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DDoS attacks in Q3 2017

Malware Alerts - Mon, 11/06/2017 - 05:00

News Overview

In the third quarter of 2017, the trends of the preceding quarters continued to develop further. The number of DDoS attacks in China, the United States, South Korea and Russia increased, which were reflected in the statistics we gathered for botnets. A sharp surge in the number (more than 450 daily) and power (up to 15.8 million packets per second) of attacks was registered in the ‘Australian sector’. The cost of protection increased accordingly: for example, in early September, six IB vendors entered into a $50 million contract with the Singapore government (the previous three-year contract cost the state half that amount).

The biggest success in combating DDoS attacks was the taking down of the huge (hundreds of thousands of devices in more than a hundred countries) WireX botnet. The botnet had been secretly working on Android devices and proliferating via legitimate Google Play applications. The joint actions of Google, Samsung and several large IT security vendors were required to take down the botnet. Given the deplorable state of security on the Internet of things and in micro-applications, such findings are now likely to occur on a fairly regular basis.

Cybercriminals are using their brains as well as their brawn. In mid-August, Imperva described Pulse Wave technology capable of increasing the power of a DDoS attack thanks to a vulnerability in hybrid and cloud technologies. The analysts at Imperva believe that most DDoS attacks will soon follow a similar pattern: short but powerful sudden “punctuated” attacks that last for several hours or several days.

The targets within the scope of the cybercriminals’ interest remain the same. In the political arena, the increase in the number of attacks has even triggered a process of qualitative change: some are voicing the belief that DDoS attacks are a legitimate form of democratic protest. However, the effectiveness of this method is still questionable: the two most notable political acts of the third quarter (an attack on the DreamHost hosting provider and on a libertarian site) achieved nothing apart from greater publicity for the attacked resources.

Cases of blackmail involving DDoS attacks – or rather, attempts that aren’t always very well executed –have become more frequent. While in the previous quarter companies preferred to pay off the attackers, mass mailings with threats are now often perceived as just another wave of spam.

As a means of applying pressure, DDoS attacks are still more beneficial in industries where downtime and communication failures lead to lost profits and reputation. The gaming industry is becoming even more attractive for cybercriminals: the profits here are estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars, while security is still far from perfect, with hybrid gaming platforms vulnerable to attacks via the links between resources and applications.

In Q3, there were three high-profile incidents involving gaming platforms (not including the DDoS attack on Final Fantasy’s servers, which, according to Square Enix, began in June and lasted till the end of July).

Firstly, in mid-August, Blizzard Entertainment reported a flood of junk traffic that caused problems for players of Overwatch and World of Warcraft.

Secondly, at the beginning of September, the Americas Cardroom online poker site began to experience difficulties. The attack (not the first to target the resource) followed the notorious pattern “demonstrate force, demand a ransom”. The site’s management refused to pay, but was forced to cancel – or more precisely, to delay – a poker championship that was already under way.

At the end of the quarter, on 30 September, the site of the UK National Lottery was seriously affected: for 90 minutes players were unable to place their stakes online or via applications, which caused the service serious losses.

It appears that constant DDoS attacks on the entertainment industry is becoming the new normal: the largest companies will either have to seriously reconsider their approach to security or put customer loyalty at risk. Some of them have started eliminating possible vectors on their own. For example, Netflix (yet another entertainment platform that could lose customers due to a loss of communication) found a serious vulnerability in API and developed two tools to deal with the infected applications.

Probably the most curious attack of the quarter was also related to the entertainment and gaming industry: the cybercriminals hacked a US casino via a smart fish tank. It had nothing to do with DDoS attacks, but it’s interesting that criminals managed to break through to the mainframe and steal 100 GB of confidential data from the organization, although the fish tank was installed on its own VPN. It is highly likely that in the near future the entertainment and gaming sector will be on a par with the financial sector when it comes to the scope and ingenuity of large-scale attacks.

Quarter Trends

In term of trends, there was a fairly new vector of attacks related to the now notorious crypto- currencies. More and more attacks are targeting Initial Coin Offering (ICO) platforms – a type of crowdfunding. Since blockchain technology allows transactions to be conducted safely, ICOs are quickly gaining in popularity. But there are risks as well: with the rapid growth and the increasing turnover of crypto-currencies, such platforms are subjected to cyberattacks, including DDoS attacks. The broad availability of the platform guarantees reliable and secure transactions, while DDoS attacks are aimed at breaking the operability of the service and thus discrediting it or, even worse, creating a smokescreen for more sophisticated types of attacks.

Another detail of this quarter is the increase in the proportion of mixed, multi-component (SYN + TCP Connect + HTTP-flood + UDP flood) attacks. As forecasted earlier, they are gradually gaining in popularity. There is nothing fundamentally new in these attacks, but in the right hands they can be quite effective.

Statistics for botnet-assisted DDoS attacks Methodology

Kaspersky Lab has extensive experience of combating cyber threats, including DDoS attacks of various complexity types and ranges. The experts of the company have been tracking the actions of botnets by using the DDoS Intelligence system.

Being part of the Kaspersky DDoS Prevention solution, the DDoS Intelligence system is intended to intercept and analyze commands sent to bots from command-and-control servers and requires neither infecting any user devices nor the actual execution of cybercriminals’ commands.

This report contains DDoS Intelligence statistics for the third quarter of 2017.

In the context of this report, it is assumed that an incident is a separate (single) DDoS-attack if the interval between botnet activity periods does not exceed 24 hours. For example, if the same web resource was attacked by the same botnet with an interval of 24 hours or more, then this incident is considered as two attacks. Also, bot requests originating from different botnets but directed at one resource count as separate attacks.

The geographical locations of DDoS-attack victims and C&C servers that were used to send commands are determined by their respective IP addresses. The number of unique targets of DDoS attacks in this report is counted by the number of unique IP addresses in the quarterly statistics.

It is important to note that DDoS Intelligence statistics are limited only to those botnets that have been detected and analyzed by Kaspersky Lab. It should also be noted that botnets are just one of the tools for performing DDoS attacks; thus, the data presented in this report do not cover every single DDoS attack occurred during the indicated period.

Q3 summary
  • Resources in 98 countries were attacked in Q3 2017 vs. 86 in Q2 2017.
  • As in Q2, around half of all attacks (51.56%) originated in China.
  • China, the US, and South Korea remained leaders in terms of both number of attacks and number of targets. According to the number of reported C&C servers, the same countries are make up the TOP 3, though South Korea calimed first place this time.
  • The longest DDoS attack was 215 hours, a decrease of 28% compared to Q2. At the same time, the share of attacks that lasted less than 50 hours remained practically unchanged (99.6% in Q3 vs. 99.7% in Q2).
  • As in the previous quarter, there was a considerable drop in the proportion of attacks over TCP (down to 11.2% from 28.2%) and ICPM (down to 7.1% from 9.42%). This caused a rise in the percentage of SYN floods and HTTP attacks.
  • The proportion of Linux botnets continued to grow. Such botnets were responsible for 69.62% of attacks in Q3 compared to 51.23% in Q2.
Geography of attacks

DDoS attacks were registered in 98 countries in Q3, where the largest number of the attacks were aimed at China (63.30% of all attacks), which is 5.3 p.p. higher than the previous quarter. South Korea’s share fell from 14.17% to 8.70%, moving it to third place. The US came second despite the percentage of attacks originating from this country falling from 14.03% to 12.98%.

The top 10 accounted for 93.56% of all attacks. Germany (1.24%) re-entered the top 10, replacing Italy out of the rating. Hong Kong (1.31%) dropped from 4th to 7th, having lost 1.07 p.p. Russia (1.58%) gained 0.35 p.p. and was once again in fourth place. The UK remained fifth while the Netherlands saw its share go up from 0.84% to 1.31%, moving it to sixth.

Distribution of DDoS attacks by country, Q2 2017 vs. Q3 2017

91.27% of all attacks were aimed at targets in the countries of the top 10 in Q3 2017.

Distribution of unique DDoS-attack targets by country, Q2 2017 vs. Q3 2017

China remained in first place: 51.56% of all targets were located in the territory of the country, an increase of 4.14 p.p. compared to Q2. At the same time, the US and South Korea remained second and third respectively, although the proportion of targets in the territories of both countries fell considerably: from 18.63% to 17.33% in the US, and from 16.35% to 11.11% in South Korea.

The share of targets located in the territory of Russia grew from 1.33% in Q2 to 2.24% in Q3, which saw Russia move up from seventh to fourth place. Australia and Italy left the top 10 and were replaced by France (1.43%) and Germany (1.65%).

Dynamics of the number of DDoS attacks

The number of attacks per day ranged from 296 (24 July) to 1508 (26 September) in Q3 2017. The peak numbers were registered on 27 July (1399) and 24 September (1497). A relative downturn was registered on 28 July (300), 31 May (240), and 25 September (297).

Dynamics of the number of DDoS attacks in Q3 2017*
*Since DDoS attacks may continuously last for several days, one attack may be counted several times in the timeline, i.e., once per day.

In Q3 2017, Monday remained the quietest day for DDoS attacks (10.39% vs 11.78% in the previous quarter), while Thursday became the busiest day (17.54%). Last quarter’s leader, Saturday, came second (15.59%) followed by Sunday (14.89%) and Tuesday (14.79%).

Distribution of DDoS attacks by day of the week, Q2 vs Q3 2017

Types and duration of DDoS attacks

As in the previous quarter, the number of SYN DDoS attacks continued to grow, rising from 53.26% to 60.43% in Q3 2017. At the same time, the percentage of TCP DDoS attacks plummeted from 18.18% to 11.19%, which did not affect second position in the rating for this type of attack. Both UDP and ICMP attacks became quite rare: their share dropped from 11.91% to 10.15% and from 9.38% to 7.08% respectively. Meanwhile, the popularity of HTTP attacks increased from 7.27% to 11.6%, which placed them in third.

Distribution of DDoS attacks by type, Q3 2017

The number of long-term attacks remained almost unchanged from the previous quarter: 0.02% of attacks lasted more than 150 hours (vs 0.01%). The longest attack lasted for 215 hours, 62 hours shorter than the record in Q2. At the same time, the share of attacks that lasted 4 hours or less dropped from 85.93% in Q2 to 76.09% in Q3. Thus, the percentage of attacks lasting from 5 to 49 and from 50 to 99 hours increased, accounting for 23.55% and 0.3% of all attacks respectively.

Distribution of DDoS attacks by duration (hours), Q2 vs Q3 2017

C&C servers and botnet types

The top 3 countries with the greatest number of detected C&C servers remained unchanged from Q2: South Korea, whose share grew from 49.11% to 50.16%, remained top. The US retained second place (16.94% vs 16.07% in Q2). China remained third although its share dropped from 7.74% to 5.86%. The top 3 countries accounted for 72.96% of C&C servers in total, which is only slightly more than in the previous quarter.

The top 10 included Italy (1.63%) and the UK (0.98%), which ousted Canada and Germany in Q3. Compared to Q2 2017, there was a significant increase in the shares of France (up to 2.93% from 1.79%) and Russia (up to 3.58% from 2.68%).

Distribution of botnet C&C servers by country in Q3 2017

In Q3, Linux-based botnets continued to win back positions from Windows: the share of detected Linux-based botnets comprised 69.62%, while the percentage of Windows-based botnets dropped to 30.38%.

Correlation between Windows- and Linux-based botnet attacks, Q3 2017

Conclusion

In the third quarter of 2017, we registered a considerable increase in the number of both DDoS attacks and their targets. Traditionally, China is the country with the largest number of attack sources and targets. It was followed by the United States and South Korea. The popularity of Windows OS as a basis for creating a botnet has fallen noticeably, while the share of Linux-based botnets increased proportionally.

Among this quarter’s trends were increased attacks on ICO platforms: in Q3, crypto-currency was widely discussed both on the Internet and in the mass media, and cybercriminals did not ignore its popularity. Yet another detail of this quarter is the growth in the proportion of multi-component attacks, consisting of various combinations of SYN, TCP Connect, HTTP flood and UDP flood techniques.

Two-Step Verification

SANS Tip of the Day - Mon, 11/06/2017 - 00:00
Two-step verification is one of the best steps you can take to secure any account. Two-step verification is when you require both a password and code sent to or generated by your mobile device. Examples of services that support two-step verification include Gmail, Dropbox and Twitter.

Spam and phishing in Q3 2017

Malware Alerts - Fri, 11/03/2017 - 06:00

Quarterly highlights Blockchain and spam

Cryptocurrencies have been a regular theme in the media for several years now. Financial analysts predict a great future for them, various governments are thinking about launching their own currencies, and graphics cards are swept off the shelves as soon as they go on sale. Of course, spammers could not resist the topics of cryptocurrency, mining and blockchain technology.

Last quarter we wrote that many Trojans were downloading ‘miners’ as a payload on victims’ computers, and in third quarter of 2017 this practice became even more widespread.

Fraud, cryptocurrencies and binary options

Financial fraud makes very active use of the cryptocurrency topic: users receive messages that vividly describe the use of special software for trading on the cryptocurrency market and how it can secure their financial future.

Examples of emails with offers “to secure your financial future”

After clicking on a link, users end up on a site where they are once again persuaded to join the ranks of the rich who only have one problem in life – how to spend their money. In reality, such sites are partners for shady brokerage houses, and purveyors of new, inexperienced customers. It is there that new users are redirected.

The plan is to get the victim to deposit a certain amount to their account, usually several hundred dollars, for the opportunity to start trading. We should note here that we’re no longer talking about cryptocurrencies – in most cases, trading involves binary options.

The problem is not even in the questionable legality of the actual trading, but that no one guarantees the honesty of the brokerage offices and, consequently, there are no guarantees that the invested funds will be returned. The fraudsters start by motivating people to invest more and more money, and then simply disappear, leaving the victim to read angry reviews on the Internet from other cheated depositors.

There are also more primitive types of fraud, where the email directly asks the recipient to transfer bitcoins to a specific wallet, with a promise to return the investment with interest five days later. But only the most naïve recipients are likely to fall for such an offer.

