools which came with ICS software (refer to the relevant software documentation for detailed instructions), provided that they are not required by the industrial process.
  • Closely monitor and log events for each remote control session required by the industrial process; remote access should be disabled by default and enabled only upon request and only for limited periods of time.

New trends in the world of IoT threats

Tue, 09/18/2018 - 06:00

Cybercriminals’ interest in IoT devices continues to grow: in H1 2018 we picked up three times as many malware samples attacking smart devices as in the whole of 2017. And in 2017 there were ten times more than in 2016. That doesn’t bode well for the years ahead.

We decided to study what attack vectors are deployed by cybercriminals to infect smart devices, what malware is loaded into the system, and what it means for device owners and victims of freshly armed botnets.

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

Number of malware samples for IoT devices in Kaspersky Lab’s collection, 2016-2018. (download)

One of the most popular attack and infection vectors against devices remains cracking Telnet passwords. In Q2 2018, there were three times as many such attacks against our honeypots than all other types combined.

service % of attacks Telnet 75.40% SSH 11.59% other 13.01%

When it came to downloading malware onto IoT devices, cybercriminals’ preferred option was one of the Mirai family (20.9%).

# downloaded malware % of attacks 1 Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.c 15.97% 2 Trojan-Downloader.Linux.Hajime.a 5.89% 3 Trojan-Downloader.Linux.NyaDrop.b 3.34% 4 Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b 2.72% 5 Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ba 1.94% 6 Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p 0.38% 7 Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.as 0.27% 8 Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.n 0.27% 9 Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.ba 0.24% 10 Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.af 0.20%

Top 10 malware downloaded onto infected IoT device following a successful Telnet password crack

And here are the Top 10 countries from which our traps were hit by Telnet password attacks:

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

Geographical distribution of the number of infected devices, Q2 2018. (download)

As we see, in Q2 2018 the leader by number of unique IP addresses from which Telnet password attacks originated was Brazil (23%). Second place went to China (17%). Russia in our list took 4th place (7%). Overall for the period January 1 – July 2018, our Telnet honeypot registered more than 12 million attacks from 86,560 unique IP addresses, and malware was downloaded from 27,693 unique IP addresses.

Since some smart device owners change the default Telnet password to one that is more complex, and many gadgets don’t support this protocol at all, cybercriminals are constantly on the lookout for new ways of infection. This is stimulated by the high competition between virus writers, which has led to password bruteforce attacks becoming less effective: in the event of a successful crack, the device password is changed and access to Telnet is blocked.

An example of the use of “alternative technology” is the Reaper botnet, whose assets at end-2017 numbered about 2 million IoT devices. Instead of bruteforcing Telnet passwords, this botnet exploited known software vulnerabilities:

Advantages of this distribution method over password cracking:

  • Infection occurs much faster
  • It is much harder to patch a software vulnerability than change a password or disable/block the service

Although this method is more difficult to implement, it found favor with many virus writers, and it wasn’t long before new Trojans exploiting known vulnerabilities in smart device software started appearing.

New attacks, old malware

To see which vulnerabilities are targeted by malware, we analyzed data on attempts to connect to various ports on our traps. This is the picture that emerged for Q2 2018:

Service Port % of attacks Attack vector Malware families Telnet 23, 2323 82.26% Bruteforce Mirai, Gafgyt SSH 22 11.51% Bruteforce Mirai, Gafgyt Samba 445 2.78% EternalBlue, EternalRed, CVE-2018-7445 – tr-069 7547 0.77% RCE in TR-069 implementation Mirai, Hajime HTTP 80 0.76% Attempts to exploit vulnerabilities in a web server or crack an admin console password – winbox (RouterOS) 8291 0.71% Used for RouterOS (MikroTik) authentication and WinBox-based attacks Hajime Mikrotik http 8080 0.23% RCE in MikroTik RouterOS < 6.38.5 Chimay-Red Hajime MSSQL 1433 0.21% Execution of arbitrary code for certain versions (2000, 2005, 2008); changing administrator password; data theft – GoAhead httpd 81 0.16% RCE in GoAhead IP cameras Persirai, Gafgyt Mikrotik http 8081 0.15% Chimay-Red Hajime Etherium JSON-RPC 8545 0.15% Authorization bypass (CVE-2017-12113)RDP 3389 0.12% Bruteforce – XionMai uc-httpd 8000 0.09% Buffer overflow (CVE-2018-10088) in XionMai uc-httpd 1.0.0 (some Chinese-made devices) Satori MySQL 3306 0.08% Execution of arbitrary code for certain versions (2000, 2005, 2008); changing administrator password; data theft –

The vast majority of attacks still come from Telnet and SSH password bruteforcing. The third most common are attacks against the SMB service, which provides remote access to files. We haven’t seen IoT malware attacking this service yet. However, some versions of it contain serious known vulnerabilities such as EternalBlue (Windows) and EternalRed (Linux), which were used, for instance, to distribute the infamous Trojan ransomware WannaCry and the Monero cryptocurrency miner EternalMiner.

Here’s the breakdown of infected IoT devices that attacked our honeypots in Q2 2018:

Device % of infected devices MikroTik 37.23% TP-Link 9.07% SonicWall 3.74% AV tech 3.17% Vigor 3.15% Ubiquiti 2.80% D-Link 2.49% Cisco 1.40% AirTies 1.25% Cyberoam 1.13% HikVision 1.11% ZTE 0.88% Miele 0.68% Unknown DVR 31.91%

As can be seen, MikroTik devices running under RouterOS are way out in front. The reason appears to be the Chimay-Red vulnerability. What’s interesting is that our honeypot attackers included 33 Miele dishwashers (0.68% of the total number of attacks). Most likely they were infected through the known (since March 2017) CVE-2017-7240 vulnerability in PST10 WebServer, which is used in their firmware.

Port 7547

Attacks against remote device management (TR-069 specification) on port 7547 are highly common. According to Shodan, there are more than 40 million devices in the world with this port open. And that’s despite the vulnerability recently causing the infection of a million Deutsche Telekom routers, not to mention helping to spread the Mirai and Hajime malware families.

Another type of attack exploits the Chimay-Red vulnerability in MikroTik routers running under RouterOS versions below 6.38.4. In March 2018, it played an active part in distributing Hajime.

IP cameras

IP cameras are also on the cybercriminal radar. In March 2017, several major vulnerabilities were detected in the software of GoAhead devices, and a month after information about it was published, there appeared new versions of the Gafgyt and Persirai Trojans exploiting these vulnerabilities. Just one week after these malicious programs were actively distributed, the number of infected devices climbed to 57,000.

On June 8, 2018, a proof-of-concept was published for the CVE-2018-10088 vulnerability in the XionMai uc-httpd web server, used in some Chinese-made smart devices (for example, KKMoon DVRs). The next day, the number of logged attempts to locate devices using this web server more than tripled. The culprit for this spike in activity was the Satori Trojan, known for previously attacking GPON routers.

New malware and threats to end users DDoS attacks

As before, the primary purpose of IoT malware deployment is to perpetrate DDoS attacks. Infected smart devices become part of a botnet that attacks a specific address on command, depriving the host of the ability to correctly handle requests from real users. Such attacks are still deployed by Trojans from the Mirai family and its clones, in particular, Hajime.

This is perhaps the least harmful scenario for the end user. The worst (and very unlikely) thing that can happen to the owner of the infected device is being blocked by their ISP. And the device can often by “cured” with a simple reboot.

Cryptocurrency mining

Another type of payload is linked to cryptocurrencies. For instance, IoT malware can install a miner on an infected device. But given the low processing power of smart devices, the feasibility of such attacks remains in doubt, even despite their potentially large number.

A more devious and doable method of getting a couple of cryptocoins was invented by the creators of the Satori Trojan. Here, the victim IoT device acts as a kind of key that opens access to a high-performance PC:

  • At the first stage, the attackers try to infect as many routers as possible using known vulnerabilities, in particular:
    • CVE-2014-8361 – RCE in the miniigd SOAP service in Realtek SDK
    • CVE 2017-17215 – RCE in the firmware of Huawei HG532 routers
    • CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562 – authorization bypass and execution of arbitrary commands on Dasan GPON routers
    • CVE-2018-10088 – buffer overflow in XiongMai uc-httpd 1.0.0 used in the firmware of some routers and other smart devices made by some Chinese manufacturers
  • Using compromised routers and the CVE-2018-1000049 vulnerability in the Claymore Etherium miner remote management tool, they substitute the wallet address for their own.
Data theft

The VPNFilter Trojan, detected in May 2018, pursues other goals, above all intercepting infected device traffic, extracting important data from it (user names, passwords, etc.), and sending it to the cybercriminals’ server. Here are the main features of VPNFilter:

  • Modular architecture. The malware creators can fit it out with new functions on the fly. For instance, in early June 2018 a new module was detected able to inject javascript code into intercepted web pages.
  • Reboot resistant. The Trojan writes itself to the standard Linux crontab job scheduler, and can also modify the configuration settings in the non-volatile memory (NVRAM) of the device.
  • Uses TOR for communication with C&C.
  • Able to self-destruct and disable the device. On receiving the command, the Trojan deletes itself, overwrites the critical part of the firmware with garbage data, and then reboots the device.

The Trojan’s distribution method is still unknown: its code contains no self-propagation mechanisms. However, we are inclined to believe that it exploits known vulnerabilities in device software for infection purposes.

The very first VPNFilter report spoke of around 500,000 infected devices. Since then, even more have appeared, and the list of manufacturers of vulnerable gadgets has expanded considerably. As of mid-June, it included the following brands:

  • ASUS
  • D-Link
  • Huawei
  • Linksys
  • MikroTik
  • Netgear
  • QNAP
  • TP-Link
  • Ubiquiti
  • Upvel
  • ZTE

The situation is made worse by the fact that these manufacturers’ devices are used not only in corporate networks, but often as home routers.

Conclusion

Smart devices are on the rise, with some forecasts suggesting that by 2020 their number will exceed the world’s population several times over. Yet manufacturers still don’t prioritize security: there are no reminders to change the default password during initial setup or notifications about the release of new firmware versions, and the updating process itself can be complex for the average user. This makes IoT devices a prime target for cybercriminals. Easier to infect than PCs, they often play an important role in the home infrastructure: some manage Internet traffic, others shoot video footage, still others control domestic devices (for example, air conditioning).

Malware for smart devices is increasing not only in quantity, but also quality. More and more exploits are being weaponized by cybercriminals, and infected devices are used to steal personal data and mine cryptocurrencies, on top of traditional DDoS attacks.

Here are some simple tips to help minimize the risk of smart device infection:

  • Don’t give access to the device from an external network unless absolutely necessary
  • Periodic rebooting will help get rid of malware already installed (although in most cases the risk of reinfection will remain)
  • Regularly check for new firmware versions and update the device
  • Use complex passwords at least 8 characters long, including upper and lower-case letters, numerals, and special characters
  • Change the factory passwords at initial setup (even if the device does not prompt you to do so)
  • Close/block unused ports, if there is such an option. For example, if you don’t connect to the router via Telnet (port TCP:23), it’s a good idea to disable it so as to close off a potential loophole to intruders.

LuckyMouse signs malicious NDISProxy driver with certificate of Chinese IT company

Mon, 09/10/2018 - 06:00

What happened?

Since March 2018 we have discovered several infections where a previously unknown Trojan was injected into the lsass.exe system process memory. These implants were injected by the digitally signed 32- and 64-bit network filtering driver NDISProxy. Interestingly, this driver is signed with a digital certificate that belongs to Chinese company LeagSoft, a developer of information security software based in Shenzhen, Guangdong. We informed the company about the issue via CN-CERT.

The campaign described in this report was active immediately prior to Central Asian high-level meeting and we suppose that actor behind still follows regional political agenda.

Which malicious modules are used?

The malware consists of three different modules:

  • A custom C++ installer that decrypts and drops the driver file in the corresponding system directory, creates a Windows autorun service for driver persistence and adds the encrypted in-memory Trojan to the system registry.
  • A network filtering driver (NDISProxy) that decrypts and injects the Trojan into memory and filters port 3389 (Remote Desktop Protocol, RDP) traffic in order to insert the Trojan’s C2 communications into it.
  • A last-stage C++ Trojan acting as HTTPS server that works together with the driver. It waits passively for communications from its C2, with two possible communication channels via ports 3389 and 443.

NDISProxy driver and RAT work together once the installer has set up all the modules

These modules allow attackers to silently move laterally in the infected infrastructure, but don’t allow them to communicate with an external C2 if the new infected host only has a LAN IP. Because of this, the operators used an Earthworm SOCKS tunneler in order to connect the LAN of the infected host to the external C2. They also used the Scanline network scanner to find file shares (port 135, Server Message Block, SMB) which they use to spread malware with administrative passwords, compromised with keyloggers.

We assess with high confidence that NDISProxy is a new tool used by LuckyMouse. Kaspersky Lab products detect the described artefacts. For more information please contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com

How does it spread?

We detected the distribution of the 32-bit dropper used for this campaign among different targets by the end of March 2018. However, we didn’t observe any spear phishing or watering hole activity. We believe the operators spread their infectors through networks that were already compromised instead.

How does it work? Custom installer Installer MD5 hash Timestamp (GMT) Size Bits dacedff98035f80711c61bc47e83b61d 2018.03.29 07:35:55 572 244 32 9dc209f66da77858e362e624d0be86b3 2018.03.26 04:16:00 572 244 32 3cbeda2c5ac41cca0b0d60376a2b2511 2018.03.26 04:16:00 307 200 32

The initial infectors are 32-bit portable executable files capable of installing 32-bit or 64-bit drivers depending on the target. The installer logs all the installation process steps in the load.log file within the same directory. It checks if the OS is Windows Vista or above (major version equal to 6 or higher) and decrypts its initial configuration using the DES (Data Encryption Standard) algorithm.

The set of well-known port numbers (HTTP, HTTPS, SMB, POP3S, MSSQL, PPTP and RDP) in the configuration is not used, which along with the “[test]” strings in messages suggests this malware is still under development.

The installer creates a semaphore (name depending on configuration) Global\Door-ndisproxy-mn and checks if the service (name also depends on configuration) ndisproxy-mn is already installed. If it is, the dropper writes “door detected” in load.log. The autorun Windows service running NDISProxy is the “door” in developer terms.

The installer also decrypts (using the same DES) the shellcode of the last stage Trojan and saves it in three registry values named xxx0, xxx1, xxx2 in key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\32ndisproxy-mn (or 64ndisproxy-mn for 64-bit hosts). The encrypted configuration is saved as the value filterpd-ndisproxy-mn in the registry key HKCR\ndisproxy-mn.

Initial installer saves XOR-encrypted Trojan’s shellcode and DES-encrypted configuration in system registry

The installer creates the corresponding autostart service and registry keys. The “Altitude” registry value (unique ID for the minifilter driver) is set to 321 000, which means “FSFilter Anti-Virus” in Windows terms:

NDISProxy network filtering driver Driver MD5 hash Timestamp Size Bits 8e6d87eadb27b74852bd5a19062e52ed 2018.03.29 07:33:58 40400 64 d21de00f981bb6b5094f9c3dfa0be533 2018.03.29 07:33:52 33744 32 a2eb59414823ae00d53ca05272168006 2018.03.26 04:15:28 40400 64 493167e85e45363d09495d0841c30648 2018.03.26 04:15:21 33744 32 ad07b44578fa47e7de0df42a8b7f8d2d 2017.11.08 08:04:50 241616 64

This digitally signed driver is the most interesting artefact used in this campaign. The network filtering modules serve two purposes: first they decrypt and inject the RAT; second, they set its communication channel through RDP port 3389.

The drivers are signed with a digital certificate issued by VeriSign to LeagSoft, a company developing information security software such as data loss prevention (DLP) solutions.

This driver makes extensive use of third-party publicly available C source code, including from the Blackbone repository available at GitHub.

Feature Public repository Driver memory injection Blackbone https://github.com/DarthTon/Blackbone NDIS network filtering driver Microsoft Windows Driver Kit (WDK) sample code “Windows Filtering Platform Stream Edit Sample/C++/sys/stream_callout.c” Parse HTTP packets Http-parser https://github.com/nodejs/http-parser

The driver again checks if the Windows version is higher than Vista, then creates a device named \\Device\\ndisproxy-%s (where the word after “-” varies – see Appendix for all variants) and its corresponding symbolic link \\DosDevices\\Global\\ndisproxy-%s.

The driver combines all the Trojan-related registry values from HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\32ndisproxy-mn and de-XORs them with a six-byte hardcoded value. It then injects the resulting Trojan executable shellcode into lsass.exe memory using Blackbone library functions.

NDISProxy works as a network traffic filter engine, filtering the traffic going through RDP port 3389 (the port number is hardcoded) and injecting messages into it.

The communication between the user-mode in-memory Trojan and the driver goes through the custom control codes used by the DeviceIoControl() Windows API function. Apart from the auxiliary codes, there are two codes worth mentioning:

Driver control code Meaning 0x222400 Start traffic filtering at RDP port 3389 0x22240C Inject given data into filtering TCP stream. Used for Trojan communication with C2 In-memory C++ Trojan SHA256 c69121a994ea8ff188510f41890208625710870af9a06b005db817934b517bc1 MD5 6a352c3e55e8ae5ed39dc1be7fb964b1 Compiled 2018.03.26 04:15:48 (GMT) Type I386 Windows GUI DLL Size 175 616

Please note this Trojan exists in memory only; the data above is for the decrypted Windows registry content without the initial shellcode

This RAT is decrypted by the NDISProxy driver from the system registry and injected into the lsass.exe process memory. Code starts with a shellcode – instead of typical Windows portable executable files loader this malware implements memory mapping by itself.

This Trojan is a full-featured RAT capable of executing common tasks such as command execution and downloading/uploading files. This is implemented through a couple dozen C++ classes such as CMFile, CMFile, CMProcess, TFileDownload, TDrive, TProcessInfo, TSock, etc. The first stage custom installer utilizes the same classes. The Trojan uses HTTP Server API to filter HTTPS packets at port 443 and parse commands.

The Trojan is an HTTP server, allowing LAN connection. It uses a SOCKS tunneler to communicate with the C2

This Trojan is used by attackers to gather a target’s data, make lateral movements and create SOCKS tunnels to their C2 using the Earthworm tunneler. This tool is publicly available and popular among Chinese-speaking actors. Given that the Trojan is an HTTPS server itself, we believe that the SOCKS tunnel is used for targets without an external IP, so the C2 is able to send commands.

Who’s behind it and why?

We found that this campaign targeted Middle Asian governments’ entities. We believe the attack was highly targeted and was linked to a high-level meeting. We assess with high confidence that the Chinese-speaking LuckyMouse actor is responsible for this new campaign using the NDISProxy tool described in this report.

In particular, the choice of the Earthworm tunneler is typical for Chinese-speaking actors. Also, one of the commands used by the attackers (“-s rssocks -d 103.75.190[.]28 -e 443”) creates a tunnel to a previously known LuckyMouse C2. The choice of victims in this campaign also aligns with the previous interests shown by this actor.

Consistent with current trends

We have observed a gradual shift in several Chinese-speaking campaigns towards a combination of publicly available tools (such as Metasploit or CobaltStrike) and custom malware (like the C++ last stage RAT described in this report). We have also observed how different actors adopt code from GitHub repositories on a regular basis. All this combines to make attribution more difficult.

This campaign appears to demonstrate once again LuckyMouse’s interest in Central Asia and the political agenda surrounding the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Indicators of Compromise

Note: The indicators in this section are valid at the time of publication. Any future changes will be updated directly in the corresponding .ioc file.

File Hashes

Droppers-installers
9dc209f66da77858e362e624d0be86b3
dacedff98035f80711c61bc47e83b61d

Drivers
8e6d87eadb27b74852bd5a19062e52ed
d21de00f981bb6b5094f9c3dfa0be533
a2eb59414823ae00d53ca05272168006
493167e85e45363d09495d0841c30648
ad07b44578fa47e7de0df42a8b7f8d2d

Auxiliary Earthworm SOCKS tunneler and Scanline network scanner
83c5ff660f2900677e537f9500579965
3a97d9b6f17754dcd38ca7fc89caab04

Domains and IPs

103.75.190[.]28
213.109.87[.]58

Semaphores

Global\Door-ndisproxy-mn
Global\Door-ndisproxy-help
Global\Door-ndisproxy-notify

Services

ndisproxy-mn
ndisproxy-help
ndisproxy-notify

Registry keys and values

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\32ndisproxy-mn
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\64ndisproxy-mn
HKCR\ndisproxy-mn\filterpd-ndisproxy-mn
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\32ndisproxy-help
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\64ndisproxy-help
HKCR\ndisproxy-mn\filterpd-ndisproxy-help
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\32ndisproxy-notify
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\64ndisproxy-notify
HKCR\ndisproxy-mn\filterpd-ndisproxy-notify

Driver certificate

A lot of legitimate LeagSoft products are signed with the following certificate. Please don’t consider all signed files as malicious.

Subject ShenZhen LeagSoft Technology Co.,Ltd. Serial number 78 62 07 2d dc 75 9e 5f 6a 61 4b e9 b9 3b d5 21 Issuer VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA Valid to 2018-07-19

Threat Landscape for Industrial Automation Systems in H1 2018

Thu, 09/06/2018 - 06:00

For many years, Kaspersky Lab experts have been uncovering and researching cyberthreats that target a variety of information systems – those of commercial and government organizations, banks, telecoms operators, industrial enterprises, and individual users. In this report, Kaspersky Lab Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT) publishes the findings of its research on the threat landscape for industrial automation systems conducted during the first half of 2018.

The main objective of these publications is to provide information support to global and local incident response teams, enterprise information security staff and researchers in the area of industrial facility security.

Key events Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers

In February, Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT published a report on an investigation into the initial infection tactics used by the notorious APT group Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti, as well as the results of an analysis of several web servers compromised by the group in 2016 and early 2017, using information provided by the server owners.

Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti has been active since at least 2010, attacking companies and individuals in various countries. The specialists at CrowdStrike initially noted a strong focus on the energy and industrial sectors, which may explain the name Energetic Bear. Later, when the diversity of the group’s attacks became clearer, the researchers at Kaspersky Lab named it Crouching Yeti. The targets of the attacks are mainly concentrated in Europe and the US. Recently, the number of attacks on companies in Turkey increased significantly. According to US-CERT and the UK National Cyber Security Centre, the Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti APT group is linked to the Russian government.

The initial infection tactics used by the group is a multi-step process that begins with phishing emails being sent out with malicious documents and infecting various servers. Some infected servers are used by the group as auxiliaries – used only for hosting various tools. Others are infected so they can be used in watering hole attacks, with some servers hosting an SMB link that leads to other servers that steal the authentication data of potential victims.

With some rare exceptions, the Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti group uses publicly available tools to carry out their attacks. All the utilities discovered by the Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT experts have open source code that is freely available on GitHub. This makes the task of attack attribution very difficult without additional group “markers”.

In most cases observed by Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT, the attackers performed tasks to identify vulnerabilities, gain persistence on different nodes and steal authentication data in order to develop the attack further.

An analysis of the compromised servers and the attacks on them showed that for Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti, almost any vulnerable server on the internet is seen as a potential foothold from which to develop targeted attacks.

The investigation into the initial, intermediate and subsequent targets of these attacks also revealed a diverse geography. The largest number of victims and targets was in Russia, followed by Turkey and Ukraine. Under half of the systems attacked were related to industry, agricultural services and utilities.

Attacks on industrial enterprises using RATs

Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT reported on yet another wave of phishing emails containing malicious attachments aimed primarily at industrial enterprises in Russia. The malicious program used in the attacks installs legitimate software for remote administration – TeamViewer or Remote Manipulator System/Remote Utilities (RMS) – that allows attackers to gain remote control over the targeted systems. Various techniques are used to mask the presence and activity of the unauthorized software.

When they need to move further within a compromised network, the attackers can download an additional set of malicious programs, which is specifically tailored to the attack on each individual victim. This set of malware may contain spyware, additional remote administration tools, software to exploit vulnerabilities in the operating system and application software, as well as the Mimikatz utility, which makes it possible to obtain account data for Windows accounts.

Also, Kaspersky Lab products blocked multiple attacks on the industrial network of an automobile manufacturer and service company, in particular, on computers designed to diagnose the engines and onboard systems of trucks and heavy-duty vehicles.

A RAT was installed and intermittently used on at least one of the computers in the company’s industrial network. Over a period of several months, numerous attempts to launch various malicious programs using the RAT were blocked on the computer. The blocked programs included modifications of the malware detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Net-Worm.Win32.Agent.pm. When launched this worm immediately begins to proliferate on the local network using exploits for the MS17-010 vulnerabilities – the same ones that were published by ShadowBrokers in the spring of 2017 and were used in attacks by the infamous WannaCry and ExPetr cryptors.

The Trojan-Downloader.Nymaim malware family was also blocked. Representatives of this family are often used to download modifications of the Necus family botnet agent which in turn is used to infect computers with ransomware from the Locky family.

Statistics

All statistical data used in this report was collected using the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN), a distributed antivirus network. The data was received from those KSN users who gave their consent to have data anonymously transferred from their computers. We do not identify the specific companies/organizations sending statistics to KSN, due to the product limitations and regulatory restrictions.

Methodology

The data was received from ICS computers protected by Kaspersky Lab products that Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT categorizes as part of the industrial infrastructure at organizations. This group includes Windows computers that perform one or several of the following functions:

  • supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) servers;
  • data storage servers (Historian);
  • data gateways (OPC);
  • stationary workstations of engineers and operators;
  • mobile workstations of engineers and operators;
  • Human Machine Interface (HMI).

The statistics analyzed also include data received from computers of industrial control network administrators and software developers who develop software for industrial automation systems.

