Few Throats to Choke: On the Current Structure of the Internet

Abstract—The original design of the Internet was as a resilient, distributed system, able to route around (and therefore recover from) massive disruption - up to and including nuclear war. However, network effects and business decisions (e.g. the purchase of GlobalCrossing by Level-3) have led to centralization of routing power. This is not merely an academic issue; it has practical implications, such as whether the citizens of a country may be subject to censorship by an “upstream” ISP in some other country, that controls its entire access to the Internet.

In this paper, we examine the extent of routing centralization in the Internet; identify the major players who control the “Internet backbone”; and point out how many of these are, in fact, under the jurisdiction of censorious countries. We also measure the collateral damage caused by censorship, particularly by the two largest Internet-using nations, China and India.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Internet, as originally mandated by DARPA, is a telecommunication network that can survive tremendous damage. As a packet-switching network, it does not require centralized control; catastrophic damage to one part of the network is simply routed around.

However, in practice, the Internet is not a flat network. It consists of a large number (currently about 55,000) of networks, called Autonomous Systems or ASes, which mostly keep their internal structure a black box and enter into relationships (as customers, peers, or providers) with other ASes to forward each others’ traffic. The existence of such relationships is a constraint on the paths followed by traffic. For example, if ASes A and B are both providers to AS X, then X will refuse to carry transit traffic from A to B (or B to A).

One consequence of such structure, pointed out by Shmatikov [1], is that individuals, companies, and even nations have very limited control over their connectivity to the Internet. Even in the case of China, the world’s largest nation by number of Internet users (720 million) [2], and connected to over 850 ASes which are happy to carry its traffic, choosing to avoid just 2% of world ASes leads to massive and costly disruption.

1) 44 ASes in China have to start functioning as transit ASes. (China has only 30 transit ASes, so this is an increase of ≈150%.

2) The effective latency seen by the Chinese user increases by a factor of 8.

In conjunction with observing how a small number of randomly-chosen Autonomous Systems has a surprising amount of power, we also note that not all Autonomous Systems are equal. In the 2001 study by Rexford and Katz [3], the Internet is demonstrated to be a hierarchy of five levels.

1) Dense Core. (≈ 20 ASes. Tier-1 providers, nearly a clique)

2) Transit Core. (162 ASes. Mostly peer with dense core or each other)

3) Outer Core. (675 ASes. Not all closely connected)

4) Small Regional ISPs. (950 ASes. Usually have a single provider)

5) Customer ASes. (8852 ASes. Stubs - end consumers)

It is natural to ask just how much power the central ASes of the Internet have. In this regard, our paper looks into the following research questions.

- What are the “backbone” ASes of the Internet, and how effective are they at capturing Internet traffic?
  - The study by Rexford et al is fifteen years old; in this time, the Internet has grown from 10,000 ASes to 55,000. How many backbone ASes are there in the current Internet?
  - Are the “backbone” ASes specifically those with no providers (Tier 1), or are other ASes better able to capture traffic?

- How much impact do censorious countries have, on the functioning of the Internet?
  - Are any backbone ASes located in censorious countries? Could they in fact be filtering traffic to other countries?
  - How much collateral damage can censor countries inflict on “downstream” ASes in other countries (who are technically outside their jurisdiction)?

We note that these questions about the structure of the Internet have important practical implications. Open access to the Internet is an exceptionally powerful resource, and plays a political role in the world; for this reason, free access to information online has been declared a human right by the United Nations [4]. However, there is a tension between free speech and keeping the commons safe. Several Governments - notably China, Russia, Cuba etc. and also some notable democracies such as India, South Africa, and Indonesia, have expressed concern about the open Internet. 1 This concern may be benevolent, e.g. policing child pornography; but there is precedent where State control of communication channels has been abused to silence the opposition. We suggest that, if in fact the power to monitor or filter all Internet traffic lies in the hands of a few major companies, this may be a cause for concern.

We begin our study with some discussion of background and related work, in the next section.

1Kyrgyzstan opposes declaring access to information online as a human right. Bangladesh, Congo, and Kenya are opposed to free speech online as a human right. Bolivia, Burundi, China, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Vietnam are opposed to both[5].
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

There are two bodies of work related to the current paper. The first involves the study of censorship and how it is implemented in various countries around the world. The second is the study of Internet mapping, or more precisely, determining the routes taken by Internet traffic. We discuss both of these areas briefly in this section.

A. Internet Censorship

Government censorship of the Internet was systematically studied by Zittrain [6], in his seminal analysis of filtering by the People’s Republic of China. Important early studies were then contributed by Deibert [7], Wolfgarten [8], and Dornseif [9], who describe not only censorship policy but also mechanism of filtering as well as anti-censorship measures. Work in the area has since focused on either determining exactly which content is blocked in a given country (i.e., policy) or how such blocking is performed (mechanism).