Naive users are invited to “invest” bitcoins for a short time at a high high rate of interest

Webcasts

Another example of the cryptocurrency theme being used in spam is that of webcasts. In most cases, scammers suggest taking a study course that will help the user understand more about cryptocurrencies and how to invest in them. Of course, the sums invested in “training” will result in huge profits in the near future, according to the organizers.

Natural disasters and the ‘White House administration’

In August and September, the world’s attention was focused on hurricanes Irma and Harvey, and the earthquake in Mexico. There were dozens of victims of these disasters, and the damage caused was estimated to be billions of dollars. These tragic events inevitably attracted the attention of so-called Nigerian scammers trying to cash in on people’s grief. They sent messages on behalf of family members whose relatives died during the hurricanes and asked for help obtaining an inheritance left by them. Natural disasters were also mentioned in emails promoting job offers and loans.

In the third quarter, ‘Nigerian’ letters also mentioned the name of Donald Trump, the current US president. The authors pretended to be representatives of state or banking organizations, and to make their message sound more important they claimed they were appointed by the US president or were acting on his behalf. The spammers spun the standard tales in their fraudulent letters, promising millions of dollars to users, with the scammers asking for personal information so that they could supposedly track the money transfer. The letters contained identical text but with different layouts and contact details.

Letters ‘from the US president’s office’

B2B fakes in malicious emails

There is still a tendency to create emails with malicious attachments for fake commercial offers. At times their quality is so good that you suspect they could be a man-in-the-middle attack.

The file in the attachment is detected as HEUR: Trojan.Java.Agent.gen. This malware is written to startup and tries to close programs such as Process Hacker, system explorer and security software processes. It then communicates with the remote server and waits for the command to install other malicious programs

The attachment is detected as HEUR: Exploit.MSOffice.Generic, exploiting the vulnerability CVE-2017-0199 in MS Word. As a result, other malicious programs are downloaded to the victim’s computer

Both archives contain the same malicious object, detected as Trojan.Win32.VBKrypt.xtgt. It collects information from the victim’s computer and transfers it to the remote server

Release of new iPhone

In September, Apple unveiled the new models of its smartphone – iPhone 8 and iPhone X. This event was widely covered in the media, and spammers, weren’t going to miss out.

Even before the official presentation, we began to record spam mailings with offers to test the updated phone for free and participate in a prize draw to win one. Some mailings even reported the recipient had won a device before it was publicly unveiled. In most cases, the links in these emails could end up downloading Reimage Repair ‘advertising software’. Immediately after the release of the smartphone, Chinese factories got in on the act, sending out emails advertising various accessories for the new model. Our traps also recorded a large volume of phishing associated with the purchase and delivery of the popular gadget.

Statistics Proportion of spam in email traffic

Percentage of spam in global email traffic, Q2 and Q3 2017

In the third quarter of 2017, the largest share of spam was recorded in September – 59.56%. The average share of spam in global email traffic was 58.02%, which was almost 1.05 p.p. more than the average for the previous quarter.

Sources of spam by country

Sources of spam by country, Q3 2017

According to the results for the third quarter of 2017, China (12.24%) became the biggest source of spam, after finishing third the previous quarter. Last quarter’s leader Vietnam (11.17%) was second after a decrease of 1.2 p.p. The US fell one place to third (9.62%), while India (8.49%) remained fourth in this rating. Iran rounded off the top 10, accounting for 2.07% of all spam.

Spam email size

Breakdown of spam emails by size, Q2 and Q3 2017

The share of very small emails (up to 2 KB) in spam increased by 9.46 p.p. to 46.87% in the third quarter. The proportion of emails between 5 and 10 KB in size also increased by 6.66 p.p. compared with the previous quarter and amounted to 12.6%.

The number of emails between 10 and 20 KB decreased, however, with their share falling by 7 p.p. There was also a decrease in emails sized 20 to 50 KB. Their share this quarter amounted to 19%, which was a fall of 8.16 p.p. compared to the previous reporting period.

Overall, the number of very small emails continues to grow.

Malicious attachments in email Top 10 malware families

TOP 10 malware families in Q3 2017

Backdoor.Java.QRat (3.11%) became the most widespread malicious program family in email traffic. Next came the Trojan-Downloader.VBS.Agent family (2.95%), followed by Trojan-Downloader.JS.SLoad (2.94%). The newcomers in this rating – Trojan.Win32.VBKrypt and Trojan-Downloader.VBS.SLoad (a VBS script that downloads and launches other malicious programs on the victim machine, usually cryptographers) occupy fifth and eighth places with 2.64% and 2.02% respectively. The Trojan.PDF.Badur family (1.79%) rounds off the top 10.

Countries targeted by malicious mailshots

Distribution of email antivirus verdicts by country, Q3 2017

Germany remained the country targeted most by malicious mailshots in the third quarter of 2017. Its share increased by 6.67 p.p. and amounted to 19.38%.

China came second, with 10.62% of mail antivirus verdicts recorded there – a drop of 1.47 p.p. compared to Q2. Russia, which came fifth the previous quarter, completed the top three (9.97%) after its share increased by 4.3 p.p. Fourth and fifth were occupied by Japan (5.44%) and Italy (3.90%) respectively.

Phishing

In the third quarter of 2017, the anti-phishing system prevented 59,569,508 attempted visits to phishing pages on the computers of Kaspersky Lab users. Overall, 9.49% of unique users of Kaspersky Lab products worldwide were attacked by phishers in Q3 2017.

Geography of attacks

The country with the largest percentage of users affected by phishing attacks was once again Brazil (19.95%, +1.86p.p.).

Geography of phishing attacks*, Q3 2017
* Number of users on whose computers the Anti-Phishing system was triggered as a percentage of the total number of Kaspersky Lab users in that country

Australia (16.51%) came second after its share increased by 3.81 p.p. In third place was New Zealand (15.61%, + 3.55pp). China (12.66%) fell from second place to fourth, with its share losing 0.19 p.p. Next came France (12.42%), Peru (11.73%), Argentina (11.43%), Canada (11.14%), Qatar (10.51%,) and Georgia (10.34%).

Brazil 19.95% Australia 16.51% New Zealand 15.61% China 12.66% France 12.42% Peru 11.73% Argentina 11.43% Canada 11.14% Qatar 10.51% Georgia 10.34%

TOP 10 countries by percentage of users attacked

Organizations under attack Rating the categories of organizations attacked by phishers

The rating of attacks by phishers on different categories of organizations is based on detections of Kaspersky Lab’s heuristic anti-phishing component. It is activated every time a user attempts to open a phishing page while information about it has not yet been included in Kaspersky Lab’s databases. It does not matter how the user attempts to open the page – by clicking a link in a phishing email or in a message on a social network or, for example, as a result of malware activity. After the security system is activated, a banner is displayed in the browser warning the user about a potential threat.

In the third quarter of 2017, almost half (47.54%) of the heuristic components of the anti-phishing system were recorded on pages with references to brands from financial categories such as Banks (24.1%, + 0.61 p.p.), Payment systems (13.94%, -4.46 p.p.) and Online stores (9.49%, -0.08 p.p.).

Distribution of organizations affected by phishing attacks by category, Q3 2017

Hot topics this quarter Airline tickets

Last quarter we described a scam involving a free giveaway of airline tickets supposedly by popular airlines, with information being spread via reposts from victims on a social network. In the third quarter, scammers continued to spread the ‘giveaway’ using WhatsApp instead. Judging by the decrease in the number of anti-phishing verdicts in the Airlines category, however, we can assume that this approach wasn’t as effective.

The downturn may also be due to the fact that scammers switched to ‘prize draws’ not only for air tickets but also other prizes, for example, sports shoes, cinema tickets, gift cards for Starbucks, etc.

Before you could claim your prize you had to share information about the prize draw with eight contacts on WhatsApp.

After clicking the button, users are redirected to WhatsApp.

The redirect function in the instant messenger and the message that has to be sent to contacts

This is what the message looks like in the app

The message needs to be sent a minimum of eight times

After sending the message to their contacts the victim, instead of winning a prize, is redirected to some dubious resource, for example, a page where malicious extensions are installed, a new survey, etc.

WhatsApp

WhatsApp users are also subjected to phishing attacks that hide behind the app brand.

More often than not the scammers try to steal money on the pretext of updating the application or paying for a subscription. At one time WhatsApp really did request a subscription payment, although now it’s free.

Scammers offer a choice of subscription – for one year, three years or five. However, victims will lose much more than the stated amount if they enter their bank card details on such a site.

Netflix

Netflix users are another popular target of phishers. The number of attacks on them increased in the third quarter. The criminals usually coax bank card details from users on the pretext of a failed payment or other problems linked to subscription renewal.

Green Card

On the eve of the Green Card lottery conducted by the US government in October-November of each year, we are seeing a surge in activity by scammers offering help to apply.

After completing the form on the fraudulent site, the user is asked to pay for their application. If the victim enters their bank card details, much more money than the amount indicated on the site can end up being withdrawn from their account.

Rap battle

Even niche events can be good cover for phishing activity. On 15 October, a rap battle was held between Russian artist Oxxxymiron and Dizaster, one of the best battle MCs in the US. This followed another battle that took place just a few months earlier between Oxxxymiron and Slava KPSS. Less than 12 hours later a video of the event had gained around 5 million views – and it wasn’t just thematic sites writing about the battle but also a lot of the mainstream Russian media.

Shortly before the publication of the official video, phishing web pages dedicated to the event began to appear online:

If a user tried to view the video, they were prompted to first sign in to the popular Russian social network VKontakte.

After entering the login and password, the victim was redirected to the official page of the Versus site on the social network, and their personal data went to the scammers.

TOP 3 attacked organizations

Fraudsters continue to focus most of their attention on the most popular brands, enhancing their chances of a successful phishing attack. More than half of all detections by Kaspersky Lab’s heuristic anti-phishing component are for phishing pages hiding behind the names of fewer than 15 companies. At the same time, the composition of the top three has remained unchanged for several quarters:

Organization % of detected phishing links Facebook 7.96 Microsoft Corporation 7.79 Yahoo! 4.79 Conclusion

In terms of the average share of spam in global email traffic (58.02%), the third quarter of 2017 was almost identical to the previous reporting period: once again growth was slightly more than one percentage point – 1.05 (and 1.07 p.p. in Q2 2017). As in previous quarters, spammers were quick to react to high-profile events and adapted their fraudulent emails to the news agenda. This quarter they were quickly to use the theme of natural disasters following hurricanes Irma and Harvey, and the earthquake in Mexico. The popular theme of cryptocurrency was also used: trusting victims were offered seminars and ‘help’ with trading that came with profits guaranteed.

Scammers continued to use all available communication channels to spread phishing content, including social networks and instant messengers: in the current quarter, the anti-phishing component prevented more than 59 million attempts to redirect to phishing pages, which is 13 million more than in Q2.

The most common malware family in the third quarter of 2017 was Backdoor.Java.QRat (3.11%), followed by Trojan-Downloader.VBS.Agent (2.95%), and Trojan-Downloader.JS.SLoad (2.94%).

Lock Your Mobile Devices

SANS Tip of the Day - Thu, 11/02/2017 - 01:00
The number one step for protecting your mobile device is making sure it has a strong passcode or password lock on it so only you can access it.

Silence – a new Trojan attacking financial organizations

Malware Alerts - Wed, 11/01/2017 - 07:26

More information about the Silence Trojan is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com

In September 2017, we discovered a new targeted attack on financial institutions. Victims are mostly Russian banks but we also found infected organizations in Malaysia and Armenia. The attackers were using a known but still very effective technique for cybercriminals looking to make money: gaining persistent access to an internal banking network for a long period of time, making video recordings of the day to day activity on bank employees’ PCs, learning how things works in their target banks, what software is being used, and then using that knowledge to steal as much money as possible when ready.

We saw that technique before in Carbanak, and other similar cases worldwide. The infection vector is a spear-phishing email with a malicious attachment. An interesting point in the Silence attack is that the cybercriminals had already compromised banking infrastructure in order to send their spear-phishing emails from the addresses of real bank employees and look as unsuspicious as possible to future victims.

The attacks are currently still ongoing.

Technical details

The cybercriminals using Silence send spear-phishing emails as initial infection vectors, often using the addresses of employees of an already infected financial institution, with a request to open an account in the attacked bank. The message looks like a routine request. Using this social engineering trick, it looks unsuspicious to the receiver:

Spear-phishing email in Russian.

Malicious .chm attachment md5 dde658eb388512ee9f4f31f0f027a7df Type Windows help .chm file

The attachment we detected in this new wave is a “Microsoft Compiled HTML Help” file. This is a Microsoft proprietary online help format that consists of a collection of HTML pages, indexing and other navigation tools. These files are compressed and deployed in a binary format with the .CHM (compiled HTML) extension. These files are highly interactive and can run a series of technologies including JavaScript, which can redirect a victim towards an external URL after simply opening the CHM. Attackers began exploiting CHM files to automatically run malicious payloads once the file is accessed. Once the attachment is opened by the victim, the embedded .htm content file (“start.htm”) is executed. This file contains JavaScript, and its goal is to download and execute another stage from a hardcoded URL:

Part of start.htm embedded file

The goal of the script is to download and execute an obfuscated .VBS script which again downloads and executes the final dropper

Obfuscated VBS script that downloads binary dropper

Dropper md5 404D69C8B74D375522B9AFE90072A1F4 Compilation Thu Oct 12 02:53:12 2017 Type Win32 executable

The dropper is a win32 executable binary file, and its main goal is to communicate with the command and control (C&C) server, send the ID of the infected machine and download and execute malicious payloads.

After executing, the dropper connects to the C&C using a GET request, sends the generated victim ID, downloads the payloads and executes them using the CreateProcess function.

C&C connect request string with ID

C&C connect procedure

Payloads

The payloads are a number of modules executed on the infected system for various tasks like screen recording, data uploading etc.

