

SNUG Evaluation

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Introduction

This document provides the findings of the evaluation of SNUG programs supported through New York State and administered by the NY Division of Criminal Justice Services. Five SNUG programs are included: Albany, Niagara Falls, Yonkers, Harlem and ENY/Brooklyn. These programs were among the projects which received initial funding support and were the five sites selected for a second round of support. The time period covered by this report begins when the program became active in late 2010 and includes information up through May 2013. Monthly time series data on crime is included covering early 2006 through May 2012 to allow for consideration of change over time.

The evaluation includes analysis of both quantitative and qualitative information. In the following chapters we share the results of our evaluation. Chapter One includes an overall summary of the findings, including specific site summaries as well as recommendations. Chapter Two introduces the CeaseFire model and gives background as to the funding process and site selection. Chapter Three elaborates on the SNUG program description. This chapter describes the program model. Chapter Four includes the results from interviews with CeaseFire Chicago staff on how well the sites did with model fidelity. Chapter Five covers Albany SNUG, Chapter Six covers Niagara Falls SNUG, and then Chapter Seven covers Yonkers SNUG. Then, Chapter Eight covers Central Harlem and Chapter Nine covers the fifth site, ENY/Brooklyn SNUG. Each site chapter describes the funding, context, staffing, street intervention, client outreach, clergy involvement, police and prosecution involvement, and the quantitative results including how SNUG impacted violence in their respective cities. In Chapter Ten we describe implications and lessons learned.

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Chapter 1: Summary of the Findings

This summary focuses on the following topics for each program:

1. Fidelity to the CeaseFire Chicago program model
2. The structure and process of the SNUG programs
3. The consistency of data tracking through the Chicago program office
4. The engagement of the community in anti-violence efforts
5. Relationship with the police and other criminal justice agencies
6. The impact on shootings and other serious crime
7. The statistical significance of impacts on crime.

In this summary the five programs are discussed separately. That discussion is reflected in the summary table below. Recommendations follow the highlights section below.

| | SNUG Evaluation General Summary of Issues | | | | |
|------------------------------------|--|----------------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------|
| | Albany | Niagara Falls | Yonkers | Harlem | Brooklyn |
| Fidelity to model | good | acceptable | strong | very strong | strong |
| Org. Structure/Process | good | very good | very good | excellent | good |
| Data Tracking | limited | very good | very good | very good | limited |
| Community engagement | strong | very strong | excellent | excellent | excellent |
| Relationship with CJ system | Excellent | very good | Excellent | acceptable | good |
| Crime reduction | yes | mixed | mixed | mixed | mixed |
| Significant Crime reduction | no | no | yes | no | no |

Evaluation Highlights

All sites did very well with: hiring credible messengers for both outreach worker and violence interrupter positions, utilizing the hiring panel, identification of high risk clients. While there was consistency across some of the sites in specific areas, there were also many standouts amongst the sites. Highlights from specific program sites include: one site's effective and creative community mobilization techniques, another site's very strong and clearly defined relationship with law enforcement, another site's ability to engage the highest risk clients in services and sustain those relationships, and still another site's ability to understand the model so well that CeaseFire Chicago staff utilized the site's workers in order to train other programs in the CeaseFire model.

Recommendations

1. Reserve SNUG interventions for addressing serious violence, particularly gun related violence in the near-term, in communities with high levels of this problem. When implemented under different circumstances the program can lose focus, struggle with

fidelity and be inefficient in the use of resources. In areas where the target is less clear or lower in prevalence, alternative programs which are not identified as SNUG and not confused with its design, should be implemented if desired. An alternative to the SNUG program could be a “SNUG Lite” of sorts, a program that does not require as much training, staffing, and resources, but focuses on the educational campaign and community mobilization through hiring credible messengers to conduct school presentations, provide shooting responses, and refer high risk individuals to services while not carrying an active caseload.

2. Recruit applicant organizations widely in communities where SNUG is supported. Include, but do not limit, the pool to existing established street outreach programs. The goal should be to make certain that funded organizations recognize the importance of program fidelity and can be committed to the requirements of the SNUG model, which include having an office in the target area open late night hours, hiring staff with criminal histories, and familiarity with data collection and reporting out.
3. Develop a local program oversight and management structure which includes the establishment of a local advisory group with representatives from social service organizations, police, other criminal justice organizations, and other representatives from the community. This will enhance accountability and build a foundation in local communities for further development of strategies and programs focused on near-term violence reduction.
4. Work in coordination with law enforcement, specifically, the local police. Ensure that the local police department is aware of SNUG operations, the goals of SNUG, and the limits that SNUG workers have in sharing information. Regular meetings should be held between the SNUG program manager and police administration which includes progress updates, violent crime data sharing, and concerns from either side.
5. Enhance the state-wide oversight and management effort to support accountability, provide technical assistance and enhance sustainability. This will help develop an infrastructure to coordinate and support community based violence prevention efforts across the state.
6. Address data and evaluation needs up front. Require commitments and memoranda of understanding regarding data collection from local intervention programs, police departments and other relevant agencies. The goal would be to support a process of evaluation that is based on constant, ongoing feedback and analysis for continuous improvement and not simply for overall assessment of effectiveness. This is an action research model where there is a direct and ongoing link between practice and research at the local level. Link data collection to funding.

7. Link local programs with local researchers to collaborate with program staff on data collection protocols, assure data collection and enhance accountability. Where possible connect the programs with local analysis centers. This will develop a local culture of support for program fidelity and evaluation.
8. Work closely with Cure Violence in Chicago to assure appropriate program definition, training and data collection. Monitor submission of data through Cure Violence. Link data submission to funding.
9. As part of management oversight, assure best practice case management is utilized, so that, as participants begin to do well or are no longer involved with the program, they are either terminated or graduate. Ensure that the case plan is followed and updated regularly, and that clients are connecting with services and following through with them.
10. Seek ways to stabilize programs through multiple years of funding. This will allow development of local experience and expertise in SNUG methods and other near-term anti-violence interventions. Prioritize stabilizing a select group of well-functioning programs over expansion to new sites.

Albany SNUG Summary Evaluation

Albany SNUG was supported by funds allocated by the New York State Senate and administered by the state Division of Criminal Justice Services. All sites that received funding, including Albany SNUG, were required to adopt the CeaseFire Chicago model of violence reduction. Albany is a city with a population of a little less than 100,000. It had 3 murders in 2012, 4 in 2011, and 4 in 2010. Albany, specifically Trinity Alliance of the Capital Region, was awarded funding to implement SNUG in August 2010, and the program was on the ground with staff trained for outreach and violence mediation work by mid October 2010. The program was active through September 2011 when funding ended and the SNUG program was forced to shut its doors. A second round of funding was awarded and received four months later, in January 2012. An almost completely new team was hired and, inconsistent with the CeaseFire model, the program manager also worked as the outreach worker supervisor. The program was up and running with new staff hired and trained in May 2012 and continues to run through the present.

SNUG Albany is run through Trinity Alliance, which is the largest social agency in the Capital Region. The SNUG headquarters is a newly renovated office building, owned by Trinity, located within the target area. The target areas are Arbor Hill and West Hill (primary target area) and the South Side (secondary target area). These areas were identified by the Albany Police Department's Crime Analysis Center through mapping violent crime in Albany.

Albany SNUG staffing has undergone more turnover than any of the other sites. The team that was involved during the first grant period was not hired during the second round, except for two

workers (one who was promoted to program manager/outreach worker and one who is no longer with the program). The program manager hired for the second round was terminated in November 2011 and the team quickly stepped up to identify one of the violence interrupters as the new program manager/outreach worker supervisor. During the second round of funding, one outreach worker was hired, then terminated, then rehired, then terminated again.

Staff were hired utilizing the CeaseFire model's hiring panel, which was used for nearly all the staff hired in Albany. Staff, except for the program manager, were all on-call and worked evening and weekend night hours, as is consistent with the model. From interviews, it appeared that the staff members were indeed credible messengers as they all had prior interactions with the criminal justice system and almost all of them were incarcerated at some point in their lives. The violence interrupters (VIs) were younger and had closer relationships with those who were considered the "trigger pullers" in the neighborhoods. The VIs work part time in short, 2 hour shifts at a time. They explained their role as walking the neighborhoods, talking with people, checking in with high-risk individuals, and hanging around known hot spots to keep their ear close to the pulse of the streets. If a dispute was brewing, then the VIs would first go to the person involved who they knew best, speak with that individual, then go to the other person, speak with them, then go back to the first person, and then hopefully bring them together and resolving the dispute. Outreach workers discussed the importance of canvassing the neighborhoods, getting high-risk clients, and working with the clients to make changes in their lives. The outreach workers did not have full caseloads, but they all had at least a few clients on their caseload. Issues clients faced include: employment, school-related, anger management, and child custody, amongst others.

Documentation is a one of the important ways that program activity and impact can be measured. CeaseFire Chicago provided training and access to their database for the SNUG team to input their site data. The data are expected to be inputted at a minimum, weekly, by the VIs and outreach workers. This did not happen with any consistency with SNUG Albany. With the new grant funding, it took months to eventually get the workers trained and access to the database. While the site reported that they were capturing data, when asked about data, they directed us to the database. CeaseFire Chicago granted the evaluators access to the database and we were able to review the data. The data indicate that, from program inception through February 28, 2013, 90 conflicts were mediated, with 43% of them completely resolved, and only 13% ongoing. Of the disputes mediated, nearly 70% were judged likely to result in a shooting if no mediation occurred. There were 32 shootings documented in the database, but only two-thirds of those resulted in a shooting response by SNUG, according to data gleaned from the database. There were 51 recorded participants during the duration of SNUG.

Regarding fidelity to the CeaseFire model SNUG Albany staff, unlike some other sites, were involved with an ongoing coalition on violence reduction in which they attended monthly meetings. Clergy were mobilized by Albany SNUG with clergy members present at shooting responses and community events. Community mobilization was done specifically through the shooting responses in which staff worked closely in the neighborhood to help the community grieve and spread the message that violence must stop. The database reported that they had 47 community activities or one activity every two weeks. While the SNUG staff did not wear any identifying t-shirts or hats, they regularly wear lanyards to identify the program. The workers

passed out brochures while canvassing and posted information in area businesses. Area businesses were also willing to provide various services for SNUG participants, including free haircuts.

SNUG Albany and the Albany Police Department not only coexist peacefully, but conversations with the Police Department revealed that the officers have been presented information on the SNUG program, have received guidance on how to interact with SNUG workers, and generally recognize the work that SNUG does in its attempts to reduce violence. While SNUG does not share information directly with law enforcement, Albany Police regularly meet with the SNUG program manager to share data and any information that would be useful to SNUG in order to reduce violence, the likelihood of retaliation, or mediate a dispute. This is consistent with the CeaseFire model.

Interviews with CeaseFire Chicago staff revealed that out of the three tier ranking system that CeaseFire utilizes for all of its sites, Albany falls into Tier Two regarding fidelity to the model. CeaseFire Chicago identified some of the previously discussed issues that affected the ranking, including management issues, staff turnover issues, staffing issues, and a higher number of stabbings than shootings (CeaseFire focuses on gun violence). CeaseFire usually has regular contact with the sites, but that has not been consistent with Albany. CeaseFire explained the upstate sites that received funding the second time have much lower incidences of violent crime and high risk participants than the NY city sites and Chicago. CeaseFire felt that Albany is good at interruption, intervention, and risk reduction, but not all of the participants are the highest risk simply because they do not have that many to choose from, and therefore the workers do not have full caseloads. The overall assessment by CeaseFire was simply that SNUG Albany does not have enough high risk clients and violent incidents to be fully consistent with the Chicago model.

Finally, we evaluated the impact of SNUG on the four Part I index crimes: murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Since SNUG was primarily intended to impact firearm-related crimes, we examined counts of these four events where a firearm was involved. The incident data span January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2012. Since implementation started in September 2010, there are 56 months of pre-implementation data and 23 months of post-implementation data.

Results indicate that in Albany, violence of all types, whether firearm-related or not, declined in the period after the implementation of SNUG. The results were generally modest, however, and most decreases in violence did not reach statistical significance. Again, note that violent crime in Albany is comparatively low in frequency. Some crime types showed only very low levels of activity, thus precluding the possibility of dramatic reductions. Notwithstanding the lack of statistically significant results, the general pattern of results is consistent with a successful outcome, with all index crimes decreasing.

In conclusion, Albany SNUG has had a very good relationship with law enforcement, mobilized the community in an effective way, did moderately well with program fidelity, but experienced staff turnover and had difficulties with data collection. Perhaps, though, the biggest issue related to both program fidelity to the model and impact on firearm crime, is that crime levels limit clear conclusions regarding program effects. The data show crime reductions over the course of the

program, but they do not achieve statistical significance. While it was clear from our assessment that the community and the workers feel a strong need for this program, there may be a way to alter the CeaseFire model to address knife violence, allow for working with lower risk individuals, and focus more on service delivery. The work done under the model including: effective community mobilizing, educational campaigns, and dispute mediations were done well and seemed to be important to the community.

Niagara Falls SNUG Summary Evaluation

Niagara Falls SNUG was supported by funds allocated by the New York State Senate and administered by the state Division of Criminal Justice Services. All sites that received funding, including Niagara Falls SNUG, were required to adopt the CeaseFire Chicago model of violence reduction. Niagara Falls is a city with a population of about 50,000. It reported 3 murders in 2012, 4 in 2011, and 5 in 2010. Niagara Falls, specifically People and Possibilities administered via the Niagara Falls Housing Authority, was awarded funding to implement SNUG in August 2010. By October 2010, the program staff were on the ground and trained for outreach and violence mediation work. The program ran through the initial grant period and then continued through the second grant period, with no hiatus. In November 2012, the funding ended and the SNUG program was forced to shut its doors.

SNUG Niagara Falls is administered by the Niagara Falls Housing Authority, which runs numerous programs throughout its housing complexes. The SNUG headquarters changed over the grant period and the original SNUG storefront was located in an area that is currently undergoing demolition. The new SNUG office was not located in the target area, and did not appear to be used regularly by either staff or participants. The CeaseFire model requires the SNUG office to be both in the target area and ideally a place that is open late night hours allowing participants and others to have a safe place to be. The target area is located within 100 city blocks of Niagara Falls. This area was identified by the Niagara Falls Police Department's crime analysts through mapping violent crime in Niagara Falls.

SNUG staffing was consistent throughout the duration of both grant funding periods, with only two staff members terminated early on for positive drug tests. Staff were hired utilizing the CeaseFire model's hiring panel, which was used for all of the hires made for SNUG Niagara Falls, except for the program manager, as is consistent with the CeaseFire model. Staff, except for the program manager, were all on-call and worked evening and weekend night hours, as is consistent with the model. From interviews, it appeared that the staff members were indeed credible messengers as all, except for one, had been incarcerated at some point in their lives. The one worker who had not been incarcerated had been involved heavily in substance abuse and is now a recovering addict, with training in substance abuse counseling.

The violence interrupters (VIs) were younger and had closer relationships with those who were considered the "trigger pullers" in the neighborhoods. The VIs work part time and explained their role as walking the neighborhoods, talking with people, and checking in with high-risk individuals. The VIs are expected to mediate disputes, and conversations revealed that all the

staff have been involved in mediating disputes. VIs and outreach workers also described their roles as working closely with the schools in conducting presentations on making healthy life decisions and not engaging in violent behavior. The VIs and outreach workers also ran specific groups or programs with identified high risk students in the schools. Outreach workers talked about their role of canvassing the neighborhoods, getting clients, working with the clients to make changes in their lives, and putting on community events. Community events were a very important aspect of the SNUG team, as they regularly hosted barbecues and other events.

Documentation is one of the important ways that program activity and impact can be measured. CeaseFire Chicago provided training and access to their database for the SNUG team to input their site data. The data are expected to be inputted at a minimum, weekly, by the VIs and outreach workers. This did seem to happen consistently with SNUG Niagara Falls. CeaseFire Chicago granted us access to the database and we were able to review the data. The data indicate that, from program inception through program closure on October 31, 2012, 37 conflicts were mediated, with 51% of them completely resolved, and only 11% ongoing. Of the disputes mediated, less than half (46%) were judged likely to result in a shooting if no mediation occurred. There were 17 shootings documented in the database, with 14 shooting responses reported, making for only 3 shootings without a shooting response. There were 66 recorded participants throughout the duration of SNUG.

Regarding fidelity to the CeaseFire model, SNUG Niagara Falls staff, were not involved with an ongoing coalition on violence reduction nor did they create a coalition. However, clergy were mobilized with clergy members present at shooting responses and community events, with some even donating extra sneakers and clothing to SNUG participants. Community mobilization was done during the shooting responses, but also during the community events and other public events where SNUG staff were invited to attend and present. The database reported that they had 41 community activities. The SNUG staff wore SNUG t-shirts, hats and wristbands; they were clearly identifiable as SNUG workers. They had plenty of promotional materials on hand including posters, business cards, banners, and bumper stickers. The workers would pass out brochures while canvassing and post information in area businesses. The educational campaign was perhaps their strongest component of the CeaseFire model for SNUG Niagara Falls. The staff were involved in many school activities, present at any major community events, were asked to present at many city events, and the community recognized SNUG workers.

SNUG Niagara Falls and the Niagara Falls Police Department worked well together. Meetings were held somewhat regularly with the program manager, informing the manager of violent activity in the target area. However, SNUG staff reported that, as violent activity was not all too frequent, they would respond to all shootings and mediate disputes anywhere in the city of Niagara Falls. Thus, while the target area was their primary focus, it was evident that they regularly worked outside of the target area.

Interviews with CeaseFire Chicago staff revealed that out of the three tier ranking system that CeaseFire utilizes for all of its sites, Niagara Falls fell into Tier Three with regards to fidelity to the model (with Tier One sites having closest fidelity to the model). CeaseFire Chicago identified some of the issues that affected the ranking, including low levels of violent activity which drove the ranking. With such low levels of violence, the participants were not nearly all

high risk, the target area was not appropriate (not enough firearm violence), and more work was done with the community rather than with individuals simply due to the lack of violent individuals. CeaseFire usually has regular contact with the sites, which was consistent with Niagara Falls during the first round of funding, but waned during the second round of funding. CeaseFire explained that the upstate sites that received funding the second time, have much lower incidences of violent crime and high risk participants than the NY city sites and Chicago. CeaseFire felt that Niagara Falls is good at the community mobilization and educational campaigning, but not all of the participants are the highest risk simply because they do not have that many to choose from. The overall assessment by CeaseFire was simply that SNUG Niagara Falls does not have enough high risk clients and violent incidents to be fully consistent with the Chicago model.

Finally, we evaluated the impact of SNUG based on the four Part I index crimes: murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Since SNUG was primarily intended to impact firearm-related crimes, we examined counts of these four events where a firearm was involved. The incident data span from January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2012. Since implementation started in September 2010, there are 56 months of pre-implementation data and 23 months of post-implementation data.

Results indicate that violence in Niagara Falls of all types, whether firearm-related or not, showed no clear pattern of change in the period after the implementation of SNUG. The results were generally modest, however, and none of the changes in violence reached statistical significance, therefore we cannot discount chance as the reason for any apparent changes. Note that violent crime in Niagara Falls is generally low in frequency to begin with. Some crime types had barely any activity at all, thus precluding the possibility of dramatic reductions. Notwithstanding the lack of statistically significant results, the mixed nature of results is not consistent with a successful outcome.

In conclusion, Niagara Falls SNUG has done very well with community mobilization, connecting with schools, and educational campaigning. However, Niagara Falls SNUG did not do as well with program fidelity. That was due to many issues outside of their control. Perhaps, the biggest issue related to both program fidelity to the model and impact on firearm crime, is that crime levels limit clear conclusions regarding program effects. The data show mixed results over the course of the program, but they do not achieve statistical significance. While it was clear from our assessment that the SNUG workers managed to find a niche for the program in working with the schools on violence prevention and reduction, it may make sense to alter the program to allow for working with lower risk individuals, and focus more on service delivery. The work done under the model including: effective community mobilizing and educational campaigns were done well and seemed to be important to the community.

Yonkers SNUG Summary Evaluation

Yonkers SNUG was supported by funds allocated by the New York State Senate and administered by the state Division of Criminal Justice Services. All sites that received funding, including Yonkers SNUG, were required to adopt the CeaseFire Chicago model of violence reduction. Yonkers is a city with a population of nearly 200,000. It reported 4 murders in 2012, 7 in 2011, and 9 in 2010. Yonkers, specifically the Yonkers YMCA, was awarded funding to implement SNUG in August 2010, with the money split between Mt. Vernon and Yonkers (\$250,000 per site). The program was on the ground with staff trained for outreach and violence mediation work by October 2010. The program ran through the initial grant period and then continued through the second grant period, securing grant funding through DCJS and the City of Yonkers, with no hiatus. The program continues through the present day.

Yonkers SNUG is administered by the YMCA, which runs numerous programs housed out of its centrally located facility. The SNUG headquarters is located within the YMCA, but does not appear to be used regularly by staff or other participants. With the YMCA as the parent organization of SNUG Yonkers, an enormous benefit is that every participant receives a free YMCA membership. The CeaseFire model requires the SNUG office to be both in the target area and ideally a place that is open late night hours allowing participants and others to have a safe place to be. There are two identified target areas, Nodine Hill and the Schlobohm housing project. These two areas were identified through consultation with other agencies working on crime prevention and with the police department, which provided data on the areas of the city with the highest number of shootings and killings.

SNUG staffing was consistent throughout the duration of both grant funding periods, with only one staff member who was not hired at program inception, brought on midway through. Staff were hired utilizing the CeaseFire model's hiring panel, which was used for all of the hires made, as is consistent with the CeaseFire model. Staff, except for the program manager, were all on-call and worked evening and weekend night hours, as is consistent with the model. From interviews, it appeared that the staff members were indeed credible messengers as all, except for the program manager, had been incarcerated at some point in their lives. With this particular site, the program manager played a role consistent with the CeaseFire model, but it was also clear that the CEO of the Yonkers YMCA was very involved with the program, aware of events that were happening, disputes mediated, and other outreach work done by the staff.

The violence interrupter (VI) was older and was brought on after the previous VI was terminated. He has very close relationships with residents of the neighborhoods and is even referred to as "uncle" by many of the community members. The VI works part time and explained his role as walking the neighborhoods, talking with people, checking in with high-risk individuals, and mediating disputes with the assistance of the outreach workers. The Outreach workers talked about their role of canvassing the neighborhoods, getting clients, working with the clients to make changes in their lives, and mediating disputes. The staff made it clear that while the VI does not have a caseload and the outreach workers do (consistent with CeaseFire model) all of the outreach workers and the VI are involved in mediating disputes. It was explained that the staff all have relationships with certain individuals, so they would use that pre-existing relationship as leverage to get an "in" to mediate disputes peacefully.

Documentation is a one of the important ways that program activity and impact can be measured. CeaseFire Chicago provided training and access to their database for the SNUG team to input their site data. The data are expected to be inputted at a minimum, weekly, by the VIs and outreach workers. This did seem to happen with consistency with SNUG Yonkers. CeaseFire Chicago granted us access to the database and we were able to review the data. The data indicated that, from program inception through February 28, 2013, 291 conflicts were mediated, with 41% of them completely resolved, and only 8% ongoing. Of the disputes mediated, 76% were judged likely to result in a shooting if no mediation occurred. There were 9 shootings documented in the database, with 5 shooting responses reported, making for 4 shootings without a shooting response, or 44%. With only 9 shootings documented in the database during that time frame and 291 mediations documented, it appears that much preventive work was done in the mediations, resulting in few shootings. There were 76 recorded participants throughout the duration of SNUG.

Regarding fidelity to the CeaseFire model, SNUG Yonkers staff are involved with an ongoing coalition on violence reduction. Clergy involvement, however, was not as active as SNUG Yonkers staff had hoped. The staff reported that they have reached out to area clergy, but have had limited response. However, there is at least one active clergy member who is very involved with SNUG and promotes the program regularly. Community mobilization was done during the shooting responses, but also during the community events and other public events of which SNUG staff were invited. The database reported that they had 105 community activities. The SNUG staff did not wear identifiable SNUG apparel, but they did regularly wear an identification card, making it clear that they are SNUG staff. The promotional materials included posters and pamphlets. They did, additionally, report strong relationships with local schools as they had presented in all of the local schools and even conducted empowerment classes at one of the schools.

SNUG Yonkers and the Yonkers Police Department reported an excellent relationship at the administrative level, with either the Police Chief or the Deputy Chief regularly reporting violent crime data to the SNUG administrators. The Chief even reported that since the inception of SNUG, shootings have decreased 70%. Meetings between SNUG staff and the Police were not regular, however, both reported that police share information with SNUG regularly and that they get along well.

Interviews with CeaseFire Chicago staff revealed that out of the three tier ranking system that CeaseFire utilizes for all of its sites, Yonkers fell into Tier One with regards to fidelity to the model (Tier One sites have closest fidelity to the model). CeaseFire Chicago had nothing but good things to report about the Yonkers site. They explained that Yonkers went a year without a shooting incident while SNUG was up and running, the team makeup is just what the CeaseFire Chicago model recommends, and it is clear that the staff and program manager understand the model very well, as the division of the target area into quadrants by program staff is effective. They went on to say that CeaseFire Chicago has even used Yonkers SNUG staff to assist in training other sites, a clear indication of how “on model” Yonkers is. Yonkers SNUG consistently gathered and inputted data into the CeaseFire database, which was evident in the data gleaned for analysis. CeaseFire Chicago felt strongly that the Yonkers staffing is the best

out of the five sites in that the team understands the model very well, works well together, and all are credible messengers. The overall assessment by CeaseFire was that SNUG Yonkers does well with every component of the model, and that it has seen drastic reductions in violent activity since program inception, an indication that the program is effective.

Finally, we evaluated the impact of SNUG based on the four Part I index crimes: murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Since SNUG was primarily intended to impact firearm-related crimes, we examined counts of these four events where a firearm was involved. The incident data span January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2012. Since implementation started in September 2010, there are 56 months of pre-implementation data and 23 months of post-implementation data.

Results indicate that after the introduction of SNUG to Yonkers, some forms of violence increased while others decreased—a classic example of mixed findings. Most of these changes were not sufficiently large enough to achieve statistical significance, so it is not possible to rule out chance as the reason behind such changes. We nevertheless need to point out that the Yonkers data applies to the entire city, whereas SNUG was only implemented in two communities. As a result, changes in violence across the city may well have obscured programmatic effects for SNUG. It is worth noting that before SNUG, Yonkers averaged a firearm-related homicide every two months. After SNUG, that number decreased to about one every four months. Non firearm-related homicides also decreased after the implementation of SNUG. While it did not reach statistical significance, these findings are nonetheless important.

Further, the number of shooting incidents in Yonkers decreased from 3.13 monthly shooting incidents pre-SNUG implementation to 1.5 monthly shooting incidents. This finding reached significance. The number of shooting victims also decreased post SNUG implementation, with 19 fewer shooting victims per year.

In conclusion, Yonkers SNUG has done very well with all aspects of the CeaseFire model, but has struggled with clergy involvement. While our analysis found mixed findings, the Chief of Police reported a 70% reduction in shootings since the inception of SNUG, CeaseFire Chicago reported a one year time lapse with no shootings in Yonkers, and Yonkers reported very few shooting incidents and a high number of mediation work. This was supported by the statistically significant finding of a reduction in shooting incidents. Further, SNUG Yonkers did extremely well, arguably the best, amongst the five funded NY sites, according to CeaseFire Chicago's assessment. Some of the inputs that likely influenced the good work include: very low staff turnover, CEO involvement in the program, regular data collection and reporting out, staff's clear understanding of the model, the SNUG office located in the YMCA, and regular educational campaigning.

Harlem SNUG Summary Evaluation

Harlem SNUG was supported by funds allocated by the New York State Senate and administered by the state Division of Criminal Justice Services. All sites that received funding, including Harlem SNUG, were required to adopt the CeaseFire Chicago model of violence reduction. The target area is located in Central Harlem and is mostly contained within the 10030 zip code. According to 2010 Census data, the area covered by the 10030 zip code in Harlem has a total population of 26,999 people. Harlem, specifically the New York City Mission Society, was awarded funding to implement SNUG in August 2010. The program was on the ground with staff trained for outreach and violence mediation work by October 2010. The program ran through the initial grant period and then continued through the second grant period, securing grant funding through DCJS and the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, with no hiatus. The program continues through the present day.

SNUG Harlem is run through the Mission Society, which has a longstanding history within the community and offers numerous programs for the community. The SNUG headquarters is located across the street from the Mission Society within the target area, and amongst a busy pedestrian thoroughfare. The SNUG office is regularly used by the staff as well as participants. The office is open late into the night and participants as well as non-participants from the neighborhoods, who are high risk, drop in and out of the office. The target area consists of a 72 block area of Harlem from 145th to 127th between Lenox and St. Nicholas avenues and is generally considered Central Harlem. The area was chosen via analysis of police data provided by the New York City police department. The target area is very large and even though the entire area is canvassed, program staff indicate that, from the inception of the SNUG program in 2010 and until 2011, the focus of their efforts was on “downtown” from 127th to 135th street. Since 2011, the focus has expanded to a bit more uptown, and with the recent addition of new staff, they have been able to focus their efforts more broadly.

SNUG Harlem has undergone little staff turnover throughout the duration of both grant funding periods, with only two staff members resigning, one for a promotion and another for a career change. However, new staff have been added as more funding has been received. This site has the largest staff, with 6 outreach workers, one outreach worker supervisor, three violence interrupters, two hospital responders, and one program manager. Staff were hired utilizing the CeaseFire model’s hiring panel, which was used for all of the hires made, as is consistent with the CeaseFire model. Staff, except for the program manager, are all on-call and worked evening and weekend night hours, as is consistent with the model. From interviews, it appeared that the staff members were indeed credible messengers as all, except for the program manager, had been incarcerated at some point in their lives.

