RAPTOR Attacks and Counter-RAPTOR Defenses: A Tale of Anonymity Systems and Network-level Adversaries
Friday, April 21, 2017
Anonymity systems such as the Tor network aim to protect user identity in online communications. In this talk, I will consider the unique perspective of network level adversaries (such as Internet service providers) and their impact on the security of the Tor network. First, I will present RAPTOR attacks (USENIX Security 2015), a suite of attacks that exploit structural properties of Internet routing and vulnerabilities in inter-domain routing (BGP) to compromise the privacy of Tor clients. Second, I will discuss Counter-RAPTOR (IEEE S&P 2017), our proposed defenses for mitigating the threat of active routing attacks on Tor. Overall, the talk motivates the design of next generation of anonymity systems that are aware of the dynamics of Internet routing
Prateek Mittal is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering at Princeton University, where he is also affiliated with the Center for Information Technology Policy. His research aims to develop privacy-preserving and secure systems. His research interests include the domains of anonymous communication, privacy-preserving data analytics, and trustworthy Internet/social systems. His research draws on techniques from network science, complex networks, large-scale machine learning, distributed systems & computer networks, and applied cryptography.
His research has influenced the design of several widely-used anonymity systems. He is the recipient of the NSF CAREER award, the M.E. Van Valkenburg research award, Faculty research awards from Google/Cisco/Intel, Princeton Engineering outstanding teacher award, and outstanding paper awards at ACM CCS & ASIACCS. He serves on the editorial board of the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS), and has co-chaired the workshops on Free and Open Communications on the Internet (FOCI) and Hot Topics in Privacy Enhancing Technologies (HotPETS).