In the area of policy, several authors have explored the censorship in single countries such as China [10], Iran [11], Pakistan [12] etc.; Verkamp et al [13] extend this with a survey of censorship across eleven countries. Several projects provide tools to determine censorship policy: ConceptDoppler [14], HerdictWeb [15], CensMon [16], and Encore [17].

Studies of mechanism show a steady increase in the sophistication of both censorship and anti-censorship, from the early work of Clayton [18] (TCP reset) and Park [19] (HTML response filtering) to the complex arsenal used by China to block Tor, reported by Winter [20]. Our work, in particular, is strongly influenced by two papers in this group: Levis [21], who raised concerns that collateral damage can be caused by the Internet filtering in a nation, and Shmatikov et al [1], who describe the costs of trying to avoid a particular AS. It is natural to ask, if a randomly-chosen AS has so much power, how hard it is to avoid a “backbone” AS as reported by Rexford [3], and also how much collateral damage is in fact being caused by the censorious nations that host one or more backbone ASes. We explore both these questions in this paper.

B. Internet Mapping

Our work draws heavily on the construction of a map of routes in the Internet. The early work in this area, such as by Govindan [22], Willinger [23], and Shavitt [24], rely on discovering router-level maps using the tool Traceroute, and then use heuristics to deduce ASes and their connections. However, we make use of the algorithm by Gao [25], which directly computes AS-level paths using public BGP routing data collected by Routeviews [26].

More recently, Claffy [27] and Giotsas [28] have demonstrated improved methods of Internet mapping, which are very accurate in deducing AS relationships (provider-customer, peer-peer). We have therefore taken the relationships they compute and used this information in finding routes in the Internet with Gao’s algorithm.
The algorithm searches for ASes that share valid business relations with the current end ASes of paths. [Rather than attempt to infer relationships, we directly used the relationships presented by CAIDA [29].]

One edge is chosen. It is simply assumed that this edge extends the given sure path by one hop. Note that we are trying to find a path from an AS to the target prefix, and that extensions of several sure paths might connect the chosen AS to the prefix. Hence there is a need for tie breaking.

- The algorithm sorts the possible paths, and selects the shortest path to the prefix.
- In case of a tie, the path with minimum uncertainty (length of the inferred path extensions) is chosen.
- If there is still a tie, the path with the higher frequency index (the number of times a sure path actually appears in the RIBs) is selected.

The frequency with which the chosen edge appears in the RIBs, the uncertainty of the extended path, and the new path length, are updated.

B. Identifying ASes of interest

To select ASes of interest from our map of Internet paths, we take a greedy approach. Ranking the ASes by path frequency (i.e. how frequently an AS appears on the paths in the graph), we keep selecting the most-frequent ASes until we achieve a desired level of coverage. We choose 90% coverage as our target - i.e. we select enough ASes to give us a cover of at least 90% of the paths in the graph.

It may be questioned here why we do not follow the standard approach of CAIDA [29], where the “importance” of an AS is determined by its customer-cone size (the total number of its customers, customers of customers, etc.) In Section V, we show that in fact customer cone size is a poor predictor of path frequency - the actual metric of our interest - and explain why this is so.

C. Validation

The most important question regarding our study, is how general its results are. If for example, we find that a small set of “key” ASes dominate routing in the Internet, can we trust this claim, or is it only true for routes to our sample of target sites (Alexa Top-100)?

To address this concern, we repeated our experiment for various target sets (Alexa top-10, top-20, top-30 ... top-200 sites) to see if our results remained stable. Finally, we performed direct cross-validation by computing heavy-hitter ASes from paths to one set of sites (Alexa Top-100) and checking whether they cover over 90% of paths to a different, disjoint set (Alexa ranks 101 to 225).

In this context, we should also consider why we did not simply use our algorithm to plot paths from every AS to every other AS in the world. The reason is that over 85% of the Internet consists of eyeball ASes, who primarily consume content from a small number of providers; the overwhelming majority of computed paths in such an all-to-all map would see almost no traffic. Our map of paths from all ASes to important destinations, in contrast, gives a reasonable picture of the actual paths taken by traffic.

IV. Experimental Results

In this section, we present our experimental results. First, we consider the map constructed with paths to our original sample, the Alexa top-100 test sites. We then check whether our results remain unchanged as we vary the set of target sites in our test.

A. Test 1 : Alexa Top-100

Fig. 1. Paths to Alexa top-100 sites captured by ASes

Fig. 2. Paths to one example target site (facebook.com) captured by ASes

The most important result we observe is that the frequency with which heavy-hitter ASes appear on paths is remarkably top-heavy, not only for our entire sample of test sites as an...
aggregate, but even for the individual sites tested (Figures 3 and 4).