All the payload modules we were able to identify are registered as Windows services.

Monitoring and control module md5 242b471bae5ef9b4de8019781e553b85 Compilation Tue Jul 19 15:35:17 2016 Type Windows service executable

The main task for this module is to monitor the activity of the victim. In order to do so it takes multiple screenshots of the victim´s active screen, providing a real-time pseudo-video stream with all the victim´s activity. A very similar technique was used in the Carbanak case, where this monitoring was used to understand the victim´s day to day activity.

The module is registered and started by a Windows service named “Default monitor”.

Malicious service module name

After the initial startup, it creates a Windows named pipe with a hardcoded value – “\\.\pipe\{73F7975A-A4A2-4AB6-9121-AECAE68AABBB}”. This pipe is used for sharing data in malicious inter-process communications between modules.

Named pipe creation

The malware decrypts a block of data and saves it as a binary file with the hardcoded name “mss.exe” in a Windows temporary location, and later executes it using the CreateProcessAsUserA function. This dropped binary is the module responsible for the real-time screen activity recording.

Then, the monitoring module waits for a new dropped module to start in order to share the recorded data with other modules using the named pipe.

Screen activity gathering module md5 242b471bae5ef9b4de8019781e553b85 Compilation Tue Jul 19 15:35:17 2016 Type Windows 32 executable

This module uses both the Windows Graphics Device Interface (GDI) and the Windows API to record victim screen activity. This is done using the CreateCompatibleBitmap and GdipCreateBitmapFromHBITMAP functions. Then the module connects to the named pipe created by the previously described module and writes the data in there. This technique allows for the creation of a pseudo-video stream of the victim’s activity by putting together all the collected bitmaps.

Writing bitmaps to pipe

C&C communication module with console backconnect

md5 6A246FA30BC8CD092DE3806AE3D7FC49 Compilation Thu Jun 08 03:28:44 2017 Type Windows service executable

The C&C communication module is a Windows service, as are all the other modules. Its main functionality is to provide backconnect access to the victim machine using console command execution. After the service initialization, it decrypts the needed Windows API function names, loads them with LoadLibrary and resolves with GetProcAddress functions.

WinAPI resolving

After successful loading of the WinAPI functions, the malware tries to connect to the C&C server using a hardcoded IP address (185.161.209[.]81).

C&C IP

The malware sends a special request to the command server with its ID and then waits for a response, which consists of a string providing the code of what operation to execute. The options are:

  • “htrjyytrn” which is the transliteration of “reconnect” (“реконнект” in russian layout).
  • “htcnfhn” which is the transliteration of “restart” (“рестарт” in russian layout).
  • “ytnpflfybq” which is the transliteration of “нет заданий” meaning “no tasks”

Finally the malware receives instructions on what console commands to execute, which it does using a new cmd.exe process with a parameter command.

Instruction check

The described procedure allows attackers to install any other malicious modules. That can be easily done using the “sc create” console command.

Winexecsvc tool

md5 0B67E662D2FD348B5360ECAC6943D69C Compilation Wed May 18 03:58:26 Type Windows 64 executable

Also, on some infected computers we found a tool called the Winexesvc tool. This tool basically provides the same functionality as the well-known “psexec” tool. The main difference is that the Winexesvc tool enables the execution of remote commands from Linux-based operating system. When the Linux binary “winexe” is run against a Windows server, the winexesvc.exe executable is created and installed as a service.

Conclusion

Attacks on financial organization remain a very effective way for cybercriminals to make money. The analysis of this case provides us with a new Trojan, apparently being used in multiple international locations, which suggests it is an expanding activity of the group. The Trojan provides monitoring capabilities similar to the ones used by the Carbanak group.

The group uses legitimate administration tools to fly under the radar in their post-exploitation phase, which makes detection of malicious activity, as well as attribution more complicated. This kind of attack has become widespread in recent years, which is a very worrisome trend as it demonstrates that criminals are successful in their attacks. We will continue monitoring the activity for this new campaign.

The spear-phishing infection vector is still the most popular way to initiate targeted campaigns. When used with already compromised infrastructure, and combined with .chm attachments, it seems to be a really effective way of spreading, at least among financial organizations.

Recommendations

The effective way of protection from targeted attacks focused on financial organizations are preventive advanced detection capabilities such as a solution that can detect all types of anomalies and scrutinize suspicious files at a deeper level, be present on users’ systems. The Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack solution (KATA) matches events coming from different infrastructure levels, discerns anomalies and aggregates them into incidents, while also studying related artifacts in a safe environment of a sandbox. As with most Kaspersky products, KATA is powered by HuMachine Intelligence, which is backed by on premise and in lab-running machine learning processes coupled with real-time analyst expertise and our understanding of threat intelligence big data.

The best way to prevent attackers from finding and leveraging security holes, is to eliminate the holes altogether, including those involving improper system configurations or errors in proprietary applications. For this, Kaspersky Penetration Testing and Application Security Assessment services can become a convenient and highly effective solution, providing not only data on found vulnerabilities, but also advising on how to fix it, further strengthening corporate security.

IOC’s

Kaspersky lab products detects the Silence trojan with the following verdicts:

Backdoor.Win32.Agent.dpke
Backdoor.Win32.Agent.dpiz
Trojan.Win32.Agentb.bwnk
Trojan.Win32.Agentb.bwni
Trojan-Downloader.JS.Agent.ocr
HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic
Full IOC’s and YARA rules delivered with private report subscription.

MD5
Dde658eb388512ee9f4f31f0f027a7df
404d69c8b74d375522b9afe90072a1f4
15e1f3ce379c620df129b572e76e273f
D2c7589d9f9ec7a01c10e79362dd400c
1b17531e00cfc7851d9d1400b9db7323
242b471bae5ef9b4de8019781e553b85
324D52A4175722A7850D8D44B559F98D
6a246fa30bc8cd092de3806ae3d7fc49
B43f65492f2f374c86998bd8ed39bfdd
cfffc5a0e5bdc87ab11b75ec8a6715a4

Tales from the blockchain

Malware Alerts - Tue, 10/31/2017 - 05:00

Cryptocurrency has gradually evolved from an element of a new world, utopian economy to a business that has affected even those sectors of society least involved in information technology. At the same time, it has acquired a fair number of “undesirable” supporters who aim to enrich themselves at the expense of other users: attackers who release miners embedded in user JS scripts, or plan to implement miners into IoT devices at the production stage; hidden in countless variations of Trojans in conjunction with SMB exploits etc.

We will tell you two unusual success stories that happened on the “miner front”. The first story echoes the TinyNuke event and, in many respects gives an idea of the situation with miners. The second one proves that to get crypto-currency, you don’t need to “burn” the processor.

DiscordiaMiner and fights on forums

In early June, our analysts found a new and seemingly unremarkable Trojan that unloaded the miner of the popular Montero crypto-currency. However, in the course of further research, we uncovered many interesting details that we would like to share with you.

Kaspersky Lab products detect this Trojan as Trojan.Win32.DiscordiaMiner. It works as follows:

  1. Creates a number of directories in the system to download the necessary files;
  2. Copies itself in C:\ProgramData\MicrosoftCorporation\Windows\SystemData\Isass.exe;
  3. Gets the update from the server;
  4. Creates an autorun task;
  5. Gets the miner files;
  6. Gets the credentials of the user in whose name it wants to run the mining;
  7. Starts the miner.

All interaction with the command server (C&C) occurs in the open, with the help of GET requests, without any check or verification. In all samples, the hxxp://api[.]boosting[.]online address is provided as the C&C. The line associated with the individual user (etc. MTn31JMWIT) and the address of the required resource – the list of files, the update, etc. – are added to the server address. Example: hxxp://api[.]boosting[.]online/MTn31JMWIT/getDiscordia

Discord on the forum

As mentioned above, at a certain point in its work, the Trojan is instructed to issue a command to run the miner: it specifies the email of the user who has “done the job”. It looks like this:

-user <user_email> -xmr

Using the value of the <user_email> argument, with the first line of the search results we get the Trojan-related topic on the Russian-language forum:

On this forum thread there is a wide discussion of the Trojan’s work details. The most interesting part of the discussion is on page 21 – the forum participants accuse the Trojan’s author of substituting users’ addresses with his own. Among other things, there is also a dialogue on the chat app, Telegram where the author explains this substitution as a banal mistake.

On the forum, the author of DiscordiaMiner references the short lifespan of this error as an argument in his defense:

He also mentions the figure of 200,000 infected machines. It is difficult to say how true this is. However, in the malware samples we received, the email that the “prosecutor” refers to is often named. Examples of other addresses: ilya-soro*****12@mail.ru, v*****re@gmail.com, topne*****arin@gmail.com, J ***** m @ yandex.ru, steamfa*****aunt1@mail.ru, me*****ook@gmail.com, x*****z@yandex.ru, piedmont ***** lines @ yahoo. com.

Among other things, in the course of the dispute the author mentions that the source codes of the Trojan DiscordiaMiner are now publicly available.

Indeed, the first line of the search results provides the link to the author’s repository.


In addition to the source codes, which really do coincide fully with the restored Trojan code, the repository also includes very informative diagrams of the Trojan’s operation, the samples of documents used for distribution as well as instructions for how exactly the UAC is to be bypassed. The pictures below are taken from the repository (which is currently unavailable).


The source codes are presented in full and, apparently, only the user-associated string (ClientID) varies from assembly to assembly.

Although the “dumping” of program source code is not unique, this case in many respects echoes the NukeBot story – the same disputes on a forum followed by the publication of the source codes by the author with the aim of “protecting honor and dignity”. Another common feature is the “minimalistic” design of both Trojans: NukeBot could only embed web-based injections into the browser, while DiscordiaMiner can download and run files from a remote server. But we cannot say whether these two bots have any more specific connections.

MD5

00B35FB5C534DEA3EA13C8BE4E4585CC
083FD078FECFE156B17A50F73666B43E
0AB8E9C539554CBA532DFC5BC5E10F77
377B9C329EBF7ACFE7DABA55A0E90E98
48E6714A486B67D237B07A7CF586B765
4BD80738059B5D34837633692F18EA08
4E79B826AE4EC544481784EF77E05DE4
4EF5A04A56004AA93167F31296CCACF7
539B092C176183EDCA6A69421B62BCE8
5F8E4CF0971B543525CA807B6A2EC73F
65CF0CC192E69EA54373758C130A983F
7F65252701C80F8D4C1484EE06597DF0
80B04BBC2F18E3FE4625C3E060DA5465

CryptoShuffler

It’s extremely rare for authors of mining software to become fabulously wealthy. With a few exceptions, the wallets used by attackers contain a total of $50-100, received from all incoming transfers during the entire period of the Trojan’s work. However, there are those that do not go down the beaten path, and benefit from “alternative” ways. The authors of the CryptoShuffler Trojan belong in this category.

Kaspersky Lab products detect this Trojan as Trojan-Banker.Win32.CryptoShuffler.gen. MD5 of the file in question is 0ad946c351af8b53eac06c9b8526f8e4

The key feature of CryptoShuffler is the following: instead of wasting processor time on mining, the Trojan simply substitutes the sender’s address in the clipboard! That was once the case with WebMoney and Bitcoin, but this malware sample is aimed at all popular cryptocurrencies.

As usually happens in the beginning, the Trojan writes itself into the registry for autoloading.

In later versions of the Trojan, this procedure is slightly different – if the module is implemented as a dynamically loaded library, its further run at the start is performed using the rundll32 system utility. The name of the called procedure and, concurrently, the main function of the represented library is call_directx_9.

The Trojan creates a thread of execution, in which it maintains unchanged the autorun branch specified in the screenshot above.

The substitution itself is performed using the API binding functions OpenClipboard \ GetClipboardData \ SetClipboardData

The search for the corresponding wallet in the string received from the clipboard is performed using regular expressions. Most popular cryptocurrency wallets have a fixed constant at the beginning of the string and a certain length – it is easy to create regular expressions for them. For example, the address of Bitcoin-wallets can be easily recognized by the digit “1” or “3” at the beginning of the string.

The body of the Trojan stores the wallets, corresponding to the specified cryptocurrencies. The main list looks like this.

WALLET Currency name 1v9UCfygQf3toN1vA5xyr7LhKmv9QWcwZ  BITCOIN D7uMywpgSyvy9J2RkyQ2oozT4xTmSSWGgR  DOGECOIN LeHrMiPzEUtJen73T5P1bVG2tG8PerzFR1  LITECOIN Xv4M3y36iu6Fc5ikk8XuQBDFMtRz2xFXKm  DASH 0xfb25b3d5ae0d6866da17c4de253ce439b71d0903  ETHEREUM 4ZFYNck6mZfG52RMdWThJEXq4Sjdszf719  MONERO N6VeTbNiFG1oapzPZmeLLkkNC55FQGMTgr  ??? t1VVkuasB7pNHPES2ei6LCqP1hZWb5rfPrB  ZCASH PM44dh7LNEjThgmscw8t5rb9LZqEPc2Upg  ???

The biggest profit reaches the cybercriminals’ pockets from the users of Bitcoin wallets – at the time of writing, there were ~ 23 BTC on the balance of their wallet, which at the end of October amounted to approximately $140,000. The amounts in the remaining wallets range from tens to thousands of US dollars.

The malware described is a perfect example of a “rational” gain. The scheme of its operation is simple and effective: no access to pools, no network interaction, and no suspicious processor load.