For the purposes of this report, attacked computers are those on which our security solutions have been triggered at least once during the reporting period. When determining percentages of machines attacked, we use the ratio of unique computers attacked to all computers in our sample from which we received anonymized information during the reporting period.

ICS servers and stationary workstations of engineers and operators often do not have full-time direct internet access due to restrictions specific to industrial networks. Internet access may be provided to such computers, for example, during maintenance periods.

Workstations of system/network administrators, engineers, developers and integrators of industrial automation systems may have frequent or even full-time internet connections.

As a result, in our sample of computers categorized by Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT as part of the industrial infrastructure of organizations, about 42% of all machines had regular or full-time internet connections in H1 2018. The remaining machines connected to the Internet no more than once a month, many much less frequently than that.

Main figures

The percentage of ICS computers attacked in H1 2018 increased by 3.5 p.p. compared with H2 2017 and reached 41.2%. The year-over-year increase was 4.6 p.p.

Percentage of ICS computers attacked, H1 2017 – H1 2018

A comparison between different regions of the world shows that:

  • countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America are significantly worse off in terms of the percentage of ICS computers attacked than countries in Europe, North America and Australia;
  • the figures for Eastern Europe are considerably greater than those for Western Europe;
  • the percentage of ICS computers attacked in Southern Europe is higher than that in Northern and Western Europe.

Presumably, this situation could be due to the amounts of funds invested by organizations in infrastructure protection solutions.

Percentage of ICS systems attacked in regions of the world, H1 2018 vs H2 2017

The main sources of infection for computers in organizations’ industrial network infrastructure are the internet, removable media and email. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about control networks being isolated, in the past years the internet became the main source of infection for computers on organizations’ industrial networks.

Main sources of threats blocked on ICS computers (percentage of computers attacked during half-year periods), H12017 – H1 2018

While a year ago, in H1 2017, the internet was the source of threats blocked on 20.6% of ICS computers, in H1 2018 the figure was as high as 27.3%.

Main sources of threats blocked on ICS computers by region, H1 2018

More information about events during H1 2018, detailed statistics and our recommendations you may find in the full version of the report (PDF)

Kaspersky Lab Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT) is a global project launched by Kaspersky Lab in 2016 to coordinate the efforts of automation system vendors, industrial facility owners and operators, and IT security researchers to protect industrial enterprises from cyberattacks. Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT devotes its efforts primarily to identifying potential and existing threats that target industrial automation systems and the Industrial Internet of Things.

We know what your kids did this summer

Mon, 09/03/2018 - 06:00

For many kids and teenagers, summer is all about ditching school books in favor of hobbies and fun. Every year we release a report on children’s interests, as reflected in their online activity. This summer, we investigated what they prefer in their free time.

The Parental Control module in Kaspersky Lab products protects children from unwanted content, as does the standalone multiplatform solution Kaspersky Safe Kids. We use them to collect anonymous statistics about children’s online activities for which filtering is available and analyze this data every year to discover where their interests lie and how they are adapting in the digital world.

How statistics are collected

Kaspersky Lab solutions scan the content of web pages that children try to access. If a particular site belongs to one of 14 unwanted categories, the module sends a notification to the Kaspersky Security Network (there is no transfer of personal user data and no violation of privacy). There are two important things to note here:

  • Parents decide for themselves what content should be blocked and configure the application accordingly. However, anonymous statistics are collected across all 14 categories.
  • Data is harvested only from computers running Windows and macOS; no mobile statistics are provided in this report.
Website categorization

In products that have the Parental Control module, web filtering is currently performed across the following categories:

Filtering search queries

Children’s search activity is the best indicator of their interests. Kaspersky Safe Kids can filter children’s queries in five different search engines: Bing, Google, Mail.ru, Yahoo!, and Yandex — on six potentially dangerous topics: Adult content, Alcohol, Tobacco, Narcotics, Racism, and Profanity.

We grouped the search queries by language. We consider statistics for the English language as international due to its prevalence. All searches in the specific language made by individual users including repeat queries were taken as the 100% reference value. The popularity of each topic, defined as the percentage of queries related to it, is calculated for each separate language.

Search queries sent to us during the period June-August 2018 were broken down into several thematic categories:

  • Alcohol, tobacco, narcotics
  • Anime
  • Shopping
  • Education
  • Computer games
  • Idols
  • Online communication
  • Music
  • News
  • Pornography and erotica
  • Sport
  • Video
  • Weapons
  • Memes
  • Other
Global picture

Distribution of Parental Control and Safe Kids notifications across 14 categories, June 2018 – August 2018 (download)

According to website visitor statistics for June to mid-August 2018, in summer children prefer video and music over social media, as on average throughout the year. The most popular sites are YouTube and Facebook. This summer, children also took greater interest in online shopping and news portals. They paid little attention to gaming sites (although this doesn’t mean they’re playing less). Interestingly, resources devoted to alcohol, tobacco, narcotics, and pornography are almost never accessed by children on PCs.

Distribution of users’ search queries by thematic categories, June 2018 – August 2018 (download)

As for search engine activity, children displayed most interest in computer games (we get data on children’s searches from mobile platforms as well as PCs, which helps explain the discrepancy between gaming site visits from desktops and search activity). In second place came videos, films, and serials. Third place belongs to pornography and erotica. As our statistics show, some children are interested in education topics during the summer months. On a separate note, we should mention that children displayed interest (albeit not much, just 0.05%) in the topic of weapons, searching for “guns” and “оружие” (weapons).

Software, audio, video

According to website visitor statistics for stationary computers, children spend more time watching YouTube videos during the summer vacation than at other times of the year. We registered especially keen interest in the blogger PewDiePie, which is not surprising, since he is currently the most popular English-speaking blogger on YouTube. Children also watched serials on Netflix and listened to music on Spotify, Soundcloud, and iTunes.

Younger children prefer SpongeBob cartoons and visit the Nickelodeon, Cartoon Network, and Disney websites. Teenagers, meanwhile, are interested in the latest movies and serials, such as Deadpool 2 and Stranger Things.

Shot from the serial Stranger Things, Netflix

The music tastes of the younger generation haven’t changed: children continue to listen to rap. The famous rapper XXXTentacion was killed this summer, causing children to look for information about his death and listen to him more than other performers. Note that November 2017 saw the death of another famous young rap artist, Lil Peep, which also provoked a spike in interest, as reflected in our 2017-2018 report.

Online communication

Although our statistics clearly indicate that children are becoming less likely to use social media on stationary computers, the number of Facebook visits kept the “Internet communication media” category in second place. Besides this social network, children use the instant messenger Google Hangouts, and web versions of WhatsApp and Telegram on PCs. Tumblr and Twitter also get a look-in. The most common search engine queries among kids are “Facebook,” “Instagram,” “Twitter,” and “Pinterest.”

Online stores and shopping

Besides chatting with friends online and watching videos and TV shows, children were interested in updating their mobile devices and the contents of their wardrobe. The top stores are Ebay, Amazon, Aliexpress, ASOS, and H&M, and the most popular brands are Nike, Adidas, Supreme, Gucci, and Vans. These footwear and clothing brands are in favor with the younger generation, not least because they are glorified by rap singers, and artists are forever doing collabs with them. For example, Travis Scott x Nike or Pharrell Williams x Adidas.

Screenshot of news from hypebeast.com

As for children’s gadgets, this summer’s hits were iPhone X and Samsung Galaxy, and its flops were Huawei and Xiaomi.

News

Many news sources have recently stepped up their coverage of cultural events, launching music sections (for instance, bbc.co.uk/music) with the latest news about musicians, plus the opportunity to watch clips and listen to new releases. This is likely a contributing factor to the rise in teenage visits to the BBC, CNN, and Buzzfeed sites. Russian-speaking teenagers prefer to read news on the information portal Meduza.

Computer games

This summer, children worldwide were hooked on Fortnite, eclipsing the extremely popular PUBG. Activision/Blizzard games are still all the rage. Meanwhile, young gamers’ interest in Roblox and Minecraft dropped off slightly.

Screenshot of Blizzard’s website

Alcohol, tobacco, narcotics

This summer, children and adolescents showed almost no interest at all in tobacco, alcohol, and narcotics. This is illustrated by the low percentage of visits to websites and the near total lack of search queries related to this topic. The only queries we spotted were “alcohol” and “marlboro,” and neither was very popular. In the Russian language, children looked for information using the query “наркотики” (drugs).

Pornography and erotica

According to global statistics, children very rarely visited pornographic sites on PCs, but judging by the search queries, it seems they tried to do so from mobile devices. Besides games, music, and fashion brands, children were found to be searching for “Sex,” “Porn,” “Pornhub,” “Xvideos,” “xnxx,” “redtube,” “youporn,” and “hentai.” Parents who activated the filter for this category in Safe Kids will have prevented their children from viewing such material, since Parental Control blocks sites of this nature.

Sport, memes, VPNs, and a whole lot more

This summer, children — together with entire planet — were glued to the FIFA 2018 World Cup in Russia. Top search queries included “world cup 2018,” “fifa 18,” “cristiano ronaldo,” “messi,” “neymar,” “football,” and “чм 2018”.

Also center-stage was the Momo Challenge, which attracted wholesale attention in July 2018 — YouTube trends were driven by young Momo-trolling bloggers. Curiously, children googled nothing specific, and our statistics logged only the search queries “momo” and “момо” (in Russian).

The topic of online privacy is relevant for children, too, as evidenced by searches for the DuckDuckGo search engine and attempts to find out what a VPN is (no interest in this topic had been registered before).

As for famous people, children continued to show interest in Kim Kardashian, Kylie Jenner, and Emma Watson; the list was also enlarged by Donald Trump and Megan Markle.

Conclusion

From the data we collected over the summer, the picture that emerges of the behavior of the average child and adolescent is to be expected. With more free time on their hands, children began watching more videos on YouTube and TV shows on Netflix. They also visited online stores more often in search of information about the latest fashion. They also carried on playing computer games and following news stories of interest to them. The topics of privacy and the World Cup also featured. Meanwhile, there were more attempts to look at pornography, presumably because in summer children often stay home alone while their parents go to work.

All the statistics in this article are an accurate reflection of what modern kids and adolescents took an interest in this summer. Note that Parental Control statistics can be used not just to glean general indicators, but to find out what interests a particular child. We recommend that you keep an eye on this data and use Safe Kids not only as a tool to restrict access to certain content, but as a guide to your child’s online world.

What are botnets downloading?

Thu, 08/30/2018 - 06:00

Spam mailshots with links to malware and bots downloading other malware are just a couple of botnet deployment scenarios. The choice of infectious payload is limited only by the imagination of the botnet operator or customer. It might be a ransomware, a banker, a miner, a backdoor, the list goes on, and you don’t need to go far for examples: take Gandcrab and Trik, or Locky and Necurs, for instance. Every day we intercept numerous file-download commands sent to bots of various types and families. Here we present the results of our botnet activity analysis for H2 2017 and H1 2018.

Methodology

Excluded from the statistics are update files downloaded by bots, since their number depends heavily on the algorithm of the particular malware in question and has an impact on the final distribution. The analysis also excludes configuration files whose download depends on the botnet algorithm and is not relevant to this article. What’s more, we only took account of unique (in terms of MD5 hash) files. The results are based on the analysis of commands from more than 60,000 different C&C associated with 150 bot families and their modifications.

Kaspersky Lab tracks the activity of botnets using Botnet Tracking, a technology that emulates infected computers (bots) to retrieve operational data about the actions of botnet operators.

The total number of unique malicious files downloaded by our bots in H1 2018 fell by 14.5% against H2 2017.

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

Number of unique malicious files, H2 2017 — H1 2018 (download)

Most popular

After analyzing the files downloaded by the bots, we identified the most widespread families. Note that the top of the list of most “popular” downloads changes little over time. In 2018, as last year, the backdoor njRAT accounted for many downloads. Its share among all files downloaded by bots increased from 3.7% to 5.2%, meaning that more than 1 in each 20 bot-downloaded files is njRAT. This widespread distribution is due to the variety of versions of the malware and the ease of setting up one’s own backdoor, creating a low entry threshold.

H2 2017 Share H1 2018 Share 1 Lethic 17.0% njRAT 5.2% 2 Neutrino.POS 4.6% Lethic 5.0% 3 njRAT 3.7% Khalesi 4.9% 4 Emotet 3.5% Miners 4.6% 5 Miners 2.9% Neutrino.POS 2.2% 6 Smoke 1.8% Edur 1.3% 7 Cutwail 0.7% PassView 1.3% 8 Ransomware 0.7% Jimmy 1.1% 9 SpyEye 0.5% Gandcrab 1.1% 10 Snojan 0.3% Cutwail 1.1%

Most downloaded threats, H2 2017 — H1 2018

Very often, botnets are used to distribute cryptocurrency mining tools. In H1 2018 miners accounted for 4.6% of all downloaded files, a far higher figure than in H2 2017 (2.9%).

Yet cybercriminal interest in ordinary currencies remains high, as evidenced by the presence of Neutrino.POS and Jimmy in the Top 10. In H2 2017, Neutrino.POS was downloaded in 4.6% of all cases. In 2018, its share in the overall stream of downloaded files declined, but its “cousin” Jimmy helped out by adding 1.1% to the share of banking Trojans.

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

Distribution map of the Top 10 downloaded threats, H2 2017 (download)

In H1 2018, the Trojan Khalesi was in third place in our ranking, accounting for 4.9% of downloaded files. But while in 2017 the Remcos, BetaBot, Smoke, and Panda bots were involved in downloading the Trojan, in 2018 Khalesi was downloaded only by the spam bot Lethic.

On a separate note, the H1 2018 Top 10 features Mail PassView, a legal password recovery tool for various email clients. Distributed via the Remcos backdoor, it is likely used to obtain passwords for victim mailboxes.

The Cutwail, Lethic, and newly rebranded Emotet bots are also firmly rooted in the Top 10.

Compared to H2 2017, the number of ransomware encryptors downloaded by bots has risen this year. Despite the overall decline in the distribution of ransomware programs, botnet operators continue to deliver them to victims. According to our data, most ransomware programs in 2017 were downloaded by the Smoke bot, but in 2018 top spot has been seized by Nitol. GandCrab ransomware is a newbie in the Top 10 most downloaded families of 2018. It appeared in 2018 and was immediately deployed and distributed by several botnet operators, most actively by Trik.

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

Distribution map of the Top 10 downloaded threats, H1 2018 (download)

In terms of behavior, the clear leaders in both halves are Trojans with such diverse capabilities that it’s difficult to pinpoint their “specialization.” A significant proportion is made up of bankers and backdoors ensuring maximum theft of important information. What’s more, last year’s most common malware included a large number of spam bots, largely due to the above-mentioned Lethic.

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

Distribution of downloaded files by behavior, H2 2017 — H1 2018 (download)

Most “versatile”

Among the families under observation, we identified the most “versatile” — that is, those downloading the largest number of different files. Such diversity can be the result of several factors:

  • Different botnets from the same family are managed by different operators with varying objectives.
  • Operators “lease” their botnets, allowing them to be used to distribute malware.
  • A botnet changes its “specialization” (for example, Emotet turned from a banking Trojan turned into a spam bot)

In 2018, as in 2017, the most “versatile” bots were Hworm, Smoke, and BetaBot (a.k.a. Neurevt).

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

Distribution of downloaded files by behavior for Hworm, H2 2017 — H1 2018 (download)

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

Distribution of downloaded files by behavior for Smoke, H2 2017 — H1 2018 (download)

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

Distribution of downloaded files by behavior for Betabot, H2 2017 — H1 2018 (download)

As we already mentioned, hidden mining software is very popular, as confirmed by the statistics. Despite the variety of downloaded malware, miners invariably end up in the Top 3.

Backdoors also feature heavily due to the wide-ranging options they provide for cybercriminals, from saving screenshots and keystrokes to direct control over the target device.

Most “international”

In terms of territorial distribution of control servers, the backdoor Njrat unsurprisingly claimed the “most international” prize, with C&C centers in 99 countries. This geographical scope is down to the ease of configuring a personal backdoor, allowing anyone to create their own botnet with minimal knowledge of malware development.

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

Distribution map of Njrat C&C centers, H2 2017 — H1 2018 (download)

Next come the backdoors DarkComet and NanoCore RAT. They share silver and bronze, having C&Cs in almost 80 countries worldwide. Despite the arrest of the creator of NanoCore, he managed to sell the source code of his privately developed RAT, which is now actively used by other cybercriminals.

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

Distribution map of DarkComet C&C centers, H2 2017 — H1 2018 (download)

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

Distribution map of NanoCore RAT C&C centers, H2 2017 — H1 2018 (download)

A look at the geography of infection targets reveals that another backdoor, QRAT, has the largest reach. In H2 2017, we registered infection attempts in 190 countries, and this year QRAT added two more countries, bringing the total to 192.

!function(e,t,n,s){var i="InfogramEmbeds",o=e.getElementsByTagName(t)[0],d=/^http:/.test(e.location)?"http:":"https:";if(/^\/{2}/.test(s)&&(s=d+s),window[i]&&window[i].initialized)window[i].process&&window[i].process();else if(!e.getElementById(n)){var a=e.createElement(t);a.async=1,a.id=n,a.src=s,o.parentNode.insertBefore(a,o)}}(document,"script","infogram-async","https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed-loader-min.js");

QRAT distribution map, H2 2017 — H1 2018 (download)

This extensive scope is due to the SaaS (Software-as-a-Service), or rather MaaS (Malware-as-a-Service), distribution model QRAT can be purchased for 30 or 90 days, or for one year. Its cross-platform nature (the malware is written in Java) also plays a role.

Conclusion

By intercepting bot commands, we can track the latest trends in the world of virus writers and provide maximum protection for our users.

Here are the main trends that we identified from analyzing files downloaded by bots:

  • The share of miners in bot-distributed files is increasing, as cybercriminals have begun to view botnets as a tool for mining cryptocurrency.
  • Backdoors consistently make up the bulk of downloads; that is, botnet operators are keen to gain maximum possible control over infected devices.
  • The number of downloaded droppers is also on the rise, indicative of attacks that are multistage and growing in complexity.
  • The share of banking Trojans among bot-downloaded files in 2018 decreased, but it’s too soon to speak of an overall reduction in number, since they are often delivered by droppers (see above).
  • Increasingly, botnets are leased according to the needs of the customer, and in many cases it is difficult to pinpoint the “specialization” of the botnet.

Loki Bot: On a hunt for corporate passwords

Wed, 08/29/2018 - 09:00

Starting from early July, we have seen malicious spam activity that has targeted corporate mailboxes. The messages discovered so far contain an attachment with an .iso extension that Kaspersky Lab solutions detect as Loki Bot. The malware’s key objective is to steal passwords from browsers, messaging applications, mail and FTP clients, and cryptocurrency wallets. Loki Bot dispatches all its loot to the malware owners.

ISO images are copies of optical discs that can be mounted in a virtual CD/DVD drive to be used in the same way as the originals. Whereas in days of yore users needed dedicated software to open this type of image, today’s operating systems support the format out of the box, and if you want to access the contents of the file, all you need to do is double-click. Malicious spam uses this type of file as a container for delivering malware, albeit rarely.

As mentioned above, hackers were sending out copies of Loki Bot to company email addresses that could be obtained from public sources or from the companies’ own websites.

The emailed messages were notably diverse:

  1. Fake notifications from well-known companies

  2. Imitating messages from well-known corporations is one of the most popular tricks in the hackers’ arsenal. Interestingly enough, fake emails used to be directed mostly at common users and customers, whereas now companies are increasingly the target.

  1. Fake notifications containing financial documents

  2. The scammers passed off malicious files as financial documents: invoices, transfers, payments, etc. This is a fairly popular malicious spamming technique, with the message body usually no more than a few lines and the subject mentioning what exactly is purported to be attached.

  1. Fake orders or offers

  2. Phishers may pose as customers placing an order, or a vendor offering their goods or services.

Every year we observe an increase in spam attacks on the corporate sector. The perpetrators have used phishing and malicious spam, including forged business emails, in their pursuit of confidential corporate information: intellectual property, authentication data, databases, bank accounts, etc. That’s why today it’s essential for corporate security measures to include both technical protection and training for employees, because their actions may cause irreparable damage to the business.

BusyGasper – the unfriendly spy

Wed, 08/29/2018 - 06:00

In early 2018 our mobile intruder-detection technology was triggered by a suspicious Android sample that, as it turned out, belonged to an unknown spyware family. Further investigation showed that the malware, which we named BusyGasper, is not all that sophisticated, but demonstrates some unusual features for this type of threat. From a technical point of view, the sample is a unique spy implant with stand-out features such as device sensors listeners, including motion detectors that have been implemented with a degree of originality. It has an incredibly wide-ranging protocol – about 100 commands – and an ability to bypass the Doze battery saver. As a modern Android spyware it is also capable of exfiltrating data from messaging applications (WhatsApp, Viber, Facebook). Moreover, BusyGasper boasts some keylogging tools – the malware processes every user tap, gathering its coordinates and calculating characters by matching given values with hardcoded ones.

The sample has a multicomponent structure and can download a payload or updates from its C&C server, which happens to be an FTP server belonging to the free Russian web hosting service Ucoz. It is noteworthy that BusyGasper supports the IRC protocol which is rarely seen among Android malware. In addition, the malware can log in to the attacker’s email inbox, parse emails in a special folder for commands and save any payloads to a device from email attachments.

This particular operation has been active since approximately May 2016 up to the present time.

Infection vector and victims

While looking for the infection vector, we found no evidence of spear phishing or any of the other common vectors. But some clues, such as the existence of a hidden menu for operator control, point to a manual installation method – the attackers used physical access to a victim’s device to install the malware. This would explain the number of victims – there are less than 10 of them and according to our detection statistics, they are all located in the Russia.

Intrigued, we continued our search and found more interesting clues that could reveal some detailed information about the owners of the infected devices. Several TXT files with commands on the attacker’s FTP server contain a victim identifier in the names that was probably added by the criminals:

CMDS10114-Sun1.txt CMDS10134-Ju_ASUS.txt CMDS10134-Tad.txt CMDS10166-Jana.txt CMDS10187-Sun2.txt CMDS10194-SlavaAl.txt CMDS10209-Nikusha.txt

Some of them sound like Russian names: Jana, SlavaAl, Nikusha.

As we know from the FTP dump analysis, there was a firmware component from ASUS firmware, indicating the attacker’s interest in ASUS devices, which explains the victim file name that mentions “ASUS”.

Information gathered from the email account provides a lot of the victims’ personal data, including messages from IM applications.

Gathered file Type Description lock Text Implant log ldata sqlite3 Location data based on network (cell_id) gdata sqlite3 Location data based on GPS coordinates sdata sqlite3 SMS messages f.db sqlite3 Facebook messages v.db sqlite3 Viber messages w.db sqlite3 WhatsApp messages

Among the other data gathered were SMS banking messages that revealed an account with a balance of more than US$10,000.But as far as we know, the attacker behind this campaign is not interested in stealing the victims’ money.

We found no similarities to commercial spyware products or to other known spyware variants, which suggests BusyGasper is self-developed and used by a single threat actor. At the same time, the lack of encryption, use of a public FTP server and the low opsec level could indicate that less skilled attackers are behind the malware.

Technical details

Here is the meta information for the observed samples, certificates and hardcoded version stamps:

Certificate MD5 Module Version Serial Number: 0x76607c02
Issuer: CN=Ron
Validity: from = Tue Aug 30 13:01:30 MSK 2016
to = Sat Aug 24 13:01:30 MSK 2041
Subject: CN=Ron 9e005144ea1a583531f86663a5f14607 1 – 18abe28730c53de6d9e4786c7765c3d8 2 2.0 Serial Number: 0x6a0d1fec
Issuer: CN=Sun
Validity: from = Mon May 16 17:42:40 MSK 2016
to = Fri May 10 17:42:40 MSK 2041
Subject: CN=Sun 9ffc350ef94ef840728564846f2802b0 2 v2.51sun 6c246bbb40b7c6e75c60a55c0da9e2f2 2 v2.96s 7c8a12e56e3e03938788b26b84b80bd6 2 v3.09s bde7847487125084f9e03f2b6b05adc3 2 v3.12s 2560942bb50ee6e6f55afc495d238a12 2 v3.18s

It’s interesting that the issuer “Sun” matches the “Sun1” and “Sun2” identifiers of infected devices from the FTP server, suggesting they may be test devices.

The analyzed implant has a complex structure, and for now we have observed two modules.

First (start) module

The first module, which was installed on the targeted device, could be controlled over the IRC protocol and enable deployment of other components by downloading a payload from the FTP server:

@install command

As can be seen from the screenshot above, a new component was copied in the system path, though that sort of operation is impossible without root privileges. At the time of writing we had no evidence of an exploit being used to obtain root privileges, though it is possible that the attackers used some unseen component to implement this feature.

Here is a full list of possible commands that can be executed by the first module:

Command name Description @stop Stop IRC @quit System.exit(0) @start Start IRC @server Set IRC server (default value is “irc.freenode.net”), port is always 6667 @boss Set IRC command and control nickname (default value is “ISeency”) @nick Set IRC client nickname @screen Report every time when screen is on (enable/disable) @root Use root features (enable/disable) @timer Set period of IRCService start @hide Hide implant icon @unhide Unhide implant icon @run Execute specified shell @broadcast Send command to the second module @echo Write specified message to log @install Download and copy specified component to the system path

The implant uses a complex intent-based communication mechanism between its components to broadcast commands:

Approximate graph of relationships between BusyGasper components

Second (main) module

This module writes a log of the command execution history to the file named “lock”, which is later exfiltrated. Below is a fragment of such a log:

Log with specified command

Log files can be uploaded to the FTP server and sent to the attacker’s email inbox. It’s even possible to send log messages via SMS to the attacker’s number.