The highest-ranked AS, AS3356 (Level 3 Communications), intercepts 1, 492, 079 paths (≈33% of total paths).2 The next highest, AS174 (Cogent Communications), intercepts 536, 752 more paths (not counting overlaps, i.e. paths intercepted by both). Together, AS3356 and AS174 intercept 2, 028, 831 (=1, 492, 079 + 536, 752) unique IP-prefix-to-AS paths, i.e., about ≈45% of all the paths. Proceeding similarly, we see that the top 30-ASes by path frequency together intercept 92.4% of all paths. The complete list is presented in Table II; as is clearly visible, nearly a third of these key ASes lie in censorious countries. (If we include AS 6453, Tata America - which, while headquartered in the US, actually belongs to an Indian company - exactly one-third of the 30 “key” ASes lies in a censorious country.)

As may be expected, out of the censorious countries, the ones with backbone ASes - Russia (11.09% of world paths) and China (7.39% of world paths), as also India (3.08% of world paths) - cover a substantial fraction of the paths in the Internet.3 This is still much smaller than the U.S. (81.82% of world paths), but overall censorious nations control 20.73% of the paths in the Internet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fraction of total paths intercepted</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RU</td>
<td>11.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>7.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>3.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EG</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE I

B. Cross-Validation

In order to verify the generality of our results, we repeated our experiment for various target sets (Alexa top-10, top-20, top-30 ... top-200 sites). In each case we found the same ASes cover ≈90% of paths. Further, the key ASes computed using the Alexa top-100, also capture over 90% of paths to the websites ranked 101 to 225. [We add in passing that we also tested how well our “key” ASes covered paths to the 50 most popular non-domestic websites in China, Iran, and Pakistan; they covered > 90% of these paths as well.]

C. Collateral Damage

As our final experiment, we considered some of the known censorious ASes and computed the number of customer AS

2Even this figure underestimates the influence of the company, as another of the 30 key ASes - AS 3549, i.e. Global Crossing - belongs to Level 3.

3In comparison, other censorious nations have much less impact: Iran covers 0.69%, Saudi Arabia 0.23%, and Venezuela, Egypt and Pakistan less than 0.15% each.
paths which are subject to the censorship policy of the AS. The fraction of traffic that experiences collateral damage from filtering by some sample censorious nations is presented in Figure 5.

![Fig. 5. Ratio of collateral damage (paths filtered that the country does not have jurisdiction over) to intentional damage (paths filtered that actually originate in the country), expressed as a percentage.](image)

The histograms represent the ratio of collateral damage - the paths that transit or originate in ASes outside the censorious nations, before passing through the ASes hosted within these nations - to the actual paths originating inside these nations, i.e. are the intended targets of filtering. For example, in case of China, 306,874 AS paths visited or originated from an AS outside China This constitutes approx. 92.25% of the 332,742 paths from Chinese ASes to the popular destinations. And in case of India, 121,931 paths transiting India suffer collateral damage compared to 186,679 paths originating in the country. In comparison, Russia shows relatively little collateral damage; the paths passing through Russian ASes mostly originate in Russia itself.

V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK

From our results in the previous section, it is clear that an overwhelming majority of Internet traffic in our tests (well over 90%) does in fact pass through one or more of a small set of backbone ASes. This would imply that these ASes have the power to set de facto censorship policy, and monitor or filter Internet traffic worldwide.

The most important question regarding our work, is how we can claim that this picture is true for Internet traffic in general, and not an artifact of our methodology - i.e., that the heavy hitters for flows to Alexa top-100 sites are also heavy hitters for flows to any site. We have already discussed our answer to this question in the previous sections, with a description of our cross-validation using different sets of target sites. In this section, we address other questions: we explore our finding that the “backbone” ASes are not necessarily the “Tier 1” ASes of the Internet, and end with a mention of how this paper related to our current and future work in the area.

4Out of these, 362 paths originated at a Chinese AS, passed through non-Chinese ASes, then re-entered China and passed through one or more Chinese ASes, before finally leaving for its destination.

A. Backbone vs Tier-1 ASes

One of the surprising observations of our paper is that the “heavy hitters” of the Internet not only form a small core, but the size of the core is not much larger than the 20 ASes reported by Rexford, despite the dramatic growth of the Internet in the intervening fifteen years [3].