All of the outreach workers work full-time, all of the violence interrupters/hospital responders work full time, and the two who are solely hospital responders, work part time. The VIs discussed their work as mostly canvassing the neighborhoods, speaking with residents to keep close to the street activity, and mediating disputes. The VIs and the hospital responders spend a good deal of time each week responding to shootings, stabbings, and assaults at the hospital. From those incidents they attempt to reduce the likelihood of retaliation by mediating disputes. VIs and hospital responders refer clients to the outreach workers. The Outreach workers

described their role as canvassing the neighborhoods, getting clients, and working with the clients to make changes in their lives.

Documentation is a one of the important ways that program activity and impact can be measured. CeaseFire Chicago provided training and access to their database for the SNUG team to input their site data. The data are expected to be inputted at a minimum, weekly, by the VIs and outreach workers. This did seem to happen with consistency with SNUG Harlem. CeaseFire Chicago granted the evaluators access to the database in order to review the data. The data indicated that, from program inception through February 28, 2013, 148 conflicts were mediated, with 34% of them completely resolved, and only 10% ongoing. Of the disputes mediated, 86% were judged likely to result in a shooting if no mediation occurred. There were 41 shootings documented in the database, with 37 shooting responses reported, making for only 4 shootings without a shooting response. There were 120 recorded participants during the duration of SNUG.

With regard to fidelity to the CeaseFire model, SNUG Harlem staff are involved with an ongoing coalition on violence reduction. Clergy were very involved in SNUG, with many opening up their gyms to participants. Community mobilization is done during the shooting responses, during the community events, and during educational campaigning. One of Harlem SNUG's ideas was to create a casket walk, in which they would walk through the neighborhoods with an empty casket and get volunteers to march with them along the way, promoting an end to gun violence. The impact on the community from these walks was not only recognized as significant by Harlem SNUG staff, but also by CeaseFire Chicago staff and sites across New York. The database reported that they had 105 community activities. The SNUG staff regularly wear SNUG t-shirts, making it clear that they work for SNUG. The promotional materials included posters and pamphlets.

SNUG Harlem does not report a strong relationship with the 32nd police precinct, which serves the target area. It was explained that they have tried in the past, and sometimes SNUG is able to get data relevant to the work being done, but it is not consistent. SNUG Harlem continues to work to improve this relationship.

Interviews with CeaseFire Chicago staff revealed that out of the three tier ranking system that CeaseFire utilizes for all of its sites, Harlem fell into Tier One with regards to fidelity to the model (Tier One sites have closest fidelity to the model). CeaseFire Chicago had very positive feedback regarding SNUG Harlem. CeaseFire reported that the staff are effective, the Casket walk is a hit, the program documentation has been done well, and that the staff do well with both outreach and dispute mediation. One of the important facets to Harlem SNUG is the location of their storefront and their accessibility to young people late in the night and even later on the weekends, with their doors open and foot traffic coming and going regularly. Harlem SNUG has been consistently on the regular CeaseFire Chicago phone calls and they have begun expanding the hospital respondent facet of the program, something that CeaseFire Chicago is impressed with. The one drawback that pulls Harlem SNUG from being a top program in CeaseFire Chicago's mind is that their target area is just too large. Unfortunately, they have not been successful in downsizing, but with the recent additional hires, it looks as though Harlem SNUG is getting closer to being a top site.

Finally, we evaluated the impact of SNUG based on: murder, criminal possession of a weapon, robbery, and aggravated assault. Since SNUG was primarily intended to impact firearm-related crimes, we examined counts of these four events where a firearm was involved. The incident data span from January 2007 through December 2012. Since the implementation of SNUG started in September 2010, there are 44 months of pre-implementation data and 28 months of post-implementation data

Results indicate that the implementation of SNUG in specific areas of Harlem was followed by an inconsistent pattern of changes, particularly for gun-related offenses, although overall six of the nine violent crimes lessened after SNUG was implemented. The degree of change was very modest, however, and most of these changes in violence did not reach statistical significance, where we can safely rule out chance as the reason for any apparent variation. Note that violent crime in the Harlem SNUG area is generally low in frequency to begin with. Some crime types had barely any activity at all (such as firearm-related felony assault) or had very small amounts of activity, thus precluding the possibility of dramatic reductions. However, there did appear to be a slight decrease in the number of shooting victims post SNUG. While the findings are not significant, they are still worth noting. Thus, with a lack of statistically significant findings, it is difficult to determine the success of the program.

In conclusion, Harlem SNUG has done very well with all aspects of the CeaseFire model, but has struggled due to the size of its target area. With the inconsistent patterns of changes in crime, determining program success was difficult. However, SNUG Harlem is one of the most creative sites of all five sites, does well with mediation and outreach, and is especially good at engaging clients and working with the highest risk clients. SNUG Harlem did extremely well, and is ranked as a tier one site amongst the five NY sites refunded for SNUG, according to CeaseFire Chicago's assessment. While SNUG Harlem has continued to expand with its hospital responders and outreach workers, it continues to be very strong with regard to program fidelity.

ENY/Brooklyn SNUG Summary Evaluation

ENY/Brooklyn SNUG was supported by funds allocated by the New York State Senate and administered by the state Division of Criminal Justice Services. All sites that received funding, including ENY/Brooklyn SNUG, were required to adopt the CeaseFire Chicago model of violence reduction. The target area has changed in between the two funding periods, the first target area encompassed a 25 block area and the second consists of two housing projects. ENY/Brooklyn, specifically ManUp Inc., was awarded funding to implement SNUG in August 2010. The program was on the ground with staff trained for outreach and violence mediation work by October 2010. The program ran through the initial grant period and ended in October 2011. It was funded for a second grant period, securing grant funding through DCJS, and was up and running again in June 2012. It ran through to November 2012, when it went on another hiatus for three weeks and then was up and running in December 2012. The program continues through the present day.

SNUG ENY/Brooklyn is run through ManUp Inc., which is a community organization that offers various community programs such as youth camps, youth employment, and mentoring. The

SNUG headquarters is located within a storefront in the target area. The SNUG office is regularly used by the staff as well as participants. The office houses a computer lab which participants and other community members are welcome to use. The target area consists of two housing projects. The original target area was located in 25 blocks around Sutter Avenue/New Lots Avenue and Van Siclen Avenue/Pennsylvania Avenue. The original target area was selected in coordination with the 75th police precinct with specific attention to violent crime. The new target area was identified by the SNUG staff during the second round of funding and continues to the present day. This new target area encompasses to housing projects along Linden Boulevard, Cozine Avenue, Pennsylvania Avenue, and Ashford Avenue.

SNUG ENY/Brooklyn has undergone substantial staff turnover throughout both grant funding periods. However, the program manager, who is also the director of the parent agency (ManUp Inc.) has remained the program manager through the duration of SNUG. Some SNUG staff have either been terminated, resigned, or did not continue after the various breaks in funding. Staff were hired utilizing the CeaseFire model's hiring panel, which was used for all of the hires made, as is consistent with the CeaseFire model. Staff, except for the program manager, are all on-call and work evening and weekend night hours, as is consistent with the model. From interviews, it appeared that the staff members were indeed credible messengers as all, or nearly all, had been incarcerated at some point in their lives.

All of the outreach workers work full-time and all of the violence interrupters work part-time. The VIs discussed their work as mostly canvassing the neighborhoods, speaking with residents to keep close to the street activity, and mediating disputes. The Outreach workers described their role of canvassing the neighborhoods, getting clients, working with the clients to make changes in their lives, and assisting with dispute mediations as necessary.

Documentation is one of the important ways that program activity and impact can be measured. CeaseFire Chicago provided training and access to their database for the SNUG team to input their site data. The data are expected to be inputted, at a minimum, weekly, by the VIs and outreach workers. This did not happen with consistency with SNUG ENY/Brooklyn. CeaseFire Chicago granted us access to the database and we were able to review the data. The data indicated that, from program inception through February 28, 2013, only 6 conflicts were mediated, with five of them completely resolved, and the other resolved temporarily. Of the six disputes mediated, 100% were judged likely to result in a shooting if no mediation occurred. There were 8 shootings documented in the database, with 7 shooting responses reported, making for only 1 documented shooting without a shooting response. There were 104 recorded participants during the duration of SNUG.

With regard to fidelity to the CeaseFire model, SNUG ENY/Brooklyn staff are involved with an ongoing coalition known as the Brooklyn Clergy Task Force. Clergy were very involved in SNUG, with many involved in community events, marches, and other community activities. Community mobilization is done during the shooting responses, during the community events, and during educational campaigning. The database indicates that the program had only 23 community activities. The SNUG staff regularly wear SNUG t-shirts, making it clear that they work for SNUG. The promotional materials included posters and pamphlets. One unique thing about ENY/Brooklyn SNUG is that they work closely with other NYC SNUG sites, on either

attending community events or mediating disputes. This was not seen with the other five sites evaluated.

SNUG ENY/Brooklyn does not report a strong relationship with the 75th police precinct, which serves both the current and former the target areas. They reported that they do have a relationship with the command staff of the 75th precinct, but that they do not regularly receive data from them. However, if they request data, then they normally will receive it. They continue working on improving this relationship.

Interviews with CeaseFire Chicago staff revealed that out of the three tier ranking system that CeaseFire utilizes for all of its sites, ENY/Brooklyn fell into Tier One with regards to fidelity to the model (Tier One sites have closest fidelity to the model). CeaseFire Chicago had very positive feedback regarding SNUG ENY/Brooklyn. CeaseFire reported that the staff hired are effective, the program manager works well with the staff, they have effectively mobilized the community, and they regularly canvas the neighborhood. One of the important facets to ENY/Brooklyn SNUG is the location of their storefront and their accessibility to young people within the target area. CeaseFire reported that ENY/Brooklyn was consistent with data collection during its first round of funding, but that after the second round of funding, when the staffing was reduced, data were not being documented regularly. CeaseFire also reported that the program manager of the ENY/Brooklyn site knows the program details the best of all five of the evaluated sites. This program manager is very clear on the expectations and reminds staff of the different components of the program. This program manager is very hands-on and very involved in the work that is done by the team. Further, ENY/Brooklyn SNUG have been consistently on the regular CeaseFire Chicago phone calls.

Finally, we evaluated the impact of SNUG based on: murder, criminal possession of a weapon, robbery, and aggravated assault. Since SNUG was primarily intended to impact firearm-related crimes, we examined counts of these four events where a firearm was involved. The incident data span from January 2007 through December 2012. Since the implementation of SNUG started in September 2010, there are 44 months of pre-implementation data and 28 months of post-implementation data.

The implementation of SNUG in specific areas of Brooklyn was followed by an inconsistent pattern of changes. Specifically, gun-related homicide and gun-related felony assault both increased, while gun-related robbery and gun-related dangerous weapon incidents decreased. The degree of change was generally modest, however, and most of these changes in violence did not reach statistical significance, where we can safely rule out chance as the reason for any apparent variation. Note that violent crime in the Brooklyn SNUG area is generally low in frequency to begin with. Some crime types had barely any activity at all (such as non-firearm-related murder) or had very small amounts of activity, thus precluding the possibility of dramatic reductions. The lack of statistically significant results, makes it difficult to determine program effectiveness.

In conclusion, ENY/Brooklyn SNUG has done very well with many aspects of the CeaseFire model, but has struggled in terms of staff turnover and program documentation. SNUG ENY/Brooklyn is one of the stand-out sites when it comes to the program manager's

involvement and understanding of the model. The site also does well with client outreach, community mobilization, clergy involvement, and canvassing. While ENY/Brooklyn is working towards improving its relationship with the police, it does well in almost every other area; however the limited documentation of program activities and lack of significant findings, makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions.

Chapter 2: Introduction and Background

In some countries, the chances that an individual will be a victim of lethal violence is small while in others, overall rates of violence, especially homicidal violence are high, and are particularly high for certain subgroups of the population. Globally, rates of violence vary along a continuum with more economically developed countries having lower levels of violence, while higher levels of violence are found in countries at the middle to lower end of the scale of affluence and economic development. There is one persistent exception to the pattern of richer countries exhibiting lower levels of violence, namely the relatively high levels of violence in the United States. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the homicide rate in the United States hovered around 5 per 100,000, which was considerably higher than rates found in other advanced affluent industrial societies. In recent decades the homicide rate of approximately 6 per 100,000 in the United States is less than the most violent countries of the Caribbean, Latin America and the former Soviet Union, but the chances of death via lethal violence in the U.S. is roughly 4 to 10 times higher than most of the other affluent countries in the world. Country level rates of violence mask the uneven distribution of violence in any particular country however, and this dimension of violence is starkly evident in the United States.

Violent crime has continued to be a complex, challenging topic to address across the United States. Homicide by a firearm is the second leading cause of death for males aged 15-24 and the third leading cause of death for males aged 25-34 (CDC, 2012). Violent crime encompasses murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault (FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program, 2011). Violence, especially lethal violence, is unevenly distributed across geographic space in the United States. Some states in New England and the Midwest have rates of lethal violence comparable to the most economically developed countries in the world, while rates of violence in the South are similar to those found in the middle and low income countries. In 2004 Maine, Vermont, Iowa, New Hampshire, and North Dakota's homicide rate was less than 2 per 100,000, but by contrast, it was 13 per 100,000 in Louisiana. In other words, in 2004, a resident of Louisiana, was eight times more likely to be slain than someone who lived in Maine. Levels of lethal violence are different across states and region of the country, but they also differ along smaller demarcations of geographic space, whereby much higher levels of lethal violence are present in the central cities compared to suburban or rural areas. Many large and medium sized cities are plagued by an epidemic of lethal violence stemming from arguments, gang related activity, or open-air drug markets among others, which are simply unimaginable in other rich countries. For example, the city of Oakland with a population of approximately 375,000 people in 2006, experienced more homicides than the entire country of Sweden. Young men perpetrate most of the homicides in America's cities, and most of their victims are also young men.

There is a gendered dimension to homicidal violence around the world and very strikingly so in the U.S. Violence is a leading cause of death among young people in Latin America and the United States, which has levels of youth violence comparable to countries in the developing world. Over the last several years, the homicide rate for young males age 15 to 29 in the U.S. has been more than 20 per 100,000, which is close to countries such as Paraguay, Kazakhstan, and Trinidad and Tobago. Data on adolescent male deaths as a result of violence indicate that 1

in 5 young men dies as a result of violence in the United States as compared to countries such as Canada, Germany and Switzerland, where the rate of adolescent male deaths via violence is closer to 1 in 65. United States is so unique regarding violence compared to countries that are similar to us, that we see levels of homicidal deaths in the U.S. that surpass those of males in some of these other countries. Females in the U.S. between the ages of 15 and 29 are three times more likely to be killed than compared to an English male, five times more likely than a French male, and nine times more likely than a Japanese male. Males are however the leading candidates of death by violence in the U.S. and this is particularly the case for African American males.

Even without any knowledge of the rates of violent crime among the various racial and ethnic groups in the U.S., a cursory examination of arrest data indicate that African Americans are overrepresented among both the victims and offenders in incidents of criminal violence. Blacks make up approximately 13 percent of the overall population in the United States, but account for roughly 50 percent of the homicide victims of which race can be determined. Homicide is the sixth leading cause of death among blacks, and among black males ages 20 to 24 in 2001, 49 percent of all deaths were a consequence of some lethal episode. The fact that homicide in the U.S is almost exclusively an intra-racial event with more than 90 percent of all victims and offenders being of the same race partially explains the high rates of deaths among black youth. These data are alarming, but even more so when compared to whites. Blacks are six times more likely to be the victim of homicide compared to whites, and unlike black males, only 11 percent of white males between the ages of 20 to 24 died a violent death in 2001. As striking as these racial differences are, it is important to note that the rate of 2.3 homicides per 100,000 population among whites in 2002 was much higher than the homicide rates of most developed nations.

Even though the violent crime rate in the United States dropped significantly starting in 1994 and lasted until approximately the early 2000s, rates of violent crime are still higher than they were a generation before. Violent crime did peak in the late 1980s and 1990s with much of the increase a function of gun homicides among urban youth who were predominantly racial minorities. This violence has garnered the attention of community activists, law enforcement and lawmakers who all have employed various tactics and programs to stem the violence.

In recent years, new efforts have been made to reduce the incidence of violence, with particular attention to evaluation and use of best practices. Out of these efforts have come new or model approaches to addressing gun violence. Most of these efforts include identifying high-risk offenders with accessibility to guns and the use of targeted interventions. In one of the most significant government efforts to decrease levels of lethal violence, the George W. Bush administration allocated more than \$1 billion to prevent gun violence via Project Safe Neighborhoods. This project sought to reduce gun violence largely by increasing cooperation between law enforcement at various levels of government and increasing the penalties for illegal gun possession. Project Safe Neighborhoods along with other violent crime reduction programs such as Project Ceasefire, which was originally enacted on Chicago, have shown some evidence at reducing violent deaths and it is the evaluation of one such program in New York State that is the subject of this evaluation.

Objective

This report presents the findings of an evaluation of five Operation SNUG (guns spelled backwards) programs implemented across New York State in 2009. Operation SNUG, based off of the Chicago CeaseFire model, is aimed at reducing gun and gang violence through creating institutional cooperation between community groups and local law enforcement. Operation SNUG includes the following core components:

1. Community mobilization
2. Youth outreach
3. Public education
4. Faith-based leader involvement
5. Law enforcement participation

Senators Malcolm A. Smith (D-14th District, Queens) and John Sampson (D-19th District, Brooklyn) were the driving forces behind this initiative. In the summer of 2009, a call for proposals was put forth to communities across New York State. Ten cities received funding for \$500,000 for a two-year grant period, beginning November 2009. The ten cities included: Albany, Brooklyn, Harlem, Buffalo, Niagara Falls, Syracuse, Rochester, Yonkers, Queens, and Mt.Vernon.

Further funding was then awarded to five of the original cities for another one-year of funding. These cities were: Brooklyn, Yonkers, Harlem, Niagara Falls, and Albany. All but one of these cities received \$150,000 (Niagara Falls received \$100,000) to continue service provision. This evaluation was completed at the behest of the Division of Criminal Justice Services for the five cities who were refunded.

Chicago CeaseFire Model

CeaseFire is a violence prevention program that started in 1999 by the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention located at University of Illinois' School for Public Health. The Chicago program utilized concepts and strategies from the public health field with the following three goals (Skogan, Hartnett, Bump, Duboid; 2009):

1. Change the operative norms regarding violence for everyone in the community
2. Provide in-the-moment alternatives to violence (specifically in regards to retaliation)
3. Increase the perceived risks and costs of involvement in violence among high-risk people

The program identifies a small number of high-risk community members through street outreach and violence interrupter workers and works closely with them to reduce the gun and gang violence throughout Chicago. At one point there were 25 program areas/sites with one central office, utilizing the neighborhood-based service delivery approach.

The program theory best explains the major components and operations within the CeaseFire model. Through the inputs of street intervention, client outreach, clergy involvement, community mobilization, educational campaign, and police and prosecution, they expect to widen decision-making alternatives, change the normal way of thinking and behaving, and educate on the risk and costs associated with violence in order to reduce the levels of violence in the communities. In order to achieve this, outreach workers and violence interrupters are utilized to engage the highest risk residents and offer case management, dispute mediation, and educate

the community on not accepting violence. The staff are credible messengers who are familiar with and have likely been involved in criminal behavior in their past, but now are interested in working with young people to educate and assist with understanding the costs associated with violence, and ways to engage in positive, healthy behavior.

Over the program period, CeaseFire went through a transition, and Cure Violence is now the name of the program. This name change happened synonymously with changes in the model.

According to cureviolence.org:

Cure Violence is a unique, interdisciplinary, public health approach to violence prevention. We maintain that violence is a learned behavior that can be prevented using disease control methods. Using proven public health techniques, the model prevents violence through a three-prong approach:

1. Identification & detection
2. Interruption, Intervention, & risk reduction
3. Changing behavior and norms

As the programs in New York were implemented under the original model, which is similar to this updated model, we conducted our evaluation with regard to the original CeaseFire model. Because of this, we continue to use the term CeaseFire throughout this report.

Public Health Approach

The public health approach is one in which focuses on the health and well-being of an entire population (CDC, 2008). This approach focuses on conditions and diseases, aiming to maximize effective strategies and interventions (Dahlberg & Krug, 2002). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention identifies a four-step public health approach:

1. Define and monitor the problem
2. Identify risk and protective factors
3. Develop and test prevention strategies
4. Assure widespread adoption

In the World Health Organization's prominent *World Report on Violence and Health* released in 2002, Dahlberg and Krug outlined the specific public health approach to violence prevention. While the approach is based on the one above, it is made more explicit here in regards to preventing violence:

1. Uncover as much information about all the aspects of violence
2. Investigate why violence occurs, including causes, protective factors, and risk factors
3. Explore ways to prevent violence
4. Implement interventions that appear to be promising, and widely disseminate the information as well as the cost-effectiveness of interventions.

Educational campaigns, identified as a critical element within the CeaseFire model, are one way of widely disseminating information to people. The educational campaigns within this framework were specific to conveying the message that both the shootings need to stop in the neighborhoods and shooting is not a normal way to deal with disputes. The overall message

was: The gun violence needs to stop. Through the use of printed posters, identified messengers in the faith-based and other communities, as well as billboards, the educational campaigns were strong within this model.

Community mobilization is intertwined with the public health model, as is the work of community health workers. These are neighborhood workers who are trained in effective strategies to reduce or prevent a specific problem. This is very similar to the outreach workers in the CeaseFire model. The outreach workers enlist the community to help put an end to shootings through utilization of community resources, engaging residents in alternative activities, and working with the community to make change.

Operation SNUG

The initial evaluation plan called for an analysis of the five project plans. This analysis would describe how each program site (1) defines the problem, (2) identifies the program goals, (3) describes how the goals are to be met, and (4) explains what the expected outcomes are. However, describing each site's project plan became difficult early on in this evaluation, as there was only one recorded proposal available for review. As we soon realized this was not feasible, the next best piece of information available for use then became the site's individual work plans, which were created by DCJS. While each work plan was the same across cities, the way that the objectives were met was done differently across cities.

Once Operation SNUG was up and running across the cities, it had the following objectives:

1. Reduce violence in the targeted area.
2. Develop and maintain a program site and recruit, interview and develop a SNUG team to be responsible and accountable for the implementation of a successful SNUG program.
3. Community mobilization: establish or participate in a broad-based coalition consisting of community residents and representatives of community organizations, schools, faith leaders and police to plan and implement anti-violence strategies.
4. Law enforcement participation: law enforcement agencies will be actively engaged in planning and implementing the Operation SNUG initiative.
5. Documentation: Continuously collect and keep data in a way that is consistent with other Operation SNUG sites in the state and cooperate with evaluation and assessment efforts as requested by DCJS.

The DCJS work plan essentially did contain the program goals (objectives) and how they are going to be met (task and performance measure). While we did not have the program problem description and expected outcomes, we were able to determine those from reviewing various program documents and interviews with staff members.

Approach

In conducting these evaluations, we had two aims: (1) Determine if SNUG was implemented with fidelity to the Chicago CeaseFire model and (2) Determine what impact, if any, the SNUG program has on the incidence of violent crime in the target areas.

In order to address aim one, we reviewed program proposals, training documents, the program database, program activities, internal documents, including the budget and job descriptions. Further, we conducted semi-structured interviews with program staff, which were initially in the form of telephone interviews and then we went on site visits to interview more in depth, attend program meetings, and see the day-to-day activities. We also conducted semi-structured telephone interviews with CeaseFire Chicago staff who worked closely with the implementation of SNUG across NY State. Those interviewed included the training coordinator, the identified liaison for SNUG New York, and the CeaseFire staff member who ran bi-weekly phone calls with the program sites.

Appendix A includes our telephone semi-structured questionnaire for each site and Appendices B, C, D, and E includes the semi-structured interview for on-site visits, with a separate form for each of the following: program managers, outreach workers, violence interrupters, and one for the target area. We utilized the surveys from Wilson, Chermak, and McGarrell's 2010 assessment of Pittsburgh's street outreach program One Vision one Life, while altering some of the surveys for this current research. We also interviewed law enforcement partners, faith-based partners, government partners, and community partners. Originally we did not intend to interview school partners, as that is not explicit in the CeaseFire model, but upon interviewing SNUG staff, it was evident that the School District was a major partner in at least two of the sites, so we included interviews with School District partners as well.

In order to address aim two, we employed an interrupted time-series with a quasi-experimental design for our evaluation. This design features numerous observations before and after the implementation of SNUG. To assess the impact of SNUG, we employ seasonally adjusted autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) analysis to estimate projected levels of violence. We then contrast the projected and actual (or observed) violent incidents as a means of detecting whether SNUG reduced levels of gun-related violence. We conducted these analyses for all five sites.

Chapter 3: SNUG Program Description

Context

It is important to understand the context in which SNUG and other programs such as Boston's Ceasefire and Project Safe Neighborhoods seek to reduce firearm violence. Most, if not all of these programs are implemented in inner city communities which saw an increase in gun related violence perpetrated in large part by urban young Black and Latino males starting in the 1980s, and reaching epidemic proportions in the early 1990s (Makarios and Pratt 2012). Nationwide violence in general, including gun violence, started to decline in the mid-1990s but recent events in Newtown, Connecticut and the hundreds of homicides in cities such as Chicago and Detroit demonstrate that gun violence is still a pertinent issue, especially in inner city communities.

The disproportionate involvement of young Latino and especially Black men as victims and perpetrators of gun violence has been explained psychologically as a function of relative deprivation or as a function of the culture of violence in inner city communities. If relative deprivation or a uniform subculture of violence explains the differential involvement of blacks in homicide, then we should see similar rates of crime among blacks across various geographical distinctions, namely local communities and states, but that is not the case. The spatial concentration of homicide in these communities requires an explanation that is attendant to the structural context of crime and the social organization of inner city communities. Sampson and Wilson (2005) do just that by arguing that the disproportionate levels of black crime in inner city communities is a function of their differential exposure to criminogenic structural conditions and the cultural adaptations to this ecological context. Borrowing from the early work of sociologists Shaw and McKay (1969 [1942]), they posit that communities characterized by concentrated poverty, joblessness, racial residential segregation, and family disruption will exhibit higher rates of violence including lethal violence. Beginning in the 1960s structural changes in the economy such as deindustrialization of the inner-city, discrimination in housing markets, and the movement of middle class blacks out of these communities created a situation whereby the black poor became more concentrated geographically (Sampson and Wilson 2005).

This explanation is a community level explanation that explains the relationship between structure and culture in generating crime in inner-city communities, however, not everyone who lives in these communities engages in violence and relatively few engage in lethal violence. Also for the purposes of a program such as SNUG which seeks to prevent and subsequently decrease the number of shootings and homicides in a specified target area, it is useful to consider the ethnographic research of sociologist Elijah Anderson in inner-city Philadelphia which suggests which individuals would be likely to engage in lethal violence.

Elijah Anderson's Code of the Street is an ethnographic study of a segregated neighborhood in Philadelphia that is afflicted by poverty, deprivation, and alienation from the broader society's institutions (Anderson, 1999:10). As he states the goal of his study is "to render ethnographically the social and cultural dynamics of the interpersonal violence that is currently undermining the quality of life of too many urban neighborhoods (Anderson, 1999:11)." As such he attempts to answer the following questions:

How do the people of the setting perceive their situation? What assumptions do they bring to their decision making? What Behavioral patterns result from these actions? What are the social implications and consequences of these behaviors? (Anderson, 1999:10).

Primarily as a consequence of the aforementioned structural forces outlined by Sampson and Wilson (2005), Anderson (1999) finds that in these segregated neighborhoods of concentrated poverty there exists a “code of the streets” that governs public behavior, especially violence. The economic deprivation and social disorganization present in these neighborhoods leads to a breakdown in “civil law,” and the code of the streets is an alternative means to socially organize the community. In the most literal sense the code amounts to a set of “informal rules” that dictate the nature of interpersonal interaction between people in the community. In American society respect is gained primarily through the pursuit and successful attainment of material objects, and a person’s ability to achieve a middle class income, education, and lifestyle. The people who inhabit the neighborhood studied by Anderson (1999) have very few chances of attaining respect, at least in the mainstream sense, and therefore are very sensitive to any slight “diss,” such as another person looking at them the wrong way, that in any way is perceived as not granting them the respect that they deserve. Subsequently violence, or the threat of violence, becomes a means to ensure that a person is respected, or as a means to gain respect.

Within these neighborhoods, Anderson (1999) argues that there are two types of people, “decent” and “street,” who share the same public space, and are both familiar with the code. Most of the people in the community are decent people, but the street element in the community, who really abide by the code, come to dominate public space, thus even decent people have to mobilize the code to survive in the community. Recent quantitative research finds support for the “code of the street” thesis as articulated by Anderson (1999). Among African American adolescents (Stewart, Schreck, Simons 2006) researchers found that individuals who adopt the street code are more likely to become victims of crime, and this risk is beyond the risk of victimization associated with living in a disorganized neighborhood. In addition, among African American adolescents, researchers found that neighborhood context, living in a “street” oriented family and racial discrimination predicted adopting the street code, which indirectly influences violence (Stewart and Simons. 2006).

The existence of these two types of people has important implications for public policy directed at improving the life chances of ghetto residents and for reducing firearm violence. Policymakers generally argue for social policies via the state as the primary means to ameliorate the terrible conditions of life in the ghetto. These policies include, but are not limited to educational programs for the poor, welfare payments in the form of direct cash payments, increasing the minimum wage, and Medicare. Anderson’s (1999) description of street oriented peoples’ rejection of mainstream values and their internalization of the code of the streets suggests however, that these types of programs may not be particularly effective in helping these individuals overcome their alienation, and the oppositional culture that arose as a reaction to the structural forces over which they have very little control. These programs are probably effective in helping the “decent” people who make up the majority of the people in the community, but for the street people who have adopted an oppositional culture and lack any hope, there has to be some type of micro-level intervention coupled with the larger macro-level changes that are necessary. The street oriented people have to be literally re-socialized through intense sociological treatment to reverse their lack of hope and distrust of mainstream society. Programs

such as SNUG are a good example of such an effort with a particular emphasis on firearm violence.