MD5

095536CA531AE11A218789CF297E71ED
14461D5EA29B26BB88ABF79A36C1E449
1A05F51212DEA00C15B61E9C7B7E647B
1E785429526CC2621BAF8BB05ED17D86
2028383D63244013AA2F9366211E8682
25BF6A132AAE35A9D99E23794A41765F
39569EF2C295D1392C3BC53E70BCF158
50E52DBF0E78FCDDBC42657ED0661A3E
6EB7202BB156E6D90D4931054F9E3439
7AE273CD2243C4AFCC52FDA6BF1C2833
7EC256D0470B0755C952DB122C6BDD0B
80DF8640893E2D7CCD6F66FFF6216016
AA46F95F25C764A96F0FB3C75E1159F8
B7ADC8699CDC02D0AB2D1BB8BE1847F4
D45B0A257F8A0710C7B27980DE22616E
D9A2CD869152F24B1A5294A1C82B7E85

Gaza Cybergang – updated 2017 activity

Malware Alerts - Mon, 10/30/2017 - 05:00

Summary information

Gaza cybergang is an Arabic politically motivated cyber criminal group, operating since 2012 and is actively targeting the MENA (Middle East North Africa) region. Gaza cybergang attacks have never slowed down, typical targets include: governments entities/embassies, oil and gaz, media/press, activists, politicians, diplomats.

One of the interesting new facts starting from Mid-2017 is their discovery inside an Oil and Gas organization in the MENA region, infiltrating systems and pilfering data for more than a year. Another interesting finding is the usage of the recent CVE 2017-0199 vulnerability and Microsoft Access files with embedded download scripts starting, helping attackers maintain low detection rates for the latter. Traces of mobile malware are also being investigated, which started showing up from in April 2017.

Recent targets by the group does seem to be varied in nature, attackers do not seem to be selectively choosing targets, but rather seeking different kinds of MENA intelligence.

Some of the interesting new updates about Gaza cybergang:

  • Gaza cybergang attackers have continued interest in governmental entities in MENA
  • New identified targets include Oil and Gaz in MENA
  • New tools and techniques include
    • Abuse of the CVE 2017-0199 vulnerability
    • Usage of macros inside Microsoft Access files, enabling lower detection rates
    • Possible Android mobile malware being used by attackers

Previous published research:
Gaza cybergang, where’s your IR team?

Kaspersky Lab products and services successfully detect and block Gaza cybergang attacks, detection names below:

  • HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic
  • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Cometer.gen
  • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic
  • Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Downeks
  • Trojan-Spy.MSIL.Downeks
  • Win32.Bublik
  • Win32.Agentb

More information about Gaza cybergang is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com

Technical details

Gaza cybergang attacks were previously surprisingly successful in utilising simple and common tools to achieve their goals, they rely on a variety of Remote Access Trojans (RATs), to perform their activities, including Downeks, Qasar, Cobaltstrike…

Though as recent as June 2017, attackers have started utilizing the CVE 2017-0199 vulnerability which enables direct code execution abilities from a Microsoft office document on non-patched victim systems(Cobaltstrike payload in this case). Another finding is a possible Android trojan that the attackers have positioned on one of their command servers starting from April 2017.

In most cases, malware is sent by email as compressed attachment or download links, in newer cases we have observed downloaders or Microsoft office documents with embedded macros being sent to victims starting from March 2017; when opened, the downloader would contact a URL or IP address to retrieve the actual payload. Once executed successfully, the malware grants full access to the attackers, providing them with the ability to collect files, keystrokes and screenshots from victim’s devices. If the initial downloaded malware was detected on the victim, the downloader would attempt to retrieve other malware files to victim’s device, in a attempt for one of those files to work.

The full list of indicators of compromise (IOCs) can be found in Appendix I. The list of the most interesting lure content, malware files and related droppers, command servers can be found in Appendix II.

Summary of recent campaigns

Below can be found the list of recent findings related to Gaza cybergang operations:

Command and control server Hash First seen File name/Social engineering lure upgrade.newshelpyou[.]com 552796e71f7ff304f91b39f5da46499b 25-07-2017 nvStView.exe 6fba58b9f9496cc52e78379de9f7f24e 23-03-2017 صور خاصة.exe
(Translation: Special photos) eb521caebcf03df561443194c37911a5 03-04-2017 صور خاصة.exe
(Translation: Special photos) moreoffer[.]life 66f144be4d4ef9c83bea528a4cd3baf3 27-05-2017 تصريح لأمير قطر واتهام الإمارات في اختراق وكالة الأنباء.exe
(Translation: A statement by the Emir of Qatar accusing the UAE of breaking the news agency) 3ff60c100b67697163291690e0c2c2b7 11-05-2017 MOM.InstallProxy.exe b7390bc8c8a9a71a69ce4cc0c928153b 05-04-2017 تعرف على المنقبة التي أساءت للسعودية
(Translation: Learn about the woman wearing niqab which offended Saudi) f43188accfb6923d62fe265d6d9c0940 21-03-2017 Gcc-Ksa-uae.exe 056d83c1c1b5f905d18b3c5d58ff5342 16-03-2017 مراسلة بخصوص اجتماع رؤساء البعثات.exe
(Translation: Correspondence regarding the meeting of Heads of Missions) 138.68.242[.]68 87a67371770fda4c2650564cbb00934d 20-06-2017 hamas.doc
نقاط اتفاق حماس وتيار فتح الاصلاحي.doc
(Translation: the points of agreement between Hamas and the reformist Fateh movement)
محضر اجتماع مركزية فتح الليلة.doc
(Translation: minutes of the tonight meeting)
سلفة أم راتب للموظفين يوم الثلاثاء المقبل؟.doc
(Translation: An advance on salary or full salary for employees next Tuesday?) lol.mynetav[.]org 4f3b1a2088e473c7d2373849deb4536f 20-06-2017 Notepad.exe
attachment.scr
https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=0B1NUTMCAOKBTdVQzTXlUNHBmZUU signup.updatesforme[.]club 7d3426d8eb70e4486e803afb3eeac14f 04-05-2017 Palestinian Retirement Authority Ramallah.exe 0ee4757ab9040a95e035a667457e4bc6 27-04-2017 27-4-2017 Fateh Gaza plo.exe ping.topsite[.]life b68fcf8feb35a00362758fc0f92f7c2e 19-03-2017 Downloaded by Macro in MDB files:
http://download.data-server.cloudns[.]club/indexer.exe 7bef124131ffc2ef3db349b980e52847 13-03-2017 الأخ اسماعيل هنية -نائب رئيس المكتب السياسي .exe
(Translation: Brother Ismail Haniyeh – Deputy Head of the Political Bureau) d87c872869023911494305ef4acbd966 19-03-2017 Downloaded by Macro in MDB files: http://download.data-server.cloudns[.]club/wordindexer.exe a3de096598e3c9c8f3ab194edc4caa76 12-04-2017 viewimages.exe c078743eac33df15af2d9a4f24159500 28-03-2017 viewimages.exe 70d03e34cadb0f1e1bc6f4bf8486e4e8 30-03-2017 download-file.duckdns[.]org/send/Egyptian_agreement_with_President_Mahmoud_Abbas.exe 67f48fd24bae3e63b29edccc524f4096 17-04-2017 http://alasra-paper.duckdns[.]org/send/رسالة_وفد_الرئيس ابومازن_لحماس_في قطاع_غزة.rar
(Message from President Abu Mazen to Hamas in Gaza Strip) 7b536c348a21c309605fa2cd2860a41d 17-04-2017 http://alasra-paper.duckdns[.]org/send/ورقة_الاسرى_المقدمة_لفك_الاضراب .rar
(Translation: captives paper submitted to stop the strike) alasra-paper.duckdns[.]org Mobile malware N/A 23-04-2017 Possible Android malware. http://alasra-paper.duckdns[.]org/send/%D9%88%ket-Edition-1.04_ApkHouse.com/Dont-Starve-Pocket-Edition-1.04_ApkHouse.com.apk hamas-wathaq.duckdns[.]org cf9d89061917e9f48481db80e674f0e9 16-04-2017 وثائق تنشر لأول مره عن حكم حماس لقطاع غزه .exe
(Translation: Documents published for the first time on Hamas ruling of Gaza Strip) manual.newphoneapp[.]com 86a89693a273d6962825cf1846c3b6ce 02-02-2017 SQLiteDatabaseBrowserPortable.exe 3f67231f30fa742138e713085e1279a6 02-02-2017 SQLiteDatabaseBrowserPortable.exe

The above listed files are further described in Appendix 1.

New findings

Gaza Cybergang attackers have been continuously evolving their skills on different levels, utilising new methods and techniques to deliver malware in addition to politically adapting social engineering decoys to regional political and humanitarian occurrences.

One of the interesting new facts starting from Mid-2017 is their discovery inside an Oil and Gas organization in the MENA region, infiltrating systems and pilfering data for more than a year, malware files found were found to be from our previously published research

While traces of Android mobile malware have been witnessed, attackers have continuously utilized the Downeks downloader and the Quasar or Cobaltstrike to target Windows devices, enabling them remote access spying and data exfiltration abilities, though now more efficient when utilizing the CVE 2017-0199 vulnerability which enables direct code execution abilities from a Microsoft office document on non-patched victim Windows systems. The use of Microsoft Access database files have also enabled the attackers to maintain low levels of detection, as it’s not an uncommon method to deliver malware.

These developments have helped the attackers continue their operations, targeting a variety of victims and organizations, sometimes even bypassing defences and persisting for prolonged periods.

1. The extended utilisation of humanitarian and political social engineering causes in the attacks

Attackers have continuously targeted victims and organizations in government entities/embassies, oil and gas, media/press, activists, politicians, diplomats.

Gaza cybergang is increasingly relying on advanced and up-to-date social engineering techniques with political and humanitarian aspects that reflect on direct regional occurrences, here is a small list of incidents that was utilized multiple time each:

  • Palestinian Government not paying salaries for Gaza employees
  • Palestinian prisoners’ hunger strike in Israeli jails
  • The political crisis in Qatar

Recent targets by the group does seem to be varied in nature, attackers do not seem to be selectively choosing targets, but rather seeking any type of intelligence.

Example lure

MD5: 66f144be4d4ef9c83bea528a4cd3baf3

تصريح لأمير قطر واتهام الإمارات في اختراق وكالة الأنباء.exe

(Translation: A statement by the Emir of Qatar accusing the UAE of breaking the news agency)

Attackers are recently utilising political events related to the Qatar political crisis in the Middle East targeting their victims.

Original filename:Qatar-27-5-2017.rar

Extracts to 66f144be4d4ef9c83bea528a4cd3baf3

تصريح لأمير قطر واتهام الإمارات في اختراق وكالة الأنباء.exe

Sha256 7fcac2f18a8844e4af9f923891cfb6f637a99195a457b6cdb916926d709c6a04

C2: moreoffer[.]life

First seen: 27 May 2017


Translation: new details on the hack of the Qatar News Agency

2. The use of Microsoft Access files with macros

Microsoft Access file with macro is another new development by the attackers group, Ms access database embedded Macros are proving to provide very low detection.

MD5: 6d6f34f7cfcb64e44d67638a2f33d619

Filename: GAZA2017.mdb

C1: http://download.data-server.cloudns[.]club/GAZA2017.mdb

Downloads and executes:

  • data-server.cloudns[.]club/wordindexer.exe
  • data-server.cloudns[.]club/indexer.exe


Translation: database of employees not receiving salaries, click “enable content” to see data


Decrypted code

3. Exploitation of the CVE 2017-0199 vulnerability

MD5: 87a67371770fda4c2650564cbb00934d

First seen: 20-06-2017

Filenames:

  • hamas.doc
  • نقاط اتفاق حماس وتيار فتح الاصلاحي.doc (Translation: the points of agreement between Hamas and the reforment Fateh movement)
  • محضر اجتماع مركزية فتح الليلة.doc (Translation: minutes of the tonight Fateh meeting)
  • سلفة أم راتب للموظفين يوم الثلاثاء المقبل؟.doc (Translation: An advance on salary or full salary for employees next Tuesday?)

The attacks are typical exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 starting from an email, distributing a malicious RTF document.The vulnerability is then in the code that handles Ole2Link embedded objects, which allows Microsoft office Word to run remote files, downloaded from 138.68.242[.]68 in this case. The downloaded payload is Cobaltstrike, which then connects to lol.mynetav[.]org to receive commands from attackers. Additional details on the CVE 2017-0199 usage with Cobaltstrike by Gaza cybergang can be found here: http://bobao.360.cn/learning/detail/4193.html

4. Possible Android mobile malware

Traces of APK files have been seen on one of the attackers command centers starting from 23-04-2017.

URL: http://alasra-paper.duckdns[.]org/send/%D9%88%ket-Edition-1.04_ApkHouse[.]com/Dont-Starve-Pocket-Edition-1.04_ApkHouse[.]com.apk

The file name (Dont-Starve-Pocket-Edition-1.04_ApkHouse[.]com.apk), is an Android application file hiding as a popular game. We believe the android trojan could be related to previously investigated Android trojan around Gaza strip

Conclusion

Gaza Cybergang has demonstrated a large number of attacks, advanced social engineering, in addition to the active development of attacks, infrastructure and the utilization of new methods and techniques. Attackers are actively improving their toolkit in an effort to minimize their exposure to security products and services. Kaspersky Lab expects these types of attacks to intensify even more both in quality and quantity in the near term.

In order to protect your company from malware, Kaspersky Lab researchers recommend implementing the following measures:

  • Educating staff to be able to distinguish spear-phishing emails or a phishing link from legitimate emails and links
  • Use proven corporate grade security solution in combination with anti-targeted attacks solutions capable of catching attacks by analyzing network anomalies
  • Providing security staff with access to latest threat intelligence data, which will arm them with helpful tools for targeted attacks prevention and discovery, such as Indicators of compromise and YARA rules
  • Making sure enterprise grade patch management processes are well established and executed.