As the screenshot above shows, the malware has its own command syntax that represents a combination of characters while the “#” symbol is a delimiter. A full list of all possible commands with descriptions can be found in Appendix II below.

The malware has all the popular capabilities of modern spyware. Below is a description of the most noteworthy:

  • The implant is able to spy on all available device sensors and to log registered events. Moreover, there is a special handler for the accelerometer that is able to calculate and log the device’s speed:

    This feature is used in particular by the command “tk0” that mutes the device, disables keyguard, turns off the brightness, uses wakelock and listens to device sensors. This allows it to silently execute any backdoor activity without the user knowing that the device is in an active state. As soon as the user picks up the device, the implant will detect a motion event and execute the “tk1” and “input keyevent 3” commands.

    “tk1” will disable all the effects of the “tk0” command, while “input keyevent 3” is the shell command that simulates the pressing of the ‘home’ button so all the current activities will be minimized and the user won’t suspect anything.

  • Location services to enable (GPS/network) tracking:
  • The email command and control protocol. The implant can log in to the attackers email inbox, parse emails for commands in a special “Cmd” folder and save any payloads to a device from email attachments.

    Accessing the “Cmd” folder in the attacker’s email box

    Moreover, it can send a specified file or all the gathered data from the victim device via email.

  • Emergency SMS commands. If an incoming SMS contains one of the following magic strings: ” 2736428734″ or ” 7238742800″ the malware will execute multiple initial commands:
Keylogger implementation

Keylogging is implemented in an original manner.

Immediately after activation, the malware creates a textView element in a new window with the following layout parameters:

All these parameters ensure the element is hidden from the user.

Then it adds onTouchListener to this textView and is able to process every user tap.

Interestingly, there is a whitelist of tapped activities:

ui.ConversationActivity
ui.ConversationListActivity
SemcInCallScreen
Quadrapop
SocialPhonebookActivity

The listener can operate with only coordinates, so it calculates pressed characters by matching given values with hardcoded ones:

Additionally, if there is a predefined command, the keylogger can make a screenshot of the tapped display area:

Manual access and operator menu

There is a hidden menu (Activity) for controlling implant features that looks like it was created for manual operator control. To activate this menu the operator needs to call the hardcoded number “9909” from the infected device:

A hidden menu then instantly appears on the device display:

The operator can use this interface to type any command for execution. It also shows a current malware log.

Infrastructure FTP server

The attackers used ftp://213.174.157[.]151/ as a command and control server. The IP belongs to the free Russian web hosting service Ucoz.

Files Description CMDS*.txt Text files with commands to execute supersu.apk SuperSU(eu.chainfire.supersu) tool 246.us
us.x SuperSU ELF binaries supersu.cfg
supersu.cfg.ju
supersu.cfg.old SuperSU configs with spyware implant mention bb.txt BusyBox v1.26.2 ELF file bdata.xml Config file for excluding malware components from Android battery saver feature Doze bdatas.apk Main implant module com.android.network.irc.apk Start implant module MobileManagerService.apk ASUS firmware system component (clean) mobilemanager.apk Corrupted archive privapp.txt Looks like a list of system applications (including spyware components) from the infected device run-as.x
run-as.y Run-as tool ELF file

SuperSU config fragment for implant components and the busybox tool supersu.cfg:

This config allows the implant to use all root features silently.

Content of bdata.xml file:

It can be added to the /system/etc/sysconfig/ path to whitelist specified implant components from the battery saving system.

Email account

A Gmail account with password is mentioned in the sample’s code:

It contains the victim’s exfiltrated data and “cmd” directory with commands for victim devices.

Appendix I: Indicators of compromise MD5

9E005144EA1A583531F86663A5F14607
18ABE28730C53DE6D9E4786C7765C3D8
2560942BB50EE6E6F55AFC495D238A12
6C246BBB40B7C6E75C60A55C0DA9E2F2
7C8A12E56E3E03938788B26B84B80BD6
9FFC350EF94EF840728564846F2802B0
BDE7847487125084F9E03F2B6B05ADC3

C2

ftp://213.174.157[.]151/

Appendix II: List of all possible commands

These values are valid for the most recently observed version (v3.18s).

Decimal Char Description 33 ! Interrupt previous command execution 36 $ Make a screenshot 48 0 Execute following shell: rm c/*; rm p/*; rm sdcard/Android/system/tmp/r/* (wipe environment paths?) 63 ? Log device info and implant meta information 66(98) B(b) Broadcast specified command to another component 67(99) C(c) Set specified command on timer to execute Debug 68(100) 65(97) D(d) A(a) Log last 10 tasks by getRecentTasks api 68(100) 83(115) D(d) S(s) Log info about device sensors (motion, air temperature and pressure, etc.) 68(100) 84(116) D(d) T(t) Log stack trace and thread information GPS module 101 e Broadcast command to GPS-tracking external component 71(103) G(g) Location tracking GPS/network Interaction with operators 73(105) 102 114 I(i) f r Get specified file from FTP (default – CMDS file with commands) 73(105) 102 115 I(i) f s Upload exfiltrated data 73(105) 73(105) I(i) I(i) Start/stop IRC service 73(105) 76(108) I(i) L(l) Send current location to IRC 73(105) 77(109) I(i) M(m) Push specified message to IRC 73(105) 82(114) I(i) R(r) Read commands from the email inbox 73(105) 83(115) I(i) S(s) Send specified file or all gathered data in email with UID as a subject Network geolocation 76(108) L(l) Get info on current cell_id Camera features 77(109) 99 M(m) c Capture photo 77(109) 108 M(m) l Log information about available cameras 77(109) 114 97 M(m) r a Start/stop audio recording (default duration – 2 minutes) 77(109) 114 98 M(m) r b Start/stop audio recording with specified duration 77(109) 114 44(114) M(m) r ,(r) Start fully customizable recording (allow to choose specific mic etc.) 77(109) 114 115 M(m) r s Stop previous recording 77(109) 114 116 M(m) r t Set recording duration 77(109) 118 M(m) v Capture video with specified duration and quality Common 79(111) 102 O(o) f Hard stop of implant services, unregister receivers 79(111) 110 O(o) n Start main implant service with all components 80(112) P(p) Find specified images and scale them with “inSampleSize” API 81(113) Q(q) Stop main implant service 82(114) R(r) Execute specified shell command Shared preferences setup 83(115) 33 S(s) ! On/off hidden operator activity 83(115) 61 S(s) = Shared preferences control (set/remove specified value) 83(115) 98 S(s) b On/off sending SMS message after device boot 83(115) 99 S(s) c Put boolean value in shared preference “cpyl” 83(115) 100 S(s) d Put boolean value in shared preference “dconn” 83(115) 101 S(s) e On/off periodically reenabling data connectivity 83(115) 102 S(s) f Set GPS location update period 83(115) 105 S(s) i Put boolean value in shared preference “imsg” 83(115) 108 97 S(s) l a On/off foreground process activity logging 83(115) 108 99 S(s) l c Start watching on captured photos and videos 83(115) 108 102 S(s) l f Start watching on Facebook messenger database changes 83(115) 108 108 S(s) l l On/off browser history logging 83(115) 108 116 S(s) l t Start watching on Telegram messenger cache database changes 83(115) 108 118 S(s) l v Start watching on Viber messenger database changes 83(115) 108 119 S(s) l w Start watching on WhatsApp messenger database changes 83(115) 109 S(s) m On/off sending log SMS messages 83(115) 110(112) S(s) o(p) Set operator telephone number (for SMS logging) 83(115) 113 S(s) q Set implant stop-mode (full or only main service) 83(115) 114 S(s) r On/off execution shell as root 83(115) 115 S(s) s On/off screen state logging 83(115) 116 S(s) t On/off screen touches logging and number of related screenshots 83(115) 117 S(s) u On/off debug logging mode with system thread info 83(115) 120 S(s) x Use FTP connection via busybox or default Socket API Sensor and display control 84(116) 98 T(t) b On/off screen brightness 84(116) 100 T(t) d On/off network data (internet) 84(116) 75(107) 48 T(t) K(k) 0 Mute, turn off brightness, disable keyguard, use wakelock and listen on device sensors. 84(116) 75(107) 49 T(t) K(k) 1 Disable features from previous command 84(116) 75(107) 50 T(t) K(k) 2 Disable Keyguard instance 84(116) 75(107) 51 T(t) K(k) 3 Write “userActivity” to log 84(116) 115 48 T(t) s 0 Disable sensor listener 84(116) 115 49 T(t) s 1 Register listener for specified sensor 84(116) 115 108 T(t) s l Log int value from file /dev/lightsensor 84(116) 119 48 T(t) w 0 Turn WiFi off 84(116) 119 49 T(t) w 1 Turn WiFi on 84(116) 119 108 T(t) w l Control WiFi lock Common backdoor commands 85(117) U(u) Download payload, remount “system” path and push payload there. Based on the code commentaries, this feature might be used to update implant components 87(119) W(w) Send SMS with specified text and number Updates from the newest version 122 33 z ! Reboot device 122 99 z c Dump call logs 122 102 z f p Send gathered data to FTP 122 102 z f g Get CMDS* text file and execute contained commands 122 103 z g Get GPS location (without log, only intent broadcasting) 122 108 102 z l f Dump Facebook messages during specified period 122 108 116 z l t Dump Telegram cache 122 108 118 z l v Dump Viber messages during specified period 122 108 119 z l w Dump WhatsApp messages during specified period 122 110 z n Get number of all SMS messages 122 111 z o Set ringer mode to silent 122 112 z p Open specified URL in webview 122 114 z r Delete all raw SMS messages 122 116 z t Set all internal service timers 122 122 z z Remove shared preferences and restart the main service 126 ~ On/off advanced logging mode with SMS and UI activity

The rise of mobile banker Asacub

Tue, 08/28/2018 - 06:00

We encountered the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub family for the first time in 2015, when the first versions of the malware were detected, analyzed, and found to be more adept at spying than stealing funds. The Trojan has evolved since then, aided by a large-scale distribution campaign by its creators (in spring-summer 2017), helping Asacub to claim top spots in last year’s ranking by number of attacks among mobile banking Trojans, outperforming other families such as Svpeng and Faketoken.

We decided to take a peek under the hood of a modern member of the Asacub family. Our eyes fell on the latest version of the Trojan, which is designed to steal money from owners of Android devices connected to the mobile banking service of one of Russia’s largest banks.

Asacub versions

Sewn into the body of the Trojan is the version number, consisting of two or three digits separated by periods. The numbering seems to have started anew after the version 9.

The name Asacub appeared with version 4 in late 2015; previous versions were known as Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Smaps. Versions 5.X.X-8.X.X were active in 2016, and versions 9.X.X-1.X.X in 2017. In 2018, the most actively distributed versions were 5.0.0 and 5.0.3.

Communication with C&C

Although Asacub’s capabilities gradually evolved, its network behavior and method of communication with the command-and-control (C&C) server changed little. This strongly suggested that the banking Trojans, despite differing in terms of capability, belong to the same family.

Data was always sent to the C&C server via HTTP in the body of a POST request in encrypted form to the relative address /something/index.php. In earlier versions, the something part of the relative path was a partially intelligible, yet random mix of words and short combinations of letters and numbers separated by an underscore, for example, “bee_bomb” or “my_te2_mms”.

Example of traffic from an early version of Asacub (2015)

The data transmitted and received is encrypted with the RC4 algorithm and encoded using the base64 standard. The C&C address and the encryption key (one for different modifications in versions 4.x and 5.x, and distinct for different C&Cs in later versions) are stitched into the body of the Trojan. In early versions of Asacub, .com, .biz, .info, .in, .pw were used as top-level domains. In the 2016 version, the value of the User-Agent header changed, as did the method of generating the relative path in the URL: now the part before /index.php is a mix of a pronounceable (if not entirely meaningful) word and random letters and numbers, for example, “muromec280j9tqeyjy5sm1qy71” or “parabbelumf8jgybdd6w0qa0”. Moreover, incoming traffic from the C&C server began to use gzip compression, and the top-level domain for all C&Cs was .com:

Since December 2016, the changes in C&C communication methods have affected only how the relative path in the URL is generated: the pronounceable word was replaced by a rather long random combination of letters and numbers, for example, “ozvi4malen7dwdh” or “f29u8oi77024clufhw1u5ws62”. At the time of writing this article, no other significant changes in Asacub’s network behavior had been observed:

The origin of Asacub

It is fairly safe to say that the Asacub family evolved from Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Smaps. Communication between both Trojans and their C&C servers is based on the same principle, the relative addresses to which Trojans send network requests are generated in a similar manner, and the set of possible commands that the two Trojans can perform also overlaps. What’s more, the numbering of Asacub versions is a continuation of the Smaps system. The main difference is that Smaps transmits data as plain text, while Asacub encrypts data with the RC4 algorithm and then encodes it into base64 format.

Let’s compare examples of traffic from Smaps and Asacub — an initializing request to the C&C server with information about the infected device and a response from the server with a command for execution:

Smaps request

Asacub request

Decrypted data from Asacub traffic:

{“id”:”532bf15a-b784-47e5-92fa-72198a2929f5″,”type”:”get”,”info”:”imei:365548770159066, country:PL, cell:Tele2, android:4.2.2, model:GT-N5100, phonenumber:+486679225120, sim:6337076348906359089f, app:null, ver:5.0.2″}

Data sent to the server

[{“command”:”sent&&&”,”params”:{“to”:”+79262000900″,”body”:”\u0410\u0412\u0422\u041e\u041f\u041b\u0410\u0422\u0415\u0416 1000 50″,”timestamp”:”1452272572″}},
{“command”:”sent&&&”,”params”:{“to”:”+79262000900″,”body”:”BALANCE”,”timestamp”:”1452272573″}}]

Instructions received from the server

A comparison can also be made of the format in which Asacub and Smaps forward incoming SMS (encoded with the base64 algorithm) from the device to the C&C server:

Smaps format

Asacub format

Decrypted data from Asacub traffic:

{“data”:”2015:10:14_02:41:15″,”id”:”532bf15a-b784-47e5-92fa-72198a2929f5″,”text”:”SSB0aG91Z2h0IHdlIGdvdCBwYXN0IHRoaXMhISBJJ20gbm90IGh1bmdyeSBhbmQgbmU=”,”number”:”1790″,”type”:”load”}

Propagation

The banking Trojan is propagated via phishing SMS containing a link and an offer to view a photo or MMS. The link points to a web page with a similar sentence and a button for downloading the APK file of the Trojan to the device.

The Trojan download window

Asacub masquerades under the guise of an MMS app or a client of a popular free ads service. We came across the names Photo, Message, Avito Offer, and MMS Message.

App icons under which Asacub masks itself

The APK files of the Trojan are downloaded from sites such as mmsprivate[.]site, photolike[.]fun, you-foto[.]site, and mms4you[.]me under names in the format:

  • photo_[number]_img.apk,
  • mms_[number]_img.apk
  • avito_[number].apk,
  • mms.img_[number]_photo.apk,
  • mms[number]_photo.image.apk,
  • mms[number]_photo.img.apk,
  • mms.img.photo_[number].apk,
  • photo_[number]_obmen.img.apk.

For the Trojan to install, the user must allow installation of apps from unknown sources in the device settings.

Infection

During installation, depending on the version of the Trojan, Asacub prompts the user either for Device Administrator rights or for permission to use AccessibilityService. After receiving the rights, it sets itself as the default SMS app and disappears from the device screen. If the user ignores or rejects the request, the window reopens every few seconds.

The Trojan requests Device Administrator rights

The Trojan requests permission to use AccessibilityService

After installation, the Trojan starts communicating with the cybercriminals’ C&C server. All data is transmitted in JSON format (after decryption). It includes information about the smartphone model, the OS version, the mobile operator, and the Trojan version.

Let’s take an in-depth look at Asacub 5.0.3, the most widespread version in 2018.

Structure of data sent to the server:

{ "type":int, "data":{ data }, "id":hex }

Structure of data received from the server:

{ "command":int, "params":{ params, "timestamp":int, "x":int }, "waitrun":int }

To begin with, the Trojan sends information about the device to the server:

{ "type":1, "data":{ "model":string, "ver":"5.0.3", "android":string, "cell":string, "x":int, "country":int, //optional "imei":int //optional }, "id":hex }

In response, the server sends the code of the command for execution (“command”), its parameters (“params”), and the time delay before execution (“waitrun” in milliseconds).

List of commands sewn into the body of the Trojan:

Command code Parameters Actions 2 – Sending a list of contacts from the address book of the infected device to the C&C server 7 “to”:int Calling the specified number 11 “to”:int, “body”:string Sending an SMS with the specified text to the specified number 19 “text”:string, “n”:string Sending SMS with the specified text to numbers from the address book of the infected device, with the name of the addressee from the address book substituted into the message text 40 “text”:string Shutting down applications with specific names (antivirus and banking applications)

The set of possible commands is the most significant difference between the various flavors of Asacub. In the 2015-early 2016 versions examined in this article, C&C instructions in JSON format contained the name of the command in text form (“get_sms”, “block_phone”). In later versions, instead of the name of the command, its numerical code was transmitted. The same numerical code corresponded to one command in different versions, but the set of supported commands varied. For example, version 9.0.7 (2017) featured the following set of commands: 2, 4, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.

After receiving the command, the Trojan attempts to execute it, before informing C&C of the execution status and any data received. The “id” value inside the “data” block is equal to the “timestamp” value of the relevant command:

{ "type":3, "data":{ "data":JSONArray, "command":int, "id":int, "post":boolean, "status":resultCode }, "id":hex }

In addition, the Trojan sets itself as the default SMS application and, on receiving a new SMS, forwards the sender’s number and the message text in base64 format to the cybercriminal:

{ "type":2, "data":{ "n":string, "t":string }, "id":hex }

Thus, Asacub can withdraw funds from a bank card linked to the phone by sending SMS for the transfer of funds to another account using the number of the card or mobile phone. Moreover, the Trojan intercepts SMS from the bank that contain one-time passwords and information about the balance of the linked bank card. Some versions of the Trojan can autonomously retrieve confirmation codes from such SMS and send them to the required number. What’s more, the user cannot check the balance via mobile banking or change any settings there, because after receiving the command with code 40, the Trojan prevents the banking app from running on the phone.

User messages created by the Trojan during installation typically contain grammatical and spelling errors, and use a mixture of Cyrillic and Latin characters.

The Trojan also employs various obfuscation methods: from the simplest, such as string concatenation and renaming of classes and methods, to implementing functions in native code and embedding SO libraries in C/C++ in the APK file, which requires the use of additional tools or dynamic analysis for deobfuscation, since most tools for static analysis of Android apps support only Dalvik bytecode. In some versions of Asacub, strings in the app are encrypted using the same algorithm as data sent to C&C, but with different keys.

Example of using native code for obfuscation

Examples of using string concatenation for obfuscation

Example of encrypting strings in the Trojan

Asacub distribution geography

Asacub is primarily aimed at Russian users: 98% of infections (225,000) occur in Russia, since the cybercriminals specifically target clients of a major Russian bank. The Trojan also hit users from Ukraine, Turkey, Germany, Belarus, Poland, Armenia, Kazakhstan, the US, and other countries.

Conclusion

The case of Asacub shows that mobile malware can function for several years with minimal changes to the distribution scheme.

It is basically SMS spam: many people still follow suspicious links, install software from third-party sources, and give permissions to apps without a second thought. At the same time, cybercriminals are reluctant to change the method of communication with the C&C server, since this would require more effort and reap less benefit than modifying the executable file. The most significant change in this particular Trojan’s history was the encryption of data sent between the device and C&C. That said, so as to hinder detection of new versions, the Trojan’s APK file and the C&C server domains are changed regularly, and the Trojan download links are often one-time-use.

IOCs

C&C IP addresses:

  • 155.133.82.181
  • 155.133.82.240
  • 155.133.82.244
  • 185.234.218.59
  • 195.22.126.160
  • 195.22.126.163
  • 195.22.126.80
  • 195.22.126.81
  • 5.45.73.24
  • 5.45.74.130

IP addresses from which the Trojan was downloaded:

  • 185.174.173.31
  • 185.234.218.59
  • 188.166.156.110
  • 195.22.126.160
  • 195.22.126.80
  • 195.22.126.81
  • 195.22.126.82
  • 195.22.126.83

Operation AppleJeus: Lazarus hits cryptocurrency exchange with fake installer and macOS malware

Thu, 08/23/2018 - 04:00

Overview

Lazarus has been a major threat actor in the APT arena for several years. Alongside goals like cyberespionage and cybersabotage, the attacker has been targeting banks and other financial companies around the globe. Over the last few months, Lazarus has successfully compromised several banks and infiltrated a number of global cryptocurrency exchanges and fintech companies.

Kaspersky Lab has been assisting with incident response efforts. While investigating a cryptocurrency exchange attacked by Lazarus, we made an unexpected discovery. The victim had been infected with the help of a trojanized cryptocurrency trading application, which had been recommended to the company over email. It turned out that an unsuspecting employee of the company had willingly downloaded a third-party application from a legitimate looking website and their computer had been infected with malware known as Fallchill, an old tool that Lazarus has recently switched back to. There have been multiple reports on the reappearance of Fallchill, including one from US-CERT.

To ensure that the OS platform was not an obstacle to infecting targets, it seems the attackers went the extra mile and developed malware for other platforms, including for macOS. A version for Linux is apparently coming soon, according to the website. It’s probably the first time we see this APT group using malware for macOS.

The fact that the Lazarus group has expanded its list of targeted operating systems should be a wake-up call for users of non-Windows platforms.

Trojanized cryptocurrency trading application

Thanks to Kaspersky Lab’s malicious-behavior detection technology, implemented in its endpoint security software, we were able to reassemble the stages of infection and trace them back to their origin. This helped us understand that one of Lazarus’ victims was infected with malware after installing a cryptocurrency trading program. We also confirmed that the user installed this program via a download link delivered over email.

Trojanized trading application for Windows

Including malicious code into distributed software and putting that on a website would be too obvious. Instead, the attackers went for a more elaborate scheme: the trojan code was pushed out in the form of an update for a trading application.

A legitimate-looking application called Celas Trade Pro from Celas Limited showed no signs of malicious behaviour and looked genuine. This application is an all-in-one style cryptocurrency trading program developed by Celas.

Screenshot of Celas Trade Pro

When we started this research, any user could download the trading application from the Celas website. Checking the installation package downloaded from the website confirmed the presence of a very suspicious updater.

Installation package download page

We have analyzed the following Windows version of the installation package:

MD5: 9e740241ca2acdc79f30ad2c3f50990a
File name: celastradepro_win_installer_1.00.00.msi
File type: MSI installer
Creation time: 2018-06-29 01:16:00 UTC

At the end of the installation process, the installer immediately runs the Updater.exe module with the “CheckUpdate” parameter. This file looks like a regular tool and most likely will not arouse the suspicion of system administrators. After all, it even contains a valid digital signature, which belongs to the same vendor. But the devil is in the detail, as usual.

The code writer developed this project under the codename “jeus”, which was discovered in a PDB path included in the updater and used as unique HTTP multipart message data separator string. Because of this, and the fact that the attacked platforms include Apple macOS, we decided to call this Operation AppleJeus.

Properties of the shady updater tool included in the package are:

MD5: b054a7382adf6b774b15f52d971f3799
File Type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Known file name: %Program Files%\CelasTradePro\Updater.exe
Link Time: 2018-06-15 10:56:27 UTC
Build path: Z:\jeus\downloader\downloader_exe_vs2010\Release\dloader.pdb

The main purpose of Updater.exe is to collect the victim’s host information and send it back to the server. Upon launch, the malware creates a unique string with the format string template “%09d-%05d” based on random values, which is used as a unique identifier of the infected host. This malware collects process lists, excluding “[System Process]” and “System” processes and gets the exact OS version from the registry value at “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion”. It seems that such values only exist from Windows 10, so we assume that the author developed and tested it on Windows 10.

  • ProductName: Windows OS version
  • CurrentBuildNumber: Windows 10 build version
  • ReleaseID: Windows 10 version information
  • UBR: Sub version of Windows 10 build
  • BuildBranch: Windows 10 build branch information

The code encrypts the collected information with the hardcoded XOR key (“Moz&Wie;#t/6T!2y“) before uploading it to the server.

Data encryption routine

The code sends the victim’s information to a webserver using HTTP and the following URL:
www.celasllc[.]com/checkupdate.php

The server is a legitimate looking website owned by the developer of the program: Celas LLC. At this point we were not able to conclude with high confidence whether the server was compromised by the threat actor or had belonged to the threat actor from the beginning. To learn more about the server, please read the “Infrastructure” section below.

The malware used a hardcoded User-Agent string “Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/6.0)” and fixed a multipart form data separator string “jeus“.

Using encryption, the custom separator string wouldn’t be a red flag for a legitimate application, but sending a request with the context-irrelevant string “get_config”, as well as uploading collected system information as “temp.gif”, mimicking a GIF image with a magic number in the header, definitely made us raise our eyebrows.

Communication with the C2 server

After successfully uploading data, the updater checks the server response. If the server responds with HTTP code 300, it means the updater should keep quiet and take no action. However, if the response is HTTP code 200, it extracts the payload with base64 and decrypts it using RC4 with another hardcoded key (“W29ab@ad%Df324V$Yd“). The decrypted data is an executable file that is prepended with the “MAX_PATHjeusD” string.

During our research, we found other similar files. One was created on August 3rd and another on August 11th. The PDB path shows that the author keeps improving this updater tool, apparently forked from some stable version released on July 2, 2018 according to the internal directory name.