Another, and perhaps equally surprising, fact is that the backbone ASes we identify are not necessarily Tier-1 ASes (defined as those with only peering relationships, and no providers). For example, our list includes the major Tier-2 ASes Cogent Communications (AS 174) and Hurricane Electric (AS 6939), as well as the ChinaNet backbone (AS 4134 and AS 4837), RosTelecom (AS 12389), Yahoo! (AS 10310) etc. which are not only Tier-2 but have Tier-2 providers (Cogent (AS 174) is a provider to RosTelecom, nLayer Communications (AS 4436) to the ChinaNet backbone, and Hurricane Electric (AS 6939) to Yahoo!) We did not, however, observe any Tier-3 ASes5. On the other hand, our list does not include five of the sixteen Tier-1 ASes, specifically Deutsche Telekom AG (AS 3320), KPN International (AS 286), Orange (AS 5511), Liberty Global (AS 6830), and Sprint (AS 1239).

We therefore find that the assumption that Tier-1 ASes are the heavy-hitters of Internet traffic, is not quite true; there is certainly a strong positive correlation between being Tier-1 and being a “key AS” of the Internet - by which we mean an AS able to intercept most Internet traffic - but it is neither necessary, nor sufficient.

Next, we observed that while many of the ASes on our list were in fact Tier-2, they were very highly ranked by CAIDA [29] in terms of Customer Cone size. This naturally raised the question of whether perhaps a composite feature - Tier-1 or large customer cone - would predict if an AS is in fact a key AS w.r.t. intercepting Internet traffic. However, there are counter examples for this as well, such as RETN (AS 9002) and SOVAM (AS 3216).

We then experimentally checked whether customer cone size is a good predictor of path frequency. Our results were very surprising: in fact, among our key ASes, the Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient between cone size and path frequency is only ≈ 0.2. We believe the explanation for this result comes from the existence of non-root paths in a customer cone, which we now explain with the help of Figure 6.

5The customers of Tier-2 ASes are mostly still Tier-2 rather than Tier-3. The term Tier-3 is used to refer to ASes not in the Internet core, i.e., which do not have peering relationships with Tier-1 or Tier-2 ASes.
large cone sizes (preferring to pass through their customer ASes instead). However, for ASes with smaller customer-cones, we observed fewer such non-root paths (possibly because an AS in a small cone tends to have fewer peers to route through). We may perform a more extensive analysis of such behavior in future work.

B. Current and Future Work

The primary idea that motivates this work is to map the Internet, and determine which entities (companies and governments) hold the strategic “high ground” of cyberspace. We are currently exploring this research direction in two other works:

- It seems to be very difficult for a country to route its traffic in a way that avoids the backbone of the Internet. Instead of considering this as a threat, as we do in this paper, could we perhaps make good use of it? In our study of Decoy Routing[omitted for review], an anti-censorship technique that re-purposes smart routers as proxies, we examine this complementary perspective.
- The largest nation on the Internet by users, China, is highly censorious. India, the second-largest, is rapidly becoming censorious as well. If in future a Great Firewall of India is built along the same lines as the Great Firewall of China, what might it look like, and what mechanisms might it employ? We study this question in our submitted paper[omitted for review].

Our results indicate that routing in the Internet is indeed dominated by a few heavy hitters, who therefore enjoy a surprising amount of power. However, several other players in the current Internet economy may also be considered “central” to the Web - the major websites themselves (especially the ones who serve as a platform - most prominently Google and Amazon); root DNS servers; and the major Internet Exchanges (DE-CIX, AMS-IX, LINX, IX.br, DATA-IX and MSK-IX, NL-IX, Equinix, etc.) The general question, “who holds the high ground,” is thus just as complicated for cyberspace as for the physical world. (The question is very similar to asking: is it the player who controls oil wells who is in a strong strategic position? Or the one with the critical ports on trade routes?) We intend to explore this research direction in detail, in the course of our future work.

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The organic growth of the Internet has led to a structure that concentrates substantial routing power in a small number of companies. The first contribution of our paper is to experimentally validate this “folk wisdom” and demonstrate that it still holds true even though the Internet has grown and expanded dramatically in the fifteen years since it was first discovered [3]. Our work also turns up two surprises. The first is that the “key” ASes of the Internet, who carry the overwhelming majority of traffic, are not identical to the Tier-1 ASes as we expected. The second is that path frequency and customer cone-size are poorly correlated, and perhaps peering links explain the reason for this.
However, the main contribution of our paper is to draw attention to the potential for censorship in this top-heavy structure. A third of the 30 key ASes that form the backbone of the Internet lie in censorious countries, and they cover over 20% of the Internet paths in our tests. Further, from direct examination we see that censorious countries filter (and possibly also monitor) a substantial fraction of traffic from other countries. (In particular, we provide direct figures for China and India.)

We conclude that while it is certainly understandable that the more powerful routing companies successfully increase their influence over time, perhaps such centralization is effectively making the Internet more fragile as it leads to a small number of “throats to choke”. We will pursue this direction further in our future work.

REFERENCES