The SNUG program cities varied in population, location, racial and ethnic makeup. The city population's ranged from a low of 27,000 people to a high of 195,000 people. While most of the cities had issues with violent crime and particularly crimes that involve guns, the program was not city-wide. Rather, a target area was chosen which had a significant issue with violent crime.

Award History

The New York State Senate was instrumental in securing the initial funding for the SNUG program. During the initial discussions regarding the program in 2009 Senator Malcolm Smith was the President of the Senate and he along with other Senators, especially Senators Andrea Stewart-Cousins, John Sampson and Ruth Hassel-Thompson, championed the need for a program at the grass roots level that would be effective at reducing the amount of gun violence in some of New York's communities. The first round of funding came through the New York Senate in 2009 with a call for proposals. Initial monies for the program were allocated by the State Senate in 2010, and ten organizations were funded. Gun violence is particularly acute in inner-city communities subsequently the all the programs that were funded are located in inner-city communities specifically Albany, East New York/ Brooklyn, Harlem, Niagara Falls, Yonkers, Buffalo, Mt. Vernon, Rochester, Syracuse, and Queens. The State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) was tasked by the Senate with administering the program, and during the first year of the program, there was a close relationship between DCJS, the Senate and the SNUG programs whereby quarterly reports were generated by each site and sent to the Senate for review.

A second round of funding then came through for five of the original ten sites. Each of the five sites received their funding at different times and ran out of funding at various times, while also picking up new funding to support the program. Each chapter describes the specific city's funding history.

Neighborhood Description

Every site had at least one target area, but the size of the target areas, both population and geographically varied immensely. The target areas ranged from as small as two housing projects to as large as a 72 block area. The target areas were often in places with high poverty rates, a higher concentration of violence than in other areas of the city, and suffering from urban blight. The program model calls for nearly all of the work to be done in the target area; however, sites ranged in terms of how frequently they stuck to that policy, as some would regularly conduct work outside of the target area, while others would not work outside of the target area unless a client moved away or a dispute was occurring between at least one person/group who resided in the target area.

Program Description

Every site reported that the agreed upon mission of SNUG is the same as Chicago CeaseFire, which is:

“A unique, interdisciplinary, public health approach to violence prevention. We maintain that violence is a learned behavior that can be prevented using disease control methods. Using proven public health techniques, the model prevents violence through a three-prong approach:

1. Identification & detection
2. Interruption, Intervention, & risk reduction
3. Changing behavior and norms” (<http://ceasefirechicago.org/how-it-works>)

This model seeks to change the behavior of a small number of individuals who are at the highest risk of being shot or being the shooter. For the SNUG sites, Chicago CeaseFire provided all of the information binders, training, and continued management plan. Essentially, everything that is a component of Ceasefire is a component of SNUG.

The primary goal of Ceasefire is to prevent shootings and subsequent homicides by seeking to influence the behavior of a small group of individuals who have a good chance of being shot or being a shooter. Many of these individuals are gang affiliated thus there is an emphasis on disrupting gang activities. Program components include the following: outreach and violence interruption, public education, faith-based leader involvement, community mobilization, and criminal justice participation. The following core components of the program are outlined by Senator’s John Sampson and Malcolm Smith in a memo to the State Division of Criminal Justice Services:

In order for Operation SNUG to be successful and effective the following program requirements are needed:

- The ability to identify and engage high-risk individuals;
- Utilization of the five core components developed by Ceasefire Chicago:
 1. Community mobilization
 2. Youth outreach
 3. Public education
 4. Faith-based leader involvement
 5. Law enforcement participation
- Located in a hotspot for gun violence;
- The hiring of credible messengers;
- A connection to afterschool services and other social service providers;
- A commitment to working with corporate partners;
- The ability to develop additional resources, including nongovernmental and governmental resources;
- The ability to collect and report data on gun violence and program operations in a timely fashion and to evaluate performance and success;
- Maintenance of files for program administration and client services;
- Development of plans for intake, risk reduction, case notes, and supervision;
- Prior experience in program administration and record keeping;
- Registration as a non-profit 501(c) (3) tax-exempt organization(s) with the New York State Attorney General Charities Bureau.

In addition, the following requirements are needed for basic financial management of public resources:

- Mission compatibility,
- A track record of running a program of similar size,
- Audited financial statements,
- An accountant and lawyer on retainer,
- A line of credit (reimbursement),
- A mechanism for the payment of wages and benefits, and
- The ability to hire ex-offenders.

Organizational Structure

The CeaseFire model utilizes a host model. The program is run through an agency, often a grassroots agency, which then hires the outreach workers and violence interrupters. The agency manages the program staff, while also in regular contact with the Chicago CeaseFire staff. In four out of the five sites, the parent agencies did not have a street outreach component prior to SNUG implementation, thus making outreach a new aspect of the agency.

Staffing

The model relies heavily on street outreach workers and violence interrupters. While research on the impact of street outreach workers is sparse, Pollack, Frattaroli, Whitehill, and Strither (2010) found in their Lowell, Massachusetts research that street outreach workers made an impact on over two-thirds of the youth's lives whom they worked with. In that study, 63% of the youths reported witnessing a street outreach worker intervene or prevent a fight. Chicago CeaseFire utilizes outreach workers who carry a caseload and violence interrupters who do not carry a caseload, but are expected to intervene in disputes.

Interviews with CeaseFire Chicago revealed that ideal program staffing is the following:

- 3 outreach workers
- 2 violence interrupters
- 1 supervisor
- 1 program manager

The following are summaries of the job descriptions created for SNUG by CeaseFire Chicago.

Program Manager

The program manager will use community organizing techniques to mobilize the community to engage in activities that will help change the thinking and norms, so that shooting and killing is no longer an acceptable behavior and to create alternatives for those currently at highest risk for shooting someone or being shot. The program manager must recruit and manage an active volunteer base and within the first two months of CeaseFire program implementation, convene and lead a group that is representative of the community to develop a violence prevention plan to reduce shootings and killings in their community. Further, the manager will document meetings, including minutes of planning committee sessions, and correspondence to area residents and community partners, etc. Will plan and implement responses to shootings, at least once monthly,

organize and executes a CeaseFire community activity, manage and track CeaseFire public education campaign in the target area, and plan and oversee the conduct of a range of activities celebrating CeaseFire Week.

Additionally, the manager will:

- Develop relationships with local service providers and program partners, including law enforcement, faith leaders, and community stakeholders, in order to identify and access resources for the highest risk.
- Be responsible for the adoption and continued implementation of CeaseFire Program Management best practices as taught in the required CeaseFire Program Management 101 Training
- Participate in evaluation activities of the community-based violence prevention program and organizes and participates in a review of program progress.
- Participate in regular meetings with Chicago Project staff to:
- Attend Intercommunity Forum meetings and contributes to the success of the forum by contributing to the agenda, participating at meetings and by interacting with representatives from other agencies that do similar work in Illinois.

Outreach Supervisor

The outreach worker supervisor will plan the daily and weekly activities for and with staff, hold daily meetings to review shootings and assess interventions, connect with community resources, supervise the outreach workers, conduct community outreach activities, attend weekly supervision meetings with Ceasefire Chicago, investigate the causes of shootings and assist in preventing retaliation. The outreach supervisor will also identify and diffuse violent “hot spots,” document client case notes and coordinate staff reports, and facilitate violence prevention workshops in the community. Lastly, the outreach supervisor is to attend meetings with law enforcement, prosecution, probation, and agencies providing opportunities to coordinate efforts to reduce violence and discuss any recent events.

Outreach Worker

The outreach worker has similar responsibilities and duties as the outreach supervisor, but with less of a focus on supervision and coordination and more of a focus on participants. The outreach worker will focus in stopping shootings in the neighborhood assigned by getting to know the highest risk individuals in the community, letting it be known that SNUG is there to stop shootings and also that the community members should let the worker know if a shooting is going to happen so that a SNUG member can intervene, and working to intervene in situations in which violence is likely. The outreach worker is also expected to understand why a shooting occurred, gain the trust of the community and those high risk people in order to prevent violence, and work as a member of a team. Further the worker should be responsive to the supervisor’s requests, keep the supervisor informed as to what is going on, and conduct community outreach, document client case notes and shootings and mediations, respond to shootings, and identify high risk individuals and intervene in their lives to provide case management, along with other responsibilities.

Violence Interrupter

Violence Interrupters are assigned to work in one or more SNUG communities and their primary responsibilities are conflict mediation and serving as conduits to outreach workers, faith leaders and CeaseFire staff. Specific responsibilities include acquiring information on potential conflicts in the target area, attending gang mediation meetings, and then working with a gang mediation task force to resolve conflicts that arise between gangs. Additionally they are required to meet with high risk individuals on a daily basis to discuss problems that arise. When problems arise and shootings do occur, they help prevent retaliatory shootings by meeting with the victim and the victim's family in the hospital, or elsewhere, so they can calm the situation and then follow up by referring the victim to an outreach worker, or keep in contact through other means. Violence Interrupters are responsible for mobilizing the community around violence reduction by, distributing public education materials in the target area, developing relationships with key community leaders, and attending community responses to shootings. Lastly, they are required to, document conflicts resolved on conflict mediation forms, keep a daily log of contacts with high risk individuals, and participate in CeaseFire outreach worker training.

The ideal candidate for a violence interrupter is someone who is very close to the streets, so close that he or she is "one stone's throw away from the high ranking members within in a gang." This person needs to have that additional edge that allows them to communicate effectively with gang members and other high risk individuals. This person also must have respect from the more violent people in the community, those who are known to be "trigger pullers."

Hiring Panel

A hiring panel is utilized for hiring the SNUG staff members. The candidate submits an application for the position which is reviewed by the Program Manager. If the person is asked to move onto the next round, then he or she will go before a hiring panel that is expected to consist of: clergy, police, CeaseFire staff, outreach worker supervisor, and five people representing different local institutions. Both law enforcement and CeaseFire have veto power if they do not feel that the candidate is appropriate.

The following questions are used guide the interview:

1. We have __ people to consider. Why hire you?
2. What are your thoughts on street gangs?
3. Have you ever mediated a conflict, and were you successful?
4. On this job, you interact with gangs, and you interact with police, how do you feel about that?
5. How do you plan to reach gang members?
6. Do you have a record?

Working Hours

Research has consistently shown that this type of violence often occurs late at night and on the weekends, which is why the model requires the workers to be out during late and weekend hours. Most of the workers had set schedules, but with the understanding that they were on call if a shooting occurred. Violence interrupters often worked part-time and expected to be called in

more frequently than the outreach workers due to the nature of their work. The only person who is not regularly on call is the program manager.

Biographies of Staff and Daily Activities

Staff are expected to have a criminal history, to have spent some time incarcerated, and could be as young as 20 years old and as old as 65 years or more. The model requires street savvy individuals who have “lived the life” and can thus better understand the individuals whom they are trying to engage in nonviolence.

The outreach workers are expected to work with high-risk clients and provide case management services for them. The youth are identified in the street as potential SNUG participants. These potential participants must fit the criteria that CeaseFire has provided, in order to ensure that they are high risk. High risk is critical because the program is built on the theory that if the workers can get these high risk participants to stop resorting to violence and to make healthier decisions, then shootings and killings will be significantly reduced in the neighborhoods. The criteria are the following:

- Gang involvement
- Key role in a gang
- Prior criminal history
- Involved in high-risk street activity (e.g. drug markets)
- Recent victim of a shooting
- Between the ages 16-25
- Recently released from prison

In order to be high risk, the participant must match at least 4 of the 7 criteria above. Medium risk is assigned to those who match 3 of the 7 above. And, lastly, low risk classification is for those who match two or fewer above. According to the Ceasefire model, the worker must petition thru CeaseFire if they would like to have a low risk participant on their caseload.

Daily activities include, canvassing and scouting for high risk people in the community. Once those high risk people are identified, then the workers begin conversations with them to start the important relationship building process. Next, as the potential participants become comfortable, the workers try to draw them into the program. This eventually results in some becoming formally engaged with the program, while others still maintain an aloof attitude, still unwilling to be considered a participant at this time. A risk reduction plan is then created in conjunction with the participant. At this time the worker also begins going to the participants’ homes for visits, meets them in the office, and is in phone contact with them. All participants are seen regularly. Services needed often include: housing assistance, resource connection, and employment services.

The violence interrupters do not take on a caseload. Instead, they are expected to canvas the streets to take the “temperature of the streets” – determine if there are any potentially violent brewing disputes. If they determine that there is something brewing, then they are to attempt to

speak with both sides of the dispute in an effort to mediate the violence. As such, whenever a shooting occurs, the violence interrupter is expected to be intricately involved in the aftermath as he/she is to identify any potential retaliation and to diffuse the situation.

Data Collection and Reports

The Ceasefire model requires that program staff collect data about their activities and all sites that have adopted the model are required to enter data into the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention database. Based on the data that is submitted by program staff, the following reports can be generated: Monthly Outreach Report; Violence Interrupter Log Report; Conflict Mediation Report; Shooting/Homicide Report; Program Indicators Report; Shooting Responses Monthly Totals; Shootings and Conflicts Mediated Monthly Totals; and Outreach Work with Participants.

The SNUG sites were given training and access to this database. Each staff member had access to only his or her clients while the program manager was given access to all of the workers' data and the outreach worker supervisor was also given more access in some cases. Some examples of what can be found in the database include: Number of shootings responses, hourly log of outreach workers' time, number of participants served, the participant risk reduction plans, and the number of community activities attended.

Workers were expected to document their work daily, and to then input their activities into the database at a minimum, weekly. CeaseFire explained that many of these workers are not comfortable with using computers, so CeaseFire was able to see how well sites were doing with data documentation through accessing the CPVP database and if necessary would remind the workers of the need to document.

Training

All sites that adopt the Ceasefire model as a means to decrease the number of shootings/homicides in their respective communities are trained by individuals from the program headquarters in Chicago. Thus, CeaseFire Chicago closely regulates the training for all of the SNUG sites. These intensive trainings include both longer five day trainings as well as shorter one day trainings. Analysis of the Violence Intervention and Reduction Training Manual indicate that major components of the training offered by Ceasefire include instruction on the foundations of violence intervention and reduction; communication techniques especially with potential participants who are not receptive to the Ceasefire message; risk assessment and risk reduction; crisis management; managing grief and loss; anger management; conflict mediation and resolution; making the Ceasefire pitch; community engagement; canvassing the target area; using the CPVP database; and street outreach in the target area.

The CeaseFire certified trainers conducted their trainings either in Chicago (Albany staff would travel to Chicago) or in sites across New York State (often times Albany staff would travel to NYC for training). CeaseFire staff explained that the trainings often include pre and posttests to assess knowledge and skill acquisition. Albany SNUG staff members were asked about the CeaseFire trainings and they recounted a number of topics covered, including the specific Ceasefire model, tough guise attitudes, crisis management, and conflict-mediation.

Program Management Training is conducted over a period of three days and two nights and is directed by two staff members from the CPVP. Participants in these training sessions include program administrators, the program manager, and the street worker supervisor. The training emphasizes “effective supervision,” “roles and responsibilities of the Ceasefire team; planning and running a meeting; risk reduction plan development; a 30-day ‘quick start’ plan for community organizing, including development of the Ceasefire ‘pitch’; planning responses to shootings and post-response strategy and follow up; and resource development.”

Outreach Worker Training is conducted over a period of 5 days and is directed by four to five staff members of the CPVP. Participants in these training sessions include all new team members. Trainers demonstrate and participants practice the four core areas of the training which are “1) introduction to CeaseFire and the role of CeaseFire street workers with an emphasis around boundaries and professional conduct; 2) identifying, engaging and building relationships with program participants, assisting participants to change their thinking and behavior through motivational interviewing (which requires prior mastery of strong listening skills) as it relates to creating and implementing a risk reduction plan; 3) preventing the initiation of violence or using mediation and conflict resolution to prevent initiation or retaliation when violence occurs; and 4) working with key members of the community, including residents, faith leaders and service providers through public education, responses to shootings and neighborhood building activities.”

Booster Session Training refers to either late night booster sessions and document training, or to flex booster sessions. Late night booster sessions and documentation training participants include the street worker supervisor, outreach workers and violence interrupters. During this training, CPVP staff accompanies team members during late night outreach on a Friday or Saturday. If the organization within which the SNUG program is to be housed choose to adopt the CeaseFire model, then team members are offered further training on data entry and documentation best practices. Flex booster sessions are directed by one to two CPVP staff members, and can last up to six days, six nights. The primary purpose of these sessions is further training in case management and training for issues that emerge during the course of SNUG operations or from the CPVP itself.

CeaseFire Chicago training is the same for VIs and outreach workers. Program managers and outreach worker supervisors participate in the same trainings, but then receive additional management training.

Conversations with CeaseFire Chicago revealed that a site is not considered to be up and running until the full 5-day training is received by staff. The sites were not to do anything on the ground out in the community until the training was completed.

Operations

Headquarters

The SNUG office is expected to be located in the target area and accessible during hours paralleling violent activity, thus open late night hours and over the weekend. The office is to

deliver the program on a day-to-day basis, as well as conduct public education activities, build relationships with the local clergy and businesses, and provide a safe haven for neighborhood residents. The sites ranged in terms of open hours and storefront location.

Supervision

The team is expected to meet regularly with their supervisor. Some sites held meetings before and after every shift, while other sites had weekly internal meetings, and still others had meetings throughout the week.

CeaseFire Chicago held bi-weekly phone calls with the sites in order to discuss how things were going, share any new educational literature that was created, and to give feedback to sites on the work that they are doing. When the sites were reduced from ten to five, the five sites began to have calls together and every other week. When the funding returned to all five sites and all were up and running again, the calls returned to weekly. They are held with CeaseFire every Wednesday since May 2012 when the five remaining sites received their funding.

Street Intervention

According to the CeaseFire model, street intervention is the primary responsibility of the violence interrupter. Violence interrupters were added to the model after it became evident that outreach workers were having trouble developing relationships with key individuals involved in the various gangs of the target area. Ideally violence interrupters are former gang members who have spent time in prison and thus have the credibility and ability to gain access to key decision makers in the gang underworld. Responsibilities include canvassing the streets to identify and intervene in gang related conflicts before they escalate into shootings/killings, and when appropriate, intervene to stop retaliatory killings. They work mostly in the streets and build relationships with some of the most hard to reach individuals. This is facilitated by the fact that violence interrupters grew up in the neighborhoods which comprise the target area, and they know the language and culture of the gangs in the target area. They are also primarily responsible for conflict mediation among individuals and gangs.

As described above, the Violence Interrupters are expected to mediate disputes that are likely to resort to violence. The data are to be inputted into the CPVP database regularly.

Client Outreach

Client outreach in the CeaseFire model is the primary responsibility of the outreach workers. Ideally these workers have street experience and are very familiar with the target area, especially with the gangs in the area. This street experience and familiarity with the target area ensures that they are credible messengers. Outreach workers are expected to build a caseload of 15 high-risk participants within four months of starting the job, and no more than 20 participants after that, and they have the primary responsibility for enacting the education campaign of the SNUG program. The worker is required to meet with the participant a minimum of 6 times a month, and must have two office visits, two home visits, and can be at the discretion of the worker. The evaluation of Chicago Ceasefire by Skogan (2009) and his colleagues indicate that very often, the outreach workers viewed their work with Ceasefire as a means to pay back a debt to society for the behaviors in which they engaged when they were involved in a life of crime.

Clergy Involvement

In the evaluation of the Chicago-CeaseFire program led by Skogan (2009) and his colleagues, the local faith community played a crucial role. As they argue, many mainstream institutions have abandoned inner-city communities and the plethora of small churches that exist in these neighborhoods fill the void left by these institutions. Very often these small or at times large churches are incorporated as not-for-profit organizations and provide services related to housing, recreational spaces, and they also are often involved in community development initiatives. The evaluation also reveals that clergy are often the opinion leaders in these poor communities and it is subsequently essential to mobilize them to speak out against violence and provide mentoring for program participants.

Community Mobilization

Community mobilization is a vital aspect of the CeaseFire model. For the program to be successful, program staff needs to mobilize community partners, especially via local community coalitions. Local community partners are often the source of services such as access to recreational facilities and jobs for program participants. Working with other community stakeholders also provides opportunities to distribute literature, and recruit program volunteers and individuals willing to participate in marches and vigils.

Educational Campaign

The CeaseFire model calls for a public education campaign aimed at changing community norms around violence and in particular a campaign that highlights the risk of engaging in violence, especially gun violence. As such program staff are tasked with distributing printed materials -- flyers, posters, bumper stickers -- in the target area to potential participants, local businesses and other community partners whom they work with. Most importantly however, the primary message of all this material should deliver the message to stop the violence and more specifically stop the shootings/killings.

Police and Prosecution

According to the CeaseFire model, the SNUG program is tasked with working with local law enforcement to achieve their mission. SNUG staff need to establish and preserve their credibility with some of the most violent and gang affiliated young people in the community therefore it is absolutely important that they not be viewed as snitches. This creates a situation where the outreach workers and violence interrupters cannot be seen as an extension of law enforcement by potential participants. The program manager or other administrators in the parent organization of SNUG then bear the primary responsibility for communicating with the police. Structurally this creates a situation whereby there is a real possibility whereby SNUG program administrators have a relationship with police administrators but police administrators do not have a relationship with the outreach workers and violence interrupters. Also, whatever the nature of the relationship between police administrators and SNUG administrators, there can be a completely different relationship with rank and file officers who interact with SNUG staff on the street. Therefore, the relationship with law enforcement is probably the most precarious of all CeaseFire relationships.

Law enforcement, by its definition, is tasked with the job of enforcing the law. SNUG, on the other hand, is tasked with forming relationships with criminally involved people and gaining their trust. This often means learning about illegal activities and particularly shady pasts of those that they are trying to influence. However, the end goal of crime violent crime reduction, ought to bring the two together. Ideally, then, both of these entities can work in parallel to reduce shootings in particular neighborhoods. This plays out interestingly when it comes to data and data sharing, as it is a one way street in that SNUG hope to get data from law enforcement, but they do not share any data with the police. As one law enforcement personnel said, “While we don’t expect anything back in terms of data, we absolutely get something back in terms of crime reduction.” That is precisely what CeaseFire hopes law enforcement sees out of the relationship.

Relationship with CeaseFire Chicago

The sites were expected to have a very close relationship with Chicago CeaseFire. The sites were to receive training from Chicago, attend bi-weekly teleconferences with Chicago, and include Chicago in thinking through any major program decisions. CeaseFire Chicago was expected to know the staff at the sites and to understand how each site is running the program. Further, Chicago was expected to assist with any technical needs that the sites had.

Chapter 4: CeaseFire Chicago Interview Findings

Ceasefire Chicago staff were interviewed regarding each site's fidelity to the model. In this chapter we discuss each site relative to model fidelity. Overall, CeaseFire Chicago ranked the Yonkers, Central Harlem, and ENY sites as being the closest and truest to the model. CeaseFire uses an internal ranking system with the sites that they oversee: A site ranking in Tier One, is implementing the model with fidelity; that is, an appropriate target area is selected, the staff are credible messengers and understand the model, outreach workers have a caseload of at least 15 with almost all of them being high-risk, the workers know what is going on in the target area, there are shooting responses, community education is consistent with a specific message, and clients are changing their behavior (enrolled in GED classes, getting employment, etc). Both Albany (Tier Two) and Niagara Falls (Tier Three) have issues with fidelity to the model. The issues will be described in more detail below, but essentially Niagara Falls' issues with model fidelity stem from relative low levels gun violence. Due to the small amount of violent activity, it makes it nearly impossible to have enough high-risk clients, an appropriate target area, and so on. Albany's model fidelity issues stem from lower levels of gun violence as well as internal management issues throughout the course of the program.

Albany SNUG

CeaseFire explained that the Albany SNUG was originally run through the University at Albany and, while it was likely helpful to run it through the university, a significant amount of money that was used for program operations in other sites was used for grant administration and evaluation by the University. It seemed as though Albany did not realize how much funding would be lost in this setup. CeaseFire also pointed to management issues throughout the program which likely set Albany back. The original program manager left after the original funding was over in order to attend school. There has been a high level of turnover as they have lost at least seven workers since the beginning of the program. The current funding period has seen one program manager terminated, one outreach worker terminated, and the community mobilization coordinator has resigned with a new coordinator hired. There was also the decision made that the program manager would serve as the outreach worker supervisor as well, which meant carrying a caseload. The decision was made by Albany SNUG and according to CeaseFire, they did not support this decision, but realized that it was what Albany felt was needed, so CeaseFire worked with them to make it happen.

With the high turnover, CeaseFire Chicago has had to ensure that the workers are all fully trained. One issue where this became problematic was with database access. While Albany SNUG had hired its workers and was ready to get on the ground, they were unable to find a time that worked for CeaseFire and Albany to get the database training to take place. At one point a training was scheduled, only for Ceasefire to cancel due to a scheduling conflict. The staff were eventually trained, but this created a large problem for data collection at the Albany site.

Albany had been consistently been on the weekly calls with CeaseFire until the second program manager was terminated. Once the new program manager came into his position, he was back on the calls with CeaseFire.

CeaseFire explained that Albany seems to have a bigger issue with stabbings than shootings, and while those are important issues, those are not particularly the aim of the CeaseFire model. The model seeks to reduce gun violence. Albany would regularly respond to stabbings, which made sense to the community because that was the issue at hand, but it created problems with fidelity to the model.

When asked about Albany's identification and detection of disputes and potential gun violence, CeaseFire felt that they were somewhat good with this, but that it is difficult to gauge due to the lower level of gun violence. Regarding violence interruption, intervention, and risk reduction, Albany has done well with interruption, even working with the local gangs to create a peace treaty. However, again due to the lower level of gun violence, not all of the clients were high risk and the workers did not all have the expected caseload size of 15 clients. Albany staff even discussed how they will take clients of varying risk levels.

Overall, CeaseFire felt that lapses in funding, management issues, and lower levels of gun violence played a major role in Albany not being completely on model.

Niagara Falls SNUG

Niagara Falls SNUG was ranked as a Tier Three program by CeaseFire and it had almost all to do with the relative lack of gun violence in the community. CeaseFire staff repeatedly stated that there was really no way for Niagara Falls to be on model simply due to its low crime numbers. What an interesting problem to have.

It seemed that CeaseFire had the least communication of all five sites with Niagara Falls, as Niagara Falls SNUG was not regularly on the weekly phone calls and they did not have consistent correspondence with them. In fact, CeaseFire was not even clear if the site was up and running during the interview. The site was not seen as a priority due to their low levels of violence and their lack of any program "problems," such as staffing, management, or others. There was very little staff turnover and all of the same staff stayed on from one grant period to the next, making the need for more training from CeaseFire almost unnecessary.

CeaseFire staff stated that Niagara Falls did a very good job of getting together the stakeholders, specifically utilizing the relationships that the program manager has with the community.

In terms of getting high risk clients, CeaseFire explained, that there have been issues with getting high risk clients simply because of the lack of violence in the city; more of the issues were around fights between Buffalo and Niagara Falls residents. The fights were over females versus gang ties or drug distribution, which made it difficult to utilize the CeaseFire model. They went on to say that a number of the fights involve blunt trauma and stabbings, which is not what the model is intended for.

Overall, CeaseFire felt that Niagara Falls did the best they could with the program funding, and that reaching out to the schools and working with lower risk clients was sort of forced upon them due to the lack of high-risk clients in the city.

Yonkers SNUG

Yonkers SNUG was identified as a Tier One site and they were held responsible for going an entire year without a shooting. CeaseFire feels that they are made up of a great team who is close to the streets and understand the model well. All levels of management, from the highly involved agency director to the program manager to the outreach supervisor were identified as being strong leaders who understand the model and hold the staff accountable. They did well at community mobilizing and educational campaigning.

CeaseFire talked specifically about the hiring that Yonkers did, and that while they had to go through a number of hoops to hire staff that were recently released and on parole, it seemed to pay off in the long run, as the staff were indeed credible messengers who could relate well to the community.

The Yonkers staff understand the model so well that CeaseFire even utilizes some of the Yonkers staff to assist with training at other sites. CeaseFire praised them, "They have shown tremendous results." Yonkers has been consistent with data collection, and they attribute that to the management team. Further, the workers have divided the target area into quadrants and each worker canvases and works in their respective quadrant.

CeaseFire stated that Yonkers has done very well with identifying and detecting possible violent situations and have successfully gotten in the middle. All of the workers have at least 15 clients and almost all of whom are high-risk. One of the benefits to being run through the YMCA is that the clients have free access to the YMCA, including free boxing classes and other opportunities. Staff felt that Yonkers truly gives the clients options that are competitive with street life. CeaseFire also felt that Yonkers does very well with changing the behavior and norms of the community through its educational campaign.

Overall Yonkers SNUG is considered to be on model and has not only done effective risk reduction with high risk clients, but they have also gone significant amounts of time with no shootings.

Central Harlem SNUG

Central Harlem SNUG is a Tier One site and has been run well since its inception. CeaseFire talked about Harlem SNUG's continued growth with the addition of hospital responders and outreach workers. CeaseFire felt that Harlem's storefront is really what the model is all about, as it is located in the target area, open late night weekend hours, a safe haven, and regularly has high-risk young people spending time in the space. One CeaseFire staff member explained, "It is really a perfect example for program replication."

Harlem has been consistent with data collection, attributing much of it to the program manager's work with the SNUG team. CeaseFire explained that the program manger always has reports in on time and they have never had issue with data collection from this site.

The identified obstacle to Harlem SNUG is the target area size: it is just too large. CeaseFire explained that the target area was decided prior to the program getting off the ground and prior to CeaseFire's involvement, so it has been an issue since inception. With downsizing not an option,

they have figured out how to make the most of it. One way is to determine which spots have more violence than others within the target area and to focus their efforts in those spaces. One CeaseFire staff member exclaimed, “If they had a smaller target area then they would be on the money.”