Additional trojanized sample #1 Additional trojanized sample #1 Installation package MD5 4126e1f34cf282c354e17587bb6e8da3 0bdb652bbe15942e866083f29fb6dd62 Package creation date 2018-08-03 09:57:29 2018-08-13 0:12:10 Dropped updater MD5 ffae703a1e327380d85880b9037a0aeb bbbcf6da5a4c352e8846bf91c3358d5c Updater creation date 2018-08-03 09:50:08 2018-08-11 7:28:08 Updater Build path H:\DEV\TManager\DLoader\20180702\dloader\WorkingDir\Output\00000009\Release\dloader.pdb H:\DEV\TManager\DLoader\20180702\dloader\WorkingDir\Output\00000006\Release\dloader.pdb

Note the TManager directory in the PDB path from the table. It will pop up again in another unexpected place later.

Trojanized trading program for macOS

For macOS users, Celas LLC also provided a native version of its trading app. A hidden “autoupdater” module is installed in the background to start immediately after installation, and after each system reboot. It keeps contacting the command and control (C2) server in order to download and run an additional executable from the server. The communication conforms to the Windows version of the updater and is disguised as an image file upload and download, while carrying encrypted data inside.

We have analyzed the following installation file:

MD5: 48ded52752de9f9b73c6bf9ae81cb429
File Size: 15,020,544 bytes
File Type: DMG disk image
Known file name: celastradepro_mac_installer_1.00.00.dmg
Date of creation: 13 July 2018

Once the Cellas Trade Pro app is installed on macOS, it starts the Updater application on the system load via a file named “.com.celastradepro.plist” (note that it starts with a dot symbol, which makes it unlisted in the Finder app or default Terminal directory listing). The “Updater” file is passed the “CheckUpdate” parameter on start.

Celas Trade Pro app plist file (Apple Property List)

The command-line argument “CheckUpdate” looks redundant from a code analysis perspective: there is no other argument that the application expects. In the absence of all arguments, it doesn’t do anything and quits. This may or may not be way to trick sandboxes that could automatically execute this trojan updater, with no suspicious activity produced without such a “secret” extra argument. The choice of a benign string such as “CheckUpdate” helps it to hide in plain sight of any user or administrator looking into running processes.

The trojanized updater works similar to the Windows version in many ways. Both applications are implemented using a cross-platform QT framework. Upon launch, the downloader creates a unique identifier for the infected host using a “%09d-%06d” format string template. Next, the app collects basic system information, which for macOS is done via dedicated QT classes:

  • Host name
  • OS type and version
  • System architecture
  • OS kernel type and version

The process of encrypting and transferring data is the same as in the Windows version. This information is XOR-encrypted with hardcoded 16-byte static key “Moz&Wie;#t/6T!2y”, prepended with GIF89a header and uploaded to the C2 server via HTTP POST and the following URL:

https://www.celasllc[.]com/checkupdate.php

POST request template strings

The module relies on a hardcoded User-Agent string for macOS:
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_12_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/66.0.3359.139 Safari/537.36

Once the server replies, it checks the HTTP response code. HTTP response code 300 indicates that the server has no task for the updater and the application terminates immediately. If the HTTP response is code 200, then the updater gets the data in the response, decodes it from base64 encoding and decrypts it using RC4 with the hardcoded static key “W29ab@ad%Df324V$Yd“. It calculates the MD5 of the decoded and decrypted data, which is compared to a value stored inside, to verify the integrity of the transferred file. After that, the payload is extracted and saved to a hardcoded file location “/var/zdiffsec“, sets executable permissions for all users and starts the app with another secret hardcoded command-line argument “bf6a0c760cc642“. Apparently the command-line argument is the way to prevent the detection of its malicious functionality via sandboxes or even reverse engineering. We have previously seen this technique adopted by Lazarus group in 2016 in attacks against banks. As of 2018, it is still using this in almost every attack we investigated.

Downloaded payload

According to data from Kaspersky Security Network, the threat actor delivered the malicious payload using one of the shadowy updaters described above. We found a malicious file created at the same host:

MD5: 0a15a33844c9df11f12a4889ae7b7e4b
File Size: 104,898,560 bytes
File Type: PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
Known file name: C:\Recovery\msn.exe
Link time: 2018-04-19 13:30:19

Note the unusually large size for an executable file. We believe that it was inflated with junk data on purpose to prevent easy download or transfer over the internet.

Searching for the reason for the malware’s appearance on the system revealed that there was an additional process responsible for producing several files before this malware was launched, suggesting a trojan dropper in action. The main function of this malware is to implant the Fallchill backdoor loader linked to several files. Upon launch, the malware checks one of the command-line arguments passed to it. The malware chooses one of the service names located in the following registry value as a disguise:

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost\netsvcs

This value includes a list of several dozen standard system service names.

The randomly chosen service name is used to name the dropped file and newly registered Windows service. Let’s refer to this randomly chosen service name as [service]. The malware contains references to several files inside:

  • The file passed as argument: contains a 16-byte key
  • msncf.dat: Encrypted configuration data
  • msndll.tmp: Encrypted Fallchill loader
  • msndll.dat: Encrypted Fallchill backdoor (payload for the loader)
  • [service]svc.dll: Fallchill backdoor loader
  • [service].dat: Copy of msndll.dat

A mix of the above-mentioned files produces the final backdoor known as Fallchill. A more detailed procedure for technical specialists is as follows:

  1. Check whether the command-line argument points to a file of 16 byte size.
  2. Read the file passed via the command-line argument. The contents of this file contains a crypto key, which we will call the main key.
  3. Open the msncf.dat file (configuration file). If the file size equals 192 bytes, read the content of the file.
  4. Open msndll.tmp file and decrypt it using the main key.
  5. Create the [service]svc.dll file and fill it with pseudo-random data.
    1. The malware fills the file with 10,240 bytes of pseudo-random data, and iterates (rand() % 10 + 10240) times. This is why it produces files which are at least 104,851,000 bytes.
  6. Copy the 16-byte main key at the end of the [service]svc.dll file.
  7. Encrypt the [service].dat file name with the main key and append it at the end of [service]svc.dll.
  8. Overwrite the beginning of [service]svc.dll with data decrypted from msndll.tmp.
  9. Move msndll.dat file to [service].dat.
  10. Delete temporary files: msndll.tmp, msncf.dat, msndll.log.
  11. Timestamp [service]svc.dll and [service].dat files.
  12. Register [service]svc.dll as a Windows service.
  13. Save a copy of data from msncf.dat file in the following registry value
    HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\TaskConfigs\Description.

Infection process diagram

Fallchill backdoor loader

We confirmed that the following malware was created on the infected host using the method described above:

Fallchill backdoor loader:

MD5: e1ed584a672cab33af29114576ad6cce
File Size: 104,878,356 bytes
File Type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (console) x86-64, for MS Windows
Known file name: C:\Windows\system32\uploadmgrsvc.dll
Link time: 2018-01-18 01:56:32

Encrypted Fallchill backdoor:

MD5: d8484469587756ce0d10a09027044808
File Size: 143,872 bytes
File Type: encrypted data
Known file name: C:\Windows\system32\uploadmgr.dat

Upon starting, uploadmgrsvc.dll reads 276 bytes from the end of its own executable file. The first 16 bytes of this 276-byte data are used as a decryption key, and the remaining 260 bytes contain the encrypted file path used by the backdoor.

Data at the end of the loader module

After decryption of the last 260-bytes, the malware retrieves the name or path of the file that contains the actual backdoor body in encrypted form.

Decrypted file name in the end of loader module

The malware reads the specified file and decrypts it using the same decryption routine. This is how the executable code of the backdoor is produced in memory and executed by the loader. Below is the meta information about the decrypted final payload in memory:

MD5: d7089e6bc8bd137a7241a7ad297f975d
File Size: 143,872 bytes
File Type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
Link Time: 2018-03-16 07:15:31

We can summarize the Fallchill backdoor loading process as follows:

Loading the Fallchill backdoor

As mentioned previously, the final payload belongs to a Fallchill malware cluster formerly attributed to the Lazarus APT group. Upon launching, this malware resolves the API function addresses at runtime, and reads the C2 server address from the registry value created during the installation stage:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\TaskConfigs\Description

If there is no configuration value, the malware falls back to a default C2 server address.

  • 196.38.48[.]121
  • 185.142.236[.]226

This is a full-featured backdoor that contains enough functions to fully control the infected host. Some of its network protocol commands are described below.

Command ID Description 0x8000 Write current time and configuration data to registry key 0x8001 Send configuration data 0x8002 Replace configuration data in the fixed registry value 0x8003 Execute Windows command, store output in temp file and upload contents to C2 0x8006 Show current working directory 0x8007 Change current working directory 0x8008 Collect process information 0x8009 Terminate process 0x8010 Start new process 0x8011 Create process with security context of the current user 0x8012 Connect to specified host/port 0x8013 Get drive information 0x8014 Directory listing 0x8015 Search a file 0x8019 Write data to a specified file 0x8020 Read contents of specified file and upload to C2 server 0x8021 Compress multiples files to a temp file (name start with ZD) and upload to C2 0x8023 Wipe specific file 0x8025 Copy file time from another file time (timestamping) 0x8026 Shutdown malware service and self-delete 0x8043 Send “Not Service” unicode string to C2 server (communication test?).

This set of capabilities is very common for many Lazarus backdoors, which have been seen in other attacks against banks and financial industry in the past years.

Infrastructure

While working on the incident of the cryptocurrency company’s breach, we were curious about the legal status of the Celas LLC company that developed this trojanized trading application.

Celas LLC main homepage.

The website had a valid SSL certificate issued by Comodo CA. However, note that the certificate from this webserver mentions “Domain Control Validated”, which is a weak security verification level for a webserver. It does not mean validation of the identity of the website’s owner, nor of the actual existence of the business. When certification authorities issue this kind of certificate they only check that the owner has a certain control over the domain name, which can be abused in certain ways.

Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 22:a6:49:c1:ae:61:3f:58:5a:a5:e3:cb:8b:23:f0:61 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA Validity Not Before: May 29 00:00:00 2018 GMT Not After : May 29 23:59:59 2019 GMT Subject: OU=Domain Control Validated, OU=PositiveSSL, CN=celasllc.com Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption Public-Key: (2048 bit) Modulus: 00:de:0f:58:f2:68:07:d2:0f:43:5a:07:c6:53:b7: 4a:b4:1c:4c:71:4f:a1:4e:80:e3:5a:ec:3b:90:a7: 91:ca:42:49:71:ba:da:33:4c:e4:4f:1f:86:d9:30: 32:a0:b1:f4:b2:f2:9c:28:97:7c:81:0f:02:d0:9c: 36:f6:9c:d6:f9:b5:ca:23:ba:1b:84:e4:0d:8c:9f: -- Redacted --

Below is the WHOIS record of the “celasllc.com” domain. The domain name was registered by an individual named “John Broox” with registrant email address “johnbroox200@gmail[.]com”.

Registrant Name: John Broox Registrant Organization: Registrant Street: 2141 S Archer Ave Registrant City: Chicago Registrant State/Province: Illinois Registrant Postal Code: 60601 Registrant Country: US Registrant Phone: +1.8133205751 Registrant Email: johnbroox200@gmail[.]com ….. Name Server: 1a7ea920.bitcoin-dns.hosting Name Server: a8332f3a.bitcoin-dns.hosting Name Server: ad636824.bitcoin-dns.hosting Name Server: c358ea2d.bitcoin-dns.hosting

The same name of “John Broox” was used inside the installation package of the macOS version of the trading application. The Info.plist properties file describes the package as follows:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd"> <plist version="1.0"> <dict> <key>CFBundleVersion</key> <string>1.00.00</string> <key>CFBundleName</key> <string>Celas Trade Pro</string> <key>CFBundleIconFile</key> <string>CelasTradePro</string> <key>CFBundlePackageType</key> <string>APPL</string> <key>CFBundleGetInfoString</key> <string>Developed by John Broox. CELAS LLC</string> <key>CFBundleSignature</key> <string>QTCELASTRADE</string> <key>CFBundleExecutable</key> <string>CelasTradePro</string> <key>CFBundleIdentifier</key> <string>com.celasllc.CelasTradePro</string> <key>NSPrincipalClass</key> <string>NSApplication</string> <key>NSHighResolutionCapable</key> <string>True</string> <key>LSMinimumSystemVersion</key> <string>10.10.0</string> </dict> </plist>

It looks at first sight like a legitimate WHOIS record, but something doesn’t really add up here. The domain celasllc.com was the only domain registered with this email address and was exclusively used for domain registration.

The registrant used the Domain4Bitcoins service to register this domain, apparently paying with cryptocurrency. According to open-source intelligence, the address of the WHOIS information is fake, unless it’s the owner of a ramen shop running a cryptocurrency exchange software development studio on the side.

View of the location referred in the WHOIS record. Image source: Google Maps.

The server hosting celasllc.com (185.142.236.213) belongs to the Blackhost ISP in the Netherlands.

WHOIS record of cellasllc.com server

Coincidentally, the Fallchill malware authors also preferred to use the same hosting company to host their C2 server. Moreover, the Celas LLC web server and one of the C2 servers of the Fallchill malware are located in the same network segment of this ISP:

  • Celas LLC infrastructure:
    • 185.142.236.213: Netherlands Blackhost Ltd. AS174 COGENT-174
  • Fallchill malware C2 server:
    • 196.38.48[.]121: South Africa Internet Solutions AS3741
    • 185.142.236[.]226: Netherlands Blackhost Ltd. AS174 COGENT-174
  • Additional attacker’s server from telemetry
    • 80.82.64[.]91: Seychelles Incrediserve Ltd AS29073
    • 185.142.239[.]173: Netherlands Blackhost Ltd. AS174 COGENT-174

However, when you look into Celas Trading Pro application’s digital signature, including its “Updater”, you will find that this certificate was also issued by Comodo CA, which refers to a company address in the United States.

Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 9a:73:55:0b:83:76:86:3b:d9:43:0f:aa:8b:5a:29:87 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO RSA Code Signing CA Validity Not Before: May 21 00:00:00 2018 GMT Not After : May 21 23:59:59 2019 GMT Subject: C=US/postalCode=49319, ST=Michigan, L=Cedar Springs/street=15519 WHITE CREEK AVE NE, O=CELAS LLC, CN=CELAS LLC Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption Public-Key: (2048 bit) Modulus: 00:b6:31:7a:c6:68:2f:d2:03:f2:e9:61:c4:86:4f: 46:62:e7:a6:d7:7c:bd:e6:9f:a8:83:2c:a6:44:43: 92:da:b7:ea:cc:3d:3e:35:20:3f:9c:57:46:1c:d1: 65:b8:28:50:29:cd:29:11:e8:56:59:85:e5:0f:19:

According to open-source data, this address doesn’t belong to a real business, and looks on maps like a meadow with a small forest and small real estate offering nearby.

Location of Cellas LLC, according to its digital certificate

Real estate history of that address

Pivoting the infrastructure a little further brings up some more suspicious things. It appears that the domain referred to two IPs, one of which was linked to a few other suspicious domains, according to PassiveDNS.

Cellas LLC linked infrastructure

The owners of the linked infrastructural elements preferred to use several interesting services for hosting domain registration. All these service providers offer a certain level of anonymity to their customers. Most of them accept Bitcoins as a main payment method to keep their customers anonymous. This is very uncommon for companies running a legitimate business.

Hosting services linked to Celas LLC:

  • Blackhost (https://black.host/)
  • Liberty VPS (https://libertyvps.net/)

Domain registration services linked to Celas LLC:

  • Domains4Bitcoins (https://www.domains4bitcoins.com/)
  • NameCheap (https://www.namecheap.com/)
  • ChangeIP (https://www.changeip.com/)
  • Njalla (https://njal.la/)

All the facts above can make the more sceptical among us doubt the intentions of Celas LLC and the legitimacy of this business. Of course, these facts alone would not be enough to accuse Celas LLC of committing a crime.

Attribution

Kaspersky Lab has previously attributed the Fallchill malware cluster to Lazarus group when it attacked the financial sector around the world. It was also confirmed by other security vendors, and the national CERT of US.

RC4 key from the older Fallchill

Fallchill malware uses a RC4 algorithm with a 16-byte key to protect its communications. The key extracted from the Fallchill variant used in the current attack is DA E1 61 FF 0C 27 95 87 17 57 A4 D6 EA E3 82 2B.

Current RC4 key of Fallchill

We were able to confirm that some of older Fallchill malware variants used exactly the same RC4 key. Below are Fallchill malware samples that used the same key (the compilation timestamp may indicate the date of malware creation).

MD5 Timestamp 81c3a3c5a0129477b59397173fdc0b01 2017-05-26 23:37:04 6cb34af551b3fb63df6c9b86900cf044 2017-06-09 17:24:30 21694c8db6234df74102e8b5994b7627 2017-11-07 17:54:19 5ad7d35f0617595f26d565a3b7ebc6d0 2015-10-24 01:52:11 c501ea6c56ba9133c3c26a7d5ed4ce49 2017-06-09 03:59:43 cafda7b3e9a4f86d4bd005075040a712 2017-11-07 17:54:33 cea1a63656fb199dd5ab90528188e87c 2017-06-12 19:25:31 6b061267c7ddeb160368128a933d38be 2017-11-09 17:18:06 56f5088f488e50999ee6cced1f5dd6aa 2017-06-13 08:17:51 cd6796f324ecb7cf34bc9bc38ce4e649 2016-04-17 03:26:56 Same C2 server with older Fallchill

We have confirmed that the C2 server addresses (196.38.48[.]121, 185.142.236[.]226) used in this attack have been used by the older variant of Fallchill.

MD5 Timestamp 94dfcabd8ba5ca94828cd5a88d6ed488 2016-10-24 02:31:18 14b6d24873f19332701177208f85e776 2017-06-07 06:41:27 abec84286df80704b823e698199d89f7 2017-01-18 04:29:29

Overlap of C2 infrastructure

Apparently, the attackers using the Fallchill malware continue to reuse code and C2 server infrastructure over and over again.

According to Kaspersky Security Network, Fallchill was not the only malware used in this attack. There was another backdoor that was used by the threat actor. We omit a full description of this backdoor in the current report to keep the write-up to an acceptable length, but we would like to highlight two important things discovered in it. First, this backdoor was created on 2018-07-12 and revealed an already familiar directory, “TManager”, which we previously saw in the Updater.exe application from the Cellas Trading Pro suite:

H:\DEV\TManager\all_BOSS_troy\T_4.2\T_4.2\Server_\x64\Release\ServerDll.pdb

Second, what is probably one of the most interesting findings to come from this additional backdoor was discovered hidden in hardcoded headers used to communicate with C2 server. The Accept-Language HTTP header string revealed a language code associated with North Korea. In our experience, this is something we normally don’t see in malware.

Accept-Language: ko-kp,ko-kr;q=0.8,ko;q=0.6,en-us;q=0.4,en;q=0.2

Accept-Language HTTP header value in the body of the backdoor

Conclusions

The Lazarus APT group’s continuous attacks on the financial sector are not much of a surprise to anyone. A lot of research has been done and published about such attacks. However, we think this case makes a difference. Recent investigation shows how aggressive the group is and how its strategies may evolve in the future.

First of all, Lazarus group has entered a new platform: macOS. There is steadily growing interest in macOS from ordinary users, especially in IT companies. Many developers and engineers are switching to using macOS. Apparently, in the chase after advanced users, software developers from supply chains and some high profile targets, threat actors are forced to have macOS malware tools. We believe that in the future Lazarus is going to support all platforms that software developers are using as a base platform, because compromising developers opens many doors at once.

We cannot say with full certainty whether Celas LLC was compromised and the threat actor abused it to push malware through an update mechanism. However, the multiple successful Lazarus attempts to compromise supply chain companies suggest that it will keep exploring this infection method. From all angles, the Celas LLC story looks like the threat actor has found an elaborate way to create a legitimate looking business and inject a malicious payload into a “legitimate looking” software update mechanism. Sounds logical: if one cannot compromise a supply chain, why not to make fake one?

This should be a lesson to all of us and a wake-up call to businesses relying on third-party software. Do not automatically trust the code running on your systems. Neither good looking website, nor solid company profile nor the digital certificates guarantee the absence of backdoors. Trust has to be earned and proven. Stay safe!

Appendix I – Indicators of Compromise File Hashes (malicious documents, trojans, emails, decoys)

Tronized installer and payload

9e740241ca2acdc79f30ad2c3f50990a celastradepro_win_installer_1.00.00.msi
4126e1f34cf282c354e17587bb6e8da3 celastradepro_win_installer_1.00.00.msi
0bdb652bbe15942e866083f29fb6dd62 CelasTradePro-Installer.msi
48ded52752de9f9b73c6bf9ae81cb429 celastradepro_mac_installer_1.00.00.dmg
b054a7382adf6b774b15f52d971f3799 Updater.exe
ffae703a1e327380d85880b9037a0aeb Updater.exe
bbbcf6da5a4c352e8846bf91c3358d5c Updater.exe
0a15a33844c9df11f12a4889ae7b7e4b msn.exe
E1ed584a672cab33af29114576ad6cce uploadmgrsvc.dll
D8484469587756ce0d10a09027044808 uploadmgr.dat
D7089e6bc8bd137a7241a7ad297f975d

Same RC4 key Fallchill

81c3a3c5a0129477b59397173fdc0b01
6cb34af551b3fb63df6c9b86900cf044
21694c8db6234df74102e8b5994b7627
5ad7d35f0617595f26d565a3b7ebc6d0
c501ea6c56ba9133c3c26a7d5ed4ce49
cafda7b3e9a4f86d4bd005075040a712
cea1a63656fb199dd5ab90528188e87c
6b061267c7ddeb160368128a933d38be
56f5088f488e50999ee6cced1f5dd6aa
cd6796f324ecb7cf34bc9bc38ce4e649

Same C&C server Fallchill

94dfcabd8ba5ca94828cd5a88d6ed488
14b6d24873f19332701177208f85e776
abec84286df80704b823e698199d89f7

File path

C:\Recovery\msn.exe
C:\Recovery\msndll.log
C:\Windows\msn.exe
C:\WINDOWS\system32\uploadmgrsvc.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\uploadmgr.dat

Domains and IPs

www.celasllc[.]com/checkupdate.php (malware distribution URL)
196.38.48[.]121
185.142.236[.]226
80.82.64[.]91
185.142.239[.]173

Dark Tequila Añejo

Tue, 08/21/2018 - 06:00

Dark Tequila is a complex malicious campaign targeting Mexican users, with the primary purpose of stealing financial information, as well as login credentials to popular websites that range from code versioning repositories to public file storage accounts and domain registrars.

A multi-stage payload is delivered to the victim only when certain conditions are met; avoiding infection when security suites are installed or the sample is being run in an analysis environment. From the target list retrieved from the final payload, this particular campaign targets customers of several Mexican banking institutions and contains some comments embedded in the code written in the Spanish language, using words only spoken in Latin America.

Most of the victims are located in Mexico. The campaign has been active since at least 2013, so it is a very ‘añejo’ (mature) product. There are two known infection vectors: spear-phishing and infection by USB device.

The threat actor behind it strictly monitors and controls all operations. If there is a casual infection, which is not in Mexico or is not of interest, the malware is uninstalled remotely from the victim’s machine.

(Translation for “Abrir la carpeta para ver los archivos” – “Open folder to see files”. The word “Archivos” is used by Spanish speakers from Latin America only)

The Dark Tequila malware and its supporting infrastructure are unusually sophisticated for a financial fraud operation. The malicious implant contains all the modules required for the operation and, when instructed to do so by het command server, different modules decrypt and activate. All stolen data is uploaded to the server in encrypted form.

This campaign modules are as follows:

  • Module 1, which is responsible for communication with the command and control server. It verifies if a man-in-the-middle network check is being performed, by validating the certificates with a few very popular websites.
  • Module 2 – CleanUp. If the service detects any kind of ‘suspicious’ activity in the environment, such as the fact that it is running on a virtual machine, or that debugging tools are running in the background, it will execute this module to perform a full cleanup of the system, removing the persistence service as well as any files created previously on the system.
  • Module 3 – Keylogger and Windows Monitor. This is designed to steal credentials from a long list of online banking sites, as well as generic Cpanels, Plesk, online flight reservation systems, Microsoft Office365, IBM lotus notes clients, Zimbra email, Bitbucket, Amazon, GoDaddy, Register, Namecheap, Dropbox, Softlayer, Rackspace, and other services.
  • Module 4 – Information stealer, which is designed to steal saved passwords in email and FTP clients, as well as from browsers.
  • Module 5 – The USB infector. This copies an executable file to a removable drive to run automatically. This enables the malware to move offline through the victim’s network, even when only one machine was initially compromised via spear-phishing. When another USB is connected to the infected computer, it automatically becomes infected, and ready to spread the malware to another target.
  • Module 6 – The service watchdog. This service is responsible for making sure that the malware is running properly.

The campaign remains active. It is designed to be deployed in any part of the world, and attack any targets according to the interests of the threat actor behind it.

Reference hashes:

4f49a01e02e8c47d84480f6fb92700aa091133c894821fff83c7502c7af136d9
dce2d575bef073079c658edfa872a15546b422ad2b74267d33b386dc7cc85b47

Reference C2s:

https://46[.]17[.]97[.]12/website/
https://174[.]37[.]6[.]34/98157cdfe45945293201e71acb2394d2
https://75[.]126[.]60[.]251/store/

For more information about this campaign, please contact us at financialintel@kaspersky.com

Security assessment of corporate information systems in 2017

Thu, 08/16/2018 - 06:00

Each year, Kaspersky Lab’s Security Services department carries out dozens of cybersecurity assessment projects for companies worldwide. In this publication, we present a general summary and statistics for the cybersecurity assessments we have conducted of corporate information systems throughout 2017.