More information about Gaza cybergang is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com

Appendix 1: malware files descriptions and decoys

In the following, we list found description of malware files starting from March 2017, including decoys used, first dates files seen, parent files…

b7390bc8c8a9a71a69ce4cc0c928153b

Parent file: 970e6188561d6c5811a8f99075888d5f 5-4-2017.zip

C2: moreoffer[.]life

First seen: 5 April 2017


Translation: Get to know the women wearing niqab and talking bad about the kingdom

f43188accfb6923d62fe265d6d9c0940

Filename: Gcc-Ksa-uae.exe

C2: moreoffer[.]life (185.11.146[.]68)

First Seen: 21 March 2017


Translation: the permanent delegation of the cooperation council for the Arab states of the Gulf (GCC) to the United Nation and other international organizations, Geneva

056d83c1c1b5f905d18b3c5d58ff5342

مراسلة بخصوص اجتماع رؤساء البعثات.Filename: exe

Translation: Correspondence regarding the meeting of Heads of Missions (Saudi related)

Parent file: fb549e0c2fffd390ee7c4538ff30ac3e

C2: moreoffer[.]life

First Seen: 16 March 2017


Translation: The fourth foreign meeting of the Kingdom’s head of missions under the title “message of the embassador”.

0ee4757ab9040a95e035a667457e4bc6

Filename: 27-4-2017 Fateh Gaza plo.exe

C2: signup.updatesforme[.]club

First seen 27 April 2017


Translation: Clarification report

7bef124131ffc2ef3db349b980e52847

الأخ اسماعيل هنية -نائب رئيس المكتب السياسي .exe

(Translation: Brother Ismail Haniyah – Deputy Head of the Political Bureau)

C2: ping.topsite[.]life

First seen: 14 March 2017


Translation: Brother Ismail Haniyah – Deputy Head of the Political Bureau

70d03e34cadb0f1e1bc6f4bf8486e4e8

download-file.duckdns[.]org/send/Egyptian_agreement_with_President_Mahmoud_Abbas.exe

C1: download-file.duckdns[.]org

C2: ping.topsite[.]life

First seen: 30 March 2017


Translation: methods to apply the palestinian national agreement pact.

67f48fd24bae3e63b29edccc524f4096

C1: http://alasra-paper.duckdns[.]org/send/رسالة_وفد_الرئيس ابومازن_لحماس_في قطاع_غزة.rar

C2: ping.topsite[.]life

RAR extracts to: 5d74487ea96301a933209de3d145105d

رسالة_وفد_الرئيس ابومازن_لحماس_في قطاع_غزة.exe

First seen: 17 April 2017


Translation: a severely threatening message from Abbas’s delegation to Hamas

7b536c348a21c309605fa2cd2860a41d

C1: http://alasra-paper.duckdns[.]org/send/ورقة_الاسرى_المقدمة_لفك_الاضراب .rar

Extracts to: d973135041fd26afea926e51ce141198, named (RTLO technique):

ورقة الاسرى المقدمة لفك الاضراب .exe

Translation:  captives paper submitted to stop the strike

C2:ping.topsite[.]life

First seen: 17 April 2017


Translation: The primary demands of the captives in the strike of freedom and dignity

9cf9d89061917e9f48481db80e674f0e9

وثائق تنشر لأول مره عن حكم حماس لقطاع غزه .exe     c11516cd8c797f0182d63cdf343d08ed

Translation: Documents published for the first time on Hamas ruling of Gaza Strip

C1: http://hamas-wathaq.duckdns[.]org/send/وثائق_تنشر_لأول_مره_عن_حكم_حماس_لقطاع_غزه.rar

C2:ping.topsite[.]life

First seen: 16 April 2017


Translation: Scandals and facts published for the first time on Hamas’s ruling of Gaza Strip

Appendix 2: List of IOCs Malicious domain names

moreoffer[.]life
signup.updatesforme[.]club
ping.topsite[.]life
alasra-paper.duckdns[.]org
hamas-wathaq.duckdns[.]org
download.data-server.cloudns[.]club
upgrade.newshelpyou[.]com
manual.newphoneapp[.]com
hnoor.newphoneapp[.]com
lol.mynetav[.]org

IP addresses

138.68.242[.]68
185.86.149[.]168
185.11.146[.]68
45.32.84[.]66
45.32.71[.]95
107.161.27[.]158
46.246.87[.]74

Hashes

MD5
87a67371770fda4c2650564cbb00934d
4f3b1a2088e473c7d2373849deb4536f
c078743eac33df15af2d9a4f24159500
3ff60c100b67697163291690e0c2c2b7
a3de096598e3c9c8f3ab194edc4caa76
7d3426d8eb70e4486e803afb3eeac14f
3f67231f30fa742138e713085e1279a6
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6fba58b9f9496cc52e78379de9f7f24e
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b68fcf8feb35a00362758fc0f92f7c2e
d87c872869023911494305ef4acbd966
66f144be4d4ef9c83bea528a4cd3baf3
B7390bc8c8a9a71a69ce4cc0c928153b
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056d83c1c1b5f905d18b3c5d58ff5342
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70d03e34cadb0f1e1bc6f4bf8486e4e8
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6d6f34f7cfcb64e44d67638a2f33d619
86a89693a273d6962825cf1846c3b6ce
5472d0554a0188c0ecebd065eddb9485

SHA256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Analyzing an exploit for СVE-2017-11826

Malware Alerts - Thu, 10/26/2017 - 05:00

The latest Patch Tuesday (17 October) brought patches for 62 vulnerabilities, including one that fixed СVE-2017-11826 – a critical zero-day vulnerability used to launch targeted attacks – in all versions of Microsoft Office.

The exploit for this vulnerability is an RTF document containing a DOCX document that exploits СVE-2017-11826 in the Office Open XML parser.

The exploit itself is in word/document.xml as follows:

Under the ECMA-376 standard for Office Open XML File Formats, the valid ‘font’ element describing the fonts used in the document must look like this:

In the body of the exploit the closing tag </w:font> is absent. The opening tag <w:font> is followed by the object element <o:idmap/> which cause ‘type confusion’ in the OOXML parser. Any object element can be used to successfully exploit this vulnerability. To pass one of the checks preceding the exploitation, there must be an OLEObject element in front of the <w:font> tag, and the length of the content of the attribute name must be no shorter than 32 bytes after conversion from UTF-8 into Unicode.

After conversion from UTF-8 to Unicode, E8 A3 AC E0 A2 80 becomes EC 88 88 08.

If all these conditions are fulfilled, this pointer will be dereferenced, and control will be transferred to the contents of this address with the offset 4.

To control the memory content at address 0x088888EC, the attackers apply the popular heap spraying technique with use of ActiveX components:

The exploit bypasses ASLR and DEP using ROP and gadgets from msvbvm60.dll. The msvbvm60.dll module is loaded from the RTF document with the help of a CLSID associated with this DLL:


The first part of ROP sets the ESP register’s value:

The second part of ROP is ignored: it was used to set the EIP register at 0x088883EC. The last ‘pop eax; retn’ gadget moves the address 0x729410D0 into EAX. This is the address for the VirtualProtect pointer in the Imports area of msvbvm60.dll from Kernel32.dll:

The VirtualProtect pointer is used in the next ROP gadget to call the function VirtualProtect(0x8888C90, 0x201, 0x40, 0x72A4C045). After this, control is transferred to the shellcode at the address 0x8888F70, which decrypts and executes the embedded:

Kaspersky Lab’s security solutions detect exploits for СVE-2017-11826 as:

  • MSWord.Agent.ix;
  • MSOffice.CVE-2017-11826.a;
  • HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic.

IOC

cb3429e608144909ef25df2605c24ec253b10b6e99cbb6657afa6b92e9f32fb5

Bad Rabbit ransomware

Malware Alerts - Tue, 10/24/2017 - 14:16

What happened?

On October 24th we observed notifications of mass attacks with ransomware called Bad Rabbit. It has been targeting organizations and consumers, mostly in Russia but there have also been reports of victims in Ukraine. Here’s what a ransom message looks like for the unlucky victims:

What is bad rabbit?

Bad Rabbit is a previously unknown ransomware family.

How is bad rabbit distributed?

The ransomware dropper was distributed with the help of drive-by attacks. While the target is visiting a legitimate website, a malware dropper is being downloaded from the threat actor’s infrastructure. No exploits were used, so the victim would have to manually execute the malware dropper, which pretends to be an Adobe Flash installer.

We’ve detected a number of compromised websites, all of which were news or media websites.

Whom does it target?

Most of the targets are located in Russia. Similar but fewer attacks have also been seen in other countries – Ukraine, Turkey and Germany. Overall, there are almost 200 targets, according to the KSN statistics.

Since when does Kaspersky Lab detect the threat?

We have been proactively detecting the original vector attack since it began on the morning of October 24. The attack lasted until midday, although we are still detecting ongoing attacks.

How is it different to ExPetr? Or it is the same malware?

Our observations suggest that this been a targeted attack against corporate networks, using methods similar to those used during the ExPetr attack.

Technical details

According to our telemetry, the ransomware is spread via a drive-by attack.

The ransomware dropper is distributed from hxxp://1dnscontrol[.]com/flash_install.php

Also according to our telemetry data, victims are redirected to this malware web resource from legitimate news websites.

The downloaded file named install_flash_player.exe needs to be manually launched by the victim. To operate correctly, it needs elevated administrative privileges which it attempts to obtain using the standard UAC prompt. If started, it will save the malicious DLL as C:\Windows\infpub.dat and launch it using rundll32.

Pseudocode of the procedure that installs the malicious DLL

infpub.dat appears to be capable of brute-forcing NTLM login credentials to Windows machines that have pseudo-random IP addresses.

The hard-coded list of credentials

infpub.dat will also install the malicious executable dispci.exe into C:\Windows and create a task to launch it.

Pseudocode of the procedure that creates the task which launches the malicious executable

What’s more, infpub.dat acts as a typical file encrypting ransomware: it finds the victim’s data files using an embedded extension list and encrypts them using the criminal’s public RSA-2048 key.

The public key of the criminals and the extension list

The criminal’s public key parameters:

Public-Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus:
00:e5:c9:43:b9:51:6b:e6:c4:31:67:e7:de:42:55:
6f:65:c1:0a:d2:4e:2e:09:21:79:4a:43:a4:17:d0:
37:b5:1e:8e:ff:10:2d:f3:df:cf:56:1a:30:be:ed:
93:7c:14:d1:b2:70:6c:f3:78:5c:14:7f:21:8c:6d:
95:e4:5e:43:c5:71:68:4b:1a:53:a9:5b:11:e2:53:
a6:e4:a0:76:4b:c6:a9:e1:38:a7:1b:f1:8d:fd:25:
4d:04:5c:25:96:94:61:57:fb:d1:58:d9:8a:80:a2:
1d:44:eb:e4:1f:1c:80:2e:e2:72:52:e0:99:94:8a:
1a:27:9b:41:d1:89:00:4c:41:c4:c9:1b:0b:72:7b:
59:62:c7:70:1f:53:fe:36:65:e2:36:0d:8c:1f:99:
59:f5:b1:0e:93:b6:13:31:fc:15:28:da:ad:1d:a5:
f4:2c:93:b2:02:4c:78:35:1d:03:3c:e1:4b:0d:03:
8d:5b:d3:8e:85:94:a4:47:1d:d5:ec:f0:b7:43:6f:
47:1e:1c:a2:29:50:8f:26:c3:96:d6:5d:66:36:dc:
0b:ec:a5:fe:ee:47:cd:7b:40:9e:7c:1c:84:59:f4:
81:b7:5b:5b:92:f8:dd:78:fd:b1:06:73:e3:6f:71:
84:d4:60:3f:a0:67:06:8e:b5:dc:eb:05:7c:58:ab:
1f:61
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

The executable dispci.exe appears to be derived from the code base of the legitimate utility DiskCryptor. It acts as the disk encryption module which also installs the modified bootloader and prevents the normal boot-up process of the infected machine.

An interesting detail that we noticed when analyzing the sample of this threat: it looks like the criminals behind this malware are fans of the famous books & TV show series Game Of Thrones. Some of the strings used throughout the code are the names of different characters from this series.

Dragon names from Game Of Thrones

Character name from Game Of Thrones

Kaspersky Lab experts are working on a detailed analysis of this ransomware to find possible flaws in its cryptographic routines.

Kaspersky Lab corporate customers are also advised to:

  • make sure that all protection mechanisms are activated as recommended; and that KSN and System Watcher components (which are enabled by default) are not disabled.
  • update the antivirus databases immediately.

The abovementioned measures should be sufficient. However, as additional precautions we advise the following:

  • restricting execution of files with the paths c:\windows\infpub.dat and C:\Windows\cscc.dat in Kaspersky Endpoint Security.
  • configuring and enabling Default Deny mode in the Application Startup Control component of Kaspersky Endpoint Security to ensure and enforce proactive defense against this and other attacks.

Kaspersky Lab products detect this threat with the following verdicts:

  • Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen.ftl
  • Multi.Generic
  • PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic

IOCs:
http://1dnscontrol[.]com/
fbbdc39af1139aebba4da004475e8839 – install_flash_player.exe
1d724f95c61f1055f0d02c2154bbccd3 – C:\Windows\infpub.dat
b14d8faf7f0cbcfad051cefe5f39645f – C:\Windows\dispci.exe

 

Dangerous liaisons

Malware Alerts - Tue, 10/24/2017 - 05:00

It seems just about everyone has written about the dangers of online dating, from psychology magazines to crime chronicles. But there is one less obvious threat not related to hooking up with strangers – and that is the mobile apps used to facilitate the process. We’re talking here about intercepting and stealing personal information and the de-anonymization of a dating service that could cause victims no end of troubles – from messages being sent out in their names to blackmail. We took the most popular apps and analyzed what sort of user data they were capable of handing over to criminals and under what conditions.

We studied the following online dating applications:

By de-anonymization we mean the user’s real name being established from a social media network profile where use of an alias is meaningless.

User tracking capabilities

First of all, we checked how easy it was to track users with the data available in the app. If the app included an option to show your place of work, it was fairly easy to match the name of a user and their page on a social network. This in turn could allow criminals to gather much more data about the victim, track their movements, identify their circle of friends and acquaintances. This data can then be used to stalk the victim.

Discovering a user’s profile on a social network also means other app restrictions, such as the ban on writing each other messages, can be circumvented. Some apps only allow users with premium (paid) accounts to send messages, while others prevent men from starting a conversation. These restrictions don’t usually apply on social media, and anyone can write to whomever they like.