Ceasefire feels that this team thinks the most outside the box of all New York sites, highlighting the numerous community activities, the community forums, weekly panels outside the SNUG office, and the casket walks.

In terms of identification and detection of violence, CeaseFire stated that they do very well at this, with the exception of the target area size, as they know everyone who lives there, what they are up to, and who to look out for. They also do very well with interruption, intervention, and risk reduction. One of their strengths is that they have had the same core team with the exception of one person since program inception. Thus, they work well together and have done a good job of getting clients in college and back into school. They have also been successful in mobilizing the community through conducting mock funerals, casket walks, and distributing information.

Overall, CeaseFire felt that Harlem does a very good job with client case management, violence interruption, community mobilization, and the educational campaign. They are also one of the strongest sites in terms of a relationship with the hospital. The only downfall is the size of the target area.

ENY SNUG

Finally, ENY Snug is also a Tier One site, who has done well with the program model. ENY suffered from lapses in funding, which created a few issues with data collection and inputting into the database. However, the program manager has been the same since program inception and CeaseFire rates his knowledge of the CeaseFire model as superb, stating that he knows the model best. The program manager is very involved, runs his team well, and is more intimately involved with the day to day operations than other sites.

Similar to Central Harlem SNUG, ENY’s storefront is completely on model, being open late hours, accessible to high risk young people, and offering alternatives to violence. CeaseFire felt that this is really a perfect example for replication.

In terms of identification and detection of violence CeaseFire felt that ENY did an excellent job as they were able see when something may possibly lead to gun violence and they did a good job with follow-up as well. ENY SNUG did well at risk reduction with the clients as they would get them jobs, take clients to functions with them, and intervene in disputes. CeaseFire felt that they did a very good job at changing the behaviors and norms of the community, such as by getting the neighborhood involved in the shooting responses. They also created a YouTube video that describes the entire CeaseFire model, which CeaseFire was very impressed with.

Overall CeaseFire, felt that ENY did a very good job with the model, and that this likely occurred due to the program manager’s integral involvement and full understanding of the

CeaseFire model. ENY did well with mobilizing the community and keeping the pulse of the neighbourhood in terms of violence.

Discussion

Conversations with CeaseFire revealed that the breaks in funding that occurred between the first and second round can really be detrimental program operations. While some sites had staff that were willing to volunteer their time, it is not at the same level as paid program staff and it lacks the accountability. CeaseFire felt that funding needs to be more consistent. These lapses in funding put some programs on hiatus, which likely contributed to issues with program fidelity.

As noted earlier in this report, CeaseFire Chicago, now Cure Violence, no longer ascribes to these specific program components, as the framework has been updated. The two main areas where changes were made to the model were related to clergy and law enforcement. The updated model does not rely so heavily on either of those components, but still recognizes the importance of those two groups on violence reduction. In terms of clergy, CeaseFire felt that if clergy are interested and fully committed to the effort, then they can be part of the community mobilization and educational campaign. While law enforcement is still critical to violence reduction and a relationship is critical, some Chicago sites have found success without having an intimate relationship with law enforcement according to CeaseFire.

Lastly, CeaseFire felt strongly that the downstate sites did very well with the model, but that they had the violent activity necessary to run the program with fidelity to the model. Due to lower levels of violence in the upstate sites (Niagara Falls and Albany), these sites had more difficulty being on model. CeaseFire explained that the upstate sites seemed to take on more of a mentoring role with clients while the downstate sites were able to get high-risk clients and work closely with them in case management.

Chapter 5: Albany Findings

Context

Albany sits within Albany County, which has a County-wide population of 304,204 and a city-wide population of 97,856 (2010 U.S. Census, 2012). Albany is located in central New York with borders on Schenectady, Rensselaer, Saratoga, Greene, and Schoharie Counties as well as sits on the Hudson River. Albany is predominantly made up of white non-hispanic residents (54%), with the second largest group being African-Americans (30.8%) and then Asian race (5%). Hispanic ethnicity is reported in 8.6% of the residents (2010 U.S. Census, 2012). While Albany is the capital of New York State, it is typical of other upstate New York cities, such as Syracuse, Rochester, and Buffalo, in that it has its share of issues to overcome.

The Department of Labor reported that in December 2012, unemployment rate was at 7.1% in Albany County, which is lower than New York State which reported an unemployment rate of 8.2% during the same time period. The city is following similar patterns to other urban areas with crime, poverty, and unemployment problems in that many residents, who are able to leave the city for better opportunities, transplanting themselves outside of the city.

While Albany only claims a population of 97,856 it does have its share of crime problems, including gang membership and violent crimes. On average, 15% of Albany's violent crimes involve the use of a firearm (DCJS, Albany Police Department, 2012). In particular, about 27% of robberies involve the use of a firearm and while the number of homicides are low (an average of 5 per year for the years 2009-2011), 63% of the homicides are due to gun violence. There were 29 shooting victims in 2009, 41 in 2010, and 48 in 2011. The average violent crime rate for Albany is about 100 per 100,000 which is lower than the New York State average which is about 390 per 100,000.

Award History

The Gun Violence Prevention Task Force in Albany championed the effort to lead a SNUG site in Albany. The task force then contacted the School of Social Welfare at the University at Albany to both assist with grantwriting and to manage the program. This was the only university based contract out of the original ten funded sites. This was done intentionally, as those at the table felt that university involvement it most closely replicates the program model. The School of Social Welfare quickly identified and subsequently contacted Trinity Alliance of the Capital Region to determine whether there was interest in taking on the role of subcontractor. As a subcontractor to this grant, Trinity would be responsible for the direct service portion of the grant. Faculty members at the School of Social Welfare, explained that Trinity was chosen due to both its longstanding commitment to the community and its service offerings. With its 100 year history it was obviously the agency most adept to providing services for the community. And with its history in the settlement house movement, the agency was also more comfortable than other agencies in hiring employees with a criminal history and working with the high risk young people.

The School of Social Welfare has worked collaboratively with Trinity both in the past and even currently. The School of Social Welfare students are often utilized at Trinity in order to help

them gain experience in the field. However, this was the first time that they had every worked in a formal, contractual way.

During the first year of funding, the Senate was intricately involved with the SNUG budget. While the budget and budget amendments were approved by DCJS, the Senate was overseeing the program spending in year one. According to the Social Welfare faculty, the legislature really managed this program. They went onto explain that during the original application period, the applicants had to change the proposal three times due to the Senate constantly changing the proposal. By the final time it was submitted, it had become clear that the Division of Criminal Justice Services would be tasked with overseeing the grant. From the perspective of some of those involved with the grant the first year, because DCJS was not involved in the entire grant making process, and was not anticipating the management of this grant, they somewhat stumbled through the first year.


During year one, there was a monthly conference call that the Senate participated in with the ten sites. The Senate continued its involvement on these calls until the end of the original grant funding (October 2011 for most sites). Data were submitted quarterly to DCJS throughout the grant period.



While the School of Social Welfare was not involved in the second year, it has offered to volunteer to advocate for funding. With limited funds available: \$300,000 for the second year of programming, the School of Social Welfare did not feel that it was necessary to have formal involvement in the program.

Neighborhood Description

The target area is made up of three neighborhoods: Arbor Hill, West Hill and South End. These neighborhoods contain 90% of Albany's housing projects. According to the interviews, the primary target area is Arbor Hill/West Hill and secondary target area is the South End neighborhood. The South End is the secondary target area as the violent crime that occurs there is less significant than the amount of violent crime that occurs in the primary target area.

The target area(s) were identified by the Albany Police Department. Violent crime data were mapped through their analysis center, resulting in very clear areas to target: Arbor Hill and West Hill had the highest concentration of violent crime and the South End had the second highest concentration. According to interviews, the data simply confirmed everyone's hunches around the geography of violent crime in Albany. The target area maps are below:





The hilly Albany terrain makes for winding roads throughout the area target areas. The primary and secondary target areas do not border one another, but are within minutes of one another, with the business district and a restaurant strip sandwiched between the two. Both target areas have similar structural features, social presence, and other similarities. The area is flooded with Brownstone buildings and sidewalks. Numerous boarded up, vacant houses were dispersed throughout the target areas. Empty lots were also a common presence. According to interviews with staff, few residents are homeowners; private landlords and the Albany Housing Authority have a strong presence in the neighborhood. The neighborhoods did not appear to have too many businesses such as grocery stores, corner stores, or specialty stores. However, there is a major thoroughfare in the Arbor/West Hill neighborhood with a number of businesses, opened and operating with several people spotted patronizing the various businesses.

Throughout the target areas, memorial after memorial to violence victims were seen on the researcher's visits, one outside of a house, another on a corner, another on a chain link fence. Not only are these memorials common, but many of them are for people who were murdered over five years ago. Surprisingly, older memorials continued to be lit, as many had flames going. Memorials varied, some were specific bottles of liquor lined up tightly together, others were prayer candles, yet others included pictures of the victim. A memorial in front of a tavern was spotted, with candles lit. This particular memorial was for someone who had been shot by the police.

Smiles, nods, waves from neighborhood residents toward the SNUG workers were commonplace; there was no indication from any of the residents that they disliked the workers or the work done by SNUG. At one point, we pulled over to say hello to someone who turned out to be one of the worker's cousins. The SNUG workers pulled the car over at one point to talk with a cousin who is involved with SNUG, in need of employment. Greetings were exchanged with residents, specifically young men, throughout the drive.

Taverns and bars appeared to be prevalent throughout the neighborhoods, with the SNUG staff explaining that they regularly canvas outside specific bars late at night in order to be first on the scene if a dispute is brewing. They then have the goal of quelling the dispute before it turns violent.

Hot spots within the target area were pointed out. These areas looked no different than the rest of the neighborhood, but one spot was directly outside of a bar, where it was explained that drinking late into the night creates many disputes; another was a gas station with an owner who does not enforce the loitering policy. A street near SNUG headquarters was identified as a hotspot with longstanding family disputes turning violent on that particular street.

"And just like that you're out if the high risk area," stated a worker, with a hint of contempt. The area immediately adjacent has lots of activity, plenty of street lighting, shops, a crosswalk, and busy restaurants. Those patronizing the establishments are mostly white and range between early twenties up through late forties. Next is a drive through downtown, passing City Hall and other government buildings with a timely and obvious arrival to the South End. The South End has fewer memorials and very few, almost zero, people outside. The area looks barren with its boarded up houses and lack of green space.

Funding

Albany SNUG received a previous award through the New York Senate as mentioned earlier in this report. This award lasted July 2010 through March 2012. Albany SNUG received a new grant through DCJS that was awarded February 2012 with an end date of January 31, 2013. This award is for \$150,000, but they were also the recipient of a \$150,000 award from the City of Albany that ran simultaneous to the DCJS one. While the original award through the Senate had an end date of March 2012, Albany SNUG used up the funds by the Fall of 2011 and they were therefore out of funds until 2012. The program stopped running during this three month time period.

During the original award, hiring began in July 2010, with the original program director hired in July. Management training was completed by her in August 2010 and the program was fully staffed and active by mid October 2010. The program continued through until August 2011, when it began to downsize with no new funding in sight, so less external outreach work was done and more internal work in preparation for program closure was done. During this time, clients were connected with other resources that could serve them. Doors then officially closed in October 2011. After the funding ran out in the fall of 2011, the staff was forced to resign. Then, during the end of 2011, a funding stream was identified to reopen the program. When the new funding came in January 2012, only two outreach workers were rehired (with one of those becoming the new program manager), the rest of the staff was made up of newly hired workers.

This new funding is scheduled to run through January 2013, but as of March 2013, the SNUG program continues to be up and running. It was clear to staff that there is a need to continue pursuing other grant opportunities to stabilize funding. There have been quarterly stakeholder meetings held searching for private funders, which have resulted in the generation of some funds. While they have not received a significant amount of funding, they still continue and they have, nonetheless, generated some funds.

Organizational Structure

Parent Organization

Trinity Alliance of the Capital Region originated as a settlement house (one of the first in the nation), 101 years ago. The rich history includes a faith leader recognizing the high numbers of immigrants settling in the capitol region and identified a need to help the immigrants by providing food, culture classes, and other types of services to the new settlers. It has since evolved into a neighborhood resource center with eight sites and over 18 programs ranging from early preschool classes to a dance program with the elderly. The CEO of Trinity explained that Trinity now runs on a \$3.2 million budget and has about 80 employees.

The CEO oversees the entire SNUG program, but he takes a backseat role to management, as he expects the program manager to be the direct manager of the program. Currently, the CEO meets with the SNUG program manager weekly, and the rest of the SNUG staff he will meet with as needed. Trinity provides various training for all of its employees and it regularly includes SNUG staff in the training opportunities.

SNUG headquarters is run out of a building owned by Trinity Alliance and that is where the SNUG staff report to. Therefore, while there is not daily interface with the parent organization by SNUG staff, there is regular interaction as many clients utilize Trinity's services, staff enjoy training opportunities with Trinity employees, and with the eight Trinity buildings, SNUG staff have greater frequency of interacting with the agency.

Staffing underwent at least three major changes from October 2010 through January 2013. The first was after the original grant ended in which the original program manager resigned. The second team to be hired on from October 2011 through May 2012 was led by the second program manager, and then the more recent change came in November 2011 with the second program manager's termination and a VI taking on the role of program manager. The section below discusses the change in staffing in more detail.

The new program manager was hired in January 2012, and his duties included assessment and building up the infrastructure of the program. Next hired was the new outreach and mobilization coordinator at the end of January. Since her hiring, SNUG is on its fourth outreach and mobilization coordinator. The next staff person was an outreach worker who was brought on in February 2012. The worker was subsequently terminated in the Fall of 2012, then rehired in the winter of 2012, and terminated again in the late winter 2013.

Then over the course of the next three months, and after 126 different people were interviewed by the program manager, the staff was finalized, which now included:


Chicago CeaseFire conducted the certification training (a 5 day training) in Albany in order for the workers to get on the ground. The night that they finished the training was the first homicide of the year. . Initially, 2 other outreach workers hired. One was carried over from before, but didn't work out, (issue was that the worker would talk about the old way of doing things, etc) the other outreach worker came to The second program manager due to concerns of safety, he had to resign because a person from prison 2 years ago had gotten out and there were concerns of his safety. This worker did not want to get into something dangerous and put the remaining staff's safety on the line. So he left the program. Then, the second program manager had to hire two new outreach workers, and at this time it was determined that he could also hire a third violence interrupter, so all of these new workers were hired over the next few weeks. The current team was on the ground and running fully beginning in July 2012. The target area was then: arbor hill, west hill, and added south end (stipulation of the money coming from the City)

At the end of October 2011, the second program manager was hired. This new program manager had been an outreach worker supervisor during the original grant period. While he was hired on as the new Program manager, he would also take on the role of outreach worker supervisor (Chicago CeaseFire had issues with this). However, due to a staffing overhaul, the program was not fully up and running until May/June 2012.

After one year assessment the SNUG staff decided that they needed more violence interrupters for two reasons, 1) there was an issue of burnout for the VIs and 2) there had been spikes in violence during SNUG's hiatus so there was a lot of work to be done by the VIs with the spikes during the hiatus. It helped that they had receive funding from other sources as well so they


could afford more violence interrupters. The decision, upon consultation with CeaseFire Chicago, was made to remove the outreach worker supervisor position and to instead imbed it within the program manager’s role. SNUG Albany decided to instead identify lead workers for each of the units.

As of the summer of 2012, the following staffing structure was in place:



The three violence interrupters work part time and they are considered the firefighters of the team. One worker explained when there is an incident they move in, identify the problem, identify the players, make the contacts, and start mediation for containment purposes. While there is a goal of the violence interrupters always being on the prevention end of violence, if a shooting does occur, then they will do similar work, but with a particular focus on retaliation. The team considers the three outreach workers to be the street social workers, who carry caseloads and work with a regular client caseload. The program manager does not have any official clients, rather he is tasked with managing the staff, engaging residents, ensuring data are inputted, and having a good sense of what is going on in the neighborhoods. The Community outreach mobilization coordinator is unique to this site when looking at the four other sites that were evaluated. This person is responsible for mobilizing the community education, peace efforts, and other options for clients. She utilizes fliers and social media for this message. This person is also responsible for secretarial activities, such as scheduling meetings, greeting clients, and calendar issues.

In November 2012, the program manager was terminated and there was an urgent need to fill his position. Therefore, a Violence Interrupter was promoted to program manager and the team is now one less a Violence interrupter. The current staffing, then, is the following:



Staffing

Albany SNUG was provided job descriptions through Chicago CeaseFire and used those for their program. Albany SNUG hired people into the following positions: program manager, outreach supervisor, outreach worker, and violence interrupter. Albany SNUG had an additional position that was hired into, the community outreach mobilization coordinator. This person is tasked with engaging the community, informing the community of upcoming events, scheduling meetings, and other administrative office duties. This particular site has had much turnover with this position, and has recently hired a fourth person into this role. Issues faced with sustaining this person in this role ranged from usual personnel issues around finding a better paying job to the unusual where a person hired into the position was not qualified.

The original program manager worked from August 2010 through August 2011. In August 2011, she resigned from her position. At the end of October 2011, the second program manager was hired on as the new program manager. He was the outreach worker supervisor during the original grant period. While he was hired on as the new Program manager, he would also take on the role of outreach worker supervisors. There were conversations with Chicago CeaseFire about this alteration and, according to Chicago, while there were concerns, Albany SNUG made the case that this was necessary and therefore moved forward with the staff changes.

The ideal candidate for a violence interrupter is someone who is very close to the streets, so close that he or she is “one stone’s throw away from the high ranking members within in a gang.” This person needs to have that additional edge that allows them to communicate effectively with gang members and other high risk individuals. This person also must have respect from the more violent people in the community, those who are known to be “trigger pullers.”

With this description, it then made sense that one of the VIs is a former general with the bloods, another is a former gang member who had very high respect from within the neighborhood, and another was known as a previous shooter in the neighborhoods.

Hiring Panel

Albany SNUG did utilize a hiring panel during its hiring process. As explained during a site visit: “The first point of contact is the team leader who interviews the applicant. Then the applicant meets with team the leader and program manager. And, last, the applicant meets with the hiring panel, which includes: representatives from the faith-based community, Albany Police Department, NY division of parole, community agency representatives (at least 2), a Chicago ceasefire representative (by way of skype), and the program manager.” Everyone who is hired is to go before the hiring panel.

The hiring process for the program manager diverges somewhat from the full hiring panel process, as it included the Director of the parent organization, but then once the program manager was hired, then she was tasked with putting together the hiring panel and hiring the remaining workers, which the Director of the parent organization was not involved in.

When asked about the program manager and team leader hiring process, it was explained that they then bypass the first two processes and move right into the final phase, which is to bring the person before a hiring panel.

The specific process for determining whether someone would be a VI or an outreach worker was made by the hiring panel. The program manager explained that the hiring panel would discuss the prospective candidates and those who seemed to have a tighter pulse on the streets and hade connections and influence over shooters were recruited for the VI position. And those who still had street credibility but were a bit further from those directly influencing the street culture would be recruited as outreach workers.

Working Hours

The model requires the workers to be out during the prime time of violent activity. Workers are expected, then, to work during late night and weekend hours. In accordance with the model, the Albany SNUG staff work mostly during evenings, late nights, and weekends. All of the workers, except for the program manager, were expected to be on call. Interviews with Albany SNUG revealed that they indeed were on call. When staff respond to an event outside of regular working hours, they are then able to comp their time within the next two weeks.

Hours worked were generally the following:

- The program manager tended to work Monday through Friday, 9-5

- The outreach workers had staggered schedules and reported working Monday through Thursday 10-6, Friday 6-2, and every other Saturday 5pm-1:00am
- The violence interrupters also have staggered schedules and reported working most often 2 hours one day, 2 hours next day, 2 hours next day, and 8 hours the following day. This was done so that they had the option of carrying over hours if they often respond incidents while on-call. This helped to account for overtime, allowing for much flexibility prior to accumulating overtime pay.

Staff Termination

As mentioned previously, Albany SNUG underwent considerable staff turnover over the duration of programming. The program went through three community mobilization coordinators and then in November 2012, the second program manager was abruptly terminated. The SNUG staff explained that they had no indication that the second program manager would be terminated, so they were caught by surprise, and more specifically, shock. The termination was done by the CEO of Trinity and the events that unfolded after the second program manager was informed of the news implied that he was very upset. He destroyed the SNUG Albany database which housed all of the participants' information as well as the events that SNUG Albany had attended and the list of volunteers. The staff then were forced to recoup the data from their heads and input it back into the electronic format. This took much time and plenty of data were lost. The next step was that the CEO of Trinity met with the team, explained what had happened, asked the team if they wanted to continue doing the work and if so, then they had to decide as a team who would be their new program manager. The team had a short time frame to make the decisions. They concluded that the program must continue and they unanimously identified their new program manager. The third program manager took the role with stride and he now regularly meets with the CEO of Trinity.

Another worker created staffing issues for the program as well. This particular worker was hired during the second round of funding as an outreach worker. Under the second program manager this worker was terminated. After the second program manager was terminated himself, this outreach worker was brought back on. However, problems continued and the worker was again terminated. No other details were shared on her termination.

Any termination decision would go by the CEO of the parent organization. While he did not necessarily have to approve the termination, he identified himself as sounding board in order that the best decision could be made. This meant that he was then aware of any issues that were arising and could assist in the problem-solving process.

Previous Client

Occasionally in CeaseFire programs across the state and country, a participant has done so well that they eventually apply for and succeed at becoming a SNUG worker. While this was not the case of any of the participants in Albany, there was an interesting series of events related to this possibility/prospect. A staff member relayed the following story:

Every other call late at night regarding shooting, shots fired, or anything was coming from this one young person, he was a hell true raiser. He was picked up one day and was at county jail, so I was able to get in there and talk to him. I had never met him before but I heard all about him. Because of our relationship with the Sheriff, I was able to get in to see him without the 24 hour notice; it was waived. So, I went in and talked to him; at first he thought I was the police. We talked and then I left. He went upstate [to be incarcerated], then 6 months later I heard from him that he was out and wanted a job. Supposedly while he was upstate he inquired about SNUG Albany and was told that it was real and that it is not affiliated with the police. I met with him and in the end, he was hired as a violence interrupter.

This particular VI has shown tremendous results in Albany and while some outside of SNUG have concerns with him being involved in criminal activity so recently, he has thus far proven that he can abide by the law. There have been no issues brought up with this VI. Speaking with staff, it was revealed that because he has so recently been tied to the streets, he is much closer to the high risk residents, also creating an opportunity for him to serve as a role model.

Biographies of Staff and their Daily Activities

All of the staff came from the neighborhoods in which they worked and all of them had a criminal background of some kind. The length of incarceration varied from one serving 90 days to another who had served 17 years in prison. The length of their criminal wrap sheets also greatly varied, mostly due to differences in age, and sometimes simply due to some being more immersed in the criminal lifestyle than others. An interesting part, but not unique to this program, was that at one point there were three workers active with parole. It varied from parole officer to parole officer, but at least one was so supportive of the program that he recommended his client to work with SNUG while at least one other was close to actively against his client being on parole and working for SNUG. As none can imagine, having a parolee work for SNUG creates many boundary issues, such as the usual conditions of parole including not engaging with delinquent peers and adhering to curfew. It was necessary for these kinds of conditions to be waived for the workers, but then it also likely meant that their respective parole officer had to be more attentive with this person.

With Albany being a city of a little less than 100,000 and the target area being even smaller, it came as no surprise that many of the workers, especially the older ones knew each other prior to working for SNUG. In fact, some of the SNUG workers even grew up together.

It was evident on the site visits that the outreach workers tended to be older (past their thirties), while the violence interrupters tended to be quite young (in their early twenties). This was interesting and different than the findings in the Ceasefire Chicago evaluation in that the VIs tended to be older because of the importance of the VIs having lengthy experience in the streets and gangs that they could draw upon; most importantly, because they would then have longstanding relationships. However, the gangs in smaller cities are very different than those found in places like Chicago and New York City. This played out well in Albany with many of the younger people both identified as the shooters but also as the decision makers within specific crews. Therefore, having younger VIs made sense and was likely effective for Albany. Albany staff explained, too, that the outreach workers, as an older group, knows the parents and can speak with them about a dispute. The younger VIs then can then speak with the young people about ending the violence or mediating the dispute; hence, putting pressure on both ends.

The second program manager/outreach worker supervisor was not very candid with his history, but explained that he is a credible street messenger in that he was born and raised in Albany, was involved in criminal activity for many years, and he was eventually sentenced to 20 years in prison, serving 17 of those years.

The third program manager was first hired as a Violence Interrupter, but was then promoted to program manager/outreach worker supervisor in November 2011. The articulate, thoughtful, and insightful young man moved to Albany from the West Coast when he was young. While growing up in Albany, he got involved in criminal activity and was arrested, convicted and served 7 years in State Prison. While in prison, one of his close friends was killed. That event impacted him greatly, creating an opportunity for him to think about the sanctity of life and the importance of making a positive difference. Just after his release and prior to his SNUG work, he was working at the Center for Employment Opportunities. Interestingly, while he was working there, his parole officer recommended him for SNUG. The third program manager had heard about SNUG from the street and had an interest in the program, but did not think he could work there. Then, in April 2012, he was hired to work for SNUG as a violence interrupter, less than 6 months after his release from prison and with the recommendation of his parole officer. While working as a violence interrupter, and before being promoted to program manager, he was working a second job at a community center.

Mike (name changed) is a young Albany native with a quiet personality. The violence interrupter described himself as being a loner but having quite a temper, or as he put it, “a hothead.” His temper helped to land him in jail and after he did his time, he was released and has continued to be employed in some way or another since his release. While he was working as a custodian, he heard about this position through SNUG. He viewed the position as a career building opportunity and he was very interested, especially because he lives in the target area. A friend worked with SNUG and he felt that he was the right person for the job. However, it was no easy task for him to get an interview. He persevered and eventually got an interview. Once he went through the hiring panel, it was a unanimous decision that he fit the role of a violence interrupter and he was subsequently hired onto the team.

The violence interrupter, Tyrese (name changed), another young Albany native, was likely the closest to the streets when he was hired. Tyrese was notorious in the Albany neighborhoods due to his reckless use of guns. He was known to be involved in some way in the majority of the shootings that took place. He was eventually arrested, convicted, and incarcerated for 6 months and while he had gotten a job shortly after his release, he was interested in working for SNUG, so he eventually applied for a position. There were two major events in his life that played a major impact in his decision to make substantial changes in his life. The first was when he witnessed his best friend get killed and the second one was the birth of his daughter. When asked what makes him a great VI he explained, “I’m from the streets, people still connect with me since I was just recently in the streets.” He feels that he has the ear of many of the violent people in the community. He knew one of the workers from his time served in jail, but he did not know anyone else. An issue of contention continues to be with his parole officer, as his officer is not supportive of him working for SNUG.

The VIs work in short shifts almost daily, walking the neighborhoods determining whether a dispute could turn violent and then in turn mediating those violent disputes. One VI articulated, “I make contact with high risk individuals in order to reduce violence in order to reduce shootings.” With such high stakes in the game, then, the VIs all expected that they would be on call in order to truly be effective. Often, someone from the community will contact the VI either through either a phone call, showing up at the SNUG office, or while the VIS are canvassing the neighborhood. Once they get the call, they then weigh in on the situation through a quick assessment of who is involved, the likelihood that it will result in violence, and a plan to address the dispute. Most often, they speak first to the person who they have the closest relationship with and they then speak with the other party. They may go back to the first party with more information and then back to the second party as needed which eventually culminates in bringing the parties together for mediation. Every mediation is done face to face, either at the hospital, on the corner, or at another public place. VIs regularly mediate together, for both safety concerns and because often other workers may have a relationship with others involved in the dispute. Once the dispute is resolved, they continue to monitor the dispute but then move on to mediating other disputes.

Rodney (name changed), an outreach worker, is an older Albany native who grew up with one of the previous program managers. He explained that he had done his time and was tired of seeing young kids hopeless, witnessing bad police and community relations, and tired of attending funerals. He started conversations with his friend the SNUG program manager about his concerns, and he wanted to get involved with SNUG. The program manager continued replying that he had no positions open. However, Rodney persevered, even working on the site when it was undergoing remodeling, and was finally offered an opportunity to interview. It was important for him to get a job in which he felt he was giving back to the community. It was explained that his reservations were with Rodney’s perception of law enforcement. The program manager believed that he had negative views that would greatly impact his ability to work with the community. It was not until the program manager witnessed Rodney’s changed attitude toward the police that he felt comfortable asking him to apply. He was eventually hired and has been working with SNUG since June 18th 2012.

The outreach worker Melissa (name changed) was not forthcoming with her history, but she made the following statement, “I am a credible messenger because everybody knows me in Albany and the surrounding area.” She went on to explain that she was once one of the young people who SNUG is helping so it was important for her to be involved. The previous program manager, contacted her for the job. She had another job at the time, but was nonetheless interested. Melissa subsequently applied and was the first person hired under the second program manager. As part of her role on the team and in being the first hired, she assisted in screening and interviewing the remainder of the prospective team members. She was terminated in the fall of 2012, rehired at the end of 2012, and then terminated again in early 2013.

The outreach worker Paul (name changed) was older with a calming presence. During his youth he grew up in both of the target areas, Arbor Hill (uptown), and then in the downtown area (SouthSide). He was very involved in teen centers when he was younger, but then as he got older he found himself entangled in the criminal justice system. He eventually served time in prison and upon his release, he wanted to give back to the community because he was tired of

seeing young people with fewer opportunities. SNUG known to the community and he was intrigued with the program because they specifically worked with young, violent kids in order to offer them other options. He learned as much as he could about SNUG and felt that he had a lot to offer, especially related to employment programs. Eventually, he put in an application and made it through the hiring process to be brought on as an outreach worker. Paul is particularly an asset because he has relationships with people in both neighborhoods. These relationships are something that he can build on when disputes need mediation.