We have analyzed several dozen projects for companies from various sectors, including government bodies, financial organizations, telecommunications and IT companies, as well as manufacturing and energy companies. The results and statistics on detected vulnerabilities are provided separately for each type of service provided: external penetration testing, internal penetration testing, web application security assessment.

The distribution of analyzed companies by industry, 2017

The overall level of protection against external attackers was assessed as low or extremely low for 43% of all analyzed companies. The level of protection against internal attackers was identified as low or extremely low for 93% of all analyzed companies.

This publication includes statistics on the most common vulnerabilities and security flaws that Kaspersky Lab’s experts have detected and that can potentially be used by threat actors for unauthorized penetration into company infrastructures.

 “Security assessment of corporate information systems in 2017” full report (PDF)

Spam and phishing in Q2 2018

Tue, 08/14/2018 - 06:00

Quarterly highlights GDPR as a phishing opportunity

In the first quarter, we discussed spam designed to exploit GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), which came into effect on May 25, 2018. Back then spam traffic was limited to invitations to participate in workshops and other educational events and purchase software or databases. We predicted that fraudulent emails were soon to follow. And we found them in the second quarter.

As required by the regulation, companies notified email recipients that they were switching to a new GDPR-compliant policy and asked them to confirm permission to store and process personal information. This was what criminals took advantage of. To gain access to the personal information of well-known companies’ customers, criminals sent out phishing emails referencing the GDPR and asking recipients to update their account information. To do this, customers had to click on the link provided and enter the requested data, which immediately fell into the hands of the criminals. It must be noted that the attackers were targeting customers of financial organizations and IT service providers.

Phishing emails exploiting GDPR

Malicious IQY attachments

In the second quarter, we uncovered several malspam incidents with never-before-seen IQY (Microsoft Excel Web Query) attachments. Attackers disguise these files as invoices, order forms, document copies, etc., which is a known ploy that is still actively used for malspamming. The From field contains addresses that look like personal emails, and names of attachments are generated in accordance with the following template: the name of the attachment, and then either a date or a random number sequence.

Harmful .iqy files

When the victim opens the IQY file, the computer downloads several trojan-downloaders, which install the Flawed Ammyy RAT backdoor. The infection chain may look like this: Trojan-Downloader.MSExcel.Agent downloads another downloader from the same family, which, in turn, downloads Trojan-Downloader.PowerShell.Agent, then this trojan downloads Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Dapato, which finally installs the actual Backdoor.Win32.RA-based.hf (also known as Flawed Ammyy RAT) used to gain remote access to the victim’s computer, steal files and personal information, and send spam.

It is rather difficult to detect these attachments because these files look like ordinary text documents which transfer web-inquiry data transfer parameters from remote sources to Excel spreadsheets. IQY files can also be a very dangerous tool in the hands of criminals because their structure is no different from the structure of legitimate files, yet they can be used to download any data at all.

It must be noted that malspam with IQY attachments is distributed via the largest botnet called Necurs. As a reminder, this is the botnet responsible for malspam (ransomware, macro-viruses, etc.), as well as pump-and-dump and dating spam. The botnet’s operation is characterized by periods of spiking and idling while infection and filter evasion mechanisms become ever more sophisticated.

Data leaks

The wave of confidential information leaks we discussed in the previous quarter is still on the rise. Here are some of the most notable events of the quarter:

  • Hacking and theft of personal information of 27M Ticketfly customers;
  • 92M MyHeritage genealogy service users’ personal information was discovered on a public server;
  • 340M individual records were lost by Exactis, a marketing company;
  • An unprotected Amazon server allowed access to the personal information of 48M Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Zillow users.

As a result of such leaks, cybercriminals get a hold of users’ names, email addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, credit card numbers, and personal preferences. This information may later be used to launch targeted phishing attacks, which are the most dangerous type of phishing.

Cryptocurrency

In the second quarter, our antiphishing system prevented 58,000 user attempts to connect to phishing websites masquerading as popular cryptocurrency wallets and markets. In addition to classic phishing, which aims at gaining access to the victim’s accounts and private key information, cybercriminals try every way to entice a victim to willingly send them cryptocurrency. One of the examples of this are cryptocoin giveaways. Cybercriminals continue using the names of new ICO projects to collect money from potential investors that are trying to gain early access to new tokens. Sometimes phishing sites pop up before official project sites.

Ethereum (ETH) is currently the most popular cryptocurrency with phishers. The popularity of Ethereum with cybercriminals increases as more funds are attracted by ICOs on the Ethereum platform. According to our very rough estimate (based on data received from over a thousand ETH wallets used by malefactors), over the Q2 2018, cybercriminals exploiting ICOs managed to make $2,329,317 (end-of-July-2018 exchange rate), traditional phishing not included.

Fake ICO project pages: the first is located on fantom.pub and imitates fantom.foundation, the real site of the FANTOM project; the second one, found on sparkster.be, is an imitation of sparkster.me, the original SPARKSTER site

World Cup 2018

Cybercriminals from all over the world prepared for the World Cup as much as its organizers and soccer fans. The World Cup was used in many traditional scamming methods using social engineering. Cybercriminals created fake championship partner websites to gain access to victims’ bank and other accounts, carried out targeted attacks, and created bogus fifa.com account sign-in pages.

HTTPS

As mentioned in the 2017 report, more and more phishing pages are now found on certified domains. Those may include hacked or specially registered domains that cybercriminals use to store their content. This has to do with the fact that most of the Internet is switching to HTTPS and it has become easy to get a simple certificate. In the middle of the second quarter, this prompted Google to announce future efforts aimed at changing the way Chrome works with certificates. Starting in September 2018, the browser (Chrome 69) will stop marking HTTPS sites as “Secure” in the URL bar. Instead, starting in October 2018, Chrome will start displaying the “Not secure” label when users enter data on unencrypted sites.

When Chrome 70 comes out in October 2018, a red “Not secure” marker will be displayed for all HTTP sites where users enter data.

Google believes that this will make more sites use encryption. After all, users should expect the web to be safe by default and receive warnings only in the event of any issues.

An example of a certified phishing website marked as “Secure”.

At the moment, the green Secure message in the URL bar is rather misleading for a user, especially when they visit a phishing website.

Vacation season

In anticipation of the vacation season, cybercriminals have used all of the possible topics that may interest travelers, from airplane ticket purchases to hotel bookings. For instance, we’ve found many websites that offer very tempting accommodations at absurd prices (e.g., an entire four-bedroom house in Prague with a pool and a fireplace at $1,000 a month). Such websites pose as Amazon, TripAdvisor, and other sites popular among travelers.

An example of a fake hotel booking website

A similar method is used to fake ticket aggregator websites. In these cases, the displayed flight information is real, but the tickets turn out to be fake.

An example of fake airline ticket websites

Distribution channels

In our reports, we regularly point out you that phishing and other spam has gone way beyond email a long time ago. Attackers use every means of communication at their disposal and even recruit unsuspecting users themselves for malware distribution. In this quarter, most large-scale attacks were found in messengers and on social networks.

WhatsApp

Cybercriminals have been using WhatsApp more frequently to distribute their content lately. WhatsApp users copy and resend spam messages themselves, just like they used to do with luck chain letters many years ago. Most of these messages contain information about fictional lotteries or giveaways (we have already discussed these types of scams many times). Last quarter, cybercriminals brought back the airplane ticket giveaways. This quarter in Russia, for instance, they used names of popular retailers such as Pyaterochka and Leroy Merlin, and also McDonald’s. Some fake messages come from popular sportswear brands, as well as certain stores and coffee shops.

Users share messages about ticket raffles with their contacts via a messenger since it’s one of the conditions for winning

Once a user has sent the message to some friends, he or she is redirected to another resource, the content of which changes depending on the victim’s location and device. If the user visits the site from their smartphone, most often they are automatically subscribed to paid services. The user may also be redirected to a page containing a survey or a lottery or to some other malicious website. For instance, a user may be invited to install a browser extension which will later intercept the data they enter on other websites and use their name to do other things online, such as publish posts on social media.

An example of a page which a user is redirected to after a survey, at the end of which they were promised a coupon to be used in a popular retail chain. As you can see, no coupon has been received, but the user is invited to install a browser extension with suspicious permissions.

Twitter and Instagram

Cybercriminals have been using Twitter to distribute fraudulent content for a long time. However, it has recently become a breeding ground for fake celebrity and company accounts.

Fake account for Pavel Durov

The most popular cover used by cybercriminals is cryptocurrency giveaways on behalf of celebrities. The user is asked to transfer a small amount of cryptocurrency to a certain wallet to get double or triple coins back. To enhance trust, the wallet may be located on a separate website, which also contains a list of fake transactions that the victim can see “updating” in real time, which confirms that any person who transfers money to the fake wallet gets back several times the amount transferred. Of course, the victim does not receive anything. Despite the simplicity of this scheme, it makes cybercriminals millions of dollars. This quarter, cybercriminals favoured the names of Elon Musk, Pavel Durov, and Vitalik Buterin in their schemes. These names were chosen for a reason — Elon Musk is an entrepreneur, inventor, and investor, while Durov and Buterin made it to the cryptocurrency market leader list published by Fortune.

An example of a website advertised on Elon Musk’s fake account

News sensations make these schemes even more effective. For instance, the shutdown of the Telegram messenger generated a wave of fake messages from “Pavel Durov” promising compensation. In this case cybercriminals use similarly-spelled account names. For example, if the original account name contains an underscore, cybercriminals register a new user with two underscores in the name and publish messages about cryptocurrency giveaways in comments to the celebrities’ authentic Twitter posts. As a result, even a detail-oriented person may have a hard time spotting the fake.

Twitter administration promised to stop this type of fraud a long time ago. One of their first steps involved blocking accounts that tried to change the user’s name to Elon Musk, and most probably other names commonly used by cybercriminals as well. However, it is easy to keep the account from being blocked by entering a Captcha and a code sent via text, after which the user can keep Elon’s name or change it to anything they want— the account will not be blocked again. It is also unclear whether Twitter will block the obfuscated names of famous people that are often exploited by cybercriminals.

Another measure taken by the social network is blocking accounts that post links to Elon Musk’s account. Just like in the previous example, the account can be unblocked by entering a Captcha and confirming a phone number via a code received in a text message.

This scam has started spreading to other platforms as well. Fake accounts can also be found on Instagram.

Vitalik Buterin’s fake Instagram account

Facebook

On Facebook, in addition to the aforementioned content distribution through viral threads, cybercriminals often use the advertising mechanisms offered by the social network. We have recorded instances of get-rich-quick schemes being spread through Facebook ads.

Fraudulent website ad on Facebook

After clicking on the ad, the user is redirected to a website where, after completing a few steps, they are offered a reward. To receive this reward, the user must either pay a fee, enter their credit card information, or share some personal details. Of course, the user does not receive any reward in the end.

Search results

Ads with malicious content and links to phishing sites can be found not only on social networks, but also in the search results pages of major search engines. This has recently become a popular method of advertising fake ICO project websites.

Users do not always notice the “Ad” label next to the ads

Spammer tricks

Last quarter, spammers tried to use the following new tricks to evade filters.

Double email headers

When generating spam emails, spammers use two From fields in the email header. The first From field contained a legitimate address, usually one from a well-known organization (whose reputation is untarnished by spam scandals) while the second contained the actual spammer email address, which has nothing to do with the first one. Spammers were expecting the email to be treated as legitimate by filters, forgetting that modern anti-spam solutions rely not only on the technical part of the email, but also on its content.

Subscription forms

In these events, spam messages in the form of an automatic mailing list subscription confirmations arrive in recipient inboxes. Regular websites capable of unlimited user registration were employed to create them (especially when they allowed using the same email address multiple times). Spammers used a script that auto-filled subscription forms inserting recipient addresses from previously collected (or purchased) databases. Spam content was a short phrase with a link to a spam resource inserted into one of the mandatory fields in the form (in particular, the recipient name). As a result, the user received a notification sent from a legitimate mail address containing a spam link instead of their name.

An example of spam mail sent using the subscription service on a legal site

Statistics: spam Proportion of spam in email traffic

Proportion of spam in global email traffic, Q1 and Q2 2018 (download)

In the Q2 2018, the largest percentage of spam was recorded in May at 50.65%. The average percentage of spam in world mail traffic is 49.66%, which was 2.16 p.p. lower than the previous reporting period.

Sources of spam by country

Spam -originating countries, Q2 2018 (download)

The leading spam-originating country in Q2 2018 was Vietnam (3.98%), which fell to seventh place in the second quarter, replaced by China (14.36%). The second and third places, the USA in Germany, are only one percentage point apart, with 12.11% and 11.12% shares, respectively. France occupied the fourth place (4.42%), and the fifth was occupied by Russia (4.34%). Great Britain occupied the tenth place (2.43%).

Spam email size

Spam email size, Q1 and Q2 2018 (download)

The results of the Q2 2018 indicate that the share of very small spam messages (up to 2 KB) fell 2.45 p.p. to 79.17%. The percentage of 5-10 KB spam messages, on the other hand, grew somewhat (by 1.45 p.p.) in comparison with the previous quarter and amounted to 5.56%.

The percentage of 10-20 KB spam messages was practically unchanged — it went down by 0.93 p.p. to 3.68%. 20-50 KB spam messages saw a similar trend, their share decreasing by 0.4 p.p. (to 2.68%) in comparison with the previous reporting period.

Malicious attachments: malware families

Top 10 malware families, Q2 2018 (download)

According to the results of the Q2 2018, the most widely-distributed family of malware by-mail was Exploit.Win32.CVE-2017-11882 (with 10.35%)/ This is the verdict attributed to various malware that exploited the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Microsoft Word. The amount of mail with the Trojan-PSW.Win32.Fareit malware family in it, which steals user information and passwords, decreased during the second quarter, losing the first place and now occupying the second place (with 5.90%). The third and fourth places are occupied by Backdoor.Win32.Androm (5.71%) and Backdoor.Java.QRat (3.80%). The Worm.Win32.WBVB family was the fifth most popular malware with cybercriminals.

Countries targeted by malicious mailshots

Distribution of Mail Anti-Virus triggers by country, Q2 2018 (download)

The first, second, and third places among the countries with the highest quantity of Mail Anti-Virus triggers in Q2 2018 were unchanged. Germany remained in the first place (9.54%), and the second and third places were taken by Russia and Great Britain (8.78% and 8.67%, respectively). The fourth and fifth places were taken by Brazil (7.07%) and Italy (5.39%).

Statistics: phishing

In the Q2 2018, the Antiphishing prevented 107,785,069 attempts to connect users to malicious websites. 9.6% of all Kaspersky Lab users around the world were subject to attack.

Geography of attacks

The country with the highest percentage of users attacked by phishing in Q2 2018 was again Brazil, with 15.51% (-3.56 p.p.).

Geography of phishing attacks, Q2 2018 (download)

Country %* Brazil 15.51 China 14.77 Georgia 14.44 Kyrgyzstan 13.60 Russia 13.27 Venezuela 13.26 Macao 12.84 Portugal 12.59 Belarus 12.29 South Korea 11.66

* Percentage of users whose Antiphishing system triggered against all Kaspersky Lab users in the respective country.

Organizations under attack

The rating of attacks by phishers on different categories of organizations is based on detections by Kaspersky Lab’s heuristic Anti-Phishing component. It is activated every time the user attempts to open a phishing page, either by clicking a link in an email or a social media message, or as a result of malware activity. When the component is triggered, a banner is displayed in the browser warning the user about a potential threat.[/caption]

In Q2 2018, the Global Internet Portals category again took first place with 25.00% (+1.3 p.p.).

Distribution of organizations affected by phishing attacks by category, Q2 2018. (download)

The percentage of attacks on organizations that may be combined into a general Finance category (banks, at 21.10%, online stores, at 8.17%, and payment systems, at 6.43%) fell to 35.70% (-8.22 p.p.). IT companies in the second quarter were more often subject to threats then in the first quarter. This category saw an increase of 12.28 p.p. to 13.83%.

Conclusion

Average spam volume of 49.66% in world mail traffic in this quarter fell 2.16 p.p. in comparison with the previous reporting period, and the Antiphishing system prevented more than 107M attempts to connect users to phishing sites, which is 17M more than in the first quarter of 2018.

In this quarter, malefactors actively used GDPR, World Cup, and cryptocurrency themes, and links to malicious websites could be found on social networks and messengers (users were often distributing them themselves), as well as in marketing messages served by large search engines.

Exploit.Win32.CVE-2017-11882 was the most widely-distributed family of malware via mail, at 10.35%. Trojan-PSW.Win32.Fareit fell from the first place to the second place (5.90%), and the third and fourth places were taken by Backdoor.Win32.Androm (5.71%) and Backdoor.Java.QRat (3.80%).

KeyPass ransomware

Mon, 08/13/2018 - 08:21

In the last few days, our anti-ransomware module has been detecting a new variant of malware – KeyPass ransomware. Others in the security community have also noticed that this ransomware began to actively spread in August:

Notification from MalwareHunterTeam

Distribution model

According to our information, the malware is propagated by means of fake installers that download the ransomware module.

Description

The Trojan sample is written in C++ and compiled in MS Visual Studio. It was developed using the libraries MFC, Boost and Crypto++. The PE header contains a recent compilation date.

PE header with compilation date

When started on the victim’s computer, the Trojan copies its executable to %LocalAppData% and launches it. It then deletes itself from the original location.

Following that, it spawns several copies of its own process, passing the encryption key and victim ID as command line arguments.

Command line arguments

KeyPass enumerates local drives and network shares accessible from the infected machine and searches for all files, regardless of their extension. It skips files located in a number of directories, the paths to which are hardcoded into the sample.

The list of excluded paths

Every encrypted file gets an additional extension: “.KEYPASS” and ransom notes named “”!!!KEYPASS_DECRYPTION_INFO!!!.txt”” are saved in each processed directory.

The ransom note

Encryption scheme

The developers of this Trojan implemented a very simplistic scheme. The malware uses the symmetric algorithm AES-256 in CFB mode with zero IV and the same 32-byte key for all files. The Trojan encrypts a maximum of 0x500000 bytes (~5 MB) of data at the beginning of each file.

Part of the procedure that implements data encryption

Soon after launch, KeyPass connects to its command and control (C&C) server and receives the encryption key and the infection ID for the current victim. The data is transferred over plain HTTP in the form of JSON.

If the C&C is inaccessible (e.g. if the infected machine is not connected to the internet or the server is down), the Trojan uses a hardcoded key and ID, which means that in the case of offline encryption the decryption of the victim’s files will be trivial.

GUI

From our point of view, the most interesting feature of the KeyPass Trojan is the ability to take ‘manual control’. The Trojan contains a form that is hidden by default, but which can be shown after pressing a special button on the keyboard. This capability might be an indication that the criminals behind the Trojan intend to use it in manual attacks.

GUI of the trojan

This form allows the attacker to customize the encryption process by changing such parameters as:

  • encryption key
  • name of ransom note
  • text of ransom note
  • victim ID
  • extension of the encrypted files
  • list of paths to be excluded from the encryption

Paths excluded from encryption by default

Pseudocode of the procedure that shows the GUI by a keypress

Geography IOC

901d893f665c6f9741aa940e5f275952 – Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder.n
hxxp://cosonar.mcdir.ru/get.php

IT threat evolution Q2 2018

Mon, 08/06/2018 - 06:00

Targeted attacks and malware campaigns Operation Parliament

In April, we reported the workings of Operation Parliament, a cyber-espionage campaign aimed at high-profile legislative, executive and judicial organizations around the world – with its main focus in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, especially Palestine. The attacks, which started early in 2017, target parliaments, senates, top state offices and officials, political science scholars, military and intelligence agencies, ministries, media outlets, research centers, election commissions, Olympic organizations, large trading companies and others.

The attackers have taken great care to stay under the radar, imitating another attack group in the region. The targeting of victims is unlike that of previous campaigns in the Middle East, by Gaza Cybergang or Desert Falcons, and points to an elaborate information-gathering exercise that was carried out prior to the attacks (physical and/or digital). The attackers have been particularly careful to verify victim devices before proceeding with the infection, safeguarding their C2 (Command-and-Control) servers. The attacks seem to have slowed down since the start of 2018, probably after the attackers achieved their objectives.

The malware basically provides a remote CMD/PowerShell terminal for the attackers, enabling them to execute any scripts or commands and receive the result via HTTP requests.

This campaign is a further symptom of escalating tensions in the Middle East.

Energetic Bear

Crouching Yeti (aka Energetic Bear) is an APT group that has been active since at least 2010, mainly targeting energy and industrial companies. The group targets organizations around the world, but with a particular focus on Europe, the US and Turkey – the latter being a new addition to the group’s interests during 2016-17. The group’s main tactics include sending phishing e-mails with malicious documents and infecting servers for different purposes, including hosting tools and logs and watering-hole attacks. Crouching Yeti’s activities against US targets have been publicly discussed by US-CERT and the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC).

In April, Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT provided information on identified servers infected and used by Crouching Yeti and presented the findings of an analysis of several web servers compromised by the group during 2016 and early 2017.

Our findings are as follows.

  1. With rare exceptions, the group’s members get by with publicly available tools. The use of publicly available utilities by the group to conduct its attacks renders the task of attack attribution without any additional group ‘markers’ very difficult.
  2. Potentially, any vulnerable server on the internet is of interest to the attackers when they want to establish a foothold in order to develop further attacks against target facilities.
  3. In most cases that we have observed, the group performed tasks related to searching for vulnerabilities, gaining persistence on various hosts, and stealing authentication data.
  4. The diversity of victims may indicate the diversity of the attackers’ interests.
  5. It can be assumed with some degree of certainty that the group operates in the interests of or takes orders from customers that are external to it, performing initial data collection, the theft of authentication data and gaining persistence on resources that are suitable for the attack’s further development.

You can read the full report here.

ZooPark

The use of mobile platforms for cyber-espionage has been growing in recent years – not surprising, given the widespread use of mobile devices by businesses and consumers alike. ZooPark is one such operation. The attackers have been focusing on targets in the Middle East since at least June 2015, using several generations of malware to target Android devices, which we have labelled versions one to four.

Each version marks a progression – from very basic first and second versions, to the commercial spyware fork in the third version and then to the complex spyware that is the fourth version. The last step is especially interesting, showing a big leap from straightforward code functionality to highly sophisticated malware.

This suggests that the latest version may have been bought from a vendor of specialist surveillance tools. This wouldn’t be surprising, since the market for these espionage tools is growing, becoming popular among governments, with several known cases in the Middle East. At this point, we cannot confirm attribution to any known threat actor. If you would like to learn more about our intelligence reports, or request more information on a specific report, contact us at intelreports@kaspersky.com.

We have seen two main distribution vectors for ZooPark – Telegram channels and watering-holes. The second of these has been the preferred method: we found several news websites that have been hacked by the attackers to redirect visitors to a downloading site that serves malicious APKs. Some of the themes observed in the campaign include ‘Kurdistan referendum’, ‘TelegramGroups’ and ‘Alnaharegypt news’, among others.

The target profile has evolved in the last few years of the campaign, focusing on victims in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon and Iran.

Some of the samples we have analyzed provide clues about the intended targets. For example, one sample mimics a voting application for the independence referendum in Kurdistan. Other possible high-profile targets include the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine refugees in the Near East in Amman, Jordan.

The king is dead, long live the king!

On April 18, someone uploaded an interesting exploit to VirusTotal. This was detected by several security vendors, including Kaspersky Lab – using our generic heuristic logic for some older Microsoft Word documents.

This turned out to be a new zero-day vulnerability for Internet Explorer (CVE-2018-8174) –patched by Microsoft on May 8, 2018. Following processing of the sample in our sandbox system, we noticed that it successfully exploited a fully patched version of Microsoft Word. This led us to carry out a deeper analysis of the vulnerability.

The infection chain consists of the following steps. The victim receives a malicious Microsoft Word document. After opening it, the second stage of the exploit is downloaded – an HTML page containing VBScript code. This triggers a UAF (Use After Free) vulnerability and executes shellcode.

Despite the initial attack vector being a Word document, the vulnerability is actually in VBScript. This is the first time we have seen a URL Moniker used to load an IE exploit in Word, but we believe that this technique will be heavily abused by attackers in the future, since it allows them to force victims to load IE, ignoring the default browser settings. It’s likely that exploit kit authors will start abusing it in both drive-by attacks (through the browser) and spear-phishing campaigns (through a document).

To protect against this technique, we would recommend applying the latest security updates and using a security solution with behavior detection capabilities.

VPNFilter

In May, researchers from Cisco Talos published the results of their investigation into VPNFilter, malware used to infect different brands of routers – mainly in Ukraine, although affecting routers in 54 countries in total. Initially, they believed that the malware had infected around 500,000 routers – Linksys, MikroTik, Netgear and TP-Link networking equipment in the small office/home office (SOHO) sector, and QNAP network-attached storage (NAS) devices. However, it later became clear that the list of infected routers was much longer – 75 in total, including ASUS, D-Link, Huawei, Ubiquiti, UPVEL and ZTE.

The malware is capable of bricking the infected device, executing shell commands for further manipulation, creating a TOR configuration for anonymous access to the device or configuring the router’s proxy port and proxy URL to manipulate browsing sessions.

Further research by Cisco Talos showed that the malware is able to infect more than just targeted devices. It is also spread into networks supported by the device, thereby extending the scope of the attack. Researchers also identified a new stage-three module capable of injecting malicious code into web traffic.

The C2 mechanism has several stages. First, the malware tries to visit a number of gallery pages hosted on ‘photobucket[.]com’ and fetches the image from the page. If this fails, the malware tries to fetch an image from the hard-coded domain ‘toknowall[.]com’ (this C2 domain is currently sink-holed by the FBI). If this fails also, the malware goes into passive backdoor mode, in which it processes network traffic on the infected device, waiting for the attacker’s commands. Researchers in the Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) at Kaspersky Lab analyzed the EXIF processing mechanism.