More specifically, in Tinder, Happn and Bumble users can add information about their job and education. Using that information, we managed in 60% of cases to identify users’ pages on various social media, including Facebook and LinkedIn, as well as their full names and surnames.


An example of an account that gives workplace information that was used to identify the user on other social media networks

In Happn for Android there is an additional search option: among the data about the users being viewed that the server sends to the application, there is the parameter fb_id – a specially generated identification number for the Facebook account. The app uses it to find out how many friends the user has in common on Facebook. This is done using the authentication token the app receives from Facebook. By modifying this request slightly – removing some of the original request and leaving the token – you can find out the name of the user in the Facebook account for any Happn users viewed.


Data received by the Android version of Happn

It’s even easier to find a user account with the iOS version: the server returns the user’s real Facebook user ID to the application.


Data received by the iOS version of Happn

Information about users in all the other apps is usually limited to just photos, age, first name or nickname. We couldn’t find any accounts for people on other social networks using just this information. Even a search of Google images didn’t help. In one case the search recognized Adam Sandler in a photo, despite it being of a woman that looked nothing like the actor.

The Paktor app allows you to find out email addresses, and not just of those users that are viewed. All you need to do is intercept the traffic, which is easy enough to do on your own device. As a result, an attacker can end up with the email addresses not only of those users whose profiles they viewed but also for other users – the app receives a list of users from the server with data that includes email addresses. This problem is found in both the Android and iOS versions of the app. We have reported it to the developers.


Fragment of data that includes a user’s email address

Some of the apps in our study allow you to attach an Instagram account to your profile. The information extracted from it also helped us establish real names: many people on Instagram use their real name, while others include it in the account name. Using this information, you can then find a Facebook or LinkedIn account.

Location

Most of the apps in our research are vulnerable when it comes to identifying user locations prior to an attack, although this threat has already been mentioned in several studies (for instance, here and here). We found that users of Tinder, Mamba, Zoosk, Happn, WeChat, and Paktor are particularly susceptible to this.


Screenshot of the Android version of WeChat showing the distance to users

The attack is based on a function that displays the distance to other users, usually to those whose profile is currently being viewed. Even though the application doesn’t show in which direction, the location can be learned by moving around the victim and recording data about the distance to them. This method is quite laborious, though the services themselves simplify the task: an attacker can remain in one place, while feeding fake coordinates to a service, each time receiving data about the distance to the profile owner.


Mamba for Android displays the distance to a user

Different apps show the distance to a user with varying accuracy: from a few dozen meters up to a kilometer. The less accurate an app is, the more measurements you need to make.


As well as the distance to a user, Happn shows how many times “you’ve crossed paths” with them

Unprotected transmission of traffic

During our research, we also checked what sort of data the apps exchange with their servers. We were interested in what could be intercepted if, for example, the user connects to an unprotected wireless network – to carry out an attack it’s sufficient for a cybercriminal to be on the same network. Even if the Wi-Fi traffic is encrypted, it can still be intercepted on an access point if it’s controlled by a cybercriminal.

Most of the applications use SSL when communicating with a server, but some things remain unencrypted. For example, Tinder, Paktor and Bumble for Android and the iOS version of Badoo upload photos via HTTP, i.e., in unencrypted format. This allows an attacker, for example, to see which accounts the victim is currently viewing.


HTTP requests for photos from the Tinder app

The Android version of Paktor uses the quantumgraph analytics module that transmits a lot of information in unencrypted format, including the user’s name, date of birth and GPS coordinates. In addition, the module sends the server information about which app functions the victim is currently using. It should be noted that in the iOS version of Paktor all traffic is encrypted.


The unencrypted data the quantumgraph module transmits to the server includes the user’s coordinates

Although Badoo uses encryption, its Android version uploads data (GPS coordinates, device and mobile operator information, etc.) to the server in an unencrypted format if it can’t connect to the server via HTTPS.


Badoo transmitting the user’s coordinates in an unencrypted format

The Mamba dating service stands apart from all the other apps. First of all, the Android version of Mamba includes a flurry analytics module that uploads information about the device (producer, model, etc.) to the server in an unencrypted format. Secondly, the iOS version of the Mamba application connects to the server using the HTTP protocol, without any encryption at all.


Mamba transmits data in an unencrypted format, including messages

This makes it easy for an attacker to view and even modify all the data that the app exchanges with the servers, including personal information. Moreover, by using part of the intercepted data, it is possible to gain access to account management.


Using intercepted data, it’s possible to access account management and, for example, send messages


Mamba: messages sent following the interception of data

Despite data being encrypted by default in the Android version of Mamba, the application sometimes connects to the server via unencrypted HTTP. By intercepting the data used for these connections, an attacker can also get control of someone else’s account. We reported our findings to the developers, and they promised to fix these problems.


An unencrypted request by Mamba

We also managed to detect this in Zoosk for both platforms – some of the communication between the app and the server is via HTTP, and the data is transmitted in requests, which can be intercepted to give an attacker the temporary ability to manage the account. It should be noted that the data can only be intercepted at that moment when the user is loading new photos or videos to the application, i.e., not always. We told the developers about this problem, and they fixed it.


Unencrypted request by Zoosk

In addition, the Android version of Zoosk uses the mobup advertising module. By intercepting this module’s requests, you can find out the GPS coordinates of the user, their age, sex, model of smartphone – all this is transmitted in unencrypted format. If an attacker controls a Wi-Fi access point, they can change the ads shown in the app to any they like, including malicious ads.


An unencrypted request from the mopub ad unit also contains the user’s coordinates

The iOS version of the WeChat app connects to the server via HTTP, but all data transmitted in this way remains encrypted.

Data in SSL

In general, the apps in our investigation and their additional modules use the HTTPS protocol (HTTP Secure) to communicate with their servers. The security of HTTPS is based on the server having a certificate, the reliability of which can be verified. In other words, the protocol makes it possible to protect against man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM): the certificate must be checked to ensure it really does belong to the specified server.

We checked how good the dating apps are at withstanding this type of attack. This involved installing a ‘homemade’ certificate on the test device that allowed us to ‘spy on’ the encrypted traffic between the server and the application, and whether the latter verifies the validity of the certificate.

It’s worth noting that installing a third-party certificate on an Android device is very easy, and the user can be tricked into doing it. All you need to do is lure the victim to a site containing the certificate (if the attacker controls the network, this can be any resource) and convince them to click a download button. After that, the system itself will start installation of the certificate, requesting the PIN once (if it is installed) and suggesting a certificate name.

Everything’s a lot more complicated with iOS. First, you need to install a configuration profile, and the user needs to confirm this action several times and enter the password or PIN number of the device several times. Then you need to go into the settings and add the certificate from the installed profile to the list of trusted certificates.

It turned out that most of the apps in our investigation are to some extent vulnerable to an MITM attack. Only Badoo and Bumble, plus the Android version of Zoosk, use the right approach and check the server certificate.

It should be noted that though WeChat continued to work with a fake certificate, it encrypted all the transmitted data that we intercepted, which can be considered a success since the gathered information can’t be used.


Message from Happn in intercepted traffic

Remember that most of the programs in our study use authorization via Facebook. This means the user’s password is protected, though a token that allows temporary authorization in the app can be stolen.


Token in a Tinder app request

A token is a key used for authorization that is issued by the authentication service (in our example Facebook) at the request of the user. It is issued for a limited time, usually two to three weeks, after which the app must request access again. Using the token, the program gets all the necessary data for authentication and can authenticate the user on its servers by simply verifying the credibility of the token.


Example of authorization via Facebook

It’s interesting that Mamba sends a generated password to the email address after registration using the Facebook account. The same password is then used for authorization on the server. Thus, in the app, you can intercept a token or even a login and password pairing, meaning an attacker can log in to the app.

App files (Android)

We decided to check what sort of app data is stored on the device. Although the data is protected by the system, and other applications don’t have access to it, it can be obtained with superuser rights (root). Because there are no widespread malicious programs for iOS that can get superuser rights, we believe that for Apple device owners this threat is not relevant. So only Android applications were considered in this part of the study.

Superuser rights are not that rare when it comes to Android devices. According to KSN, in the second quarter of 2017 they were installed on smartphones by more than 5% of users. In addition, some Trojans can gain root access themselves, taking advantage of vulnerabilities in the operating system. Studies on the availability of personal information in mobile apps were carried out a couple of years ago and, as we can see, little has changed since then.

Analysis showed that most dating applications are not ready for such attacks; by taking advantage of superuser rights, we managed to get authorization tokens (mainly from Facebook) from almost all the apps. Authorization via Facebook, when the user doesn’t need to come up with new logins and passwords, is a good strategy that increases the security of the account, but only if the Facebook account is protected with a strong password. However, the application token itself is often not stored securely enough.


Tinder app file with a token

Using the generated Facebook token, you can get temporary authorization in the dating application, gaining full access to the account. In the case of Mamba, we even managed to get a password and login – they can be easily decrypted using a key stored in the app itself.


Mamba app file with encrypted password

Most of the apps in our study (Tinder, Bumble, OK Cupid, Badoo, Happn and Paktor) store the message history in the same folder as the token. As a result, once the attacker has obtained superuser rights, they will have access to correspondence.


Paktor app database with messages

In addition, almost all the apps store photos of other users in the smartphone’s memory. This is because apps use standard methods to open web pages: the system caches photos that can be opened. With access to the cache folder, you can find out which profiles the user has viewed.

Conclusion

Having gathered together all the vulnerabilities found in the studied dating apps, we get the following table:

App Location Stalking HTTP (Android) HTTP (iOS) HTTPS Messages Token Tinder + 60% Low Low + + + Bumble – 50% Low NO – + + OK Cupid – 0% NO NO + + + Badoo – 0% Medium NO – + + Mamba + 0% High High + – + Zoosk + 0% High High –
(+ iOS) – + Happn + 100% NO NO + + + WeChat + 0% NO NO – – – Paktor + 100% emails Medium NO + + +

Location — determining user location (“+” – possible, “-” not possible)

Stalking — finding the full name of the user, as well as their accounts in other social networks, the percentage of detected users (percentage indicates the number of successful identifications)

HTTP — the ability to intercept any data from the application sent in an unencrypted form (“NO” – could not find the data, “Low” – non-dangerous data, “Medium” – data that can be dangerous, “High” – intercepted data that can be used to get account management).

HTTPS — interception of data transmitted inside the encrypted connection (“+” – possible, “-” not possible).

Messages — access to user messages by using root rights (“+” – possible, “-” not possible).

TOKEN — possibility to steal authentication token by using root rights (“+” – possible, “-” not possible).

As you can see from the table, some apps practically do not protect users’ personal information. However, overall, things could be worse, even with the proviso that in practice we didn’t study too closely the possibility of locating specific users of the services. Of course, we are not going to discourage people from using dating apps, but we would like to give some recommendations on how to use them more safely. First, our universal advice is to avoid public Wi-Fi access points, especially those that are not protected by a password, use a VPN, and install a security solution on your smartphone that can detect malware. These are all very relevant for the situation in question and help prevent the theft of personal information. Secondly, do not specify your place of work, or any other information that could identify you. Safe dating!

Securely Deleting Files

SANS Tip of the Day - Thu, 10/19/2017 - 01:00
When you delete a file, that file is actually still on your computer. The only way you can truly and securely remove a file is by wiping it or using some type of secure deletion.

ATM malware is being sold on Darknet market

Malware Alerts - Tue, 10/17/2017 - 05:00

Disclaimer and warning

ATM systems appear to be very secure, but the money can be accessed fairly easily if you know what you are doing. Criminals are exploiting hardware and software vulnerabilities to interact with ATMs, meaning they need to be made more secure. This can be achieved with the help of additional security software, properly configured to stop the execution of non-whitelisted programs on ATMs.

Worryingly, it is very easy to find detailed manuals of ATM malware. Anybody can simply buy them for around 5000 USD on darknet markets.

Introduction

In May 2017, Kaspersky Lab researchers discovered a forum post advertising ATM malware that was targeting specific vendor ATMs. The forum contained a short description of a crimeware kit designed to empty ATMs with the help of a vendor specific API, without interacting with ATM users and their data. The post links to an offer that was initially published on the AlphaBay Darknet marketplace, which was recently taken down by the FBI.


Advertisement post


An offer post on AlphaBay market

The price of the kit was 5000 USD at the time of research. The AlphaBay description includes details such as the required equipment, targeted ATMs models, as well as tips and tricks for the malware’s operation. And part of a detailed manual for the toolkit was also provided.


Screenshot of a description on AlphaBay market

Previously described ATM malware Tyupkin was also mentioned in this text. The manual “Wall ATM Read Me.txt” was distributed as a plain text file, written in poor English and with bad text formatting. The use of slang and grammatical mistakes suggests that this text was most likely written by a native Russian-speaker.


Apart of a manual with text formatting applied

The manual provides a detailed picture, though only a fragment of the complete manual is being shown. There is a description for each step of the dispense process:

Prepare an all tools, all the programs should be placed on a flash disk.
Tools are wireless keyboard, usb hub, usb cable, usb adapter usb a female to b female, Windows 7 laptop or a tablet ( to run code generator) and a drill.
Find an appropriate ATM
Open ATM door and plug into USB port.
Execute Stimulator to see full information of all the ATM cassettes.
Execute CUTLET MAKER to get it is code.
Execute password generator on a tablet or on a laptop and paste CUTLET MAKER code to it, put the result password to CUTLET MAKER.
Dispense the money from chosen cassette.

The manual provides usage descriptions for all parts of the toolset. The list of crimeware from the kit consists of CUTLET MAKER ATM malware, the primary element, with a password generator included and a Stimulator – an application to gather cash cassette statuses of a target ATM. The crimeware kit is a collection of programs possibly written by different authors, though CUTLET MAKER and Stimulator were protected in the same way, c0decalc is a simple terminal-based application without any protection at all.

Delicious cutlet ingredients: CUTLET MAKER, c0decalc and Stimulator

The first sample was named “CUTLET MAKER” by its authors and has been designed to operate the cash dispense process on specific vendor ATMs.