The workers reported doing a lot of work with the particular participants, but also canvassing the neighborhoods, which includes giving away t-shirts, pamphlets, posters, and other materials. Occasionally the outreach workers will do mediations, but often only when a worker knows someone involved and has influence.

As of the present, the community outreach and mobilization coordinator has had four different people in the position. The biography below is for the third person who was in the position. Two of the people who left the position for a more secure, better paying job, and the third person was terminated due to an inability to meet the job requirements. We met with Denise who was there for her first day on the job, but had been volunteering for weeks with the program. While she did not currently live in the target area, she grew up in Newark New Jersey but would travel to Albany during the summer months. Therefore, she had a familiarity with the city. Her background is in the public health arena as she has experience in both operations management and working with nonprofit agencies. She had been recently laid off and while she has two higher level degrees, she has a felony background, making the job search difficult. She had heard about SNUG and decided that it made sense to apply, as she also had family who were involved in street life. She applied for the position and was then hired on. The program manager at the time explained that because of her expertise in operations management, they were hoping to use her skills to better run SNUG and better collect data. She later was rehired into her previous position, so she left SNUG.

Data Collection and Reports

When asked about data collection, Albany SNUG explained that the program data can be accessed in the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention (CPVP)'s database. Some examples of what can be found include: Number of shootings responses, Hourly log of outreach workers' time, number of participants served, the participant risk reduction plans, and the number of community activities attended.

However, during one of the site visits, information was revealed that the staff do not have access to the CPVP database because they had not yet been trained by CeaseFire Chicago in data documentation. CeaseFire Chicago corroborated this and explained that they do not give access to people who have not received the training, in order to better account for data reliability. The second program manager explained that they were collecting minimal data on the work being done. He was encouraging staff to fill out an activity log daily, but there is little reason to believe that the logs were filled out with any consistency. The second program manager created a database that the activity logs were then inputted into. As mentioned previously, the second program manager was explosive when he was terminated, destroying the SNUG Albany database on his way out. Therefore, those data were lost. While there had been a number of obstacles to

the Albany site's data training, by the second visit, all staff had been trained and were inputting into the CPVP (official) database.

When looking at the data, in the CPVP database, as is described in more detail below, there is little reason to believe that those data are accurately reflecting the work done by SNUG staff. There are very serious concerns that the work is not being documented and therefore, there is little hope of having an accurate grasp of the work done by SNUG staff. Obviously, then, this makes for a very difficult analysis.

However, as part of the evaluation, SNUG workers filled out a survey about their daily activities and we share those results in the following Operations section.

Training

CeaseFire

As mentioned previously, CeaseFire provided training for all of the sites. The following outlines the SNUG Albany training schedule provided by CeaseFire Chicago:

1. Full Training on 10/12/10 – 10/16/10
2. Full training on 05/17/11 – 05/21/11 (Training held in BK)
3. Booster training on 07/08/11 – 07/09/11
4. Full training on 05/08/12 – 05/12/12

A separate training is done by CeaseFire for data inputting and database access, the staff had not been trained on this during the first visit, but they had been trained on it by the second visit.

Internal

There is no regular schedule for in-service training. The second program manager explained that in-service training occurs with some consistency, and that it is usually in the form of community agency representatives or community members presenting on various issues including professional responsibility, trauma, and other topics. With the third program manager in place, in-service training has occurred with more regularity. The CEO explained that Trinity has provided a number of trainings for staff associated with any Trinity program and that SNUG staff regularly participate. Specific training that he discussed included training around supervision.

Operations

Headquarters

The SNUG office is a renovated storefront located in the target area. In order to get into the building, a doorbell is rung with a SNUG staff member in control of building access. There is a bright and clean sitting area, with a front desk in the space as well. A bulletin board posts a number of community resources and service organizations to contact. There were no identifying

SNUG materials present. The Program Manager's office is located adjacent to the waiting area, with a door open. On one of the site visits, a participant was in the office with the program manager while another was in the waiting area. There are a number of other office spaces, a clean restroom, computers for access, as well as large meeting room space for the SNUG team.

Spreading the message of stopping the violence is central to the CeaseFire model and one of the SNUG program's goals is to make SNUG synonymous with that message. Through the use of wearing SNUG clothing, pins, buttons, hats, and other gear, the message can be more easily spread. While SNUG Albany staff had SNUG t-shirts to pass out to the residents and others, they themselves were not wearing SNUG clothing. When asked about this, everyone explained that they have identification badges, worn around their necks, and that is really all that is necessary. The second program manager explained that especially the Violence interrupters are chameleons in the community, so it is important that the worker do not call attention to themselves.

Supervision

Weekly staff meetings are held with consistency and include all SNUG staff. Daily meetings are additionally held with team leaders (VI leader and outreach worker leader) at the beginning of each shift and at end of each shift in order to debrief from the night. The team meets at headquarters prior to going out for the evening and they then meet at the end of the night to debrief.

Components of supervision include the team leaders ensuring that the data are inputted by the team members and holding staff accountable for the work done with the participants. Team leaders responsible also check in to make sure that workers have the right number of participants and they are seeing the participants regularly.

When the second program manager was in place, the CEO of the parent organization was much less involved in the day to day activities of SNUG. In fact, the CEO did not have regular meetings with the SNUG. He explained that with the new third program manager, he is much more involved with the daily activities of SNUG. Further, a standing meeting is held every Friday afternoon with the CEO and program manager. The rest of the SNUG staff are invited to the meetings as necessary.

Street Intervention

According to the CeaseFire model, street intervention is the primary responsibility of the violence interrupter. Even though the violence interrupter is primarily responsible for interrupting violence, both they and the outreach workers are trained in interrupting violence and subsequently, both engage in interrupting violence.

The second program manager described an estimated 23 total gangs in the area, but felt that only about half of those (10-12) should be considered real threats and organized enough to be a concern. Further, of those 10-12, there are five who really run the neighborhoods. Therefore, these five identified gangs are who the VIs focus their efforts on.

Because the VIs only work part time, they decided to work short shifts spreading their work across more days with fewer hours on each day. This was so that they have the opportunity to be out on the street almost daily. The VIs also revealed that the vital responsibility of this job, peaceful dispute mediation, is a way of life for them, so they are regularly doing this work during all hours, without getting paid.

The VIs have the critical task of identifying who is feuding with who and who needs to be contacted in order to diffuse the situation. Disputes are shared with the VIs regularly by neighbors, people who are involved but don't want it to resort to violence, and even the police. Once a dispute is identified, the next step is for the team leader to gather more information and best determine who can be affective in the neighborhood to assist with mediating the dispute. The VI will then work with this person to get information and begin the steps toward mediation.

One VI explained, disputes between people that often lead to violence can be over "anything you could fathom." Another worker stated, "I mediate everything from bar fights to domestic disputes." Still another worker was surprised at how many "beefs" are going on in the community; he exclaimed that he had no idea how many people are beefing at any one time. He went on to explain that disputes tend to be over money, gambling quarrels, rumors, and gun thefts. Many workers felt strongly that females have strong role to play in the development of disputes. While they generally agreed that women do not ending being the trigger pullers, they are often behind many of the lethal disputes.

It became very clear that the relationship with the disputing parties is critical. Often times, as Albany is a small community, the VIs already knew at least one of the people involved in the dispute. When they are not familiar with someone involved, they reach out to other SNUG staff, including outreach workers and the program manager, to determine who knows this person and who can get through to him. While the vast majority of the time there is someone on the team who has a relationship, if there is no relationship to be found, those are often the disputes least likely to make any headway.

The workers went on to say that the relationship is integral, but an important factor with the relationship is that the mediating person had been "part of the life." This meant that they had been involved in street activity, been incarcerated, had family members who were involved, or some other connection to living a high risk lifestyle. It seemed as though it was important to the disputants that those mediating the argument were familiar with the stakes and the protocol for dealing with disagreements. Staff unanimously felt that an outsider would never have leverage to do this work both effectively and safely.

This was evidenced in the relationship with the nearby city of Troy and the regular disputes between the two cities. It was reported that one staff member was getting very concerned about a potentially violent situation occurring between the two cities, but that there was no SNUG program present in Troy. With no SNUG present, his staff did not have the relationships to utilize in order to reduce the likelihood of violence. In the end, a SNUG staff member made a connection with a gang leader in Troy and was able to quell the potential violence.

One measurable outcome of the Violence Interrupters' work was the development of a peace treaty between the two rival gangs in Albany: Uptown and Downtown. Through the relationships that the VIs had with the community in both gangs, they were able to get the two gangs to come together and create a peace treaty that is still in existence. As part of the agreement, they were not to shoot anyone over any gang dispute. While there have since been shootings, according to the staff, none of the shootings were related to gang issues (territory, affiliation, drug sales, etc); rather they were personal, non-gang-related issues between two people.

Staff emphasized that the dispute work is temperamental. In other words, hard work does not always pay off. The outcome is often dependent on the strength of the leadership of that particular gang, but due to the somewhat loose structure of many Albany gangs, the leadership is not always strong. Thus, while the VIs may be able to influence the leader, if the leader does not have a strong hold on his members, then there is the possibility that the gang members may create violent situations against the leader's request. This limitation is especially important to recognize when reviewing mediation outcomes.

If something occurs outside of their target area, together, the VIs and program manager will decide whether or not they will assess the situation. The staff exercised concern over spreading themselves too thin and the importance of keeping a focused effort. However, they may respond to the incident if it is someone who lives in the target neighborhood, but was in another neighborhood. This is because they are concerned that the issues could spillover into their target area.

As described above, the Violence Interrupters are expected to mediate disputes that are likely to resort to violence. The data are to be inputted into the CPVP database regularly. However, the Albany team was not trained on how to use the database for a number of months, so data were not being inputted into the database. The data provided below provide a small and, perhaps, not very reliable glimpse as to the work done by the interrupters.

| (January 1, 2010 through February 28, 2013) | Albany |
|---|--------|
| <u>Mediation Report</u> | |
| N. Conflicts Mediated | 90 |
| Outcome: Conflicts Resolved | 39 |
| Outcome: conflicts resolved temporarily | 34 |
| Outcome: conflicts ongoing | 12 |
| Conflict led to shooting: very likely | 34 |
| Conflict led to shooting: Likely | 28 |
| Conflict led to shooting: Unlikely | 20 |

As can be seen above, there were a total of 90 mediations, with 12 months of the first round of funding and 10 months into the second round of funding, there is a total of 22 active months included. These numbers average to about 4 mediations a month. Forty-three percent of those conflicts were resolved completely, with only 13% still ongoing. Ceasefire seeks to work

specifically with people who are likely to be the shooters in a dispute, and out of the 90 conflicts mediated, 69% were rated as either likely or very likely to end up in a shooting.

Of importance, in one conversation, however, the staff revealed that there were 50 mediations documented one month during the summer when only had 9 shootings. However, the data above make it clear that of those mediations were not documented in the CPVP database. We discussed the nature of fights and one worker explained that you always have to be careful if you break up a fight. He elaborated, “While you may be trying to be a Good Samaritan or keep the peace, the person may not like just how you broke up the fight, either you touched them wrong or you said something that wasn’t right. This can cause serious safety issues for us [staff].”

According to the interviews, the staff explained that if a shooting occurs, then the outreach workers, outreach supervisor, and the violence interrupters show up to the site. While the program manager does not have to be there, he often would show up. It was also noted that depending on the situation and availability, all the staff may not be able to show up immediately, but they do show up eventually. They will then canvas the community, knocking on doors and speaking to the residents, with the specific message: do not shoot. They will also stand in front of area where the young person was shot and respond to the violence by shouting chants, or memorializing the victim, or speaking with residents. An important goal of the shooting response is to stop retaliation. This is done by first identifying who the shooter is, which the VIs are usually able to get a handle on, and then determining next steps. This also helps the SNUG staff to get a sense of who the shooters are on the city.

During the same time period, shootings and shooting responses were to be captured in the database. The table below shows the data that were documented during the same time period as above.

| <u>Shooting response</u> | Albany |
|---|--------|
| N of shooting responses | 21 |
| N of community members present at the responses | 471 |
| Total N Shootings | 32 |

Over the 22 active months, there was an average of one shooting response a month, and an average of 1.5 shootings per month. Further, with 471 community members present, that works out to be about 21 community members at each response.

Client Outreach

Client outreach in the CeaseFire model is the primary responsibility of the outreach workers. During one of the site visits two workers reported a caseload of 18 participants, while the newest worker reported a caseload of 15 participants. Workers reported having mostly male clients, with two workers reporting female clients on their caseload. The female worker had the most females of any of the workers.

Working with female participants has been difficult to manage due to the CeaseFire protocol when working with female clients. This protocol states that when a worker is conducting a home visit with someone who of the opposite sex, then they must have someone of similar gender go

with them on the visit. Albany SNUG had a female outreach worker during a period of the program, allowing for female participants to be much more manageable. When she was no longer with SNUG, it became much more difficult to have female participants.

The table below highlights the work done by the outreach workers over the course of the program. Unfortunately, as data were inconsistently entered into the CPVP database, we are not sure how accurate these data are. 27% of the participants were referred to education-related programs; only 4% were referred to substance abuse programs, and 18% were referred to employment related resources. There were no other referrals documented. We have reason to believe that the data represented below, are not an accurate representation of the program activities, but we have no other data that can be used to better understand the activities of the outreach work.

| <u>Outreach Report</u> | Albany |
|-----------------------------------|--------|
| N of participants | 51 |
| N of referrals to employment | 9 |
| N of referrals to education | 14 |
| N of referrals to Substance abuse | 2 |
| N of other referrals | 0 |
| Hours spent with participant | 88.5 |
| Age (based on year 2011) | |
| more than 40 yrs old | 0 |
| 36-40 years | 0 |
| 31-35 years | 2 |
| 26-30 years | 6 |
| 21-25 years | 14 |
| 16-20 years | 27 |
| younger than 16 years | 2 |

With the ideal participant being high risk, it often takes more than one attempt to get him or her involved as a participant. The workers will often meet with a potential participant two to three times and by the fourth time, they will consider them an official participant and begin tracking data on him or her. Worth noting, the staff make a clear distinction between a client and a participant. A client is considered to be someone who they have been engaging, but has not yet agreed to formally participate in the program. Workers regularly discussed their “extra” clients, which ended up being an additional 3-4 clients to the caseload. They will continue to work with this person, including providing services for them ,hoping to eventually get him as an official participant, but in the interim the work is not documented because there is no place to document.

Workers were pretty adamant that they did not want to lose any participants, as each participant is valued highly. When asked about participant termination or graduation, it was explained that none of the participants have either officially graduated or been terminated, instead, the workers see less of them. The consensus was that the participants are very high risk and so while they may wane in and out, it can do harm if they remove them from their caseload. With this information, when looking at the database specifically related to the number of participants, it

would seem then that they participant count is a running tally of the number of participants ever active with the program, not just currently active. Regarding graduation, this seemed to be a gray area as none of the workers could identify a participant who had graduated or was ready to graduate. It is possible that with the management and personnel changes, the program may not have been running long enough for participants to be in a position to graduate.

Participants tended to be between 12 and 22 years old and male. Staff reported that the participants were Latino, white, and black. Workers in Albany reported that they take clients of varying risk levels, as one worker reported, “because you never know what could happen.” Per the CeaseFire model, a risk reduction plan is then developed with the youth. This plan is generated from conversations with the participants and then followed throughout their duration with the program. The CeaseFire model recommends that this plan is regularly reassessed and continuously brought to the forefront.

While outreach workers conduct case management services for their participants, they are also required to canvas the neighborhoods spreading the message of non-violence and seeking out potential participants. The workers explained that regularly hand out education materials to both participants and the neighborhood residents in order to help spread the message of peace.

Many of the participants are known by the various staff members in some way or another, prior to engagement with the program. Some participants are the children of men that the older staff knew from their past, while other staff know family members of the participants and still others used to know the participants directly. These prior relationships were identified as absolutely key to the work done. The staff explained that with relationships already built, the trust is already present.

Occasionally, a parent will contact SNUG about a child, and they are willing to assess the youth to see if he is appropriate for the program. If it is deemed that they do not qualify then refer out to another program (hopefully within the trinity program). There was conversation at the first site visit that some young people who are on probation were being referred to the program by a judge, and while that sounded initially like that would be a good idea, on the second site visit, the staff explained what carelessness that was. They explained that SNUG workers are not snitches and that it became difficult when Probation officers were doing their job and checking on with workers on how the participant was doing, but the SNUG workers could not give out any information. Also, there was the issue of the involuntary nature of this when the judge orders the programming as a condition of probation. This again went against the purpose of the program. They have since ended that relationship.

Employment was the number one identified issues that the participants face. As one worker put it, “there is not much money on the street.” While some clients had jobs, few of them had full time jobs. Further, many participants were able to get summer jobs, but then they lose the job when the fall begins. The staff believed that there are plenty of services available in the community, and that there is no need for more services, other than stronger job placement services. Some of the agencies they refer clients to are: Equinox, Trinity, AmeriCorps, JobCorps, and BOCES.

When asked if their clients tend to be connected to other services prior to engagement in the program, the workers responded with a resounding, “No.” One worker stated, “There is nothing for these kids. And relating to these kids is difficult for others. This program is really such a non-traditional program, that you could not put them in another place.” The explanation was that while there are other service providers out there, these agencies are not affective or even an option for these young people because they have different needs. A SNUG staff member explained that they now hear from kids who know they are about to do something bad, they now recognize that there is another option. They then they will come to the SNUG office, as it is viewed as a safe haven, in order to cool off and talk it out. Staff reported that a decent amount of walk-ins show up to the office, as they have heard about the program and need a safe place. .

While no staff members reported being victimized on the job, they did report that there have been participants that were shot or stabbed while engaged in the program.

Clergy Involvement

In the evaluation of the Chicago-CeaseFire program led by Skogan (2009) and his colleagues, the local faith community played a crucial role. Staff felt that their relationship with the faith community is excellent, in fact the statement was made, “they are one of our strongest supporters.” The second program manager attended the monthly church coalition meetings to discuss SNUG activities, recruit volunteers, and hear news from the faith community. At those meetings he was able to garner support for SNUG and build relationships with the faith community.

In the early days of Albany SNUG, a Covenant of Peace was implemented with the support of the faith community, consistent with the CeaseFire model, and was signed by Trinity and SNUG staff, as well as community members. The Covenant is essentially a declaration by the church that they are committed to the issue of nonviolence.

The anti-violence task force that SNUG is a part of is run by a member of the faith community. Interestingly, the Albany faith community is so taken with SNUG that when funding was diminished, there was a major initiative to invest private dollars from the faith community into SNUG activities. In January 2012, The Albany African-American Clergy United for Empowerment (faiths from across the entire metropolitan area) raised over thousands of dollars directly for SNUG. This was done with the support and guidance of the Bishop who oversees the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany. This particular Bishop has supported SNUG and pressed for widespread support of SNUG through raising funds for the program (Albany times Union, January 13, 2012).

Interviews with SNUG staff revealed that they receive counseling, support to victims of homicide, consultation, volunteering at community events, and assistance at the hospital from various members of the faith community. The staff reported a close relationship with numerous clergy members. An interview revealed that one of the local clergy leaders was a part of the SNUG hiring panel as well as continues regular involvement in the program. When asked about his current involvement, he stated that he attends shooting responses, canvases with the workers occasionally, and comforts relatives of victims who have been shot or stabbed. He was supportive of SNUG stating, "This is a key way to reduce violence." He was aware of the

turnover and management issues and felt that there is always a learning process but that if SNUG can get a handle on the staffing issues and create consistency with the staff, then they will be better suited to continue the work. He also felt strongly that SNUG plays an active role and has successfully reduced the number of shootings in Albany.

Community Mobilization

Community mobilization is a vital aspect of the CeaseFire model. When SNUG was first implemented, there was neighborhood concern that SNUG was involved with the police. The residents would even refer to the SNUG staff as snitches. This was mostly due to misinformation about the program. However, through the continued work of SNUG staff, and getting people on their team who had strong influence over the community, SNUG successfully quelled these concerns. The team even expressed their excitement when they were able to get one specific member of their team as a VI and how that was a big factor in getting the community to recognize their work, and that they are not sharing information with the police.

When asked about the community's take on SNUG now, and whether there are any repercussions for being involved in SNUG, the response was, "No repercussions at all; in fact it's the opposite: we now have a grip on the city and the community calls us and wants us there."

The entire team canvases almost daily. During neighborhood canvassing the staff network or mediating as necessary. They also continue to distribute brochures, buttons, stickers, posters, and other materials to the community. One community member explained that on his street alone, there are four or five houses that still have the SNUG posters posted in their windows from nearly three years ago. He then went on to say, "This is not the kind neighborhood that puts up political signs, but they still have these SNUG posters up. It really is amazing."

As part of their mobilization efforts, they host what they deem "fast bbqs," in which they identify hotspots in the target area and just pop up and have a barbecue until they run out of food. As explained by staff, the idea is to systematically engage the residents in positive activities. It was really important to the SNUG team that residents have positive activities to engage in, which is their thought behind the barbecues.

The CPVP database recorded 47 community activities over the course of the program's existence. If these data are accurate, then it seems that Albany SNUG has one community activity per week.

SNUG described a very strong relationship with the community development sector. They regularly meet with the neighborhood associations. They also meet regularly with the violence reduction task force. This community coalition now includes about 25 partners that meet bi-weekly to discuss issues around violence. According to interviews, this task force includes key stakeholders in community, and its goal is the creation of an initiative to reduce violence.

On a recent call with the CEO of Trinity it was explained that that coalition is seeking dissolution as the work has been done through SNUG.

Regarding the relationship with SNUG to the local businesses, the SNUG staff explained that they will inform the businesses of the work, who they are, and what the goal of the program is.

This is a way to inform business owners that they can let the SNUG staff know if there is talk of a shooting in the near future or any illegal activity. The other role that the businesses play is that of employment. SNUG staff regularly canvass the local businesses finding out if there are any employment opportunities for their participants.

SNUG staff have a strong relationship with two of the local barbershops in that any of the SNUG participants are eligible to get a haircut and a shave free of charge if they are attending school or if they have a job. Further, for SNUG's Peace in the Street campaign (a community event), many businesses donated food and drinks to support the effort.

University at Albany School of Social Welfare Interview

The School of Social Welfare at the University at Albany reported that the 2012 summer had the potential to be violent, but with SNUG present and specifically if it had not been for the second program manager standing by the family who had a son that was murdered, then there would have been a lot more violence.

Community Support

When SNUG Albany risked losing funding, there was tremendous support by the community to continue funding SNUG. As evidence of this support, a group of community members rallied at the Governor's mansion in order to get attention for support for funding. Further, testimony was presented in favor of SNUG programming at the joint legislative public hearing on January 30, 2012 by representatives from Albany City Council, Trinity Alliance, Albany Police Department, SNUG, mother of a shooting victim, and the faith community. The testimony points out a reduction in specific violence incidents during SNUG's implementation, including only one retaliatory shooting and reductions in shootings overall during the 2011 from 2010 (when SNUG was not implemented). It goes on to further state that when SNUG ended in October 2011, shootings increased from 2010 at the end of the year. The testimony provides newspaper clippings evidencing the community's support of SNUG, as well as the outcomes found in Skogan's evaluation of CeaseFire Chicago (Joint Legislative Public Hearing on 2012-2013 Executive Budget Proposal: Public Protection). In the end, SNUG was granted \$150,000 from the Division of Criminal Justice Services, so the testimony did not result in the \$500,000 they were hoping to acquire. Nonetheless, the community came together in an attempt to continue a program that they saw as a necessity.

The University at Albany's Center for the Elimination of Health Disparities hosted events around health disparities in the spring and summer of 2012. An event was hosted specifically targeting the work done by SNUG. This event brought in CeaseFire Chicago violence interrupter Ameena Matthews and attendees viewed the film "The Interrupters" and then had a facilitated discussion after the film screening. There was a suggested donation of \$10 to attend the event which would go directly to SNUG.

A longtime resident of one of the streets located in the target area shared his feelings around SNUG. He explained that he has seen many agencies, groups, coalitions, and others attempt to reduce violence and other social issues in his neighborhood, but that none have been there for the long haul. However, he feels that SNUG is different; that SNUG has structure in place to methodically reduce violence. He went on to discuss how he has come face to face with

shooting victims on two occasions, so it is a very real concern of his. He is impressed with the SNUG workers' shooting response and going door to door with the community members to spread the message of stop the violence and to give support. SNUG has, in his words, "broken the silence," that was there for so long amongst the neighbors and really deals with violence as a public health issue. SNUG mobilizes the residents around peace. There is much grief in these neighborhoods, and out of SNUG's efforts, there has now been a Mom's group created for mothers to garner support from one another and to grieve over violence that has affected their families.

While the resident acknowledged that the police department has made strides recently in community policing, but he feels that SNUG does things differently than the police, in that they talk with the community, walk the community, and empower the community. He went on to say that some of the residents on his street still have the SNUG posters in their windows; that is how strong the community support is for the program.

He initially got involved through the first program manager inviting him to a SNUG meeting as he is a member of his neighborhood block club. While he admits that he has been involved in community organizing, he explained that he has never seen this level of organizing and connecting with people from the ground up. He stated, "they came to me. I have never encountered anything like this." He feels that this systematic approach breathes new life into the community.

When asked if he attended any of the shooting response or community events, he said that he had and that they were very powerful. He said that a number of people were present, and that people were all grieving in different ways. He explained that he has taken his children to some events, but he has found them to be too young to get much out of the events (the oldest child is under 10 years old). He did, however, go on to state that many teenagers present as well as members of the community are present at the responses and that they are very a powerful tool in mobilizing the community.

Educational Campaign

The CeaseFire model calls for a public education campaign aimed at changing community norms around violence and in particular a campaign that highlights the risk of engaging in violence, especially gun violence. When the staff were asked about the educational campaign and specific materials, they explained that they were working on a brochure currently and that they were also putting together Public Service Announcements (PSAs) to spread the message. Recruitment for the PSA's is being done with the target population. They also ask this target group to help with spreading the message through passing out cards and other educational materials.

Albany SNUG reported that Ceasefire Chicago does not oversee the material development and distribution process, but they assist with idea formation and sharing examples of work done in the past. SNUG went on to say that all of the sites take great pride in what they create for their newest educational campaign, so they are constantly sharing with other sites their final product. SNUG Albany was very familiar with the posters created by sites across New York State. This part of the program seemed to be enjoyed greatly by the Albany SNUG team; however, we did not see any SNUG posters or brochures in the office.

According to the SNUG staff, one of their pieces that had the most impact (as measured by people's feedback) was a photo of a young child, with the message, "don't shoot, I want to grow up." They were very proud of this particular poster.

Relationship with the Schools

SNUG staff described a strong relationship with both the Albany School District and specific schools. They went on to explain that they conduct two sessions with males and females at the alternative learning center weekly, every Thursday and as often as needed outside of that. The Learning Center has students in middle school up through high school age who participate. The participants are identified by the principal and many of them are gang associated. Originally, the program manager was running the group, then the outreach workers were, and they have now put community workers in that role in order to free up the outreach workers' time.

An interview with the CEO of Trinity revealed that there were at least two occasions when the Albany School District had serious concerns that a large fight was going to break out which may result in gun violence, so they School District contacted SNUG staff and asked that they be present at dismissal. On both occasions SNUG staff were present and there was no serious fighting or other violence that occurred.

Police and Prosecution

According to the CeaseFire model, the SNUG program is tasked with working with local law enforcement to achieve their mission. Albany SNUG had a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in place with the Albany Police Department, in order to formally share data, during the first round of funding. During one of the visits the second program manager explained that there was protocol being set up now by the Chief of Police to put a system in place for SNUG to be immediately notified by the commanding officer on the scene of a shooting. It was expected that a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) would be signed by both agencies. During the previous funding cycle, there was an MOU in place before funding ended in October 2011. With the new funding, the Department still does share information and regularly meets with SNUG staff, but there is no MOU in place yet.

The program manager meets with a liaison at the police department. This was important because if the police met at the SNUG office, the SNUG staff would almost immediately lose credibility within the community. The SNUG staff assessed the community's relationship with the police and they described it as distrust from both the community to the police and from the police towards the community. This was why it is vital that their work remains separate from the police work.

When asked about how the Police Department feels about the SNUG work, the second program manager explained, "the top brass are 100% behind us, the command staff is 80% behind our work, and line staff are mostly supportive." While advocating for continued support of SNUG in January 2012, The Albany Chief of Police, Steven Krokoff stated "The demand side, people wanting the guns, the subculture of violence, we have a very limited effect on. Programs like SNUG are community-based and get into the heart of where that mentality is." In the same testimony he explained that SNUG has even had an effect on his officers in that others are

working in a structured, programmatic way to reduce violence (Supporters Push for SNUG Funding, YNN, n.d.).

The Violence Interrupters were asked about their relationship with the police. One stated, “I assume they know who I am, but we don’t talk. I’ve only met the Chief, but not other line officers.” Another stated, “It’s iffy.” He elaborated by saying that some officers will ask him to move on but other times they do not. His way of dealing with not so friendly officers was to keep a cool head and to continue to do his job; what he is getting paid for and what he loves. Yet another worker described the close relationship that has surprisingly been created with officers now by stating, “you would think we was dealin’ together.” Law enforcement knew this worker very well previously, from the other end of the law. However, he has changed immensely and he explained that initially, and rightfully, many of the officers did not believe that he could change. But, now that they see the work that he has done and they are proud of him.

The outreach workers seemed to report an overall positive relationship with law enforcement, by explaining that they will regularly speak with participant’s probation officers, lawyers, and parents.

The SNUG staff regularly responds to the local hospital when victims are treated for shooting related injuries. While interviews with the head of Security revealed that the SNUG staff are heartily welcomed at the hospital and that they have made clear contributions to ensuring safety in the hospital and informing hospital security about this at-risk population, there is a different response from law enforcement. The VIs disclosed a time recently that they described as a silent standoff between the police and the SNUG workers. The victim had asked for the SNUG staff and had nothing more to say to the Officers about the incident, but the Officers were not prepared to leave, perhaps because they felt that the victim would give the SNUG workers more information. This “silent standoff” lasted for a few minutes until the officers eventually left the room.