One of the interesting questions is who is behind this malware. Cisco Talos indicated that a state-sponsored or state affiliated threat actor is responsible. In its affidavit for sink-holing the C2, the FBI suggests that Sofacy (aka APT28, Pawn Storm, Sednit, STRONTIUM, and Tsar Team) is the culprit. There is some code overlap with the BlackEnergy malware used in previous attacks in Ukraine (the FBI’s affidavit makes it clear that they see BlackEnergy (aka Sandworm) as a sub-group of Sofacy).

LuckyMouse

In March 2018, we detected an ongoing campaign targeting a national data center in Central Asia. The choice of target of the campaign, which has been active since autumn 2017, is especially significant – it means that the attackers were able to gain access to a wide range of government resources in one fell swoop. We think they did this by inserting malicious scripts into the country’s official websites in order to conduct watering-hole attacks.

We attribute this campaign to the Chinese-speaking threat actor LuckyMouse (aka EmissaryPanda and APT27) because of the tools and tactics used in the campaign, because the C2 domain, update.iaacstudio[.]com, was previously used by this group and because they have previously targeted government organizations, including those in Central Asia.

The initial infection vector used in the attack against the data centre is unclear. Even where we observed LuckyMouse using weaponized documents with CVE-2017-118822 (Microsoft Office Equation Editor, widely used by Chinese-speaking actors since December 2017), we couldn’t prove that they were related to this particular attack. It’s possible that the attackers used a watering hole to infect data center employees.

The attackers used the HyperBro Trojan as their last-stage, in-memory remote administration tool (RAT) and their anti-detection launcher and decompressor makes extensive use of the Metasploit ‘shikata_ga_nai’ encoder as well as LZNT1 compression.

The main C2 used in this campaign is bbs.sonypsps[.]com, which resolved to an IP address that belongs to a Ukrainian ISP network, held by a MikroTik router using version 6.34.4 (March 2016) of the firmware with SMBv1 on board. We suspect that this router was hacked as part of the campaign in order to process the malware’s HTTP requests.

The initial module drops three files that are typical for Chinese-speaking threat actors – a legitimate Symantec pcAnywhere file (‘intgstat.exe’) for DLL side-loading, a DLL launcher (‘pcalocalresloader.dll’) and the last-stage decompressor (‘thumb.db’). As a result of all these steps, the last-stage Trojan is injected into the process memory of ‘svchost.exe’.

The launcher module, obfuscated with the notorious Metasploit ‘shikata_ga_nai’ encoder, is the same for all the droppers. The resulting de-obfuscated code performs typical side-loading: it patches the pcAnywhere image in memory at its entry-point. The patched code jumps back to the second ‘shikata_ga_nai’ iteration of the decryptor, but this time as part of the white-listed application.

The Metasploit encoder obfuscates the last part of the launcher’s code, which in turn resolves the necessary API and maps ‘thumb.db’ into the memory of the same process (i.e. pcAnywhere). The first instructions in the mapped ‘thumb.db’ are for a new iteration of ‘shikata_ga_nai’. The decrypted code resolves the necessary API functions, decompresses the embedded PE file with ‘RtlCompressBuffer()’ using LZNT1 and maps it into memory.

Olympic Destroyer

In our first report on Olympic Destroyer, the cyberattack on the PyeongChang Winter Olympics, we highlighted a specific spear-phishing attack as the initial infection vector. The threat actor sent weaponized documents, disguised as Olympic-related content, to relevant persons and organizations.

We have continued to track this APT group’s activities and recently noticed that they have started a new campaign with a different geographical distribution and using new themes. Our telemetry, and the characteristics of the spear-phishing documents we have analysed, indicate that the attackers behind Olympic Destroyer are now targeting financial and biotechnology-related organizations based in Europe – specifically, Russia, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Ukraine.

The group continues to use a non-executable infection vector and highly obfuscated scripts to evade detection.

The earlier Olympic Destroyer attacks – designed to destroy and paralyse infrastructure of the Winter Olympic Games and related supply chains, partners and venues – were preceded by a reconnaissance operation. It’s possible that the new activities are part of another reconnaissance stage that will be followed by a wave of destructive attacks with new motives. This is why it is important for all bio-chemical threat prevention and research companies and organizations in Europe to strengthen their security and run unscheduled security audits.

The variety of financial and non-financial targets could indicate that the same malware is being used by several groups with different interests. This could also be a result of cyberattack outsourcing, which is not uncommon among nation state threat actors. However, it’s also possible that the financial targets might be another false flag operation by a threat actor that has already shown that they excel at this during their last campaign.

It would be possible to draw certain conclusions about who is behind this campaign, based on the motives and selection of targets. However, it would be easy to make a mistake with only the fragments of the picture that are visible to researchers. The appearance of Olympic Destroyer at the start of this year, with its sophisticated deception efforts, changed the attribution game forever. In our view, it is no longer possible to draw conclusions based on a few attribution vectors discovered during a regular investigation. The response to threats such as Olympic Destroyer should be based on co-operation between the private sector and governments across national borders. Unfortunately, the current geo-political situation in the world only boosts the global segmentation of the internet and introduces many obstacles for researchers and investigators. This will encourage APT attackers to continue marching into the protected networks of foreign governments and commercial companies.

Malware stories Leaking ads

When we download popular apps with good ratings from official app stores, we assume they are safe. This is partially true, because usually these apps have been developed with security in mind and have been reviewed by the app store’s security team. Recently, we looked at 13 million APKs and discovered that around a quarter of them transmit unencrypted data over the internet. This was unexpected, because most apps were using HTTPS to communicate with their servers. But among the HTTPS requests, there were unencrypted requests to third-party servers. Some of these apps were very popular – in some cases they could boast hundreds of millions of downloads. On further inspection, it became clear that the apps were exposing customer data because of third-party SDKs – with advertising SDKs usually to blame. They collect data so that they can show relevant ads, but often fail to protect that data when sending it to their servers.

In most cases the apps were exposing IMEI, IMSI, Android ID, device information (e.g. manufacturer, model, screen resolution, system version and app name). Some apps were also exposing personal information, mostly the customer’s name, age, gender, phone number, e-mail address and even their income.

Information transmitted over HTTP is sent in plain text, allowing almost anyone to read it. Moreover, there are likely to be several ‘transit points’ en route from the app to the third-party server – devices that receive and store information for a certain period of time. Any network equipment, including your home router, could be vulnerable. If hacked, it will give the attackers access to your data. Some of the device information gathered (specifically IMEI and IMSI numbers) is enough to monitor your further actions. The more complete the information, the more of an open book you are to outsiders — from advertisers to fake friends offering malicious files for download. However, data leakage is only part of the problem. It’s also possible for unencrypted information to be substituted. For example, in response to an HTTP request from an app, the server might return a video ad, which cybercriminals can intercept and replace with a malicious version. Or they might simply change the link inside an ad so that it downloads malware.

You can find the research here, including our advice to developers and consumers.

SynAck targeted ransomware uses the Doppelganging technique

In April 2018, we saw a version of the SynAck ransomware Trojan that employs the Process Doppelganging technique. This technique, first presented in December 2017 at the BlackHat conference, has been used by several threat actors to try and bypass modern security solutions. It involves using NTFS transactions to launch a malicious process from the transacted file so that it looks like a legitimate process.

Malware developers often use custom packers to try and protect their code. In most cases, they can be effortlessly packed to reveal the original Trojan executable so that it can then be analyzed. However, the authors of SynAck obfuscated their code prior to compilation, further complicating the analysis process.

SynAck checks the directory where its executable is started from. If an attempt is made to launch it from an ‘incorrect’ directory, the Trojan simply exits. This is designed to counter automatic sandbox analysis.

The Trojan also checks to see if is being launched on a PC with the keyboard set to a Cyrillic script. If it is, it sleeps for 300 seconds and then exits, to prevent encryption of files belonging to victims from countries where Cyrillic is used.


Like other ransomware, SynAck uses a combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms. You can find the details here.

The attacks are highly targeted, with a limited number of attacks observed against targets in the US, Kuwait, Germany and Iran. The ransom demands can be as high as $3,000.

Roaming Mantis

In May we published our analysis of a mobile banking Trojan, Roaming Mantis. We called it this because of its propagation via smartphones roaming between different Wi-Fi networks, although the malware is also known as ‘Moqhao’ and ‘XLoader’. This malicious Android app is spread using DNS hijacking through compromised routers. The victims are redirected to malicious IP addresses used to install malicious apps – called ‘facebook.apk’ and ‘chrome.apk’. The attackers count on the fact that victims are unlikely to be suspicious as long as the browser displays the legitimate URL.

The malware is designed to steal user information, including credentials for two-factor authentication, and give the attackers full control over compromised Android devices. The malware seems to be financially motivated and the low OPSEC suggests that this is the work of cybercriminals.

Our telemetry indicates that the malware was detected more than 6,000 times between February 9 and April 9, although the reports came from just 150 unique victims – some of whom saw the same malware appear again and again on their network. Our research revealed that there were thousands of daily connections to the attackers’ C2 infrastructure.

The malware contains Android application IDs for popular mobile banking and game applications in South Korea. It seems the malicious app was initially targeted at victims in South Korea and this is where the malware was most prevalent. We also saw infections in China, India and Bangladesh.

It’s unclear how the attackers were able to hijack the router settings. If you are concerned about DNS settings on your router, you should check the user manual to verify that your DNS settings haven’t been tampered with, or contact your ISP for support. We would also strongly recommend that you change the default login and password for the admin web interface of the router, don’t install firmware from third-party sources and update the router firmware regularly to prevent similar attacks.

Some clues left behind by the attackers – for example, comments in the HTML source, malware strings and a hardcoded legitimate website – point to Simplified Chinese. So we believe the cybercriminals are familiar with both Simplified Chinese and Korean.

Following our report, we continued to track this campaign. Less than a month later, Roaming Mantis had rapidly expanded its activities to include countries in Europe, the Middle East and beyond, supporting 27 languages in total.

The attackers also extended their activities beyond Android devices. On iOS, Roaming Mantis uses a phishing site to steal the victim’s credentials. When the victim connects to the landing page from an iOS device, they are redirected to fake ‘http://security.apple.com/’ webpage where the attackers steal user ID, password, card number, card expiry date and CVV.

On PCs, Roaming Mantis runs the CoinHive mining script to generate crypto-currency for the attackers – drastically increasing the victim’s CPU usage.

The evasion techniques used by Roaming Mantis have also become more sophisticated. They include a new method of retrieving the C2 by using the e-mail POP protocol, server-side dynamic auto-generation of APK file/filenames and the inclusion of an additional command to potentially assist in identifying research environments.

The rapid growth of the campaign implies that those behind it have a strong financial motivation and are probably well-funded.

If it’s smart, it’s potentially vulnerable

Our many years of experience in researching cyberthreats suggests that if a device is connected to the internet, eventually someone will try to hack it. This includes children’s CCTV cameras, baby monitors, household appliances and even children’s toys.

This also applies to routers – the gateway into a home network. In May, we described four vulnerabilities and hardcoded accounts in the firmware of the D-Link DIR-620 router – this runs on various D-Link routers supplied to customers by one of the biggest ISPs in Russia.

The latest versions of the firmware have hardcoded default credentials that can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker to gain privileged access to the firmware and to extract sensitive data – for example, configuration files with plain-text passwords. The vulnerable web interface allows an unauthenticated attacker to run arbitrary JavaScript code in the user environment and run arbitrary commands in the router’s operating system. The issues were originally identified in firmware version 1.0.37, although some of the discovered vulnerabilities were also identified in other version of the firmware.

You can read the details on the vulnerabilities here.

In May, we also investigated smart devices for animals – specifically, trackers to monitor the location of pets. These gadgets are able to access the pet owner’s home network and phone, and their pet’s location. We wanted to find out how secure they are. Our researchers looked at several popular trackers for potential vulnerabilities.

Four of the trackers we looked at use Bluetooth LE technology to communicate with the owner’s smartphone. But only one does so correctly. The others can receive and execute commands from anyone. They can also be disabled, or hidden from the owner – all that’s needed is proximity to the tracker. Only one of the tested Android apps verifies the certificate of its server, without relying solely on the system. As a result, they are vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks—intruders can intercept transmitted data by ‘persuading’ victims to install their certificate.

GPS trackers have been used successfully in many areas, but using them to track the location of pets is a step beyond their traditional scope of application. For this, they need to be upgraded with new ‘user communication interfaces’ and ‘trained’ to work with cloud services, etc. If security is not properly addressed, user data becomes accessible to intruders, potentially endangering both users and pets.

Some of our researchers recently looked at human wearable devices – specifically, smart watches and fitness trackers. We were interested in a scenario where a spying app installed on a smartphone could send data from the built-in motion sensors (accelerometer and gyroscope) to a remote server and use the data to piece together the wearer’s actions – walking, sitting, typing, etc. We started with an Android-based smartphone, created a simple app to process and transmit the data and then looked at what we could get from this data.

Not only was it possible to work out if the wearer is sitting or walking, but also figure out if they are out for a stroll or changing subway trains, because the accelerometer patterns differ slightly – this is how fitness trackers distinguish between walking and cycling. It is also easy to see when someone is typing. However, finding out what they are typing would be hard and would require repeated text entry. Our researchers were able to determine the moments when a computer password entered with 96 per cent accuracy and a PIN code entered at an ATM with 87 per cent accuracy. However, it would be much harder to obtain other information – for example, a credit card number or CVC code – because of the lack of predictability about when the victim would type such information.

In reality, the difficulty involved in obtaining such information means that an attacker would have to have a strong motive for targeting someone specific. Of course, there are situations where this might be worthwhile for attackers.

An MitM extension for Chrome

Many browser extensions make our lives easier, hiding obtrusive advertising, translating text, helping us to choose the goods we want in online stores, etc. Unfortunately, there are also less desirable extensions that are used to bombard us with advertising or collect information about our activities. Then there are extensions whose main aim is to steal money. In the course of our work, we analyse a large number of extensions from different sources. Recently, a particular browser extension caught our eye because it communicated with a suspicious domain.

This extension, named ‘Desbloquear Conteúdo’ (which means ‘Unblock Content’ in Portuguese) targeted customers of Brazilian online banking services – all the attempted installations that we traced occurred in Brazil.

The aim of this malicious extension is to harvest logins and passwords and then steal money from the victims’ bank accounts. Such extensions are quite rare, but they need to be taken seriously because of the potential damage they can cause. You should only install verified extensions with large numbers of installations and reviews in the Chrome Web Store or other official service. Even so, in spite of the protection measures implemented by the owners of such services, malicious extensions can still end up being published there. So it’s a good idea to use an internet security product that gives you a warning if an extension acts suspiciously.

By the time we published our report on this malicious extension, it had already been removed from the Chrome Web Store.

The World Cup of fraud

Fraudsters are always on the lookout for opportunities to make money off the back of major sporting events. The FIFA World Cup is no different. Long before anyone kicked a football in Russia, cybercriminals had started to create phishing websites and send messages exploiting World Cup themes.

This included notifications of fake lottery wins, informing recipients that they had won cash in a lottery supposedly held by FIFA or official partners and sponsors.

They typically contain attached documents congratulating the ‘winner’ and asking for personal details such as name, address, e-mail address, telephone number, etc. Sometimes such messages also contain malicious programs, such as banking Trojans.

Sometimes recipients are invited to take part in a ticket giveaway, or they are offered the chance to win a trip to a match. Such messages are sent in the name of FIFA, usually from addresses on recently registered domains. The purpose of such schemes is mainly to update e-mail databases used to distribute more spam.

One of the most popular ways to steal banking and other credentials is to create counterfeit imitations of official partner websites. Partner organizations often arrange ticket giveaways for clients, and attackers exploit this to lure their victims onto fake promotion sites. Such pages look very convincing: they are well-designed, with a working interface, and are hard to distinguish from the real thing. Some fraudsters buy SSL certificates to add further credibility to their fake sites. Cybercriminals are particularly keen to target clients of Visa, the tournament’s commercial sponsor, offering prize giveaways in Visa’s name. To take part, people need to follow a link that points to a phishing site where they are asked to enter their bank card details, including the CVV/CVC code.

Cybercriminals also try to extract data by mimicking official FIFA notifications. The victim is informed that the security system has been updated and all personal data must be re-entered to avoid being locked out. The link in the message takes the victim to a fake account and all the data they enter is harvested by the scammers.

In the run up to the tournament, we also registered a lot of spam advertising soccer-related merchandise, though sometimes the scammers try to sell other things too – for example, pharmaceutical products.

You can find our report on the ways cybercriminals have exploited the World Cup in order to make money here. We’ve provided some tips on how to avoid phishing scams – advice that holds good for any phishing scams, not just for those related to the World Cup.

In the run up to the tournament, we also analyzed wireless access points in 11 cities hosting FIFA World Cup matches – nearly 32,000 Wi-Fi hotspots in total. While checking encryption and authentication algorithms, we counted the number of WPA2 and open networks, as well as their share among all the access points.

More than a fifth of Wi-Fi hotspots use unreliable networks. This means that criminals simply need to be located near an access point to intercept the traffic and get their hands on people’s data. Around three quarters of all access points use WPA/WPA2 encryption, considered to be one of the most secure. The level of protection mostly depends on the settings, such as the strength of the password set by the hotspot owner. A complicated encryption key can take years to successfully hack. However, even reliable networks, like WPA2, cannot be automatically considered totally secure. They are still susceptible to brute-force, dictionary and key reinstallation attacks, for which there are a large number of tutorials and open source tools available online. Any attempt to intercept traffic from WPA Wi-Fi in public access points can also be made by penetrating the gap between the access point and the device at the beginning of the session.

You can read our report here, together with our recommendations on the safe use of Wi-Fi hotspots, advice that holds good wherever you may be – not just at the World Cup.

IT threat evolution Q2 2018. Statistics

Mon, 08/06/2018 - 06:00

Q2 figures

According to KSN:

  • Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked 962,947,023 attacks launched from online resources located in 187 countries across the globe.
  • 351,913,075 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by Web Anti-Virus components.
  • Attempted infections by malware designed to steal money via online access to bank accounts were logged on the computers of 215,762 users.
  • Ransomware attacks were registered on the computers of 158,921 unique users.
  • Our File Anti-Virus logged 192,053,604 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.
  • Kaspersky Lab products for mobile devices detected:
    • 1,744,244 malicious installation packages
    • 61,045 installation packages for mobile banking Trojans
    • 14,119 installation packages for mobile ransomware Trojans.
Mobile threats General statistics

In Q2 2018, Kaspersky Lab detected 1,744,244 malicious installation packages, which is 421,666 packages more than in the previous quarter.

Number of detected malicious installation packages, Q2 2017 – Q2 2018

Distribution of detected mobile apps by type

Distribution of newly detected mobile apps by type, Q2 2018

Among all the threats detected in Q2 2018, the lion’s share belonged to potentially unwanted RiskTool apps (55.3%); compared to the previous quarter, their share rose by 6 p.p. Members of the RiskTool.AndroidOS.SMSreg family contributed most to this indicator.

Second place was taken by Trojan-Dropper threats (13%), whose share fell by 7 p.p. Most detected files of this type came from the families Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Piom and Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.

The share of advertising apps continued to decreased by 8%, accounting for 9% (against 11%) of all detected threats.

A remarkable development during the reporting period was that SMS Trojans doubled their share up to 8.5% in Q2 from 4.5% in Q1.

TOP 20 mobile malware

Note that this malware rating does not include potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or Adware.

  Verdict %* 1 DangerousObject.Multi.Generic 70.04 2 Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh 12.17 3 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Lezok.p 4.41 4 Trojan.AndroidOS.Agent.rx 4.11 5 Trojan.AndroidOS.Piom.toe 3.44 6 Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.dl 3.15 7 Trojan.AndroidOS.Piom.tmi 2.71 8 Trojan.AndroidOS.Piom.sme 2.69 9 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.i 2.54 10 Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.Agent.ga 2.42 11 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Agent.ii 2.25 12 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.ba 1.80 13 Trojan.AndroidOS.Agent.pac 1.73 14 Trojan.AndroidOS.Dvmap.a 1.64 15 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Lezok.b 1.55 16 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Tiny.d 1.37 17 Trojan.AndroidOS.Agent.rt 1.29 18 Trojan.AndroidOS.Hiddapp.bn 1.26 19 Trojan.AndroidOS.Piom.rfw 1.20 20 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Lezok.t 1.19

* Unique users attacked by the relevant malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus that were attacked.

As before, first place in our TOP 20 went to DangerousObject.Multi.Generic (70.04%), the verdict we use for malware detected using cloud technologies. In second place was Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh (12.17%). This verdict is given to files recognized as malicious by our system based on machine learning. Third was Dropper.AndroidOS.Lezok.p (4.41%), followed by a close 0.3 p.p. margin by Trojan.AndroidOS.Agent.rx (4.11%), which was in the third position in Q1.

Geography of mobile threats

Map of attempted infections using mobile malware, Q2 2018

TOP 10 countries by share of users attacked by mobile malware:

  Country* %** 1 Bangladesh 31.17 2 China 31.07 3 Iran 30.87 4 Nepal 30.74 5 Nigeria 25.66 6 India 25.04 7 Indonesia 24.05 8 Ivory Coast 23.67 9 Pakistan 23.49 10 Tanzania 22.38

* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus (under 10,000).
** Unique users attacked in the country as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus in the country.

In Q2 2018, Bangladesh (31.17%) topped the list by share of mobile users attacked. China (31.07%) came second with a narrow margin. Third and fourth places were claimed respectively by Iran (30.87%) and Nepal (30.74%).

Russia (8.34%) this quarter was down in 38th spot, behind Taiwan (8.48%) and Singapore (8.46%).

Mobile banking Trojans

In the reporting period, we detected 61,045 installation packages for mobile banking Trojans, which is 3.2 times more than in Q1 2018. The largest contribution was made by Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Hqwar.jck – this verdict was given to nearly half of detected new banking Trojans. Second came Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.dq, accounting for about 5,000 installation packages.

Number of installation packages for mobile banking Trojans detected by Kaspersky Lab, Q2 2017 – Q2 2018

TOP 10 mobile bankers

  Verdict %* 1 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.dq 17.74 2 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.aj 13.22 3 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.q 8.56 4 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.e 5.70 5 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.di 5.06 6 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.bo 4.65 7 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Faketoken.z 3.66 8 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.bj 3.03 9 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Hqwar.t 2.83 10 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.ar 2.77

* Unique users attacked by the relevant malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus that were attacked by banking threats.

The most popular mobile banking Trojan in Q2 was Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.dq (17.74%), closely followed by Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.aj (13.22%). These two Trojans use phishing windows to steal information about user’s banking cards and online banking credentials. Besides, they steal money through abuse of SMS services, including mobile banking. The popular banking malware Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.q (8.56%) took third place in the rating, moving one notch down from its second place in Q2.

Geography of mobile banking threats, Q2 2018

TOP 10 countries by share of users attacked by mobile banking Trojans

  Country* %** 1 USA 0.79 2 Russia 0.70 3 Poland 0.28 4 China 0.28 5 Tajikistan 0.27 6 Uzbekistan 0.23 7 Ukraine 0.18 8 Singapore 0.16 9 Moldova 0.14 10 Kazakhstan 0.13

* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus (under 10,000).
** Unique users attacked by mobile banking Trojans in the country as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus in this country.

Overall, the rating did not see much change from Q1: Russia (0.70%) and USA (0.79%) swapped places, both remaining in TOP 3.

Poland (0.28%) rose from ninth to third place thanks to activation propagation of two Trojans: Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.cw and Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Marcher.w. The latter was first detected in November 2017 and uses a toolset typical of banking malware: SMS interception, phishing windows and Device Administrator privileges to ensure its persistence in the system.

Mobile ransomware Trojans

In Q2 2018, we detected 14,119 installation packages for mobile ransomware Trojans, which is larger by half than in Q1.

Number of installation packages for mobile ransomware Trojans detected by Kaspersky Lab, Q2 2017 – Q2 2018

  Verdict %* 1 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Zebt.a 26.71 2 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ag 19.15 3 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob.h 15.48 4 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ae 5.99 5 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Egat.d 4.83 6 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.snt 4.73 7 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ab 4.29 8 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Small.cm 3.32 9 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Small.as 2.61 10 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Small.cj 1.80

* Unique users attacked by this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus attacked by ransomware Trojans.

The most popular mobile ransomware is Q2 was Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Zebt.a (26.71%), encountered by more than a quarter of all users who got attacked by this type of malware. Second came Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ag (19.15%), nudging ahead of once-popular Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob.h (15.48%).

Geography of mobile ransomware Trojans, Q2 2018

TOP 10 countries by share of users attacked by mobile ransomware Trojans

  Country* %** 1 USA 0.49 2 Italy 0.28 3 Kazakhstan 0.26 4 Belgium 0.22 5 Poland 0.20 6 Romania 0.18 7 China 0.17 8 Ireland 0.15 9 Mexico 0.11 10 Austria 0.09

* Excluded from the rating are countries where the number of users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus is relatively small (fewer than 10,000)
** Unique users in the country attacked by mobile ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus in the country.

First place in the TOP 10 went to the United States (0.49%); the most active family in this country was Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng:

  Verdict %* 1 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ag 53.53% 2 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ae 16.37% 3 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.snt 11.49% 4 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ab 10.84% 5 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob.h 5.62% 6 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.z 4.57% 7 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.san 4.29% 8 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ac 2.45% 9 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.h 0.43% 10 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Zebt.a 0.37%

* Unique users in USA attacked by this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus in this country who were attacked by ransomware Trojans.

