Fridays, 5:00pm - 7:00pm
Taking a philosophy course and want to know more about what this pholosophy thing is about? Simply interested in philosophical discussion? Join us for informal conversation and student presentations. Our goal is to make philosophy inclusive and accessible to all levels of experience... newbies and seasoned philosophers alike.
Eastman Lounge is located in front fo the ID office; for any latecomers, if you cannot find us there, go to the end of the hallway, turn right, and we'll be in the first room on the right.
If you wish to stay up to date with the club, please visit our Facebook group.
AI Seminar Series
November 19, 2018 - 12:00pm to 1:00pm
Bamboo Room (Campus Center 2650)
What Artificial Intelligence Can Learn From The Intelligence of Arthropods
Irina Mikhalevich (Rochester Institute of Technology)
Our theories of mind specify the conditions of satisfaction for true artificial intelligence. If we assume that the mind is representational and computational, as is the standard view in cognitive science today, then replicating minds in machines will require a representational approach. If we instead take the mind to be extended into the body or into the world, then our approach might focus more on creating embodied and embedded artificial agents. This talk looks at an unusual source inspiration for models of mind: insects and spiders. For decades, insects and spiders were thought to be simple biomechanical systems whose behaviors could be explained by looking at how their bodies interacted with their environments rather than by top-down control mechanisms. The successes of insect-model robotics, in turn, appeared to corroborate the view that our focus should be not on their cognition (understood as representation), but on the biomechanics of body-world interactions. And some philosophers saw these successes as further corroborating the view that the mind is not contained in the brain, but is extended into the body and perhaps the world. Emerging research on the brains and behavior of insects and spiders, however, suggests that many of these animals may be far from simple systems, and may be capable representational thinkers in their own right. This talk examines this evidence and draws out its implications for our models of the mind.