To answer the question of how a cook from the CUTLET MAKER interface and cutlets relate to stealing money from ATMs, we must explain the meaning of the word “Cutlet“. Originally, it means a meat dish, but as a Russian slang term “Cutlet” (котлета) means “a bundle of money”, suggesting that the criminals behind the malware might be native Russian speakers.

The “Cutlet Maker” malware functionality suggests that two people are supposed to be involved in the theft – the roles are called “drop” and “drop master”. Access to the dispense mechanism of CUTLET MAKER is password protected. Though there could be just one person with the c0decalc application needed to generate a password. Either network or physical access to an ATM is required to enter the code in the application text area and also to interact with the user interface.

Stimulator was possibly developed by the same authors. Its purpose is to retrieve and show the status information of specific vendor ATM cash cassettes (such as currency, value and the amount of notes).

CUTLET MAKER and c0decalc

CUTLET MAKER is the main module responsible for dispensing money from the ATM. The sample analysed in this research has the MD5 checksum “fac356509a156a8f11ce69f149198108” and the compilation timestamp Sat Jul 30 20:17:08 2016 UTC.

The program is written in Delphi and was packed with VMProtect, however it is possible that multiple packers might have been used.

Different versions of the main component were found while researching this toolset. The first known submission of the first version sent to a public multiscanner service took place on June 22nd 2016. All submissions discovered by Kaspersky Lab were performed from different countries, with Ukraine being the chronological first country of origin.

Known CUTLET MAKER filenames (according to public multiscanner service information):

cm.vmp.exe
cm15.vmp.exe
cm16F.exe
cm17F.exe

The following version information was captured from the application’s window caption, followed after a “CUTLET MAKER” name. Known versions at the time of research were:

1.0
1.02
1.0 F

The assumed development period is from 2016-06-22 to 2016-08-18, according to the first submission date of the earliest version and the last submission date of the latest version at the time of writing. The application requires a special library to operate, which is part of a proprietary ATM API, controlling the cash dispenser unit.

With all the dependencies in place, the interface shows a code.


CUTLET MAKER challenge code marked with red rectangle

In order to unlock the application, a password from c0decalc generator needs to be entered, thereby answering the given challenge code. If the password is incorrect, the interface won’t react to any further input.

Each “CHECK HEAT” and “start cooking!” button corresponds to a specific ATM cash cassette. Buttons labeled “CHECK HEAT” dispense one note, “start cooking!” dispenses 50 “cutlets” with 60 notes each.  The “Stop!” button stops an ongoing “start cooking!” process. “Reset” is intended to reset the dispense process.

c0decalc a password generator for CUTLET MAKER

This tool is an unprotected command line application, written in Visual C. The purpose of this application is to generate a password for CUTLET MAKER’s graphical interface.

The compilation timestamp for this specific sample is Sun Nov 13 11:35:25 2016 UTC and was first uploaded to a public multiscanner service on December 7th 2016.


Example output for “12345678” input

Kaspersky Lab researchers checked the algorithm during the analysis and found “CUTLET MAKER” working with the passwords generated by “c0decalc”.

Stimulator

The Stimulator sample analysed in this research has the MD5 hash “27640bb7908ca7303d13d50c14ccf669”. This sample is also written in Delphi and packed the same way as “CUTLET MAKER”. The compilation timestamp is Sat Jul 16 18:34:47 2016 UTC.

The application is designed to work on specific vendor ATMs and also uses proprietary API calls.

Some additional symbols were found in the memory dump of a “Stimulator” process, pointing to an interesting part of the application. After execution and pressing the “STIMULATE ME!” button, the proprietary API function is used to fetch an ATM’s cassette status. The following cassette state results are used:

1CUR
2CUR
3CUR
4CUR
1VAL
2VAL
3VAL
4VAL
1NDV
2NDV
3NDV
4NDV
1ACT
2ACT
3ACT
4ACT

Each preceding number is mapped to an ATM cassette. The three character states are interpreted as follows:

nCUR cassette n currency (like “USD”, “RUB”) nVAL cassette n note value (like 00000005, 00000020 ) nACT cassette n counter for specific notes in a cassette (value from 0 to 3000) nNDV number of notes in the ATM for cassette n (value from 0 to 3000)


The result of “STIMULATE ME!” button press in proper environment

Each column, shown in the picture above, describes the state of one corresponding ATM cassette.

The background picture used in the application interface turns out to be quite unique, the original photo was posted on a DIY blog:

https://www.oldtownhome.com/2011/8/4/Knock-Knock-Whos-There-Merv-the-Perv/


Original picture as used in “Stimulator” application (photo by Alex Santantonio)

Conclusion

This type of malware does not affect bank customers directly, it is intended for the theft of cash from specific vendor ATMs. CUTLET MAKER and Stimulator show how criminals are using legitimate proprietary libraries and a small piece of code to dispense money from an ATM. Examples of appropriate countermeasures against such attacks include default-deny policies and device control. The first measure prevents criminals from running their own code on the ATM’s internal PC. It is likely that ATMs in these attacks were infected through physical access to the PC, which means criminals were using USB drives to install malware onto the machine. In such a case, device control software would prevent them from connecting new devices, such as USB sticks. Kaspersky Embedded Systems Security will help to extend the security level of ATMs.

Kaspersky Lab products detects this treats as Backdoor.Win32.ATMletcut, Backdoor.Win32.ATMulator, Trojan.Win32.Agent.ikmo

BlackOasis APT and new targeted attacks leveraging zero-day exploit

Malware Alerts - Mon, 10/16/2017 - 10:28

More information about BlackOasis APT is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com

Introduction

Kaspersky Lab has always worked closely with vendors to protect users. As soon as we find new vulnerabilities we immediately inform the vendor in a responsible manner and provide all the details required for a fix.

On October 10, 2017, Kaspersky Lab’s advanced exploit prevention systems identified a new Adobe Flash zero day exploit used in the wild against our customers. The exploit was delivered through a Microsoft Office document and the final payload was the latest version of FinSpy malware. We have reported the bug to Adobe who assigned it CVE-2017-11292 and released a patch earlier today:

So far only one attack has been observed in our customer base, leading us to believe the number of attacks are minimal and highly targeted.

Analysis of the payload allowed us to confidently link this attack to an actor we track as “BlackOasis”. We are also highly confident that BlackOasis was also responsible for another zero day exploit (CVE-2017-8759) discovered by FireEye in September 2017.  The FinSpy payload used in the current attacks (CVE-2017-11292) shares the same command and control (C2) server as the payload used with CVE-2017-8759 uncovered by FireEye.

BlackOasis Background

We first became aware of BlackOasis’ activities in May 2016, while investigating another Adobe Flash zero day. On May 10, 2016, Adobe warned of a vulnerability (CVE-2016-4117) affecting Flash Player 21.0.0.226 and earlier versions for Windows, Macintosh, Linux, and Chrome OS. The vulnerability was actively being exploited in the wild.

Kaspersky Lab was able to identify a sample exploiting this vulnerability that was uploaded to a multi scanner system on May 8, 2016. The sample, in the form of an RTF document, exploited CVE-2016-4117 to download and install a program from a remote C&C server. Although the exact payload of the attack was no longer in the C&C, the same server was hosting multiple FinSpy installation packages.

Leveraging data from Kaspersky Security Network, we identified two other similar exploit chains used by BlackOasis in June 2015 which were zero days at the time.  Those include CVE-2015-5119 and CVE-2016-0984, which were patched in July 2015 and February 2016 respectively.  These exploit chains also delivered FinSpy installation packages.

Since the discovery of BlackOasis’ exploitation network, we’ve been tracking this threat actor with the purpose of better understanding their operations and targeting and have seen a couple dozen new attacks. Some lure documents used in these attacks are shown below:

Decoy documents used in BlackOasis attacks

To summarize, we have seen BlackOasis utilizing at least five zero days since June 2015:</p style=”margin-bottom:0!important”>

  • CVE-2015-5119 – June 2015
  • CVE-2016-0984 – June 2015
  • CVE-2016-4117 – May 2016
  • CVE-2017-8759 – Sept 2017
  • CVE-2017-11292 – Oct 2017
Attacks Leveraging CVE-2017-11292

The attack begins with the delivery of an Office document, presumably in this instance via e-mail.  Embedded within the document is an ActiveX object which contains the Flash exploit.

Flash object in the .docx file, stored in uncompressed format

The Flash object contains an ActionScript which is responsible for extracting the exploit using a custom packer seen in other FinSpy exploits.

Unpacking routine for SWF exploit

The exploit is a memory corruption vulnerability that exists in the “com.adobe.tvsdk.mediacore.BufferControlParameters” class.  If the exploit is successful, it will gain arbitrary read / write operations within memory, thus allowing it to execute a second stage shellcode.

The first stage shellcode contains an interesting NOP sled with alternative instructions, which was most likely designed in such a way to avoid detection by antivirus products looking for large NOP blocks inside flash files:

NOP sled composed of 0x90 and 0x91 opcodes

The main purpose of the initial shellcode is to download second stage shellcode from hxxp://89.45.67[.]107/rss/5uzosoff0u.iaf.

Second stage shellcode

The second stage shellcode will then perform the following actions:</p style=”margin-bottom:0!important”>

  1. Download the final payload (FinSpy) from hxxp://89.45.67[.]107/rss/mo.exe
  2. Download a lure document to display to the victim from the same IP
  3. Execute the payload and display the lure document
Payload – mo.exe

As mentioned earlier, the “mo.exe” payload (MD5: 4a49135d2ecc07085a8b7c5925a36c0a) is the newest version of Gamma International’s FinSpy malware, typically sold to nation states and other law enforcement agencies to use in lawful surveillance operations.  This newer variant has made it especially difficult for researchers to analyze the malware due to many added anti-analysis techniques, to include a custom packer and virtual machine to execute code.

The PCODE of the virtual machine is packed with the aplib packer.

Part of packed VM PCODE

After unpacking, the PCODE it will look like the following:

Unpacked PCODE

After unpacking the virtual machine PCODE is then decrypted:

Decrypted VM PCODE

The custom virtual machine supports a total of 34 instructions:

Example of parsed PCODE

In this example, the “1b” instruction is responsible for executing native code that is specified in parameter field.

Once the payload is successfully executed, it will proceed to copy files to the following locations:</p style=”margin-bottom:0!important”>

  • C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\AdapterTroubleshooter.exe
  • C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\15b937.cab
  • C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\install.cab
  • C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\msvcr90.dll
  • C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\d3d9.dll

The “AdapterTroubleshooter.exe” file is a legitimate binary which is leveraged to use the famous DLL search order hijacking technique.  The “d3d9.dll” file is malicious and is loaded into memory by the legit binary upon execution.  Once loaded, the DLL will then inject FinSpy into the Winlogon process.

Part of injected code in winlogon process

The payload calls out to three C2 servers for further control and exfiltration of data. We have observed two of them used in the past with other FinSpy payloads. Most recently one of these C2 servers was used together with CVE-2017-8759 in the attacks reported by FireEye in September 2017. These IPs and other previous samples tie closely to the BlackOasis APT cluster of FinSpy activity.

Targeting and Victims

BlackOasis’ interests span a wide gamut of figures involved in Middle Eastern politics and verticals disproportionately relevant to the region. This includes prominent figures in the United Nations, opposition bloggers and activists, and regional news correspondents. During 2016, we observed a heavy interest in Angola, exemplified by lure documents indicating targets with suspected ties to oil, money laundering, and other illicit activities. There is also an interest in international activists and think tanks.

Victims of BlackOasis have been observed in the following countries: Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Libya, Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Netherlands, Bahrain, United Kingdom and Angola.

Conclusions

We estimate that the attack on HackingTeam in mid-2015 left a gap on the market for surveillance tools, which is now being filled by other companies. One of these is Gamma International with their FinFisher suite of tools. Although Gamma International itself was hacked by Phineas Fisher in 2014, the breach was not as serious as it was in the case of HackingTeam. Additionally, Gamma had two years to recover from the attack and pick up the pace.

We believe the number of attacks relying on FinFisher software, supported by zero day exploits such as the ones described here will continue to grow.

What does it mean for everyone and how to defend against such attacks, including zero-day exploits?

For CVE-2017-11292 and other similar vulnerabilities, one can use the killbit for Flash within their organizations to disable it in any applications that respect it.  Unfortunately, doing this system-wide is not easily done, as Flash objects can be loaded in applications that potentially do not follow the killbit. Additionally, this may break any other necessary resources that rely on Flash and of course, it will not protect against exploits for other third party software.

Deploying a multi-layered approach including access policies, anti-virus, network monitoring and whitelisting can help ensure customers are protected against threats such as this.  Users of Kaspersky products are protected as well against this threat by one of the following detections:</p style=”margin-bottom:0!important”>

  • PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic
  • HEUR:Exploit.SWF.Generic
  • HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic

More information about BlackOasis APT is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the Adobe Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) for working with us to identify and patch this vulnerability.

References
  1. Adobe Bulletin https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb17-32.html
Indicators of compromise

4a49135d2ecc07085a8b7c5925a36c0a
89.45.67[.]107

Cloud Security

SANS Tip of the Day - Fri, 10/13/2017 - 01:00
One of the most effective steps you can take to protect your cloud account is to make sure you are using two-step verification. In addition, always be sure you know exactly whom you are sharing files with. It is very easy to accidently share your files with the entire Internet when you think you are only sharing them with specific individuals.

ATMii: a small but effective ATM robber

Malware Alerts - Tue, 10/10/2017 - 05:00

While some criminals blow up ATMs to steal cash, others use less destructive methods, such as infecting the ATM with malware and then stealing the money. We have written about this phenomenon extensively in the past and today we can add another family of malware to the list – Backdoor.Win32.ATMii.