Conversations with the Assistant Chief of Police at APD revealed a formal, structured relationship with SNUG Albany. The chief explained that there is a weekly meeting at the police department with the CEO of Trinity and the program manager, but that they will also share data as it becomes available, such as shooting and stabbing data. SNUG staff are utilized by the police department if intelligence finds that there is a dispute that may turn violent, the police then contact SNUG to get on the ground and attempt to mediate the situation. Probation, Parole, and the police attend a weekly school meeting with school security and SNUG attends those meetings as well. He went on to state, “Our numbers have continued to drop. And we have only had two people shot since the beginning of 2013. We recognize that nothing is done in a vacuum, but I would not want them to stop their work.” A particularly memorable incident as when there was an officer involved in a shooting of a resident, and deadly force was used. He explained that SNUG staff were excellent at coming out and supporting the community, but also keeping them from getting to the point where they were boiled over.

The Assistant Chief explained that the police department put together a written procedure for their officers explaining what SNUG is, how the department is utilizing them, and what to expect from SNUG. The outreach workers attended some roll calls in order for the officers to recognize their faces. However, he explained that the 40% of the current force has been in the

department for less than two years, so he was meeting with SNUG staff that day to have the workers come to more roll calls and introduce themselves. The conversation ended with the Assistant Chief relaying his strong support for the program and explaining that while everyone may not get it, he understands that the community relates better to these workers, so they are in a position to build trusting relationships with the same goal as the police: to reduce the violence.

Of relevance, is that the previous program manager was recruited for a position with SNUG due to his relationship with an Officer. This particular Officer was a childhood friend of the individual and he recommended that he look into the position. He was then hired and continues his strong relationship with this officer.

Staff reported that the County Sheriff is very supportive of SNUG. The Sheriff's Department has co-sponsored a number of SNUG events, which often meant providing food and refreshments for the residents and attendees. The staff explained that they do not regularly interact with deputies, but when they do, the interaction is positive.

The second program manager, presented for SNUG at the Albany Office of Probation's regional meeting and the officers seemed to be interested in the program. However, the second program manager explained that he felt that some officers (even one that is supervising one of the current staff members) are not completely supportive of SNUG. He explained that the feedback during that meeting from some of the officers was pushback around SNUG gathering information on shootings and not sharing that information with law enforcement. Albany SNUG was not clear on how to manage that issue of concern, other than attempting to explain to the officers why they cannot share information. There appeared to be misunderstanding in that relationship.

There are currently two staff members on parole. Originally the local Office of Parole was adversary towards the idea of hiring parolees as SNUG staff, but recently the office referred one of the current violence interrupters to SNUG.

The program manager felt that the District Attorney was supportive of SNUG. He recently met with the DA regarding the hiring of a recent worker who they had initial concerns with. But, the meeting was a success and this particular worker is doing well and fully engaged in the SNUG work.

Relationship with CeaseFire Chicago

The Albany SNUG staff reported a close relationship with CeaseFire, stating names of people they work with from CeaseFire. The workers all felt that the training received was effective and related to the job. The second program manager discussed the bi-weekly conference call with CeaseFire and also that they will call Ceasefire if they run into any problems, issues, or questions. The manager explained that the bi-weekly conference calls are a time to share different creative ideas, problem solve together, and to give highlights as to the work being done at each site. Further, he felt strongly that that they have full access to the Ceasefire team.

CeaseFire Chicago Interviews

Conversations with Chicago Ceasefire suggested a more complicated story. CeaseFire said that they were regularly in contact with Albany SNUG during the first round of funding, but then during the second round of funding, the contact has not been that consistent. The staff said that the management issues became a problem and that Albany program was not present on the bi-weekly calls. They went on to say that the new staff were then hired, but that there were a number of scheduling issues with training the workers, therefore the workers were not trained, and they were particularly not trained in data collection and database use. Therefore, the workers were not documenting the work being done.

SNUG University at Albany Evaluation

As mentioned above, University at Albany School of Social Welfare conducted an evaluation of Albany SNUG during its first year of programming. The evaluation consisted of focus groups, community surveys, and program and crime data analyzed. The evaluation found that community development and the educational component of SNUG have been essential to the program. Promising outcomes were also found in the data analyzed. Recommendations made included: increase the focus on staff supervision and retention, continue to fund SNUG, and stabilize the SNUG team. Interviews with the School of Social Welfare found that the Albany researchers felt that it is important to look at what is sufficient funding in any given community in order to run the program with fidelity to the model. Further, they felt strongly that a cost-benefit analysis would shed light on some of the work done by SNUG. The community response to the presence of SNUG and concern that would not be here anymore was overwhelming.

SNUG Albany: Impact on Violence

Methodology

The purpose of this research is to evaluate what impact, if there is any, SNUG has had on gun-related offending and violence within its area of operation in Albany, NY. Our data source is the New York Division of Criminal Justice Services, which collates incident data from police departments across New York State.

Ideally, in order to limit problems with internal validity, program evaluations would employ a true or classic experimental design with random assignment of cities and locations into experimental and control groups. As is often the case with evaluation research, however, practical concerns precluded randomly assigning SNUG to some cities and not to others. Rather, SNUG sites were selected based on need and other considerations. Consequently, the sites receiving the SNUG program may differ systematically from those sites that did not receive the program, which could account for differences in levels of violence before and after implementation of SNUG.

Since a true experimental design was not feasible, we employed an interrupted time-series quasi-experimental design for our evaluation. This design features numerous observations before and after the implementation of SNUG. To assess the impact of SNUG, we employ seasonally

adjusted autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) analysis to estimate projected levels of violence. We then contrast the projected and actual (or observed) violent incidents as a means of detecting whether SNUG reduced levels of gun-related violence.

Results

We evaluated the impact of SNUG based on the four Part I index crimes: murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Since SNUG was primarily intended to impact firearm-related crimes, we examined counts of these four events where a firearm was involved. If SNUG was successful, it is also possible that there would be spillover effects into those crimes that were not committed with firearms. That is, it is possible that the number of non-firearm-related violent offenses may increase as disputes continue to be settled violently (albeit now without firearms) or else the SNUG violence interrupters may be responsible for higher levels of peaceful dispute resolution, with consequently less violence of any type. The incident data span from January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2012. Since implementation started in September 2010, there are 56 months of pre-implementation data and 23 months of post-implementation data.

Table 1 reports the average monthly number of violent incidents across the four index crimes (both firearm-related and non-firearm related) during the period of the study. The average number of violent incidents in Albany, pre- and post-SNUG, declined across all measures. The decreases were evident among both firearm-related and non-firearm-related offenses. For instance, across the entire study period there was an average of .45 homicide incidents each month in Albany (or about one homicide every two months). About .30 firearm-related homicides occurred each month. Before SNUG, the monthly homicide average was .54 (of which .36 were firearm-related). After SNUG, the monthly averages declined to .13 homicides each month. While there was a difference of .15 homicides pre- and post-SNUG, the monthly average of non-firearm-related homicides decreased (.09) as well over the same period.


Table 1. Violent Crimes for Albany, 2006-12, Pre- and Post-SNUG

| <u>Measure</u> | <u>Firearem related</u> | <u>Non firearm</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|--------------|
| Overall Homicide | 0.30 | 0.15 | 0.45 |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.36 | 0.18 | 0.54 |
| Post-SNUG | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.29 |
| D (Homicide) | -0.23 | -0.09 | -0.25 |
| Overall Rape | 0.01 | 3.66 | 3.67 |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.02 | 3.82 | 3.84 |
| Post-SNUG | 0.00 | 3.23 | 3.23 |

| | | | |
|----------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| D (Rape) | -0.02 | -0.65 | -0.67 |
| Overall Robbery | 7.42 | 20.84 | 28.26 |
| Pre-SNUG | 7.86 | 22.00 | 29.86 |
| Post-SNUG | 6.13 | 17.75 | 23.88 |
| D (Robbery) | -1.73 | -4.25 | -5.98 |
| Overall Aggravated Assault | 6.19 | 47.67 | 53.86 |
| Pre-SNUG | 6.59 | 49.87 | 56.46 |
| Post-SNUG | 5.17 | 42.87 | 48.04 |
| D (Agg. Assault) | -1.42 | -7.00 | -8.42 |

This simple comparison suggests that SNUG was consistently effective at reducing violence; however, these results need to be interpreted with caution. The declines for many of these offenses after the intervention were quite small in magnitude; for instance, firearm-related homicide only decreased by an average of .15 incidents per month after the advent of SNUG. In fact, none of the decreases in violence were of enough magnitude to achieve statistical significance at the .05 level except for robbery (without a firearm) and aggravated assault (without a firearm), meaning that we cannot rule out chance fluctuation as the reason for most of the decreases that appeared after implementation of SNUG. Table A1 shows the t-scores for each type of violence, pre- and post-SNUG intervention. The question turns to whether these decreases were augmented by the presence of SNUG.

Chart 1 shows the actual and ARIMA-projected incidences of firearm-related homicide. During the SNUG intervention, between September 2010 and June 2012, ARIMA forecast that Albany would average .36 firearm-related homicides per month. The actual monthly averages while the intervention was underway were slightly less at .13 homicides per month. The difference between the actual and projected firearm-related homicides during this period is statistically significant, although very modest. In contrast, non-firearm-related homicides were projected to be .17 per month; however, the actual monthly average was less at .09 per month. This decrease, however, did not achieve statistical significance. In fact, none of the other violent offenses, whether firearm-related or not, showed any statistically significant differences between the actual and projected counts. Table B1 reports the means and t-scores for the contrast between the actual and projected violent incidents.



Concerning the number of shooting incidents and shooting victims, the average per month decreased somewhat pre- and post-SNUG. Albany averaged 3.29 shooting incidents each month before the implementation of SNUG; this dropped to 2.86 per month. This difference, however, is not statistically significant. A similar pattern held for the average number of shooting victims per month—before SNUG, Albany averaged 3.88 victims where after SNUG this number decreased to 3.18 per month. Again, the reduction was not sufficiently large enough to achieve statistical significance. Nevertheless, over the course of a year this amounts to eight fewer shooting victims.

We should remind the reader that any significant decreases during the period of the study, although giving the impression that SNUG was efficacious, may in fact be due to factors unrelated to SNUG—i.e., threats to internal validity (such as historical events, statistical regression). One way to assess this possibility is to create comparison cities, which is to say locate other cities in New York that are as similar as possible to the test city except for the fact that they did not have SNUG. The creation of comparison groups is somewhat problematic insofar as few cities had the very low level of gun-related crime evident in Albany (Niagara Falls is the most comparable in terms of crime level, but was a SNUG city). Additionally, virtually all of the major cities in New York at some point had SNUG, contaminating the results to some degree. Readers should therefore be cautioned that these comparisons can only be suggestive and not conclusive.

With these caveats in mind, we obtained data from three cities that did not have SNUG for the full period of the evaluation: Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse. The control cities showed a mixed pattern of changes in their level of violent offense activity. Buffalo consistently showed declines across all of the crime types measured during the study period: non-gun-related murder and rape, and aggravated assault with and without a firearm. For Rochester, a scattering of these decreases was statistically significant: firearm-related murder, robbery with and without a

firearm, aggravated assault with a firearm, shooting incidents, shooting victims, and individuals killed. For Syracuse, the nearest city geographically to Albany, only robberies without firearms decreased significantly after September 2010—the remaining crimes did not vary enough for us to rule out chance as the reason for the change. The significant changes in all three cities were in a downward direction, however, indicating that something statewide was occurring that possibly had nothing to do with SNUG. On the other hand, SNUG was briefly present in all three cities and therefore it is possible to argue that the decreases were the result of a lingering effect even after the removal of the program.

Conclusion

Violence in Albany of all types, whether firearm-related or not, declined in the period after the implementation of SNUG. The results were generally modest, however, and most decreases in violence did not reach statistical significance, where we can safely rule out chance as the reason for any apparent changes. Note that violent crime in Albany is generally low in frequency to begin with. Some crime types had barely any activity at all (in the case of firearm-related rape) or had very small amounts of activity, thus precluding the possibility of dramatic reductions. Notwithstanding the lack of statistically significant results, the general pattern of results is consistent with a successful outcome, with all index crimes decreasing.

Table A1. T-Scores for Pre- and Post-SNUG Observations

| | Pre | Post | T Value |
|----------------------------------|-------|-------|---------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 0.18 | 0.09 | 0.89 |
| SD | 0.43 | 0.29 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 0.36 | 0.14 | 1.48 |
| SD | 0.65 | 0.35 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Rape w/o Firearm (mean) | 3.82 | 3.23 | 1.33 |
| SD | 1.83 | 1.48 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Rape with Firearm (mean) | 0.02 | 0 | 0.71 |
| SD | 0.13 | 0 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 22 | 17.86 | 2.75* |
| SD | 6.08 | 5.46 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 7.86 | 6.32 | 1.61 |
| SD | 3.82 | 3.58 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 49.88 | 42.05 | 3.95* |
| SD | 6.59 | 10.18 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault with Firearm (mean) | 6.59 | 5.18 | 1.49 |
| SD | 3.99 | 2.87 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |

(* denotes significant difference at $p < .05$)

Table B1. T-Scores for Actual and Projected Violent Incidents

| | Actual | Projected | T-Value |
|----------------------------------|--------|-----------|---------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 0.09 | 0.17 | -1.06 |
| SD | 0.29 | 0.19 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 0.13 | 0.36 | -2.22 |
| SD | 0.35 | 0.32 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Rape w/o Firearm (mean) | 3.23 | 3.95 | -1.84 |
| SD | 1.48 | 1.02 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Rape with Firearm (mean) | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| SD | 0 | 0 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 17.86 | 21.18 | -2.11 |
| SD | 5.46 | 4.73 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 6.32 | 7.56 | -1.48 |
| SD | 3.58 | 1.42 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 42.05 | 45.27 | -1.14 |
| SD | 10.18 | 7.95 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault with Firearm (mean) | 5.18 | 6.2 | -1.33 |
| SD | 2.87 | 2.02 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |

Chapter 6: Niagara Falls Findings

Context

Niagara Falls sits within Niagara County, which has a County-wide population of 216,469 and a city-wide population of 50,193 (U.S. Census, 2012). Niagara Falls is located in upstate New York with borders on Lake Ontario, Niagara River, Canada, and Erie County (home to Buffalo). Niagara Falls is predominantly made up of white non-hispanic residents (69%), with the second largest group being African-Americans (22%) and then those with mixed race (3.9%). Hispanic ethnicity is reported in 3% of the residents (U.S. Census, 2012).

The Department of Labor reported that in December 2012, unemployment rate was at 9.4% in the county, which is higher than New York State which reports unemployment rate at 8.2% during the same time period. The city is following similar patterns to other urban areas with crime, poverty, and unemployment problems in that many residents, who are able to leave the city for better opportunities, transplant themselves outside of the city.

While Niagara Falls only boasts a population of 50,193 it does have its share of crime problems, including gang membership and violent crimes. On average, 18% of Niagara Falls' violent crimes involve the use of a firearm (DCJS, Niagara Falls City Police Department, 2012). In particular, about 25% of robberies involve the use of a firearm and while the number of homicides are low (an average of 5 per year), over half of the homicides are due to gun violence. There were 15 shooting victims in 2009, 18 in 2010, and 24 in 2011.

Niagara Falls SNUG is based off of the Chicago CeaseFire model, which seeks to change the behavior of a small number of individuals who are at the highest risk of being shot or being the shooter. The model relies heavily on street outreach workers and violence interrupters.

While research on the impact of street outreach workers is sparse, Pollack, Frattaroli, Whitehill, and Strither (2010) found in their Lowell, Massachusetts research that street outreach workers made an impact on over two-thirds of the youth's lives whom they worked with. Furthermore, 63% of those youths reported witnessing a street outreach worker intervene or prevent a fight.

Award History

Niagara Falls Housing Authority was the recipient of the SNUG funding and, therefore, Niagara Falls SNUG is run through this organization via People and Possibilities. Because the funding stream for the Housing Authority does not support programming, the Housing Authority created People and Possibilities, a 501(c)(3), in order to apply for grant funding to run programs in their community centers. People and Possibilities is a subsidiary of Niagara Falls Housing Authority through which SNUG Niagara Falls funding was both applied for and received through.

The previous grant which was managed through DCJS ran October 2010 through March 2012. In the previous grant, the program manager was hired at the end of September and the rest of the team was hired throughout the month of October. The second round of funding from DCJS was released at the tail end of the original grant funding, allowing for the SNUG staff to continue working through the next grant period. Thus, Niagara Falls SNUG did not have a lapse in their program period. While the second DCJS was scheduled to continue through June/July 2013, the

money allotted only lasted through the end of October 2012. October 31, 2012 was the last day of the Niagara Falls SNUG program. People and Possibilities applied for a grant through the City to continue the program, but they were not awarded the grant. As of this writing, SNUG Niagara Falls is no longer active.

During the first year of funding, the Senate was intricately involved with the SNUG budget. While the budget and budget amendments were approved by DCJS, the Senate was overseeing the program spending in year one. During year one, there was a monthly conference call that the Senate participated in with the ten sites. The Senate continued its involvement on these calls until the end of the original grant funding (October 2011 for most sites). Data were submitted quarterly to DCJS throughout the grant period. During the second grant funding period, the Senate was not as involved, but data continued to be submitted quarterly to DCJS throughout the grant period.

Neighborhood Description

The target area is made up of 50 city blocks and was decided on with assistance from the Niagara Falls Police Department. The Police Department calculated the number of shooting victims, shooting incidents, and the number of crimes across the city and determined that the area with the highest concentration of these incidents was the Highland Neighborhood, located in zip codes 14301 and 14305.

The neighborhood included an abundance of vacant lots (nearly one on every corner) as well as boarded up houses and businesses. We encountered a number of businesses that appeared to have closed down (i.e. restaurant and a chain corner store) without any signs of other, newer businesses moving into the area. The operating businesses included: barber shops, mini marts, auto shops, a community resource center, and a restaurant. The mostly two-story, brick homes included large front porches. During our visits there were many residents outside, either on their porches or walking the neighborhoods. We were informed that most of the residents are renters who live in this neighborhood. Anecdotally, the workers talked about the large number of landlords with Canadian citizenship taking advantage of the American market in buying up and renting homes in this neighborhood. There seemed to be a consensus that the landlords were not as invested in community improvement as the SNUG workers would have liked. Niagara Falls has an immigrant population consisting of: Jamaicans, Africans, and Indians. The workers explained that most of the stores are owned by those of Italian or Arab descent, who do not live in the neighborhood. The black-owned businesses that have attempted to make traction in the neighborhoods have not done well. Thus, the remaining black owned businesses are few.

There are two police sub-stations located in or near the target area, but there were no police cars present at the stations nor was there any obvious police presence in the neighborhoods, either via police car, officers walking the beat, or officer on bike. One of the police sub-stations was even closed, and it was the afternoon during a weekday, with no one present in the station and all doors were locked. There was not a large amount of graffiti, though there was noticeable gang graffiti on the side of building, in large lettering. While driving, a worker pointed out a huge, grassy, well-maintained corner lot that with a house to the side and explained that that is where they have a number of community barbecues, as the homeowners are very supportive of SNUG

and offer their yard for use. This appeared to be a well-lit area with easy access by residents to attend the SNUG events hosted there.

Within a section of the target area in which many of the low-income apartments owned by the Housing Authority had been, there was major construction occurring. The construction includes the demolition of 132 unit public housing units and the creation of single-family houses instead. This was where the original SNUG storefront was located.

As Niagara Falls is a small city, the SNUG staff deemed it important to point out areas outside of the target area that are hot spots. They talked about responding to violent incidents outside of the target area as well as canvassing outside of the target area. On one of the particularly high crime streets, the staff pointed out that there are a number of street lights out of operation because the bulbs have been shot out intentionally by some of the residents to make for less light in order to better conceal illegal activity occurring.

Legends Park, the newly renovated outdoor basketball park, which now has four updated courts as well as stadium seating, is a highlight for the community. The heat from the day was likely the reason the courts were empty, but they were located near the Housing Authority's Community Center which houses the ATTAIN lab (Advanced Technology Training and Information Networking). These are "technology laboratories located across New York States' most economically challenged urban and rural communities" (ATTAIN lab, 2013). This is the computer lab where the workers input their activity into the CPVP database weekly.

When asked about hot spots within the target area, it was explained that much of the violence occurs either on corners where people are known to hang out or outside of bars during the early morning hours. There were a number of clubs, both inside and outside of the target area, that were identified hot spots. Additionally, some of these corner stores were identified as hot spots that attract much more activity at night than witnessed during the daytime visit.

Overall, the target area in Niagara Falls contained a number of challenging physical conditions. This assessment was made based on the presence of boarded up buildings, a school that was seemingly in disrepair, the close proximity of manufacturing businesses to residential areas, and the general look of the area especially the homes and the yards. Further, there were a few other community centers, and there were a significant number of one way streets and alleys.

Program Description

SNUG Niagara Falls follows the CeaseFire Model and is a replication of the model. Therefore, they follow the same program description, same mission, and have other program facets that are meant to be replicated from the CeaseFire model.

Funding

The original grant award came through Senator Antwone Thompson. Senator Thompson encouraged the Housing Authority's People and Possibilities to apply for the funding as the Niagara Falls Housing Authority enjoys a self-described "wonderful working relationship with him [Senator Thompson]." After they received the funding, and when it was close to running out, DCJS contacted SNUG Niagara Falls and informed them of the continued funding through

the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds. This new funding would only be available until July/August 2013.

SNUG Niagara Falls continued to apply for further funding throughout the program period. On one of the larger applications, they partnered with City, the school superintendent, and a few faith-based organizations. Unexpectedly, one of Niagara Falls SNUG's CeaseFire Chicago contacts identified that specific funding opportunity. However, they have since been notified that they did not receive the award.

Organizational Structure

Parent Organization

The Housing Authority (U.S. Federal Government) does not have a funding stream to support programming within Community Centers, so the Niagara Falls Housing Authority was limited in applying for grants for program-related activities. In order to create a funding stream for grants, the NFHA formed People and Possibilities, a 501(c)(3), in order to apply for grant funding for programs in the Centers. SNUG fell under the program category, so SNUG is officially run through People and Possibilities, which is a subsidiary of Niagara Falls Housing Authority. For operational purposes, all meetings are held at the NFHA. People and Possibilities has been around since 2001 and the only other major program that is run through it is an after-school program which is a four year long grant. The other programs receive smaller funding from local politicians and banks.


People and Possibilities has its own board of directors engaged in the day to day activities at the Community Centers. The Housing authority is overseen by a board of directors separate for People and Possibilities' Board of Directors. Further, The Housing Authority owns and operates two community centers for use by the entire community, not just those living in the housing complexes. NFHA has an estimated 60 total employees, plus the additional staff from SNUG and the Advantage after-school program, which brings the total to an estimated 80 employees. The SNUG staff expressed their happiness with being situated with the Housing Authority as they feel it gives them credibility in the community and amongst other agencies.

SNUG

The SNUG program began in October 2010. Over the course of the grant, only two workers left, both of whom were terminated shortly after it started. Staffing is the following:

- 1 program manager (part-time)
- 1 outreach worker supervisor – (full-time at 35 hours)
- 3 outreach workers – (full-time at 35 hours)
- 1 part-time violence interrupter
- Admin assistant - through administrative part of grant, but not a specific position that can be found in the budget

The SNUG staff totals seven, with four of those seven working full-time. After the program manager was hired, the next hired was the Outreach Supervisor who works full-time. The remaining staff includes three outreach workers, one violence interrupter, and one administrative position. The diagram below outlines the staffing:



Staffing

The NFHA worked with a designee from the New York Senate who developed the budget and staffing positions for SNUG Niagara Falls. These decisions were made with input from Chicago CeaseFire, but with limited input from SNUG Niagara Falls. Essentially, the Senate designee made all of the determinations around the number of workers, full or part time positions, and the number of violence interrupters and outreach workers.

Niagara Falls SNUG was provided job descriptions through Chicago CeaseFire and used those for their program. Niagara Falls SNUG hired people into the following positions:

- Program manager
- Outreach worker supervisor
- Outreach worker
- Violence interrupter

The key position of program manager was viewed as a very important position and one that would lead the direction of the SNUG program and thus greatly influence the program. Therefore, they knew that they wanted someone who was welcome in the communities that would be served. They also wanted someone who had a good reputation and was already working with young people who are in danger of becoming further involved in the criminal justice system. At the time that the proposal was being put together, the eventual program

manager was working at a program for young people having a difficult time at home. In the words of Housing Authority Staff member, “He can go anywhere in Niagara Falls, even places where the police can’t go and that’s who they needed for the program. He knew of individuals in the community. So, they already knew that they wanted him hired.” While the proposal was being put together and ultimately submitted, the eventual program manager made it clear that he was interested in the position, so when the funding came through, he was the first person hired into the program.

Support Staff

The support staff member was identified as someone who works with the NFHA and works on the administrative part of the SNUG grant. Operationally, this meant that she submitted all of the reports and followed the reporting requirements through DCJS. While she did attend community events that the SNUG staff organized, this was not part of her job requirements and it was mostly done outside of her working hours.

Hiring Panel

Niagara Falls SNUG utilized hiring panel, which is in line with the CeaseFire model. According to SNUG Niagara Falls, it was mandatory that each SNUG site utilize a hiring panel, which included participation by one of the CeaseFire Chicago staff members. The hiring panel included: representative from police department, a county legislator, the deputy director of the housing authority, the newly hired program manager, Kelly Mariano (the administrator of the grant), and Frank Perez from Ceasefire (he attended remotely).

Word of mouth was used to advertise for the positions, as recommended by Ceasefire. There was no trouble utilizing word of mouth in order to generate interest from the community for the positions to be filled. Staff reported that there were more than enough prospective candidates to choose from to fill the position. The administrator explained, “There are constantly new people who want to and do apply for positions in SNUG. That is never a problem.” While there was turnover with two original workers hired, since their termination, SNUG Niagara Falls has had same team over the last 1 ½ years.

Working Hours

The Niagara Falls SNUG was very involved with schools, conducting numerous presentations and running groups in the schools. While the CeaseFire model often calls for staff to work late evening and night hours, Niagara Falls SNUG decided it made sense to them and the work they do to have a split shift schedules. This would then give them time to do workshops during the day and canvas at night. The staff had pushed to work these hours after they were up and running for some time.

The hours that the staff work varies amongst all of the workers, but in general, the following outlines the staffing hours:

- Tuesday: 10-6
- Wednesday: 10-6

- Thursday: split shift, 10-1 then 8 pm-midnight;
- Friday: split shift, 10-1 then 9-1 am;
- Saturday: 8pm-1am;
- Off Sunday and Monday

The program manager tended to work 9-5 Monday through Friday.

Consistent with the Ceasefire model, the outreach supervisor, outreach workers, and violence interrupter are always on-call. Therefore, if a shooting or other violent event occurs, the staff could be contacted and are expected to respond.

Similar across other sites, many of the Niagara Falls workers feel strongly that this is not a job, but rather a responsibility and therefore a way of life. This meant that many of the workers are regularly doing the work during non-work hours. The Niagara Falls staff explained that many of them still get in the car on Mondays and canvas the neighborhoods to determine whether something is ready to happen, and if it does, then they will call the team, and consequently, will then get paid. If they respond to something on-call, then they are able to use comp time to make up for this.

Staff Termination

Early on in the program, there was a worker that the rest of the staff had concerns about his possible current use of drugs. This concern was brought up to the parent agency and a surprise drug test was conducted, resulting in this specific worker testing positive for illegal substances. He was consequently terminated. Then, shortly after, another worker had a substance abuse related issue, and admitted to the issue, and was also terminated. Other than those two terminations, the staff remained consistent throughout the program period.

Biographies of Staff Plus Daily Activities

The SNUG staff were all credible messengers, in line with the CeaseFire model. All but one person had a criminal history and all of those with a criminal history served time. The one person without a criminal history has a longstanding history with addiction and is currently in recovery. Surprisingly, all of the SNUG workers were raised in Niagara Falls, making them all extremely familiar with the neighborhoods, with many familiar with numerous families and individuals. The SNUG staff stated that they were all raised in different parts of the city, therefore together the team knows a number of people, which greatly helps in their efforts. None of the workers were currently under any form of community supervision.

All the staff members are black, and all of them are male. The staff ages ranged from an estimated 25 years old up through 60 years old. With the oldest identified as the program manager. All staff members have a felony conviction, except for one, thus all but one have served some time in jail or prison.

The program manager seemed to be the oldest of the group and had various connections with agencies not only all over town, but throughout the country. The ordained minister currently serves on the State Citizens Police and Review Complaint Committees, which the New York

Commissioner of Correction is involved with. The program manager has not always been involved in the community in a positive way, however. He jokingly made the comment, "I've been to most of the prisons in New York State." He grew up in Niagara Falls and was involved in heavy drug trafficking, making a living off of selling drugs. Eventually he got caught, arrested, and sentenced so many times that he eventually made the decision to turn his life around. He has been engaged in community activities for a number of years, specifically working with young men who are involved in the justice system.

The program manager seemed to rely quite a bit on the outreach supervisor for the daily work to be done. He discussed going to community meetings, being involved in community events, organizing the community events, and simply being present. The program manager reported most important part to the program manager is his relationships with the community agency providers, the residents, and then his connections to political positions in Niagara Falls as well as Niagara Falls Police Department. The program manager reported spending the majority of his time canvassing the neighborhoods, informing businesses and community members of upcoming events, meeting closely with clergy, and planning upcoming activities.

The outreach worker supervisor was candid about his various run-ins with the law. He explained that he was well known to the community due to his reputation for "pistol packing." Eventually he served time in prison and, since his incarceration, he has had a desire to give back to the community. He felt strongly that his experiences make him a credible messenger. He is currently very involved with his church and serves as the Vice Chairperson on the youth department at his church. He also is very involved in music and enjoys making music that is positive and has a religious tone to it.