Italy (0.28%) came second among countries whose residents were attacked by mobile ransomware. In this country, most attacks were the work of Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Zebt.a. Third place was claimed by Kazakhstan (0.63%), where Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Small.cm was the most popular mobile ransomware.

Attacks on IoT devices

Judging by the data from our honeypots, brute forcing Telnet passwords is the most popular method of IoT malware self-propagation. However, recently there has been an increase in the number of attacks against other services, such as control ports. These ports are assigned services for remote control over routers – this feature is in demand e.g. with internet service providers. We have observed attempts to launch attacks on IoT devices via port 8291, which is used by Mikrotik RouterOS control service, and via port 7547 (TR-069), which was used, among other purposes, for managing devices in the Deutsche Telekom network.

In both cases the nature of attacks was much more sophisticated than plain brute force; in particular, they involved exploits. We are inclined to think that the number of such attacks will only grow in the future on the back of the following two factors:

  • Brute forcing a Telnet password is a low-efficiency strategy, as there is a strong competition between threat actors. Each few seconds, there are brute force attempts; once successful, the threat actor blocks such the access to Telnet for all other attackers.
  • After each restart of the device, the attackers have to re-infect it, thus losing part of the botnet and having to reclaim it in a competitive environment.

On the other hand, the first attacker to exploit a vulnerability will gain access to a large number of device, having spent minimum time.

Distribution of attacked services’ popularity by number of unique attacking devices, Q2 2018

Telnet attacks

The scheme of attack is as follows: the attackers find a victim device, check if Telnet port is open on it, and launch the password brute forcing routine. As many manufacturers of IoT devices neglect security (for instance, they reserve service passwords on devices and do not leave a possibility for the user to change them routinely), such attacks become successful and may affect entire lines of devices. The infected devices start scanning new segments of networks and infect new, similar devices or workstations in them.

Geography of IoT devices infected in Telnet attacks, Q2 2018

TOP 10 countries by shares of IoT devices infected via Telnet   Country %* 1 Brazil 23.38 2 China 17.22 3 Japan 8.64 4 Russia 7.22 5 USA 4.55 6 Mexico 3.78 7 Greece 3.51 8 South Korea 3.32 9 Turkey 2.61 10 India 1.71

* Infected devices in each specific country as a percentage of all IoT devices that attack via Telnet.

In Q2, Brazil (23.38%) took the lead in the number of infected devices and, consequently, in the number of Telnet attacks. Next came China (17.22%) by a small margin, and third came Japan (8.64%).

In these attacks, the threat actors most often downloaded Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.c (15.97%) to the infected devices.

TOP 10 malware downloaded to infected IoT devices in successful Telnet attacks   Verdict %* 1 Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.c 15.97 2 Trojan-Downloader.Linux.Hajime.a 5.89 3 Trojan-Downloader.Linux.NyaDrop.b 3.34 4 Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b 2.72 5 Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ba 1.94 6 Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p 0.38 7 Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.as 0.27 8 Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.n 0.27 9 Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.ba 0.24 10 Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.af 0.20

*Proportion of downloads of each specific malware program to IoT devices in successful Telnet attacks as a percentage of all malware downloads in such attacks

SSH attacks

Such attacks are launched similarly to Telnet attacks, the only difference being that they require to bots to have an SSH client installed on them to brute force credentials. The SSH protocol is cryptographically protected, so brute forcing passwords require large computational resources. Therefore, self-propagation from IoT devices is inefficient, and full-fledged servers are used to launch attacks. The success of an SSH attack hinges on the device owner or manufacturers’ faults; in other words, these are again weak passwords or preset passwords assigned by the manufacturer to an entire line of devices.

China took the lead in terms of infected devices attacking via SSH. Also, China was second in terms of infected devices attacking via Telnet.

Geography of IoT devices infected in SSH attacks, Q2 2018

TOP 10 countries by shares of IoT devices attacked via SSH   Country %* 1 China 15.77% 2 Vietnam 11.38% 3 USA 9.78% 4 France 5.45% 5 Russia 4.53% 6 Brazil 4.22% 7 Germany 4.01% 8 South Korea 3.39% 9 India 2.86% 10 Romania 2.23%

*The proportion of infected devices in each country as a percentage of all infected IoT devices attacking via SSH

Online threats in the financial sector Q2 events New banking Trojan DanaBot

The Trojan DanaBot was detected in May. It has a modular structure and is capable of loading extra modules with which to intercept traffic, steal passwords and crypto wallets – generally, a standard feature set for this type of a threat. The Trojan spread via spam messages containing a malicious office document, which subsequently loaded the Trojans’ main body. DanaBot initially targeted Australian users and financial organizations, however in early April we noticed that it had become active against the financial organizations in Poland.

The peculiar BackSwap technique

The banking Trojan BackSwap turned out much more interesting. A majority of similar threats including Zeus, Cridex and Dyreza intercept the user’s traffic either to inject malicious scripts into the banking pages visited by the victim or to redirect it to phishing sites. By contrast, BackSwap uses an innovative technique for injecting malicious scripts: using WinAPI, it emulates keystrokes to open the developer console in the browser, and then it uses this console to inject malicious scripts into web pages. In a later version of BackSwap, malicious scripts are injected via the address bar, using JavaScript protocol URLs.

Carbanak gang leader detained

On March 26, Europol announced the arrest of a leader of the cybercrime gang behind Carbanak and Cobalt Goblin. This came as a result of a joint operation between Spain’s national police, Europol and FBI, as well as Romanian, Moldovan, Belorussian and Taiwanese authorities and private infosecurity companies. It was expected that the leader’s arrest would reduce the group’s activity, however recent data show that no appreciable decline has taken place. In May and June, we detected several waves of targeted phishing against banks and processing companies in Eastern Europe. The email writers from Carbanak masquerades as support lines of reputable anti-malware vendors, European Central Bank and other organizations. Such emails contained attached weaponized documents exploiting vulnerabilities CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-8570.

Ransomware Trojan uses Doppelgänging technique

Kaspersky Lab experts detected a case of the ransomware Trojan SynAck using the Process Doppelgänging technique. Malware writers use this complex technique to make it stealthier and complicate its detection by security solutions. This was the first case when it was used in a ransomware Trojan.

Another remarkable event was the Purga (aka Globe) cryptoware propagation campaign, during which this cryptoware, alongside with other malware including a banking Trojan, was loaded to computers infected with the Trojan Dimnie.

General statistics on financial threats

These statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky Lab products received from users who consented to provide statistical data.

In Q2 2018, Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked attempts to launch one or more malicious programs designed to steal money from bank accounts on the computers of 215,762 users.


Number of unique users attacked by financial malware, Q2 2018

Geography of attacks

Geography of banking malware attacks, Q2 2018

TOP 10 countries by percentage of attacked users Country* % of users attacked** 1 Germany 2.7% 2 Cameroon 1.8% 3 Bulgaria 1.7% 4 Greece 1.6% 5 United Arab Emirates 1.4% 6 China 1.3% 7 Indonesia 1.3% 8 Libya 1.3% 9 Togo 1.3% 10 Lebanon 1.2%

These statistics are based on Anti-Virus detection verdicts received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who consented to provide statistical data.

*Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab’ product users (under 10,000).
** Unique Kaspersky Lab users whose computers were targeted by banking Trojans or ATM/PoS malware as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

TOP 10 banking malware families Name Verdicts* % of attacked users** 1 Nymaim Trojan.Win32. Nymaim 27.0%   2 Zbot Trojan.Win32. Zbot 26.1%   3 SpyEye Backdoor.Win32. SpyEye 15.5%   4 Emotet Backdoor.Win32. Emotet 5.3%   5 Caphaw Backdoor.Win32. Caphaw 4.7%   6 Neurevt Trojan.Win32. Neurevt 4.7%   7 NeutrinoPOS Trojan-Banker.Win32.NeutrinoPOS 3.3%   8 Gozi Trojan.Win32. Gozi 2.0%   9 Shiz Backdoor.Win32. Shiz 1.5%   10 ZAccess Backdoor.Win32. ZAccess 1.3%  

* Detection verdicts of Kaspersky Lab products. The information was provided by Kaspersky Lab product users who consented to provide statistical data.
** Unique users attacked by this malware as a percentage of all users attacked by financial malware.

In Q2 2018, the general makeup of TOP 10 stayed the same, however there were some changes in the ranking. Trojan.Win32.Zbot (26.1%) and Trojan.Win32.Nymaim (27%) remain in the lead after swapping positions. The banking Trojan Emotet ramped up its activity and, accordingly, its share of attacked users from 2.4% to 5.3%. Conversely, Caphaw dramatically downsized its activity to only 4.7% from 15.2% in Q1, taking fifth position in the rating.

Cryptoware programs Number of new modifications

In Q2, we detected 7,620 new cryptoware modifications. This is higher than in Q1, but still well below last year’s numbers.

Number of new cryptoware modifications, Q2 2017 – Q2 2018

Number of users attacked by Trojan cryptors

In Q2 2018, Kaspersky Lab products blocked cryptoware attacks on the computers of 158,921 unique users. Our statistics show that cybercriminals’ activity declined both against Q1 and on a month-on-month basis during Q2.

Number of unique users attacked by cryptors, Q2 2018

Geography of attacks

TOP 10 countries attacked by Trojan cryptors Country* % of users attacked by cryptors** 1 Ethiopia 2.49 2 Uzbekistan 1.24 3 Vietnam 1.21 4 Pakistan 1.14 5 Indonesia 1.09 6 China 1.04 7 Venezuela 0.72 8 Azerbaijan 0.71 9 Bangladesh 0.70 10 Mongolia 0.64

* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab users (under 50,000).
** Unique users whose computers were attacked by Trojan cryptors as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

The list of TOP 10 countries in Q2 is practically identical to that in Q1. However, some place trading occurred in TOP 10: Ethiopia (2.49%) pushed Uzbekistan (1.24%) down from first to second place, while Pakistan (1.14%) rose to fourth place. Vietnam (1.21%) remained in third position, and Indonesia (1.09%) remained fifth.

TOP 10 most widespread cryptor families Name Verdicts* % of attacked users** 1 WannaCry Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna 53.92   2 GandCrab Trojan-Ransom.Win32.GandCrypt 4.92   3 PolyRansom/VirLock Virus.Win32.PolyRansom 3.81   4 Shade Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Shade 2.40   5 Crysis Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crusis 2.13   6 Cerber Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Zerber 2.09   7 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen 2.02   8 Locky Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Locky 1.49   9 Purgen/GlobeImposter Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Purgen 1.36   10 Cryakl Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryakl 1.04  

* Statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky Lab products. The information was provided by Kaspersky Lab product users who consented to provide statistical data.
** Unique Kaspersky Lab users attacked by a particular family of Trojan cryptors as a percentage of all users attacked by Trojan cryptors.

WannaCry further extends lead over other cryptor families, its share rising to 53.92% from 38.33% in Q1. Meanwhile, the cybercriminals behind GandCrab (4.92%, emerged only in Q1 2018) put so much effort into its distribution that it rose all the way up to second place in this TOP 10, displacing the polymorphic worm PolyRansom (3.81%). The remaining positions, just like in Q1, are occupied by the long-familiar cryptors Shade, Crysis, Purgen, Cryakl etc.

Cryptominers

As we already reported in Ransomware and malicious cryptominers in 2016-2018, ransomware is shrinking progressively, and cryptocurrency miners is starting to take its place. Therefore, this year we decided to begin to publish quarterly reports on the situation around type of threats. Simultaneously, we began to use a broader range of verdicts as a basis for collecting statistics on miners, so the Q2 statistics may not be consistent with the data from our earlier publications. It includes both stealth miners which we detect as Trojans, and those which are issued the verdict ‘Riskware not-a-virus’.

Number of new modifications

In Q2 2018, Kaspersky Lab solutions detected 13,948 new modifications of miners.

Number of new miner modifications, Q2 2018

Number of users attacked by cryptominers

In Q2, we detected attacks involving mining programs on the computers of 2,243,581 Kaspersky Lab users around the world.

Number of unique users attacked by cryptominers, Q2 2018

In April and May, the number of attacked users stayed roughly equal, and in June there was a modest decrease in cryptominers’ activity.

Geography of attacks

Geography of cryptominer attacks, Q2 2018

TOP 10 countries by percentage of attacked users Country* % of attacked users** 1 Ethiopia 17.84 2 Afghanistan 16.21 3 Uzbekistan 14.18 4 Kazakhstan 11.40 5 Belarus 10.47 6 Indonesia 10.33 7 Mozambique 9.92 8 Vietnam 9.13 9 Mongolia 9.01 10 Ukraine 8.58

*Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab’ product users (under 50,000).
** Unique Kaspersky Lab users whose computers were targeted by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

Vulnerable apps used by cybercriminals

In Q2 2018, we again observed some major changes in the distribution of platforms most often targeted by exploits. The share of Microsoft Office exploits (67%) doubled compared to Q1 (and quadrupled compared with the average for 2017). Such a sharp growth was driven primarily by massive spam messages distributing documents containing an exploit to the vulnerability CVE-2017-11882. This stack overflow-type vulnerability in the old, deprecated Equation Editor component existed in all versions of Microsoft Office released over the last 18 years. The exploit still works stably in all possible combinations of the Microsoft Office package and Microsoft Windows. On the other hand, it allows the use of various obfuscations for bypassing the protection. These two factors made this vulnerability the most popular tool in cybercriminals’ hands in Q2. The shares of other Microsoft Office vulnerabilities did no undergo much change since Q1.

Q2 KSN statistics also showed a growing number of Adobe Flash exploits exploited via Microsoft Office. Despite Adobe and Microsoft’s efforts to obstruct exploitation of Flash Player, a new 0-day exploit CVE-2018-5002 was discovered in Q2. It propagated in an XLSX file and used a little-known technique allowing the exploit to be downloaded from a remote source rather than carried in the document body. Shockwave Flash (SWF) files, like many other file formats, are rendered in Microsoft Office documents in the OLE (Object Linking and Embedding) format. In the case of a SWF file, the OLE object contains the actual file and a list of various properties, one of which points to the path to the SWF file. The OLE object in the discovered exploit did not contain an SWF file in it, but only carried a list of properties including a web link to the SWF file, which forced Microsoft Office to download the missing file from the provided link.

Distribution of exploits used in cybercriminals’ attacks by types of attacked applications, Q2 2018

In late March 2018, a PDF document was detected at VirusTotal that contained two 0-day vulnerabilities: CVE-2018-4990 and CVE-2018-8120. The former allowed for execution of shellcode from JavaScript via exploitation of a software error in JPEG2000 format image processor in Acrobat Reader. The latter existed in the win32k function SetImeInfoEx and was used for further privilege escalation up to SYSTEM level and enabled the PDF viewer to escape the sandbox. Ana analysis of the document and our statistics show that at the moment of uploading to VirusTotal, this exploit was at the development stage and was not used for in-the-wild attacks.

In late April, Kaspersky Lab experts using an in-house sandbox have found the 0-day vulnerability CVE-2018-8174 in Internet Explorer and reported it to Microsoft. An exploit to this vulnerability used a technique associated with CVE-2017-0199 (launching an HTA script from a remote source via a specially crafted OLE object) to exploit a vulnerable Internet Explorer component with the help of Microsoft Office. We are observing that exploit pack creators have already taken this vulnerability on board and actively distribute exploits to it both via web sites and emails containing malicious documents.

Also in Q2, we observed a growing number of network attacks. There is a growing share of attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities patched with the security update MS17-010; these make up a majority a of the detected network attacks.

Attacks via web resources

The statistics in this chapter are based on Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when malicious objects are downloaded from malicious/infected web pages. Malicious websites are specially created by cybercriminals; web resources with user-created content (for example, forums), as well as hacked legitimate resources, can be infected.

Top 10 countries where online resources are seeded with malware

The following statistics are based on the physical location of the online resources used in attacks and blocked by our antivirus components (web pages containing redirects to exploits, sites containing exploits and other malware, botnet command centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web attacks. In order to determine the geographical source of web-based attacks, domain names are matched against their actual domain IP addresses, and then the geographical location of a specific IP address (GEOIP) is established.

In the second quarter of 2018, Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked 962,947,023 attacks launched from web resources located in 187 countries around the world. 351,913,075 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by web antivirus components.

Distribution of web attack sources by country, Q2 2018

In Q2, the TOP 4 of web attack source countries remain unchanged. The US (45.87%) was home to most sources of web attacks. The Netherlands (25.74%) came second by a large margin, Germany (5.33%) was third. There was a change in the fifth position: Russia (1.98%) has displaced the UK, although its share has decreased by 0.55 p.p.

Countries where users faced the greatest risk of online infection

To assess the risk of online infection faced by users in different countries, for each country we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky Lab users on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the quarter. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries.

This rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the Malware class; it does not include Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or adware.

Country* % of attacked users** 1 Belarus 33.49 2 Albania 30.27 3 Algeria 30.08 4 Armenia 29.98 5 Ukraine 29.68 6 Moldova 29.49 7 Venezuela 29.12 8 Greece 29.11 9 Kyrgyzstan 27.25 10 Kazakhstan 26.97 11 Russia 26.93 12 Uzbekistan 26.30 13 Azerbaijan 26.12 14 Serbia 25.23 15 Qatar 24.51 16 Latvia 24.40 17 Vietnam 24.03 18 Georgia 23.87 19 Philippines 23.85 20 Romania 23.55

These statistics are based on detection verdicts returned by the Web Anti-Virus module that were received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who consented to provide statistical data.
Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab users (under 10,000).
** Unique users targeted by Malware-class attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

Geography of malicious web attacks in Q2 2018 (percentage of attacked users)

On average, 19.59% of Internet user computers worldwide experienced at least one Malware-class web attack.

Local threats

Local infection statistics for user computers are an important indicator: they reflect threats that have penetrated computer systems by infecting files or removable media, or initially got on the computer in an encrypted format (for example, programs integrated in complex installers, encrypted files, etc.).

Data in this section is based on analyzing statistics produced by Anti-Virus scans of files on the hard drive at the moment they were created or accessed, and the results of scanning removable storage media.

In Q2 2018, our File Anti-Virus detected 192,053,604 malicious and potentially unwanted objects.

Countries where users faced the highest risk of local infection

For each country, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky Lab product users on whose computers File Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. These statistics reflect the level of personal computer infection in different countries.

The rating includes only Malware-class attacks. It does not include File Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or adware.

Country* % of attacked users** 1 Uzbekistan 51.01 2 Afghanistan 49.57 3 Tajikistan 46.21 4 Yemen 45.52 5 Ethiopia 43.64 6 Turkmenistan 43.52 7 Vietnam 42.56 8 Kyrgyzstan 41.34 9 Rwanda 40.88 10 Mongolia 40.71 11 Algeria 40.25 12 Laos 40.18 13 Syria 39.82 14 Cameroon 38.83 15 Mozambique 38.24 16 Bangladesh 37.57 17 Sudan 37.31 18 Nepal 37.02 19 Zambia 36.60 20 Djibouti 36.35

These statistics are based on detection verdicts returned by OAS and ODS Anti-Virus modules received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who consented to provide statistical data. The data include detections of malicious programs located on user computers or removable media connected to computers, such as flash drives, camera and phone memory cards, or external hard drives.
Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab users (under 10,000).
** Unique users on whose computers Malware-class local threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

Geography of malicious web attacks in Q2 201 (ranked by percentage of users attacked)

On average, 19.58% of computers globally faced at least one Malware-class local threat in Q2.

How do file partner programs work?

Thu, 08/02/2018 - 06:00

It’s easy to notice if you’ve fallen victim to an advertising partner program: the system has new apps that you didn’t install, ad pages spontaneously open in the browser, ads appear on sites where they never used to, and so on. If you notice these symptoms on your computer, and in the list of installed utilities there is, for example, setupsk, Browser Enhancer, Zaxar game browser, “PC optimizers” (such as Smart Application Controller or One System Care), or unknown browsers, 99% of the time it’s pay-per-install network. Every month, Kaspersky Lab security solutions prevent more than 500,000 attempts to install software that is distributed through advertising partner programs. Most such attempts (65%) happen in Russia.

Geography of attempts to install advertising partner programs apps, June 2018

The partner program acts as an intermediary between software vendors who wish to distribute their apps and owners of file hosting sites. When the user clicks the Download or similar button on such sites, the partner program provides a special installer that downloads the required file, but also determines which set of additional software should be installed on the PC.

File partner programs benefit everyone except the user. The site owner receives money for installing “partner” apps, and the partner program organizer collects a fee from the advertisers, who in turn get what they wanted, since their software is installed.

Propagation methods

To illustrate the process, we chose a scheme used by several partner programs. Let’s look at a real page offering to download a plugin for the S.T.A.L.K.E.R. game.

On attempting to download it, the user is redirected to a landing page selected by the administrator of the file-sharing site when loading the file onto the partner program server. Such pages often mimic the interface of popular cloud services:

Example of a fake page to which the user is redirected

This is what the landing page chooser looks like in the File-7 partner program settings

On clicking the download button, the user receives a file with one of the following formats:

  • ZIP-archive
  • Torrent file
  • ISO image
  • HTML document

Moreover, archives are often multi-layered and, in many cases, password-protected. Such protective measures and choice of format are not accidental — partner programs engage a wide range of tricks to prevent browser from blocking the download of their installers.

Notification about installer download blocks in a partner program’s news feed

The victim is often guided through the loader installation with hints on the download pages as to how to find the program, which password to use for the archive, and how to run the installer. Some versions contain readme attachments with a description of the actions required for the installation. Regardless of the type of file that the user wanted to download, the end product is an executable. Interestingly, every time one and the same file is downloaded, its hash sum changes, and the name always contains a set of some characters.

Example of how loader files are named

Communicating with the server

At the preparatory stage, the partner program installer exchanges data with the C&C server. Every message transmitted uses encryption, usually rather primitive: first it is encoded in Base64, then the result is inverted, and again encoded in Base64.

  1. At stage one, the loader transmits information about the downloaded installer, plus data for identifying the victim to the server. The message includes confidential information: user name, PC domain name, MAC address, machine SID, hard drive serial number, lists of running processes and installed programs. Naturally, the data is collected and transmitted without the consent of the device owner.
  2. The server responds with a message containing the following information fields:
  • adverts list — with the installation conditions for certain partner software
  • content — contains the name of the file that the user originally intended to download and a link to it
  • icon — contains a link to an icon that is later downloaded and used when starting the graphical interface of the loader.

  1. The installer checks that the conditions listed for each “advert” are fulfilled. If all conditions are met, the id of the advert is added to the adverts_done list. In the example above, for instance, the registry is checked for paths indicating that one of the selected antiviruses is installed on the computer. If this is the case, the partner software with id 1116 is not added to the adverts_done list and will not subsequently be installed on the user’s computer. The purpose of such a check is to prevent the installation of a program that would trigger antivirus software. Next, the generated list is sent to the server:
  2. The server selects several id’s (usually 3-5) from the resulting adverts_done list and returns them to the campaigns list. For each id, this list has a checkboxes field containing the text to be displayed in the installation consent window, the url field containing a link to the installer of the given advert, and the parameter field containing a key for installing the unwanted software in silent mode.

After that, a window opens that simulates the download process in Internet Explorer. The loader does not explicitly notify the user that additional programs will be installed on the computer along with the downloaded file. Their installation can be declined only by clicking a barely discernible slider in the bottom part of the window.


File loader window

During the file download process, software that the user does not deselect is installed inconspicuously. At the final stage of operation, the loader reports to the server about the successful installation of each individual product:

Installed software analysis

By analyzing the loader process, we managed to get some links to various programs that can be installed secretly. Although most of the software relates to different advertising families (that’s how Pbot finds its way onto user devices, for example), that is not the only thing distributed via file partner programs. In particular, around 5% of the files were legitimate browser installers. About 20% of the files are detected as malicious (Trojan, Trojan-Downloader, etc.).

Conclusion

Owners of file-sharing sites that cooperate with similar partner programs often do not even check what kind of content visitors get from the resource. As a result, anything at all can be installed on the user’s computer besides legitimate software. Therefore, in the absence of security solutions, such resources need to be used with extreme caution.

Kaspersky Lab products detect the loaders of file partner programs with the following verdicts:

AdWare.Win32.AdLoad
AdWare.Win32.FileTour
AdWare.Win32.ICLoader
AdWare.Win32.DownloadHelper

IoCs:

1F2053FFDF4C86C44013055EBE83E7BD
FE4932FEADD05B085FDC1D213B45F34D
38AB3C96E560FB97E94222740510F725
F0F8A0F4D0239F11867C2FD08F076670
692FB5472F4AB07CCA6511D7F0D14103

Attacks on industrial enterprises using RMS and TeamViewer

Wed, 08/01/2018 - 06:00

Main facts

Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT has identified a new wave of phishing emails with malicious attachments targeting primarily companies and organizations that are, in one way or another, associated with industrial production.

The phishing emails are disguised as legitimate commercial offers and are sent mainly to industrial companies located in Russia. The content of each email reflects the activity of the organization under attack and the type of work performed by the employee to whom the email is sent.

According to the data that we have collected, this series of attacks started in November 2017 and is currently in progress. Notably, the first similar attacks were recorded as far back as 2015.

The malware used in these attacks installs legitimate remote administration software – TeamViewer or Remote Manipulator System/Remote Utilities (RMS). This enables the attackers to gain remote control of infected systems. The threat actor uses various techniques to mask the infection and the activity of malware installed in the system.

According to the data available, the attackers’ main goal is to steal money from victim organizations’ accounts. When attackers connect to a victim’s computer, they search for and analyze purchase documents, as well as the financial and accounting software used. After that, the attackers look for various ways in which they can commit financial fraud, such as spoofing the bank details used to make payments.