ATMii was first brought to our attention in April 2017, when a partner from the financial industry shared some samples with us. The malware turned out to be fairly straightforward, consisting of only two modules: an injector module (exe.exe, 3fddbf20b41e335b6b1615536b8e1292) and the module to be injected (dll.dll, dc42ed8e1de55185c9240f33863a6aa4). To use this malware, criminals need direct access to the target ATM, either over the network or physically (e.g. over USB). ATMii, if it is successful, allows criminals to dispense all the cash from the ATM.

exe.exe – an injector and control module

The injector is an unprotected command line application, written in Visual C with a compilation timestamp: Fri Nov 01 14:33:23 2013 UTC. Since this compilation timestamp is from 4 years ago – and we do not think this threat could have gone unnoticed for 4 years – we believe it is a fake timestamp. What’s also interesting is the OS that is supported by the malware: One more recent than Windows XP. We can see this in the image below, where the first argument for the OpenProcess() function is 0x1FFFFu.


OpenProcess call with the PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS constant

It is the PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS constant, but this constant value differs in older Windows versions such as Windows XP (see the picture below). This is interesting because most ATMs still run on Windows XP, which is thus not supported by the malware.


A list of PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS values per Windows version

The injector, which targets the atmapp.exe (proprietary ATM software) process, is fairly poorly written, since it depends on several parameters. If none are given, the application catches an exception. The parameters are pretty self-explanatory:

param  short description /load Tries to inject dll.dll into atmapp.exe process /cmd Creates/Updates C:\ATM\c.ini file to pass commands and params to infected library /unload Tries to unload injected library from atmapp.exe process, while restoring its state.

/load param

<exe.exe> /load

The application searches for a process with the name atmapp.exe and injects code into it that loads the “dll.dll” library (which has to be in the same folder as the exe.exe file). After it has been loaded it calls the DLLmain function.

/unload param <exe.exe> /unload

As the name already suggests, it is the opposite of the /load parameter; it unloads the injected module and restores the process to its original state.

/cmd param <exe.exe> /cmd [cmd] [params]

The application creates/updates C:\ATM\c.ini which is used by the injected DLL to read commands. The file is updated each time the .exe is run with the /cmd param.


Contents of c.ini after execution of “exe.exe /cmd info”

The executable understands the following set of commands:

command description scan Scans for the CASH_UNIT XFS service disp Stands for “dispense”. The injected module should dispense “amount” cash of “currency” (amount and currency are used as parameters) info Gets info about ATM cash cassettes, all the returned data goes to the log file. die Injected module removes C:\ATM\c.ini file dll.dll injecting module

After injection and execution of the DllMain function, the dll.dll library loads msxfs.dll and replaces the WFSGetInfo function with a special wrap function, named mWFSGetInfo.

At the time of the first call to the fake WFSGetInfo function, C:\ATM\c.ini is ignored and the library tries to find the ATM’s CASH_UNIT service id and stores the result, basically in the same way as the scan command does. If the CASH_UNIT service is not found, dll.dll won’t function. However, if successful, all further calls go to the mWFSGetInfo function, which performs the additional logic (reading, parsing and executing the commands from the C:\ATM\c.ini file).


Contents of C:\ATM\c.ini after execution of “exe.exe /cmd disp RUB 6000”

Below is an output of the strings program uncovering some interesting log messages and the function names to be imported. The proprietary MSXFS.DLL library and its functions used in the ATMii malware are marked with red boxes.

“scan” command

Because of the architecture of XFS, which is divided into services, the injected library first needs to find the dispense service. This command must be successfully called, because the disp and info commands depend on the service id retrieved by scan. Scan is automatically called after the dll has been injected into atmapp.exe.

After collecting the WFS_INF_CDM_STATUS data, additional data gets added to the tlogs.log. An example can be found below:


(387):cmd_scan() Searching valid service
(358):FindValidService() Checking device index=0
(70):CheckServiceForValid() ————————————————
(72):CheckServiceForValid() Waiting for lock
(76):CheckServiceForValid() Device was locked
(86):CheckServiceForValid() WFSGetInfo Success 0
(182):CheckServiceForValid() Done-> szDevice: WFS_CDM_DEVONLINE, szDispenser: WFS_CDM_DISPOK, szIntermediateStacker: WFS_CDM_ISEMPTY, szSafeDoor: WFS_CDM_DOORCLOSED
(195):CheckServiceForValid() Unlocking device
(390):cmd_scan() Service found 0

Part of a tlogs.log possible log after successfully executed “scan” command

“info” command

Before the criminals can dispense cash, they first need to know the exact contents of the different cassettes. For this, they use the info command which provides exhaustive information on all cassettes and their contents. The list of used XFS API functions is the same as with the scan command, but this time WFSGetInfo is called with the WFS_INF_CDM_CASH_UNIT_INFO (303) constant passed as a param.

Below is an example of the data in log file returned by the info command.


(502):ExecuteCmd() Executing cmd
(506):ExecuteCmd() CMD = info
(402):cmd_info() ! hFoundGlobalService = 0
(213):GetDeviceInformation() ————————————————
(220):GetDeviceInformation() Device locked 0
(337):GetDeviceInformation() Module: C:\program files\dtatmw\bin\atmapp\atmapp.exe
Cash Unit # 1, name=SOMENAME
Type: 3
Status: HIGH
Currency ID: 0x52-0x55-0x42
Note Value: 5000
Notes Count: 3000
Notes Initial Count: 3000
Notes Minimum Count: 10
Notes Maximum Count: 0

Example5 Part of a tlogs.log possible log after successfully executed “info” command

“disp” command

The dispense command is followed by two additional params in the command file: currency and amount. Currency must contain one of the three-letter currency codes of notes kept in the CASH_UNIT_INFO structure (currency codes are described in ISO_4217 e.g. RUB, EUR). The amount code holds the amount of cash to dispense and this value must be a multiple of ten.

“die” command

Does nothing except deleting C:\ATM\c.ini command file.

Conclusion

ATMii is yet another example of how criminals can use legitimate proprietary libraries and a small piece of code to dispense money from an ATM. Some appropriate countermeasures against such attacks are default-deny policies and device control. The first measure prevents criminals from running their own code on the ATM’s internal PC, while the second measure will prevent them from connecting new devices, such as USB sticks.

Back up Your Files

SANS Tip of the Day - Tue, 10/10/2017 - 01:00
Eventually, we all have an accident or get hacked. And when we do, backups are often the only way to recover. Backups are cheap and easy; make sure you are backing up all of your personal information (such as family photos) on a regular basis.

Shopping Online

SANS Tip of the Day - Mon, 10/09/2017 - 01:00
When shopping online, always use your credit cards instead of a debit card. If any fraud happens, it is far easier to recover your money from a credit card transaction. Gift cards and one-time-use credit card numbers are even more secure.

Email and Emotions

SANS Tip of the Day - Fri, 10/06/2017 - 01:00
Never send an email when you are angry; you will most likely regret it later. Instead, when you are emotional and want to reply to someone, open up an email and write everything you feel, but do not send it. (Be sure there is no name in the TO field so that you do not accidently send it.) After you have vented, save the email and come back an hour later. You only want to reply to any type of emotional situation after you have had time to cool down.

The Festive Complexities of SIGINT-Capable Threat Actors

Malware Alerts - Wed, 10/04/2017 - 06:00

To read the full paper and learn more about this, refer to “Walking in Your Enemy’s Shadow: When Fourth-Party Collection Becomes Attribution Hell”

Attribution is complicated under the best of circumstances. Sparse attributory indicators and the possibility of overt manipulation have proven enough for many researchers to shy away from the attribution space. And yet, we haven’t even discussed the worst-case scenarios. What happens to our research methods when threat actors start hacking each other? What happens when threat actors leverage another’s seemingly closed-source toolkit? Or better yet, what if they open-source an entire suite to generate so much noise that they’ll never be heard?

Thankfully, the 2017 VirusBulletin conference is upon us and, as in previous years, we’re taking the opportunity to dive into an exciting subject, guided by our experience from doing hands-on APT research.

During the past years, we discussed the evolution of anti-malware research into intelligence brokerage, the inherent problems with doing attribution based solely on fifth-domain indicators, and an attempt to have a balanced discussion between defensive cats and the sly mice that elude them. Continuing in this direction, this year we decided to put our heads together to understand the implications that the esoteric SIGINT practice of fourth-party collection could have on threat intelligence research.

A few types of SIGINT Collection

The means by which information is generated and collected is the most important part of an analyst’s work. One must be well aware of the means and source of the information analyzed in order to either compensate or exploit its provenance. For that reason, collection can be categorized by its means of generation in relation to the position of the parties involved, as discussed below. These definitions will serve as functional categories for our understanding as outsiders looking into the more complex spheres of collection dynamics.

To showcase the types of data collection, let’s imagine a competent entity named ‘Agency-A’ as a stand-in for a ‘God on the wire‘-style SIGINT agency interested in fourth-party collection.

There are multiple types of collection categories available to this entity. The more obvious being information collected by Agency-A directly (first-party) or shared with Agency-A by partner services (second-party). Third-party collection, or information collected via access to strategic organizations, whether they realize it or not, has gotten a lot of attention over the past few years. This would include ISPs, ad networks, or social media platforms that aggregate great troves of valuable data.

Similarly, we will use further entities Agency-B as a second semi-competent SIGINT agency upon which Agency-A can be recurringly predatory for the sake of explanation. When necessary an even less competent Agency-C will serve as prey.

Yet, things get most interesting when we start talking about:

Fourth-party collection – …involves interception of a foreign intelligence service’s ‘computer network exploitation’ (CNE) activity in a variety of possible configurations. Given the nature of Agency-A as a cyber-capable SIGINT entity, two modes of fourth-party collection are available to it: passive and active. The former will take advantage of its existing visibility into data in transit either between hop points in the adversary’s infrastructure or perhaps in transit from the victim to the command-and-control servers themselves (whichever opportunity permits). On the other hand, active means involve the leveraging of diverse CNE capabilities to collect, replace, or disrupt the adversary’s campaign. Both present challenges we will explore in extensive detail further below.”

In less technical terms, fourth-party collection is the practice of spying on a spy spying on someone else. Or with age-old cryptographic interlocutors: Bob is obsessed with Alice. Alice is being spied on by her overzealous neighbour Eve. In order for Bob to be a creeper without arousing suspicion, he decides to spy on Eve with the purpose of getting to know Alice through Eve’s original privacy violation.

As you might expect there are different ways to do this and many of them enjoy the benefit of being near impossible to detect. Where possible, we have added examples of what to us looks like possible active attempts to collect on another’s collection. Otherwise, we have added thought experiments to help us wrap our heads around this shadowy practice. Two examples worth bringing to your attention (reproduced faithfully from our paper):

‘We heard you like popping boxes, so we popped your box so we can watch while you watch’

Attempting to highlight examples of fourth-party collection is a difficult exercise in the interpretation of shadows and vague remnants. While passive collection is beyond our ability to observe, active collection involves the risk of leaving a footprint in the form of artefacts. In the course of APT investigations, Kaspersky Lab’s Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) has encountered strange artefacts that defy immediate understanding in the context of the investigation itself. While we cannot be certain of the intent or provenance of these artefacts, they nonetheless fit a conceptual framework of active fourth-party collection. Here’s a few examples:

Crouching Yeti’s Pixelated Servers

In July 2014, we published our research on Crouching Yeti, also known as ‘Energetic Bear’, an APT actor active since at least 2010. Between 2010 and 2014, Crouching Yeti was involved in intrusions against a variety of sectors, including:

  • Industrial/machinery
  • Manufacturing
  • Pharmaceutical
  • Construction
  • Education
  • Information technology

Most of the victims we identified fell into the industrial and machine manufacturing sector, indicating vertical of special interest for this attacker.

To manage their victims, Crouching Yeti relied on a network of hacked websites which acted as command-and-control servers. For this, the attackers would install a PHP-based backend that could be used to collect data from or deliver commands to the victims. To manage the backend, the attackers used a control panel (also written in PHP) that, upon checking login credentials, would allow them to manage the information stolen from the victims.

In March 2014, while investigating one of the hacked sites used by Energetic Bear, we observed that for a brief period of time, the page for the control panel was modified to include an <img src> tag that pointed to a remote IP address in China. This remote 1×1 pixels wide image was likely intended to fingerprint the attackers as they logged into their control panel. The fingerprinting could have been used to collect attributory indicators. The usage of an IP address in China, which appeared to point to yet another hacked server, was most likely an attempt at a rudimentary false flag should this injection be discovered.

NetTraveler’s Most Leet Backdoor

While investigating the Nettraveler attacks, we obtained a disk image of a mothership server used by the threat actor. The mothership, a combination staging and relay server, contained a large number of scripts used by the attackers to interact with their malware, as well as VPN software and other IP masking solutions used to tunnel into their own hacking infrastructure.

Beyond the fortuitous boon of seizing such a content-rich server, GReAT researchers made a further unexpected discovery: the presence of a backdoor apparently placed by another entity.

We believe the backdoor was installed by an entity intent on maintaining prolonged access to the Nettraveler infrastructure or their stolen data. Considering that the NetTraveler operators had direct access to their mothership server and didn’t need a backdoor to operate it, we consider other possible interpretations less likely.

The artefact encountered is the following:

Name svchost.exe MD5 58a4d93d386736cb9843a267c7c3c10b Size 37,888

Interestingly, the backdoor is written in assembly and was injected into an empty Visual C executable that served as a template. This unusual implementation was likely chosen in order to confuse analysis or prevent detection by simple antivirus programs.

The backdoor is primitive and does nothing but listen to port 31337 (The most ‘LEET!’ port) and wait for a payload to be sent. The acceptable payload format is depicted here:

The assembly code is then executed and can perform any action chosen by the predatory attackers. The backdoor requires no authentication. Combining this sort of backdoor with Metasploit or other similar frameworks could have easily been used to control the system.

During the last years, we have seen a number of other peculiar incidents and cases which could constitute fourth party collection.”

To read the full paper and learn more about this, refer to “Walking in Your Enemy’s Shadow: When Fourth-Party Collection Becomes Attribution Hell”