One of the outreach workers is younger and soft spoken, and had a history of criminal justice involvement. He did well when he was released from prison and is currently attending college part time with plans to be a professional social worker. He looked to be the youngest worker of the SNUG group and has done well in already getting to associates degrees, recently receiving custody of his child, and even obtaining his license to minister. This worker was also very heavily involved in his faith, as he is president of Young Adult Ministries at his church.

An older outreach worker had never been involved in the criminal justice system, but did have experience with addiction. He described himself as an addict for a number of years and while he did not get arrested and incarcerated, he feels he can relate well with many other participants because often times addiction has touched their lives in one way or another (whether through themselves having an issue with addiction or a parent having an addiction). He currently runs a recovery group with those who are trying to become sober. It was very clear that the strength he brings to the team is in his patience, experience with addiction, and ability to counsel others.

Another outreach worker, who appeared to be in his late 20s, also had a felony conviction and served time, making him a credible messenger. It was clear from conversations that he was very involved with sports and even helped run a basketball program for young men in the community. He was also involved heavily with his faith.

Outreach workers reported walking the neighborhood and talking with current or potential clients daily. They also reported that they were regularly involved in preventing shootings. However,

when asked what activities they engage in with the most consistency, they explained that they most often are hanging with clients on the street, taking clients to job referrals, or helping clients fill out job applications. All of the workers also reported that they are regularly present at the schools in order to ensure safety after school hours.

The sole violence interrupter (VI) on the team was also the one most recently released from prison, of all the members of the team. When asked about changing his life around, he shared an interesting story. While he was behind bars there was a particular deputy who he would regularly interact with. One day the corrections officer informed the VI that his incarceration was particularly beneficial to him because he is able to provide for his kids and that he was also planning to purchase a boat in the future. This was the pivotal moment in VI's life when he decided he had to change. He refused to help this corrections officer support his family through his job security. When framed in that way, he got so angry that he vowed to never step foot in the facility again. He has not been arrested since that episode. This incident he claims was particularly important in his eventual desistance from crime and his transformation into someone who wanted to atone for some of the wrong he did by giving back to the community.

The VI explained that he would canvas the neighborhood daily, talking with the residents in order to gauge whether any violent activities were brewing. Speaking daily with high-risk individuals in the neighborhoods was identified as one of the most important activities completed by the VI. When a conflict is identified, the VI then proceeds to mediate the conflict, which happened regularly. Often, the VI would then attempt to connect those who he mediated a dispute with to outreach workers as potential participants. One of the other regular activities that the VI would participate in was going to schools to both give presentations on gang desistance as well as provide an after school presence.

Data Collection and Reports

The SNUG staff reported that they both make their own shorthand notes as well as document the work done on a daily log form that they created. Then, one time every week they will go to the ATTAIn computer lab and input their notes into the CPVP database. Because the computers are not located in their storefront, the staff reported that it is much easier for them to input notes weekly versus every day. The data are inputted individually into the Chicago Violence Prevention Database (CPVP). The Program manager did not report inputting anything into the database, but he reported that he has access to all of the worker's data. The outreach supervisor has access to all the outreach workers' data in order ensure they are inputting data accurately.

During one of the site visits, we had the opportunity to sit in on a staff meeting. At that meeting, the VI discussed a recent dispute that he had mediated. After he explained what had happened, the outreach worker supervisor passed him a blank piece of lined paper and it appeared that he was writing down what he had just recollected in the meeting. This seemed to be an efficient way to get the work done documented. Documentation seemed to be an issue across many of the sites evaluated, so this appeared to be at least an attempt in getting the activities documented.

Training

Ceasefire

CeaseFire Chicago closely regulates the training for all of the SNUG sites. These intensive trainings include both longer five-day trainings as well as shorter one day trainings. Topics covered range from role expectations to database training to safety precautions. The CeaseFire certified trainers conducted their trainings either in Chicago or in sites across New York State (Niagara Falls staff would travel to Buffalo or New York City for training). CeaseFire staff explained that the trainings often include pre and posttests to assess for knowledge and skill acquisition. Niagara Falls SNUG staff were asked about the CeaseFire trainings and they recounted a number of topics covered, and even shared with us the training manual from CeaseFire that they had on hand.

For any workers who came on after the original training period, they would contact CeaseFire to find out when the next training was held and they would then participate in that training. That occurred with one worker hired on later in Niagara Falls. He then attended training in Brooklyn.

The following outlines the Niagara Falls SNUG training schedule provided by CeaseFire Chicago:

1. Management training on 10/06/10 – 10/08/12
2. Full Training on 10/26/10 – 10/30/10 (Training was held in Buffalo)
3. Full training on 05/17/11 – 05/21/11 (Training held in Brooklyn)

The program manager and outreach worker supervisor attended a national gang symposium in Orlando as part of further training.

Internal

The staff reported that once a new worker is hired, he/she receives the CeaseFire training, but when they return to Niagara Falls, they receive on-the-job training by the outreach supervisor. The supervisor covers topics such as: credible messenger, the current gang situation, and other topics. The staff did not report any further internal training. One staff member reported, “We use our gut feelings, street sense, plus training, all together in conjunction.” The staff recognized the importance of training, but also the need for street sense and trusting oneself. The two latter skills were deemed critical by the staff simply due to the nature of the work being done and the high risk of danger.

Niagara Falls SNUG Operations

Headquarters

The original Niagara Falls SNUG storefront could be found right in the midst of their target area on Center Avenue. The storefront was a property owned by Niagara Falls Housing Authority and was rented to the SNUG program. The Niagara Falls Housing Authority began a demolition project where the original SNUG office was located, so the office location had to be moved. The new SNUG office is located outside of the target area.

This building is owned by the Niagara Falls Housing Authority and seemed to be in need of repair. The area surrounding the headquarters consisted of some older houses, but there was also significant new home construction underway. There are a number of SNUG posters in both English and Spanish posted on the front of the flat, two-story brick building which houses SNUG downstairs, with plans for a non-profit tenant to move upstairs. The entire SNUG office space is dark with wood paneling lining the walls. There are a few rooms in the space, all of which have some furniture in them. The furniture consists of: two desks, a few chairs, and a bookshelf filled with SNUG information as well as other local program information. The walls are lined with a number of pictures from SNUG events, awards, people associated with the SNUG program, SNUG program posters and a large target area map, almost the height of the entire wall.

When asked about whether they see participants in the office, the workers responded that they rarely do, that they instead see them out in the street. There did not seem to be very much foot traffic in the area and the office is locked when no one is there. This office set up did not appear to be conducive for participants or others coming in and relaxing to get out of the street. This seemed strictly like a business that is open limited hours. When asked about where the staff input into the database, they explained that they either use computers at the ATTAIN lab or they have space at the Niagara Falls Housing Authority office.

Supervision

The outreach supervisor explained that much of his supervision is focused on documentation and ensuring that the outreach workers are following through on their job responsibilities. One of the outreach workers had been assisting with supervision, and he has been identified as a lead worker. This particular worker has shown that he has a strong skillset in managing the workers and ensuring that they are working well out in the streets, with clients, and amongst the team. Unfortunately, he was not compensated for his extra effort, but the Niagara Falls Housing Authority planned on promoting him to supervisor level if they were awarded another grant.

The program manager did not report conducting internal or continuing training with his staff. He also did not report regular supervision conducted by him. Rather, it seemed that the outreach worker supervisor was mostly responsible for conducting supervision.

Street Intervention

According to the CeaseFire model, street intervention is the primary responsibility of the violence interrupter. Even though the violence interrupter is primarily responsible for interrupting violence, both they and the outreach workers are trained in interrupting violence and subsequently, both engage in interrupting violence.

Niagara Falls SNUG staff reported that there are a few major gangs in the area, such as Bloods and the Rollin 60s Crips. However, they explained that the vast majority of gangs are not formal and structured, but rather they are just claiming membership. Those gang members will get initiated in prison, then get released and attempt to start a sect in Niagara Falls, which rarely becomes any sort of highly functioning, structured gang. Rather, the gangs here are looser and informal and identify themselves as crews.

SNUG staff reported that they hear about impending disputes while canvassing the neighborhoods (they reported canvassing throughout the entire city), from participants, business owners, young people in the neighborhood, and they even reported receiving will get calls from residents just to let them know that something may be brewing in the neighborhood. Another method that SNUG staff utilize to identify disputes is social media, such as twitter and Facebook. The staff are able to access these sites and identify disputes.

Staff reported that rarely do disputes last any longer than weeks or months. The disputes more frequently tend to be immediate or lasting only a few days. Disputes are often over robberies gone bad, over a female, personal disputes, and a few are drug-related. Staff explained that many fights, similar to other site’s findings, begin with females who will instigate a fight between two males. However, the staff said that there are also many nasty fights between females that they are involved in mediating. While only one worker had females on his caseload, they reported that females are often involved in mediations. The staff made the point that girls are “worse than boys.” They felt strongly that the girls are trying to get a “rep” and that explains much of the problems that come from them. Fights around the females tend to involve romantic disputes.

When asked about mediating disputes, the staff reported that it is important to educate them about the costs associated with violence. They will explain to the community the definition of a gang for legal purposes and how that can impact arrests, conviction, and sentencing. They also try to educate them on the impact that an arrest and incarceration can have on loved ones, such as partners, children, and parents.

If a shooting occurs, then the Outreach workers, outreach supervisor, and interrupter show up to the site of the shooting. The program manager reported that he is not always part of the shooting response. The workers then canvas the community to get information and to spread the message to not shoot. They will also stand in front of area where the victim was shot and respond to the violence by gathering community residents, grieving, and spreading the message to stop the violence. SNUG staff explained that they will respond to shootings both inside and outside of the target area. This seemed to be done due to the low level of shootings in the city.

| | |
|---|-----|
| <u>Shooting response (1/1/ 2010 through 2/28/ 2013)</u> | |
| N of shooting responses | 14 |
| N of community members present at the responses | 429 |
| Total N Shootings | 17 |

Over the course of the program period, Niagara Falls only reported 17 shootings, with 14 shooting responses. This made for only three documented shootings where there was no shooting response. With 429 community members recorded at all of the shootings, that makes for an average of 30 residents at every shooting response. While there are no CeaseFire Chicago guidelines for the number of community members present at shooting responses, having 30 people present at every response would seem to be an accomplishment.

Workers identified two specific areas that they have “cleaned up.” When asked how they cleaned up these areas, they reported it was done through area canvassing, standing on corners, breaking up street fights, flooding the nearby store with SNUG literature, and the storeowners being very supportive of the SNUG work.

Surprisingly, workers reported a lack of debriefing done for the workers. Throughout the evaluation, the workers reported instance of guns being pulled on them, breaking up serious fights, and witnessing violent altercations, yet none of them reported any organized time to process what they witnessed and to better cope with the work that they do. Debriefing does not seem to be built into the CeaseFire Chicago model.

| <u>Mediation Report (1/1/ 2010 through 2/28/ 2013)</u> | |
|--|----|
| N. Conflicts Mediated | 37 |
| Outcome: Conflicts Resolved | 19 |
| Outcome: conflicts resolved temporarily | 14 |
| Outcome: conflicts ongoing | 4 |
| Conflict led to shooting: very likely | 8 |
| Conflict led to shooting: Likely | 9 |
| Conflict led to shooting: Unlikely | 17 |

As can be seen from the data above, 37 total conflicts were mediated during the program period. Of those, half (51%) were completely resolved, the remaining were temporarily resolved or are ongoing. CeaseFire is expected to mediate disputes that are likely t lead to a shooting, yet SNUG Niagara Falls reported that only 54% of the conflicts mediated were likely to result in a shooting. This is concerning and again casts support that there is not enough violent activity in Niagara Falls to run the CeaseFire model with complete fidelity. Staff estimated that of those who they conducted mediations with, 70% are black, 20% are Latino, 10% are white.

As part of the CeaseFire Model there is a Hospital response to violent injuries. The SNUG team met with the hospital on several occasions but unfortunately could not get the process worked out. The hospital had specific issues around confidentiality. Therefore no system was put in place, even with SNUG trying over a period of time to get the hospital on board. In order to get around this, staff reported that they hear about the shootings from the community and will then show up to the hospital to at least meet with the family members.

Client Outreach

Client outreach in the CeaseFire model is the primary responsibility of the outreach workers. The SNUG Niagara Falls team focused a lot of efforts on preventing violence from beginning in the first place. For them, this meant that they regularly went into the schools to talk about violence and even covered topics such as bullying and respect. The SNUG team recognized that the other sites likely did not go into the schools as much as they did, which was why they were very proud of their efforts within the schools and their ability to reach so many young people. During the presentations they will show clips on bullying, discuss current issues going on in the student’s lives, and continue to push the message of nonviolence. The presentations are done

during school hours and they often would bring literature to the classroom and leave the materials there for the students and/or teachers to share.

| | |
|---|-----|
| <u>Outreach Report (1/1/ 2010 through 2/28/ 2013)</u> | |
| N of participants | 66 |
| N of referrals to employment | 43 |
| N of referrals to education | 53 |
| N of referrals to Substance abuse | 9 |
| N of other referrals | 17 |
| Hours spent with participant | 351 |
| Age (based on year 2011) | |
| More than 40 years | 7 |
| 36-40 years | 3 |
| 31-35 years | 1 |
| 26-30 years | 4 |
| 21-25 years | 16 |
| 16-20 years | 32 |
| Younger than 16 years | 3 |

The chart above shows a total of 66 participants. With a total of three outreach workers and one supervisor, that averages to about 16-17 participants per worker, which is consistent with the model. About half of the participants ranged between 17 and 22 years old. There was a surprising number of older clients (30 years old and older), making up about 17% of the total number of participants. Consistent with the interviews, participants mostly sought services for education and employment.

All three of the outreach workers carry a caseload and we were reminded that they are expected to not carry more than 16 participants per worker, per the Ceasefire model. When asked about participant recruitment, they explained, “Clients are right there in front of you. Right there in the streets. There are plenty of potential clients. You can make them clients if you reach out to someone who is going down the wrong path and ask if they would be willing to work with you.” They seemed to work with low, medium, and high risk participants and workers also reported that some of their clients are people that they have known from the past while others are friends that they have known for a long period. As part of the work done with the participants, a case plan is developed for each participant in order to guide the direction of the services. Staff discussed the issues that the participants face and that as the outreach worker, they should be taking on whatever issue the participant brings to the table, which often includes: help with GED, employment, mentor, and follow-up on him.

One of the workers explained that in order to help some of his participants to get jobs he first had to teach some of them to read and write simply so that they were able to fill out the job application. He then went on to discuss a number of participants, in their thirties, who are illiterate. The staff went on to explain that they generally does a lot of work around teaching the

participants how to get a job, as this was the most pressing issue for participants. The workers believed that most of the participants will work in the legitimate workforce if given an opportunity. Surprisingly, the workers could not identify any organizations that they collaborate with or regularly refer clients to other than the Reporting Centers that are run by the Program Manager as a separate job of his.

The staff will meet with participants in community, the park, at restaurants, but not frequently in the SNUG office. It was interesting to see that the workers all reported that they do not regularly take clients to the office, while the CeaseFire model encourages the storefront to be accessible and a place where participants and prospective participants feel comfortable spending time there, as it is meant to be a safe haven. One surprising thing was that the workers reported confiscated weapons from participants. They stated that as soon as they get a weapon from a participant they then hand the weapon over to the program manager who, in turn, turns them into the police department.

When asked about client graduation or termination, SNUG staff responded that Ceasefire instructs them not to close cases because they do not want them to give up on the clients, even if they drift away. They went on to say that many clients will still stay in touch with the staff even if they have drifted from the program. However, one of the workers discussed closing out cases successfully, but that there was really no formal decision made. It was clear that participants who are not successful remain on the caseload infinitely.

Niagara Falls Outreach workers reported that clients face the following issues: anger management, physical disability, homelessness, drug use, job readiness, never had a job, have no high school degree, have no GED, parents on drugs, targets of abuse at home, have children to support, have felony record, have been a shooting victim, have been a shooter, and gang issues.

Regarding female clients, workers explained that the Ceasefire restrictions make it difficult to have any female clients as a male worker, therefore they do not have females on their caseload. However, one staff member said that they did attempt to hire a female worker for SNUG, but that unfortunately was not successful. Therefore, they were limited with their hiring pool.

SNUG staff reported that parents generally were very impressed with SNUG and there were even instances when they would call the staff members and ask them to either speak with or meet with their child. The SNUG staff made it clear that the neighborhood knew about SNUG and were supportive, and also wanted their children involved with SNUG.

Clergy Involvement

In the evaluation of the Chicago-CeaseFire program led by Skogan (2009) and his colleagues, the local faith community played a crucial role. SNUG Niagara Falls enjoys a positive relationship with the area clergy. Workers explained that when churches have events or other activities, they will often invite SNUG to attend as well. Staff reported working with the Niagara ministerial council as well. And, as would be expected, they reported working closer with some churches over others.

SNUG staff stated that many churches in Niagara Falls are doing better at working with high risk kids, as there are several faith-based leaders who support SNUG. Workers identified a specific Pastor who is very involved in the SNUG work in that he regularly volunteers his time at SNUG events and even donates items to SNUG such as basketball shoes. However, they also noted that there are still some churches that have pastors who are not out in the community, not visible, and not as willing to work with the more difficult community members.

Niagara Falls SNUG staff were all highly engaged in their own personal faiths. They were so personally involved that it was often difficult to distinguish between SNUG work and personal work, as the two were regularly interwoven in conversations. At one point the program manager stated that, "God made it so that people like us can do what we do." The program manager is an ordained minister who is involved with his church (even pointing out his church during the tour of the target area). The program manager is also the Executive Director of a religiously affiliated youth center for young people on Probation. Another worker is heavily involved in his church, and he also conducts a group called Victory Over Addiction which in essence use religion to help people desist from drug use. This particular worker reported abstaining from drugs via religion and more importantly the word of God.

Every SNUG worker was heavily involved in their particular faith through running ministry programs, volunteering time, or running actual faith-based programs outside of their SNUG work. They would often have their participants engaged in some of these activities.

Community Mobilization

Community mobilization is a vital aspect of the CeaseFire model. Niagara Falls SNUG explained that it took about six months before the community would trust SNUG. Once the community started to see how well the participants were doing, they began to believe that the SNUG workers cared and followed through with what they said they would do. It also helped that family members of participants, including parents, began to believe that SNUG workers were effective too. This was the way that they slowly build trust in the neighborhoods.

SNUG hosted a barbecue where the Mayor and Chief of Police were cooking food for the high risk young people. The staff felt strongly that that was an inspirational event. They also had a big end of summer event. Staff also talked about times when they attended funerals at the behest of the family due to concerns that retaliation would occur at the funeral. Volunteers were important to the work done by SNUG. The volunteers assist at the shooting responses, midnight BBQs, and other events. They even went on to say that the Office of Probation has sent people to volunteer with SNUG for community service and that has been successful.

One of their events was a Male Summit that was attended by approximately 250 males. The event was in conjunction with the housing authority. This event included presentations by SNUG staff. There is a parent teacher collaboration team with which SNUG is involved with and SNUG also sits on the board of the Isaiah 61 Project which is a program to change the city's economic situation for re-entry clients in order to offer support and better access to employment post release.

SNUG staff were involved in a stop the bullying rally where the staff presented at the event. They seem to be involved in stop the bullying campaign in that there were SNUG posters focused on stopping bullying that were being posted out in the community. According to the staff the no bullying posters in area businesses signal that these establishments are safe havens for young people to go to in need of a safe place.

According to the CPVP database that Niagara Falls inputted data into, the SNUG staff reported running 41 community events over the entire grant period. Over the 26 months of the program, there were 1-2 events per month.

Every staff member reported an excellent relationship with the community. It was clear that SNUG staff were well known in the community, as was evidenced during the ride along with residents waving and nodding their heads to the staff, in meeting community agency people that SNUG worked with, and from the SNUG literature found in the windows of local businesses. The Administrator of the grant from NFHA explained, “They are like celebrities. We go into Wal-Mart and everyone knows who they are.” The staff also talked about a number of community events that they have been invited to, including school events, City events, and social service agency events.

The staff reported working heavily with the block clubs in order to mobilize the community. They did recognize that this was not an easy task as many black clubs were worried about trusting something new. When asked about being a part of or creating a community coalition to reduce violence as is part of the Ceasefire Model, the staff reported that there is not a coalition in existence.

Educational Campaign

The CeaseFire model calls for a public education campaign aimed at changing community norms around violence and in particular a campaign that highlights the risk of engaging in violence, especially gun violence. There were many aspects to Niagara Falls’ SNUG’s educational campaign, including: hosting Facebook page, space in the NFHA’s quarterly newsletter, banners hanging on SNUG storefront, SNUG banners for community events and shooting responses, posters, magnets, various giveaway items, business cars, and positive media from the local paper. Staff members stressed the importance of media for the SNUG program. They presented media stories about their events and with flyers of events that they conducted previously. Video of many of their events can also be found on YouTube. The staff felt strongly that it was important that remain in the public eye.

When asked about canvassing, they explained that they will place SNUG pamphlets in local businesses and that they disappear fast in the stores (many even stated that they go, “too fast”), they also use palm cards that are placed in the local barber shops.

Some of the other promotional materials that the staff had included: tri-folds (in color, black and white, updated version), posters, business cards, emergency guide card to fill out, small notepads with pencil, at least three different color 8 ½ x 11 posters, informational sheets (description of SNUG, success stories across the state of SNUG, participant eligibility criteria), headbands and arm bands, bumper stickers, and t-shirts.

This particular SNUG embraced the idea of going into schools, and reported involvement in almost all of the schools, from elementary to alternative, to the high schools. In the younger classes they will read to the kids. But in the high schools, SNUG workers will talk about their background, how they changed, discuss prison, explain drug abuse, and talk the impact on their families. The SNUG staff would go into specific schools as well as the Boys and Girls Club weekly for presentations. At one particular school, the Principal identified high risk kids to be a part of a group run by the SNUG workers. The workers ran the groups and the principal reported positive progress made with many of those who participated in the group. The workers would cover topics such as: what jail is like, how to stay away from peer influence, and how to remain nonviolent. The workers were also asked to work specific security for schools when the school knew about a fight brewing. The SNUG staff would respond when school was letting out and as a result they reported that they stopped several gang fights at the schools. SNUG staff also stated that the students would often inform them of planned fights at the schools that they would also intervene in. SNUG also runs an annual teen summit through the schools.

Police and Prosecution

SNUG reported positive relationships law enforcement from the administrative level, but not such a positive relationship on the street level. An interesting incident was described by the administrative staff member. There had been a large fight in the target area that the police responded to. As the police were questioning people once the fight was broken up, two of those who had been fighting stated that they were SNUG staff. The officers were confused as they had not seen these two workers before. The Police Chief then contacted SNUG and asked if SNUG had hired new workers. The chief soon learned that SNUG had not hired new workers, but that these two were indeed impersonating SNUG workers in an effort to stay out of trouble with the law. This incident lowered the police department's confidence in SNUG, but SNUG has slowly gained it back. This was the only reported issue that occurred between the police and SNUG.

The SNUG staff reported being very clear in what their limits are and the need to stay back when police arrive to the scene. One of the more troubling findings was that law enforcement does not contact SNUG when shooting occurs. SNUG workers shockingly felt that they usually know about a shooting before the officers do. They also reported using their own statistics versus the police department's statistics because they felt strongly that their numbers were more accurate. There was a clear disconnect between the officers on the street and the SNUG workers. However, the program manager reported a great relationship with police chief, as he is supportive, and one of the reasons that SNUG was refunded. The program manager speaks bi-weekly with the police chief and they would meet every two months or so with him in person. It seemed that the meetings varied though depending on whether any violent incidents had occurred.

While the program manager was close with the Police Chief, the rest of the staff did not feel close with officers in the Department. When asked if the workers are close with any of the officers who work at the neighborhood service center in the target area, they responded, "No." From conversations with the workers, it was revealed that they have never been to a roll call, do not attend meetings with the police, and are generally not connected with law enforcement in any institutionalized way. The Program Manager stated that this may be because he is the only one in contact with the police in order for the SNUG program to maintain the credibility of the other

staff members. However, there were no regular meetings held between the program manager and law enforcement.

Interestingly, one of the officers contacted one of the SNUG workers via social media to say that he was proud of this particular worker due to the improvements in his life he has made and for his work with SNUG.

The program manager mentioned a particular Family Court Judge who was known for being tough with clients. This particular Judge had learned about SNUG via the news media and word of mouth and felt strongly about the work they were doing. Therefore, a respondent was released to the program manager's youth reporting center because this Judge knew that the Reporting Center works closely with the SNUG program. The SNUG staff felt very positive about this outcome.

The Mayor of Niagara Falls reported that the Police work closely with SNUG, but that they do this in a way that the community continues to support and trust SNUG. He also talked about SNUG being a positive force for stability in the neighborhoods, especially with fish fries, barbecues, and other community events that are put on by SNUG. The mayor reported interacting with SNUG workers informally, but on a regular basis, often times at community events. He went on to explain that SNUG provides male role models to the community, demonstrating the ability to turn one's life around. Lastly, he felt strongly that SNUG was affective at what it does and that it has made an impact on the community.

Relationship with CeaseFire Chicago

Niagara Falls SNUG reported a close relationship with CeaseFire Chicago as far as training at data collection. However, it did not seem that Niagara Falls staff were in regular contact with CeaseFire Chicago throughout the program period other than for those two issues. Ceasefire Chicago reported that Niagara Falls was not as involved as other sites. They explained that due to the low SNUG staff turnover and low incidence of violent crime, they did not have to be very hands on with Niagara Falls. Essentially, they trained the staff and were available for consultation, but once the second round grant funding became available, CeaseFire was not as involved and not as much in contact with Niagara Falls workers. CeaseFire explained that there simply was not an identified need for them to be more involved in the Niagara Falls programming.

Other Related Operations

Niagara Falls SNUG staff consisted of a group of workers who were heavily involved in SNUG, but also were involved in their own personal volunteer activities, to which many participants were referred to and subsequently involved in. The following is a list of the volunteer activities that the workers were engaged in. It should be noted that the workers regularly rolled their SNUG work and volunteer work into one larger professional activity. This unconscious rolling into one, made it difficult to understand what was separate from SNUG and what was a part of their SNUG activities. Nonetheless, these workers made it very clear that their personal and professional lives cross paths and are almost interchangeable. It was evident from the interviews that the staff are regularly volunteering their time for various efforts across Niagara Falls.

1. City Basketball program
 - SNUG worker runs this
 - For ages 9-17
 - Year-round
 - Raise the money themselves
 - The young people play in the gym 2 nights/week
 - They play league games – in summer league, winter league, etc
 - This is considered a safe haven
 - In the summer league they had 240 kids every weekend
 - Are able to use the school gyms – the school “donates” the gyms (allows them to use them free of charge
 - SNUG clients enrolled in this program
2. Addiction Support Group
 - Religious Affiliation
 - SNUG worker runs this through his church
 - Anyone with addiction issues and men’s issues can come to this group
 - Has brought some SNUG participants to this group
3. Ministry at the jail
 - Not very formal but many of the workers participate in jail ministry
4. New Jerusalem reporting center for boys
 - SNUG program manager is the Director of this agency
 - This is for young men on probation – affiliated with office of probation
 - There are 15-20 people who show up to the reporting center Monday thru Friday
 - Unclear if any participants are affiliated with the reporting center
5. Life transformation ministries, life global
 - Also run by the SNUG program manager
 - School truancy program
 - Program for youth crime prevention
 - For 12-17 year olds
 - Unclear if any participants attend this
6. PEACE program done at Niagara county jail
 - This was has been going on for 2 years with Niagara County
 - Run by two of the SNUG workers
 - Meet weekly in the jail with a group of men
 - Goal is to help inmates change the way they think and to stop thre revolving door
 - SNUG participants have been a part of this program
7. East Side men’s club
 - Run by a SNUG worker for fathers who are felons
 - Activist organization, everything is free
 - Been running for 4 years

- An annual year end party is held
- Similar to a support group, but it is a way to give back
- No participants are a part of this

The Mayor of Niagara Falls supports SNUG closely in its efforts to reduce violence in the City. The Mayor even donated some of his personal money to the SNUG program. It was explained that the Mayor and City Council asked SNUG to patrol the renovated basketball area at Legends Park due to the numerous problems at the site before the renovation. Some of the problems included fights where SNUG staff had to intervene.

Conclusion

Some of the strong points of the program offered by the staff are 1) community events 2) going into the Niagara Falls school district, going into the charter school where they build relationships with kids (k through 12), and a truancy program where SNUG works with Life Transformation Ministries Youth Global in the schools.

SNUG Niagara Falls: Impact on Violence

Methodology

The purpose of this research is to evaluate what impact, if there is any, SNUG has had on gun-related offending and violence within its area of operation in Niagara Falls, NY. Our data source is the New York Division of Criminal Justice Services, which collates incident data from police departments across New York State.

Ideally, in order to limit problems with internal validity, program evaluations would employ a true or classic experimental design with random assignment of cities and locations into experimental and control groups. As is often the case with evaluation research, however, practical concerns precluded randomly assigning SNUG to some cities and not to others. Rather, SNUG sites were selected based on need and other considerations. Consequently, the sites receiving the SNUG program may differ systematically from those sites that did not receive the program, which could account for differences in levels of violence before and after implementation of SNUG.

Since a true experimental design was not feasible, we employed an interrupted time-series quasi-experimental design for our evaluation. This design features numerous observations before and after the implementation of SNUG. To assess the impact of SNUG, we employ seasonally adjusted autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) analysis to estimate projected levels of violence. We then contrast the projected and actual (or observed) violent incidents as a means of detecting whether SNUG reduced levels of gun-related violence.