In cases where the cybercriminals need additional data or capabilities after infecting a system, such as privilege escalation and obtaining local administrator privileges, the theft of user authentication data for financial software and services, or Windows accounts for lateral movement, the attackers download an additional pack of malware to the system, which is specifically tailored to the attack on each individual victim. The malware pack can include spyware, additional remote administration utilities that extend the attackers’ control on infected systems, malware for exploiting operating system and application software vulnerabilities, as well as the Mimikatz utility, which provides the attackers with Windows account data.

Apparently, among other methods, the attackers obtain the information they need to perpetrate their criminal activity by analyzing the correspondence of employees at the enterprises attacked. They may also use the information found in these emails to prepare new attacks – against companies that partner with the current victim.

Clearly, on top of the financial losses, these attacks result in leaks of the victim organizations’ sensitive data.

Phishing emails

In most cases, the phishing emails have finance-related content; the names of attachments also point to their connection with finance. Specifically, some of the emails purport to be invitations to tender from large industrial companies (see below).

Malicious attachments may be packed into archives. Some of the emails have no attachments – in these cases, message text is designed to lure users into following links leading to external resources and downloading malicious objects from those resources.

Below is a sample phishing email used in attacks on some organizations:

Screenshot of a phishing email

The above email was sent on behalf of a well-known industrial organization. The domain name of the server from which the message was sent was similar to the domain name of that organization’s official website. The email had an archive attached to it. The archive was protected with a password that could be found in the message body.

It is worth noting that the attackers addressed an employee of the company under attack by his or her full name (this part of the email was masked in the screenshot above for confidentiality reasons). This indicates that the attack was carefully prepared and an individual email that included details relevant to the specific organization was created for each victim.

As part of the attacks, the threat actor uses various techniques to mask the infection. In this case, Seldon 1.7 – legitimate software designed to search for tenders – is installed in infected systems in addition to malware components and a remote administration application.

To keep users from wondering why they didn’t get information on the procurement tender referred to in the phishing email, the malicious program distributes a damaged copy of Seldon 1.7 software.

Window of legitimate software Seldon 1.7

In other cases, the user is shown a partially damaged image.

Image opened by malware

There is also a known case of malware being masked as a PDF document containing a bank transfer receipt. Curiously, the receipt contains valid data. Specifically, it mentions existing companies and their valid financial details; even a car’s VIN matches its model.

Screenshot of a bank transfer receipt displayed by malware

The malware used in these attacks installs legitimate remote administration software – TeamViewer or Remote Manipulator System/Remote Utilities (RMS).

Attacks using RMS

There are several known ways in which the malware can be installed in a system. Malicious files can be run either by an executable file attached to an email or by a specially crafted script for the Windows command interpreter.

For example, the archive mentioned above contains an executable file, which has the same name and is a password-protected self-extracting archive. The archive extracts the files and runs a script that installs and launches the actual malware in the system.

Contents of the malware installation file

It can be seen from the commands in the screenshot above that after copying the files the script deletes its own file and launches legitimate software in the system – Seldon v.1.7 and RMS, – enabling the attackers to control the infected system without the user’s knowledge.

Depending on the malware version, files are installed in %AppData%\LocalDataNT folder %AppData%\NTLocalData folder or in %AppData%\NTLocalAppData folder.

When it launches, legitimate RMS software loads dynamic libraries (DLL) required for the program’s operation, including the system file winspool.drv, which is located in the system folder and is used to send documents to the printer. RMS loads the library insecurely, using its relative path (the vendor has been notified of this vulnerability). This enables the attackers to conduct a DLL hijacking attack: they place a malicious library in the same directory with the RMS executable file, as a result of which a malware component loads and gains control instead of the corresponding system library.

The malicious library completes malware installation. Specifically, it creates a registry value responsible for automatically running RMS at system startup. Notably, in most cases of this campaign the registry value is placed in the RunOnce key, instead of the Run key, enabling the malware to run automatically only the next time the system starts up. After that, the malware needs to create the registry value again.

It is most likely that the attackers chose this approach to mask the presence of malware in the system as well as possible. The malicious library also implements techniques for resisting analysis and detection. One such technique involves dynamically importing Windows API functions using their hashes. This way, the attackers do not have to store the names of these functions in the malicious library’s body, which helps them to conceal the program’s real functionality from most analysis tools.

Part of a malicious code fragment implementing the dynamic import of functions

The malicious dynamic library, winspool.drv, decrypts configuration files prepared by the attackers, which contain RMS software settings, the password for remotely controlling the machine and the settings needed to notify the attackers that the system has been successfully infected.

One of the configuration files contains an email address to which information about the infected system is sent, including computer name, user name, the RMS machine’s Internet ID, etc. The Internet ID sent as part of this information is generated on a legitimate server of the RMS vendor after the computer connects to it. The identifier is subsequently used to connect to the remotely controlled system located behind NAT (a similar mechanism is also used in popular instant messaging solutions).

A list of email addresses found in the configuration files discovered is provided in the indicators of compromise section.

A modified version of RC4 is used to encrypt configuration files. Configuration files from the archive mentioned above are shown below.

Decrypted contents of InternetId.rcfg file

Decrypted contents of notification.rcfg file

Decrypted contents of Options.rcfg file

Decrypted contents of Password.rcfg file

After this, the attackers can use the system’s Internet ID and password to control it without the user’s knowledge via a legitimate RMS server, using the standard RMS client.

Attacks using TeamViewer

Attacks using legitimate TeamViewer software are very similar to those using RMS software, which are described above. A distinguishing feature is that information from infected systems is sent to malware command-and-control servers, rather than the attackers’ email address.

As in the case of RMS, malicious code is injected into the TeamViewer process by substituting a malicious library for system DLL. In the case of TeamViewer, msimg32.dll is used.

This is not a unique tactic. Legitimate TeamViewer software has been used in APT and cybercriminal attacks before. The best-known group to have used this toolset is TeamSpy Crew. We believe that the attacks described in this document are not associated with TeamSpy and are the result of known malware being re-used by another cybercriminal group. Curiously, the algorithm used to encrypt the configuration file and the password for decrypting it, which were identified in the process of analyzing these attacks, are the same as those published last April in a description of similar attacks.

It is common knowledge that legitimate TeamViewer software does not hide its startup or operation from the user and, specifically, notifies the user of incoming connections. At the same time, the attackers need to gain remote control of the infected system without the user’s knowledge. To achieve this, they hook several Windows API functions.

The functions are hooked using a well-known method called splicing. As a result, when legitimate software calls one of the Windows API functions, control is passed to the malicious DLL and the legitimate software gets a spoofed response instead of one from the operating system.

Windows API function hooked by the malware

Hooking Windows API functions enables attackers to hide TeamViewer windows, protect malware files from being detected, and control TeamViewer startup parameters.

After launching, the malicious library checks whether an internet connection is available by executing the command “ping 1.1.1.1” and then decrypts the malicious program’s configuration file tvr.cfg. The file contains various parameters, such as the password used for remotely controlling the system, URL of the attackers’ command-and-control server, parameters of the service under whose name TeamViewer will be installed, the User-Agent field of the HTTP header used in requests sent to the command-and-control server, VPN parameters for TeamViewer, etc.

Screenshot of decrypted contents of the malware configuration file

Unlike RMS, Team Viewer uses a built-in VPN to remotely control a computer located behind NAT.

As in the case of RMS, the relevant value is added to the RunOnce registry key to ensure that the malware runs automatically at system startup.

The malware collects data on the infected machine and sends it to the command-and-control server along with the system’s identifier needed for remote administration. The data sent includes:

  • Operating system version
  • User name
  • Computer name
  • Information on the privilege level of the user on whose behalf the malware is running
  • Whether or not a microphone and a webcam are present in the system
  • Whether or not antivirus software or other security solutions are installed, as well as the UAC level

Information about security software installed in the system is obtained using the following WQL query:

root\SecurityCenter:SELECT * FROM AntiVirusProduct

The information collected is sent to the attackers’ server using the following POST request:

POST request used to send encrypted data to the command-and-control server

Another distinguishing feature of attacks that involve the TeamViewer is the ability to send commands to an infected system and have them executed by the malware. Commands are sent from the command-and-control server using the chat built into the TeamViewer application. The chat window is also hidden by the malicious library and the log files are deleted.

A command sent to an infected system is executed in the Windows command interpreter using the following instruction:

cmd.exe /c start /b

The parameter “/b” indicates that the command sent by the attackers for execution will be run without creating a new window.

The malware also has a mechanism for self-destructing if the appropriate command is received from the attackers’ server.

The use of additional malware

In cases where attackers need additional data (authorization data, etс.), they download spyware to victim computers in order to collect logins and passwords for mailboxes, websites, SSH/FTP/Telnet clients, as well as logging keystrokes and making screenshots.

Additional software hosted on the attackers’ servers and downloaded to victims’ computers was found to include malware from the following families:

In all probability, these Trojans were downloaded to compromised systems and used to collect information and steal data. In addition to remote administration, the capabilities of malware from these families include:

  • Logging keystrokes
  • Making screenshots
  • Collecting system information and information on installed programs and running processes
  • Downloading additional malicious files
  • Using the computer as a proxy server
  • Stealing passwords from popular programs and browsers
  • Stealing cryptocurrency wallets
  • Stealing Skype correspondence
  • Conducting DDoS attacks
  • Intercepting and spoofing user traffic
  • Sending any user files to the command-and-control server

In other cases observed, after an initial analysis of an infected system, the attackers downloaded an additional malware module to the victim’s computer – a self-extracting archive containing various malicious and legitimate programs, which were apparently individually selected for each specific system.

For example, if the malware had previously been executed on behalf of a user who did not have local administrator privileges, to evade the Windows User Account Control (UAC), the attackers used the DLL hijacking technique mentioned above, but this time on a Windows system file, %systemdir%\migwiz\migwiz.exe, and a library, cryptbase.dll. The local administrator privileges obtained are used to run RemoteUtilities, a remote administration utility, on the infected system. The attackers use a modified RemoteUtilities executable file to mask the presence of the software on the system. The utility offers extensive functionality for managing the system remotely:

  • Remotely controlling the system (RDP)
  • Transferring files to and from the infected system
  • Controlling power on the infected system
  • Remotely managing the processes of running application
  • Remote shell (command line)
  • Managing hardware
  • Capturing screenshots and screen videos
  • Recording sound and video from recording devices connected to the infected system
  • Remote management of the system registry

In some cases, the Mimikatz utility was installed in addition to cryptbase.dll and RemoteUtilities. We believe that the attackers use Mimikatz in cases when the first system infected is not one that has software for working with financial data installed on it. In these cases, the Mimikatz utility is used to steal authentication data from the organization’s employees and gain remote access to other machines on the enterprise’s network. The use of this technique by the attackers poses a serious danger: if they succeed in obtaining the account credentials for the domain administrator’s account, this will give them control of all systems on the enterprise’s network.

Attack targets

According to KSN data, from October 2017 to June 2018, about 800 computers of employees working at industrial companies were attacked using the malware described in this paper.

Number of computers attacked by month. October 2017 – June 2018

According to our estimate, at least 400 industrial companies in Russia have been targeted by this attack, including companies in the following industries:

  • Manufacturing
  • Oil and gas
  • Metallurgy
  • Engineering
  • Energy
  • Construction
  • Mining
  • Logistics

Based on this, it can be concluded that the attackers do not concentrate on companies in any specific industry or sector. At the same time, their activity clearly demonstrates their determination to compromise specifically systems belonging to industrial companies. This choice on the part of the cybercriminals could be explained by the fact that the threat awareness and cybersecurity culture in industrial companies is inferior to that in companies from other sectors of the economy (such as banks or IT companies). At the same time, as we have noted before, it is more common for industrial companies than for companies in other sectors to conduct operations involving large amounts of money on their accounts. This makes them an even more attractive target for cybercriminals.

Conclusions

This research demonstrates once again that even when they use simple techniques and known malware, threat actors can successfully attack many industrial companies by expertly using social engineering and masking malicious code in target systems. Criminals actively use social engineering to keep users from suspecting that their computers are infected. They also use legitimate remote administration software to evade detection by antivirus solutions.

This series of attacks targets primarily Russian organizations, but the same tactics and tools can be used in attacks against industrial companies in any country of the world.

We believe that the threat actor behind this attack is highly likely to be a criminal group whose members have a good command of Russian. This is indicated by the high level at which texts in Russian are prepared for phishing emails used in the attack, as well as the attackers’ ability to make changes to organizations’ financial data in Russian. More data about the research on the infrastructure and language used by the attackers is available in the private version of the report on the Treat Intelligence portal.

Remote administration capabilities give criminals full control of compromised systems, so possible attack scenarios are not limited to the theft of money. In the process of attacking their targets, the attackers steal sensitive data belonging to target organizations, their partners and customers, carry out surreptitious video surveillance of the victim companies’ employees, and record audio and video using devices connected to infected machines.

The various malware components used in this attack are detected by Kaspersky Lab products with the following verdicts:

  • Trojan.BAT.Starter
  • Trojan.Win32.Dllhijack
  • Trojan.Win32.Waldek
  • Backdoor.Win32.RA-based
  • Backdoor.Win32.Agent

 Indicators of compromise (PDF)

A mining multitool

Thu, 07/26/2018 - 06:00

Recently, an interesting miner implementation appeared on Kaspersky Lab’s radar. The malware, which we dubbed PowerGhost, is capable of stealthily establishing itself in a system and spreading across large corporate networks infecting both workstations and servers. This type of hidden consolidation is typical of miners: the more machines that get infected and the longer they remain that way, the greater the attacker’s profits. Therefore, it’s not uncommon to see clean software being infected with a miner; the popularity of the legitimate software serves to promote the malware’s proliferation. The creators of PowerGhost, however, went further and started using fileless techniques to establish the illegal miner within the victim system. It appears the growing popularity and rates of cryptocurrencies have convinced the bad guys of the need to invest in new mining techniques – as our data demonstrates, miners are gradually replacing ransomware Trojans.

Technical description and propagation method

PowerGhost is an obfuscated PowerShell script that contains the core code and the following add-on modules: the actual miner, mimikatz, the libraries msvcp120.dll and msvcr120.dll required for the miner’s operation, a module for reflective PE injection and a shellcode for the EternalBlue exploit.

Fragment of the obfuscated script

The add-on modules encoded in base64

The malicious program uses lots of fileless techniques to remain inconspicuous to the user and undetected by antivirus technologies. The victim machine is infected remotely using exploits or remote administration tools (Windows Management Instrumentation). During infection, a one-line PowerShell script is run that downloads the miner’s body and immediately launches it without writing it to the hard drive.

What the script does after that can be broken down into several stages:

  • Automatic self-update. PowerGhost checks if a new version is available on the C&C. If there is, it downloads the new version and launches it instead of itself.
  • Propagation.With the help of mimikatz, the miner obtains the user account credentials from the current machine, uses them to log on and attempts to propagate across the local network by launching a copy of itself via WMI. By “a copy of itself” here and below we mean the one-line script that downloads the miner’s body from the C&C.
    PowerGhost also tries to spread across the local network using the now-notorious EternalBlue exploit (MS17-010, CVE-2017-0144).
  • Escalation of privileges. As the miner spreads via mimikatz and WMI, it may end up on a new machine with user rights. It will then attempt to escalate its privileges in the system with the 32- or 64-bit exploits for MS16-032, MS15-051 and CVE-2018-8120.
  • Establishing a foothold in the system. PowerGhost saves all the modules as properties of a WMI class. The miner’s body is saved in the form of a one-line PowerShell script in a WMI subscription that activates every 90 minutes.
  • Payload.Lastly, the script launches the miner by loading a PE file via reflective PE injection.

In one PowerGhost version, we detected a tool for conducting DDoS attacks. The malware writers obviously decided to make some extra money by offering DDoS services.

PowerShell function with the tell-tale name RunDDOS

It’s worth pointing out that this is the only one of the miner’s functions that copies files to the hard drive. This is quite possibly a test tool that will later be replaced with a fileless implementation. Also supporting the assertion that this function was added to this version as an afterthought is the peculiar way the DDoS module is launched: the script downloads two PE modules, logos.png and cohernece.txt. The former is saved to the hard drive as java-log-9527.log and is an executable file for conducting DDoS attacks. The file cohernece.txt is protected with the software protection tool Themida, complete with a check for execution in a virtual environment. If the check does not detect a sandbox, then cohernece.txt launches the file java-log-9527.log for execution. In this curious way, the ready DDoS module was supplemented with a function to check for execution in a virtual environment.

Fragment of disassembled code of the file cohernece.txt

Statistics and geography

Corporate users bore the brunt of the attack: it’s easier for PowerGhost to spread within a company’s local area network.

Geography of infections by the miner

PowerGhost is encountered most often in India, Brazil, Columbia and Turkey.

Kaspersky Lab’s products detect the miner and/or its components with the following verdicts:

  • PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic
  • PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic
  • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic
  • not-a-virus:HEUR:RiskTool.Win32.BitMiner.gen

E-wallets at nanopool.org and minexmr.com:

43QbHsAj4kHY5WdWr75qxXHarxTNQDk2ABoiXM6yFaVPW6TyUJehRoBVUfEhKPNP4n3JFu2H3PNU2Sg3ZMK85tPXMzTbHkb
49kWWHdZd5NFHXveGPPAnX8irX7grcNLHN2anNKhBAinVFLd26n8gX2EisdakRV6h1HkXaa1YJ7iz3AHtJNK5MD93z6tV9H

Indicators of compromise C&C hostnames:
  • update.7h4uk[.]com
  • 185.128.43.62
  • info.7h4uk[.]com
MD5:

AEEB46A88C9A37FA54CA2B64AE17F248
4FE2DE6FBB278E56C23E90432F21F6C8
71404815F6A0171A29DE46846E78A079
81E214A4120A4017809F5E7713B7EAC8

A study of car sharing apps

Wed, 07/25/2018 - 06:00

The growing popularity of car sharing services has led some experts to predict an end to private car ownership in big cities. The statistics appear to back up this claim: for example, in 2017 Moscow saw the car sharing fleet, the number of active users and the number of trips they made almost double. This is great news, but information security specialists have started raising some pertinent questions: how are the users of these services protected and what potential risks do they face in the event of unauthorized access to their accounts?

Why is car sharing of interest to criminals?

The simple answer would be because they want to drive a nice car at somebody else’s expense. However, doing so more than once is likely to be problematic – once the account’s owner finds out they have been charged for a car they never rented, they’ll most likely contact the service’s support line, the service provider will check the trip details, and may eventually end up reporting the matter to the police. It means anyone trying it a second time will be tracked and caught red-handed. This is obvious and makes this particular scenario the least likely reason for hijacking somebody’s account.

The selling of hijacked accounts appears to be a more viable reason. There is bound to be demand from those who don’t have a driving license or those who were refused registration by the car sharing service’s security team. Indeed, offers of this nature already exist on the market.

Criminals offer hijacked accounts from a wide range of car sharing services…

…and explain why you are better off using somebody else’s account

In addition, someone who knows the details of a user’s car sharing account can track all their trips and steal things that are left behind in the car. And, of course, a car that is fraudulently rented in somebody else’s name can always be driven to some remote place and cannibalized for spare parts.

Application security

So, we know there is potential interest among criminal elements; now let’s see if the developers of car sharing apps have reacted to it. Have they thought about user security and protected their software from unauthorized access? We tested 13 mobile apps and (spoiler alert!) the results were not very encouraging.

We started by checking the apps’ ability to prevent launches on Android devices with root privileges, and assessed how well the apps’ code is obfuscated. This was done for two reasons:

  • the vast majority of Android applications can be decompiled, their code modified (e.g. so that user credentials are sent to a C&C), then re-assembled, signed with a new certificate and uploaded again to an app store;
  • an attacker on a rooted device can infiltrate the process of the necessary application and gain access to authentication data.

Another important security element is the ability to choose a username and password when using a service. Many services use a person’s phone number as their username. This is quite easy for cybercriminals to obtain as users often forget to hide it on social media, while car sharing users can be identified on social media by their hashtags and photos.

An example of how a social media post can give you away

We then looked at how the apps work with certificates and if cybercriminals have any chance of launching successful MITM attacks. We also checked how easy it is to overlay an application’s interface with a fake authorization window.

Reverse engineering and superuser privileges

Of all the applications we analyzed, only one was capable of countering reverse engineering. It was protected with the help of DexGuard, a solution whose developers also promise that protected software will not launch on a device where the owner has gained root privileges or that has been modified (patched).

File names in the installation package indicate the use of DexGuard

However, while that application is well protected against reverse engineering, there’s nothing to stop it from launching on an Android device with superuser privileges. When tested that way, the app launches successfully and goes through the server authorization process. An attacker could obtain the data located in protected storage. However, in this particular app the data was encrypted quite reliably.

Example of user’s encrypted credentials

Password strength

Half the applications we tested do not allow the user to create their own credentials; instead they force the user to use their phone number and a PIN code sent in a text message. On the one hand, this means the user can’t set a weak password like ‘1234’; on the other hand, it presents an opportunity for an attacker to obtain the password (by intercepting it using the SS7 vulnerability, or by getting the phone’s SIM card reissued). We decided to use our own accounts to see how easy it is to find out the ‘password’.

If an attacker finds a person’s phone number on social media and tries to use it to log in to the app, the owner will receive an SMS with a validation code:

As we can see, the validation code is just four digits long, which means it only takes 10,000 attempts to guess it – not such a large number. Ideally, such codes should be at least six digits long and contain upper and lower case characters as well as numbers.

Another car sharing service sends stronger passwords to users; however, there is a drawback to that as well. Its codes are created following a single template: they always have numbers in first and last place and four lower-case Latin characters in the middle:

That means there are 45 million possible combinations to search through; if the positioning of the numbers were not restricted, the number of combinations would rise to two billion. Of course, 45,000,000 is also large amount, but the app doesn’t have a timeout for entering the next combination, so there are no obstacles to prevent brute forcing.

Now, let’s return to the PIN codes of the first application. The app gives users a minute to enter the PIN; if that isn’t enough time, users have to request a new code. It turned out that the combination lifetime is a little over two minutes. We wrote a small brute force utility, reproduced part of the app/server communication protocol and started the brute force. We have to admit that we were unable to brute force the code, and there are two possible reasons for that. Firstly, our internet line may have been inadequate, or secondly, the car sharing operator set an appropriate two-minute timeout for the PIN code, so it couldn’t be brute forced within two minutes even with an excellent internet connection. We decided not to continue, confirming only that the service remained responsive and an attack could be continued after several attempts at sending 10,000 requests at a time.

While doing so, we deliberately started the brute force in a single thread from a single IP address, thereby giving the service a chance to detect and block the attack, contact the potential victim and, as a last resort, deactivate the account. But none of these things happened. We decided to leave it at that and moved on to testing the next application.

We tried all the above procedures on the second app, with the sole exception that we didn’t register a successful brute force of the password. We decided that if the server allows 1,000 combinations to be checked, it would probably also allow 45 million combinations to be checked, so it is just a matter of time.

The server continues to respond after 1,000 attempts to brute force the password

This is a long process with a predictable result. This application also stores the username and password locally in an encrypted format, but if the attacker knows their format, brute forcing will only take a couple of minutes – most of this time will be spent on generating the password/MD5 hash pair (the password is hashed with MD5 and written in a file on the device).

MITM attack

It’s worth noting that the applications use HTTPS to communicate data to and from their control centers, so it may take quite a while to figure out the communication protocol. To make our ‘attack’ faster, we resorted to an MITM attack, aided by another global security flaw: none of the tested applications checks the server’s certificate. We were able to obtain the dump of the entire session.


Screenshot of a successful MITM attack. HTTPS traffic dump was obtained

Protection from overlaying

Of course, it’s much faster and more effective (from the attacker’s point of view) if an Android device can be infected, i.e., the authorization SMS can be intercepted, so the attacker can instantly log in on another device. If there’s a complex password, then the attacker can hijack the app’s launch by showing a fake window with entry fields for login details that covers the genuine app’s interface. None of the applications we analyzed could counter this sort of activity. If the operating system version is old enough, privileges can be escalated and, in some cases, the required data can be extracted.

Outcome

The situation is very similar to what we found surrounding Connected Car applications. It appears that app developers don’t fully understand the current threats to mobile platforms – that goes for both the design stage and when creating the infrastructure. A good first step would be to expand the functionality for notifying users of suspicious activities – only one service currently sends notifications to users about attempts to log in to their account from a different device. The majority of the applications we analyzed are poorly designed from a security standpoint and need to be improved. Moreover, many of the programs are not just very similar to each other but are actually based on the same code.

Russian car sharing operators could learn a thing or two from their colleagues in other countries. For example, a major player in the market of short-term car rental only allows clients to access a car with a special card – this may make the service less convenient, but dramatically improves security.

Advice for users
  • Don’t make your phone number publicly available (the same goes for your email address)
  • Use a separate bank card for online payments, including car sharing (a virtual card also works) and don’t put more money on it than you need.
  • If your car sharing service sends you an SMS with a PIN code for your account, contact the security service and disconnect your bank card from that account.
  • Do not use rooted devices.
  • Use a security solution that will protect you from cybercriminals who steal SMSs. This will make life harder not only for free riders but also for those interested in intercepting SMSs from your bank.
Recommendations to car sharing services
  • Use commercially available packers and obfuscators to complicate reverse engineering. Pay special attention to integrity control, so the app can’t be modified.
  • Use mechanisms to detect operations on rooted devices.
  • Allow the user to create their own credentials; ensure all passwords are strong.
  • Notify users about successful logons from other devices.
  • Switch to PUSH notifications: it’s still rare for malware to monitor the Notification bar in Android.
  • Protect your application interface from being overlaid by another app.
  • Add a server certificate check.