Results

We evaluated the impact of SNUG based on the four Part I index crimes: murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Since SNUG was primarily intended to impact firearm-related crimes, we examined counts of these four events where a firearm was involved. If SNUG was

successful, it is also possible that there would be spillover effects into those crimes that were not committed with firearms. That is, it is possible that the number of non-firearm-related violent offenses may increase as disputes continue to be settled violently (albeit now without firearms) or else the SNUG violence interrupters may be responsible for higher levels of peaceful dispute resolution, with consequently less violence of any type. The incident data span from January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2012. Since implementation started in September 2010, there are 56 months of pre-implementation data and 22 months of post-implementation data.

Table 1 reports the average monthly number of violent incidents across the four index crimes (both firearm-related and non-firearm related) during the period of the study. There was some variability in the average number of violent incidents in Niagara Falls, pre- and post-SNUG. Some decreased, like murders involving firearms and rape incidents without firearms. For instance, across the entire study period there was an average of .23 firearm-related homicide incidents each month in Niagara Falls (or about one homicide of that type every four months). Before SNUG, the monthly homicide average was .29; after SNUG, the monthly averages declined to .09 homicides each month. While there was a difference of .20 homicides pre- and post-SNUG, this change is small enough not to achieve statistical significance; however, over the period of the SNUG program, there were 4.4 fewer homicides. None of the changes consequent to the implementation of SNUG achieved statistical significance, whether for better or worse.


Table 1. Violent Crimes for Niagara Falls 2006-12, Pre- and Post-SNUG

| <u>Measure</u> | Firearm related | Non firearm | Total |
|---------------------|--------------------|----------------|--------------|
| Overall Homicide | 0.23 | 0.10 | 0.33 |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.29 | 0.09 | 0.38 |
| Post-SNUG | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0.23 |
| D (Homicide) | -0.20 | 0.05 | -0.15 |
| Overall Rape | 0.00 | 2.42 | 2.42 |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.00 | 2.50 | 2.50 |
| Post-SNUG | 0.00 | 2.23 | 2.23 |
| D (Rape) | 0.00 | -0.27 | -0.27 |
| Overall Robbery | 3.62 | 10.60 | 14.22 |
| Pre-SNUG | 3.61 | 10.45 | 14.06 |
| Post-SNUG | 3.64 | 11.00 | 14.64 |


| | | | |
|----------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| D (Robbery) | 0.03 | 0.55 | 0.58 |
| Overall Aggravated Assault | 4.97 | 26.69 | 31.66 |
| Pre-SNUG | 4.75 | 27.07 | 31.82 |
| Post-SNUG | 5.55 | 25.73 | 31.28 |
| D (Agg. Assault) | 0.80 | -1.34 | -0.54 |

This simple comparison suggests that SNUG had a very inconsistent effect at reducing violence; however, these results need to be interpreted with caution. The changes for many of these offenses after the intervention were quite small in magnitude; for instance, firearm-related homicide only decreased by an average of .20 incidents per month after the advent of SNUG. In fact, none of the decreases in violence were of enough magnitude to achieve statistical significance at the .05 level, meaning that we cannot rule out chance fluctuation as the reason for most of the decreases that appeared after implementation of SNUG. Table A2 shows the t-scores for each type of violence, pre- and post-SNUG intervention. The question turns to whether these decreases were augmented by the presence of SNUG.

Chart 1 shows the actual and ARIMA-projected incidences of firearm-related homicide. During the SNUG intervention, between September 2010 and June 2012, ARIMA forecast that Niagara Falls would average .10 firearm-related homicides per month. The actual monthly averages while the intervention was underway were slightly higher at .14 homicides per month. The difference between the actual and projected firearm-related homicides during this period is not statistically significant. In fact, none of the other violent offenses, whether firearm-related or not, showed any statistically significant differences between the actual and projected counts. Table B2 reports the means and t-scores for the contrast between the actual and projected violent incidents.



Actual and Predicted Firearm-Related Aggravated Assaults, Niagara Falls, 2006-12



Concerning the number of shooting incidents and shooting victims, the average per month went up pre- and post-SNUG. Niagara Falls averaged 1.57 shooting incidents each month before the implementation of SNUG; this grew slightly to 1.68 per month, which is too slight a difference to be statistically significant. A similar pattern held for the average number of individuals killed each month—before SNUG, Niagara Falls averaged 1.71 victims where after SNUG this number increased to 1.77 per month. Again, this difference is too slight for us to attribute to any factor besides chance. This means that in a typical year the number of shooting victims increased by almost one.

We should remind the reader that any significant decreases during the period of the study, although giving the impression that SNUG was efficacious, may in fact be due to factors unrelated to SNUG—i.e., threats to internal validity (such as historical events, statistical regression). One way to assess this possibility is to create comparison cities, which is to say locate other cities in New York that are as similar as possible to the test city except for the fact that they did not have SNUG. The creation of comparison groups is somewhat problematic insofar as few cities had the very low level of gun-related crime evident in Niagara Falls (Albany is the most comparable in terms of crime level, but was a SNUG city). Additionally, virtually all of the major cities in New York at some point had SNUG, contaminating the results to some degree. Readers should therefore be cautioned that these comparisons can only be suggestive and not conclusive.

With these caveats in mind, we obtained data from three cities that did not have SNUG for the full period of the evaluation: Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse. The control cities showed a mixed pattern of changes in their level of violent offense activity. Buffalo, which is geographically close to Niagara Falls, consistently showed declines across all of the crime types measured during the study period: non-gun-related murder and rape, and aggravated assault with

and without a firearm. For Rochester, a scattering of these decreases was statistically significant: firearm-related murder, robbery with and without a firearm, aggravated assault with a firearm, shooting incidents, shooting victims, and individuals killed. For Syracuse, only robberies without firearms decreased significantly after September 2010—the remaining crimes did not vary enough for us to rule out chance as the reason for the change. The significant changes in all three cities were in a downward direction, however, indicating that something statewide was occurring that possibly had nothing to do with SNUG. On the other hand, SNUG was briefly present in all three cities and therefore it is possible to argue that the decreases were the result of a lingering effect even after the removal of the program.

Conclusion

Violence in Niagara Falls of all types, whether firearm-related or not, showed no clear pattern of change in the period after the implementation of SNUG. The results were generally modest, however, and none of the changes in violence reached statistical significance, where we can safely rule out chance as the reason for any apparent changes. Note that violent crime in Niagara Falls is generally low in frequency to begin with. Some crime types had barely any activity at all (in the case of firearm-related rape) or had very small amounts of activity, thus precluding the possibility of dramatic reductions. Notwithstanding the lack of statistically significant results, the mixed nature of results is not consistent with a successful outcome.

Table A2. T-Scores for Pre- and Post-SNUG Observations

| | Pre | Post | T Value |
|----------------------------------|-------|-------|---------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 0.09 | 0.14 | -0.64 |
| SD | 0.29 | 0.35 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 0.29 | 0.09 | 1.74 |
| SD | 0.46 | 0.43 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Rape w/o Firearm (mean) | 2.5 | 2.23 | 0.65 |
| SD | 1.74 | 1.31 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Rape with Firearm (mean) | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| SD | 0 | 0 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 10.45 | 11 | -0.59 |
| SD | 3.69 | 3.67 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 3.61 | 3.63 | -0.04 |
| SD | 2.19 | 2.3 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 27.07 | 25.73 | 0.66 |
| SD | 6.67 | 10.62 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault with Firearm (mean) | 4.75 | 5.54 | -1.04 |
| SD | 2.66 | 3.71 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |

(* denotes significant difference at $p < .05$)

Table B2. T-Scores for Actual and Projected Violent Incidents

| | Actual | Projected | T Value |
|----------------------------------|--------|-----------|---------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 0.14 | 0.1 | 0.48 |
| SD | 0.35 | 0.15 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 0.09 | 0.35 | -1.94 |
| SD | 0.43 | 0.44 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Rape w/o Firearm (mean) | 2.23 | 2.28 | -0.13 |
| SD | 1.31 | 1.08 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Rape with Firearm (mean) | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| SD | 0 | 0 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 11 | 10.44 | 0.59 |
| SD | 3.67 | 2.36 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 3.63 | 3.7 | -0.12 |
| SD | 2.3 | 1.24 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 25.73 | 27.58 | -0.71 |
| SD | 10.62 | 5.32 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault with Firearm (mean) | 5.54 | 4.66 | 0.96 |
| SD | 3.71 | 1.94 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |

(* denotes significant difference at $p < .05$)

Chapter 7: Yonkers Findings

Context

The City of Yonkers is in Westchester County New York and according to 2010 Census data, has a total population of 195,976. Westchester County is in the southern area of the state and is bordered by Putnam, Rockland, Orange and Bronx counties. Yonkers is situated in the southern region of Westchester County and is contiguous with the Bronx. In many ways Yonkers is an extension of New York City and interviews with program staff indicate that shooting victims in Yonkers are often transported to Harlem hospital due to its proximity and ability to deal with more complex medical problems. Racial demographics indicate that the city is 58.7% White, 20.5% Black or African American, 1.4% American Indian and Alaskan native, 6.8% Asian, 0.2% Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, and 16.8% of the population is other race. Hispanic and Latino is an ethnic category as measured by the Census, and they comprise 34.7% of the total population of the city with Puerto Ricans (10.1%) and Other Hispanic or Latino (16.7%) the two largest origin groups. Roughly 6.5% of the male and female population respectively is between the ages of 15 and 24 years old, and 9.4% of all female headed households had children under the age of 18 present. Census data also reveal that 46.1% of occupied housing units are owner occupied and 53.1% are renter occupied. In the year before the Census, 12.4% of all families had incomes below the poverty level, 19.4% of families with children under 18 had incomes below the poverty level, and 37.1% of female headed families with children under 18 had incomes below the poverty level. Employment data indicate that 7.5% of the civilian labor force is unemployed, and in 2011, the median income was \$56,816. The foreign born comprise 31.1% of the total population, with 55.3% of this group from Latin America, 20.8% from Europe, and 19.5% from Asia.

Neighborhood Context and Target Area Description

The target area of the Yonkers SNUG program consists of two areas, Nodine Hill and the Schlobohm housing project. Interviews with program staff from the YMCA -- the parent organization for the SNUG program -- indicate that these two areas were chosen in consultation with other agencies working on crime prevention and the police department, which provided data on the areas of the city with the highest number of shootings and killings. The two target areas border each other with Elm Street serving as an unofficial border between the two areas due in part to the presence of rival gangs in the target areas who are at “war” with each other.

Nodine Hill is an area in the Southwest of the city consisting primarily of private low income housing, and as the name suggests, it is situated on very hilly terrain. Observations and interviews with program staff indicate that the area is densely populated with a majority Latino population. There are very few buildings that seem to be in an advanced state of disrepair, and there seems to be much commercial activity in the area. During a tour of the target area, many businesses were noted; especially small and medium size businesses with many people patronizing these establishments. During the daytime, the streets of the area are very busy, with much pedestrian and vehicular traffic. The neighborhood is described by program staff as mostly Latino, but observations reveal a significant presence of Blacks in addition to Latinos. Young men can be seen hanging out in front of various business establishments especially on Elm Street which is a major thoroughfare in the neighborhood. On various streets in the

neighborhood, children played outside or were seemingly on their way home from school. Program staff indicated however, that some of the “kids” in the area cannot leave their neighborhood or street without risking being the victim of an assault or worse being shot. Program staff indicated that there are more than 25 “crews” in the area, and two main gangs, the “Cliff Street Gangstas,” and the “Elm Street Wolves.” Mexican gangs are also present, but they do not have many members. Shortly before the evaluator’s first visit to the area, SNUG staff noted that the FBI and the DEA arrested many gang members/leaders in the target area and some of those arrested were program participants. Good Shepherd Presbyterian Church is located in Nodine Hill, and in addition to being a safe zone where SNUG brought together local gang members to find out their needs, it is being converted into a community center where all the social services agencies that serve the area will presumably have a presence. SNUG’s parent organization, the YMCA of Yonkers, has programs at the Church, and program participants have been referred to the Church’s General Education Diploma program.

The Schlobohm Housing Project is the other part of the target area, and it consists of eight large public housing buildings that are somewhat separated from the community. It is the largest public housing development in Yonkers, and residents refer to the project as “slow bomb” or “the hole.” There are approximately 75 apartments in each building which indicates that many people are concentrated in a very small space. The “hole” is a particularly apt description of this area because the entire project is situated in an area that is below the level of the rest of the surrounding community. You can literally look down into the project even with its tall buildings. The project has a prison-like quality in that it is surrounded by a canal, and where the canal is absent, there are walls approximately 15 feet high with a metal fence that is about 10 feet high on top of the walls. There is one guarded entrance to the complex, and residents as well as visitors are required to show identification to enter. The entrance also doubles as an exit. Program staff and observations of the project indicate that most of its residents are Black or Latino. Some of the Latinos are documented while others are not and there is also a presence of Africans and Haitians. They also indicate that they canvass a complex known as the Cromwell Towers which abuts “the hole” due in part to the crews that span both complexes.

Program Description

Analysis of program documents and interviews with program staff reveal the mission of the Yonkers YMCA SNUG program is to essentially replicate the Ceasefire model as developed by the Chicago Violence Prevention Initiative housed within the School of Public Health at the University of Illinois at Chicago.

Funding

Senators Andrea Stewart-Cousins and Ruth Hassel-Thompson are two of the five Senators who represent West-Chester County in the State Senate and they were very influential in helping to secure funding for the program. The target areas for the Yonkers and Mount Vernon SNUG programs lie within the Senator’s respective districts. The current Yonkers City Councilman Christopher Johnson, worked for Senator Stewart-Cousins during the period that the initial request for proposal was put forth by the Senate and he sent out the applications for the grant on her behalf. Two applications were returned, one from the Nepperhan Community Center, and a joint application from the Yonkers YMCA and the Yonkers Community Action Program (Y-CAP) with the YMCA as the lead organization. The joint proposal from the YMCA and Y-CAP


was awarded the grant from the Senate. Of the original ten SNUG programs that were originally funded by the Senate, eight received \$500,000 dollars, while the programs in Yonkers and Mount Vernon received \$250,000. The Yonkers and Mount Vernon programs received the lesser amount due in part because the two cities are in the same county, are contiguous with each other, and Senators Stewart-Cousins and Senator Thompson thought that it would be better to split the funding rather than have one team that was not 100% familiar with the respective target areas. The Senate awarded the initial grants by county therefore the choice was between having one program that served both Mount Vernon and Yonkers, or having two programs in the respective communities.

As previously stated, the State Senate awarded the Yonkers SNUG program \$250,000 for the period August 2010 to November 30 2011. These monies originated from the State. A second round of funding was extended to five of the original SNUG programs and Yonkers was fortunate to be one of these programs to receive some of these funds totaling \$150,000 from December 1, 2011 to July 2012. These funds did not originate from the State however, but via a grant to DCJS from the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance (JAG) Program. This grant program is the primary means by which the federal government disseminates monies to criminal justice agencies at the state and local levels of government. Since August of 2012, the Yonkers YMCA SNUG program has been funded by monies provided by the Yonkers City Council. This grant for \$200,000 was possible in part due to the efforts of Yonkers City Councilman Johnson who as previously stated worked for Senator Stewart-Cousins and was involved in the initial efforts to get the program established in Yonkers. Interviews with other community leaders indicate that they are also actively engaged in lobbying efforts at the local and state levels to get more funding for the program which they think has been highly effective at reducing the number of shootings in the target area.

Organizational Structure

As previously noted, the Yonkers SNUG program is embedded within the Yonkers Family YMCA. The YMCA is located on a very busy thoroughfare in downtown Yonkers and is in close proximity to both parts of the target area for the program. The YMCA in Yonkers was established in 1882 and they are committed to youth development, healthy living and social responsibility. There are about 50 employees and the programs offered include, housing, teen employment, afterschool programs for children and teens, fitness programs, a feeding program for the community, senior citizens programs, and the YMCA worked in violence prevention long before the SNUG program was started due to the need for these programs in the community. The Yonkers YMCA is housed in a typical YMCA building with housing, recreational programs, a gymnasium and pools, etc. The SNUG program has office space within the building and every participant in the SNUG program receives a free membership to the YMCA. Participants are able to take advantage of a number of services including, music production, woodworking, boxing, employment services, teen programs, swimming, or weightlifting. Program staff relayed the idea that if participants are given something to do, then they are less likely to engage in behavior that is problematic.

The following organizational chart depicts the structure of the Yonkers SNUG program since its inception in 2010:



Since its inception, the Yonkers SNUG program has had the same structure. More specifically there is a program manager, one outreach worker supervisor, four outreach workers and one violence interrupter. The program manager works on a part time basis in that he occupies the position as the Program Manager for SNUG in addition to being the Director of Development and Grant Administration. The outreach worker supervisor and the outreach workers are all full-time employees and the violence interrupter works on a part-time basis. Even though we did not include the CEO of the Yonkers YMCA in the organizational chart, it is important to note that she plays a critical role in the functioning of the program. She is the supervisor of the program manager, and she keeps abreast of the work of program staff on a daily basis. She is also the main liaison with the Yonkers Police Department, in addition to other organizations that work with the program. It is also important to note that even though the program has maintained the same structure since inception, one member of the original team – the violence interrupter – was terminated due to his involvement in activities unbecoming of an individual who is responsible for leading participants away from involvement in crime and violence especially gun violence and gang activity. A new violence interrupter was hired and that new team has been intact since his hire.

Even though the outreach worker supervisor, outreach workers, and violence interrupter have different roles within the program, they are all trained as violence interrupters. As such, program staff reports that an absolute distinction does not exist in the work that is conducted by the outreach workers and the violence interrupter. Sometimes it is a participant who has a relationship with a particular outreach worker who is in need of mediation, and it is more prudent to have the mediation conducted by the outreach worker as opposed to the violence interrupter.

In the Ceasefire model, hospital responders provide on the spot support and alternatives in the hospital, mediate and resolve conflicts, in addition to linking shooting victims to outreach workers and other community services. The Yonkers SNUG program does not have hospital responders and they do not have a formal relationship with a hospital. Jacobi Hospital in the Bronx is an institution that can readily handle gun-shot victims and shooting victims from Yonkers are regularly transported there. Yonkers SNUG did try and establish a relationship with Jacobi Hospital but due to changes in the administration of the hospital however, this was not possible. Program staff report that they are supposed to have a hospital responder but currently do not have funding for the position and are actively seeking funding for this position. Sometimes a police detective will call and inform the team that someone has been admitted to the hospital however.

Staffing

Discussions with the program manager indicate that the job descriptions are the same as those provided by Chicago Ceasefire. The following positions were held by SNUG Yonkers staff:

- Program Manager
- Outreach Supervisor
- Outreach Worker
- Violence Interrupter

During an interview, the program manager indicated that he is responsible for payroll, supervision of the staff, and general management of the SNUG program. Noting that other staff members need to maintain credibility with “the guys on the street” the program manager more often meets with the police, gathers statistics from the police, and goes to various community meetings as a representative of SNUG. He states that his role is primarily administrative and planning but his comments during interviews indicate that he does much more. For example he relates that at times he will bring the entire staff to a community meeting where they talk about violence and present what happens on the streets to community members.

The program manger also indicated that both outreach workers and violence interrupters go out on the streets. Their training is exactly the same. If one is called in to handle another person’s area, whether its mediation or support for youth, they are there to do that. The outreach supervisor also from time to time will serve as an outreach worker as well. They will take on clients in order to bridge gaps, to keep youth connected. Outreach workers themselves each have caseloads of 15 high profile youth. The participants who comprise the caseload have a demonstrated history of violence. The staff have a list of seven criteria that they use to select participants and participants must meet four out of the seven criteria. These criteria include youth that will most likely to shoot or be shot; 16-25 years old generally even though depending on the circumstances, they may accept participants outside this range; recently released from prison; recent victim of shooting; a major player of a street organization; acting in high risk street activity; a history of violent crimes versus others; and a weapon carrier. The outreach workers are like social workers in that they do a significant amount of case management. They also bring the credibility of the streets with them, and that helps them relate to the participants. As case managers they help participants with relationships, jobs, poor living conditions, or to change their negative attitude toward life.

Lastly, the program manager indicated that the violence interrupter is the on-call person when a shooting occurs and in that instance he is immediately dispatched. He has to immediately do difficult mediation work to find out what happened and then get to the next potential place where a retaliatory shooting may occur. In essence he “mediates and kind of calms tempers and calms the storm.”

Hiring Panel

Consistent with the Ceasefire model, a hiring panel was used to select the program staff – the program manager, outreach worker supervisor, outreach workers, and violence interrupter. The panel consisted of the CEO of the Yonkers YMCA, two police captains from two of the local precincts, and three local agency directors who administer programs in violence prevention and gang prevention. Other than the aforementioned, program staff indicated that there were no community members on the hiring panel because many of these individuals were not as yet familiar with the Ceasefire model. If the team is expanded in the future however, they indicate that other community members will be present. During the interview process Ceasefire Chicago was present via Skype and had some say in which specific staff members were selected for the team.

Staff Biographies and Daily Activities

All of the staff members who work for the Yonkers SNUG program are African American and all are male. This is particularly important because as previously noted, young black males are overrepresented among the shooters in the inner-city therefore they may be more able to relate to program staff from similar racial background and who have had similar experiences with crime and violence. The CEO of the parent organization is an African American female however. Interviews with program staff also reveal that some of them grew up together and they claim that they “call each other’s mom, mom.” The following are brief biographies of the program staff. Overall it is apparent from the staff biographies that the staff selected for the program is consistent with the Ceasefire model in that they are all credible messengers. All of them were both born and raised in Yonkers or are transplants that lived in Yonkers for a significant portion of their lives.

The Program Manager has been in his position since the inception of the program. He grew up in the Schlobohm Housing project which is one part of the target area of the SNUG program. This public housing project had and still has some of the highest levels of violence in Yonkers. While growing up on Schlobohm, He was able to avoid involvement in crime and dedicated himself to community organizations such as his family’s church and later The Salvation Army. However, he is a credible messenger because he has brothers that were involved in crime and subsequently he knew many of the people that were involved in crime in the community. In his young adult years he followed a career path through The Salvation Army, continually working with similar populations in both Philadelphia and Columbus for 21 years. Now he serves as a program leader and chief development officer for the Yonkers Family YMCA. He took on this task because he did not want to move away from direct service to the community and wanted something that would challenge him to reach beyond the normal spectrum of social services and ministry.

The Outreach Worker Supervisor has been in his position since the inception of the program as well. He was born in Yonkers, is a high school graduate and was imprisoned for 18 years due to his involvement in crime. He was released from prison in 2009 after finding a job he was fired because his employer was wary of his criminal background. He then went back to school via the Educational Opportunity Center and became certified as a Microsoft specialist. He was limited in his use of his Microsoft credential however due to his criminal background and subsequently had a job doing medical coding and billing. He was sought out for the job with the SNUG program by the CEO of the YMCA who contacted his parole officer before making contact with him. At first he thought that the program was about “snitching” but he later found out that it was about helping young people desist from involvement in crime. He is a credible messenger due to his origins in Yonkers, and his past involvement in crime.

One of the outreach workers is from Yonkers and currently lives in the Nodine Hill target area. He has been with the program since its inception. He was imprisoned for a total of 26 years and while in prison, he became a leader due to his advocacy on behalf of his colleagues. At the beginning of this evaluation he was on life parole, but he has since been released from supervision. Of the program staff, Gregory is the person who most deals with the political figures. He regularly speaks with legislators and other leaders about programs to help participants and the people of Nodine Hill. Within Nodine Hill he works with a coalition known as Common Good that is based at a Presbyterian church. This coalition seeks to establish the space at the church as a one stop area for services that are needed in the community, especially activities for youth.

Another outreach worker is a credible messenger due to his “street sense,” “swagger” and the years he reports that he spent hustling drugs. One of the hotspots in the target area is the same place where he previously sold drugs. His street knowledge allows him to relate to young people and to “deliver messages of hope, encouragement, and to promote non-violent behavior.” Young people relate to him due to his own personal experience in the “streets” when he was younger, and he endeavors to instill a sense of respect in youth which he thinks is lacking. He served two months in jail when he was younger due in part to his ability to avoid “negative situations” that could have led to a much longer period of incarceration. He has been with the program since its inception.

Another outreach worker has been with the program since its inception. As a child he witnessed the murder of his father and he claims that the absence of his father or a male authority figure in his life influenced his decision to join the “Bloods” in the mid-1990s. He was one of the first “Bloods” in Yonkers. Several years of involvement in crime, including stabbings and shootings, eventually led to his apprehension by the police and a 13 year prison sentence. At one point he was incarcerated in the same prison facility as the outreach worker supervisor. At first he was apprehensive about the SNUG program because he thought that it would ruin the reputation that he had in the streets. When one of the founders of a local gang offered his support for the Ceasefire program however, he became convinced that the program was doing good work in the community. As an outreach worker he is dedicated to preventing youth from making the mistakes that he made.

The violence interrupter has been with the program since January 2011. He joined the staff after the previous violence interrupter was fired. He is 42 years old and in his younger days in the 1980s he was involved in drug selling with a crew of 15 coworkers. Eventually he came to the attention of the police and subsequently was imprisoned twice for a total of 14 years. As the violence interrupter of the team, it is especially important that he is viewed as a credible messenger by the youth that are the target of the SNUG program. He seems to be a credible messenger in that when he started canvassing a lot of the young men knew him already and still refer to him as “Uncle” when they see him. Youth give him respect and will listen to him. He delivers a message to the youth that they cannot keep hurting themselves and the community by engaging in gang activity and other types of criminal behavior. In addition to preventing shootings, he argues that SNUG is about linking troubled youth with services so that they can get education and find work. He also strongly believes in the capacity for troubled youth to transform themselves because he and the SNUG staff were able to change their lives. He also thinks that many of the young men who are participants or potential participants in the SNUG program do not want to be involved in the activities for which make them prime candidates for the program, but engage in these activities due to peer pressure and the absence of a male figure in their lives.

Data Collection and Reports

The Ceasefire model requires that program staff collect data about their activities and all sites that have adopted the model are required to enter data into the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention database. Based on the data that is submitted by program staff, the following reports can be generated: Monthly Outreach Report; Violence Interrupter Log Report; Conflict Mediation Report; Shooting/Homicide Report; Program Indicators Report; Shooting Responses Monthly Totals; Shootings and Conflicts Mediated Monthly Totals; and Outreach Work with Participants.

Interviews with program staff indicate that they input data into the CPVP database and all the staff members input their own data. Data submitted include the number visits with clients, number of community executed and number of people who participated, and involvement with the police. They also report that at the end of each week, the outreach supervisor reviews the data that is submitted and reports any major issues with the data with the rest of the staff. The program manager reviews the data monthly to ensure that the staff actually knows how to input the data, and that they are truthful in entering the data. Additionally, a copy of data is then sent to DCJS along with a summary qualitative report. The CPVP database is the only means of data collection for the SNUG program other than the Mission Society’s internal assessment of the various funded programs within the organization. Since most of the participants in the program have a criminal history, or are engaging in criminal behavior, detailed information that can lead to their identification is not recorded. The names of all program participants are coded and other information about the participants is rather basic ensuring that it is almost impossible to trace the data back to a particular program participant.

Training

The following dates and locations indicate the when and where of Ceasefire training for the Yonkers SNUG Program. The locations of the trainings are indicative of the fact that some of

the training sessions included staff from multiple SNUG sites, and is consistent with conversations with program staff who indicate that they know the staff from multiple sites.

- Full training on 11/02/10 – 11/06/10 (Training was held in Mt. Vernon)
- Management training 11/17/10 -11/19/10 (Training was held in Manhattan)
- Full training on 01/18/11 – 01/22/11 (Training held in Harlem)
- Booster training on 01/11/12 -01/14/12 (Trainings held at each site independently for 1 day)
- Booster training on 07/27/12 – 07/30/12

Interviews with program staff reveal other important aspects of their training. First violence interrupters and outreach workers receive the same training. In addition, every other Monday there is a state call-in where all the SNUG programs in New York State and CeaseFire discuss ongoing issues in their respective programs. Lastly, the Yonkers SNUG program gathered gang specialists in Westchester County and were subsequently trained and certified as gang specialists. This training was supported by funding for the SNUG program.

SNUG Operations Yonkers

Street Intervention

In the Yonkers SNUG program both the outreach workers and the violence interrupters were trained to interrupt violence and they all engaged in street intervention. The biographies of the program staff indicate that the violence interrupter meets all the aforementioned criteria. Although the other staff members were not previously members of a gang, their training as gang specialists has equipped them with the necessary tools to establish relationships with current gang members and intervene in conflicts. The following table consists of data from the CPVP database on conflicts mediated by the Yonkers SNUG team covering the period January 1, 2010 through February 28, 2013:

| | |
|---|--------------------|
| Yonkers SNUG Mediation Report | 1/1/2010-2/28/2013 |
| Number of Conflicts Mediated | 291 |
| Outcome: conflicts resolved | 118 |
| Outcome: conflicts resolved temporarily | 148 |
| Outcome: conflicts ongoing | 24 |
| Conflict led to shooting: very likely | 165 |
| Conflict led to shooting: likely | 56 |
| Conflict led to shooting: unlikely | 56 |

This data indicate that within this time period roughly 40% of the conflicts mediated were resolved and roughly 50% were temporarily resolved. Assuming that this data accurately reflect program activity, this is an extraordinarily impressive outcome whereby roughly 90% of conflicts mediated were either temporarily or permanently resolved. Most important however is what this data reveal regarding the likelihood that a shooting may have occurred if not for the intervention of the Yonkers staff. The data indicate that roughly 57% of the conflicts mediated

were reported as very likely to result in the shooting, and an additional 19% of conflicts mediated were likely to have resulted in a shooting.

The following table consists of data from the CPVP database on shooting responses by the Yonkers SNUG team covering the period January 1, 2010 through February 28, 2013.

| Yonkers SNUG Shooting Responses | 1/1/2010-2/28/2013 |
|--|---------------------------|
| Number of shooting responses | 5 |
| Number of community members present at the responses | 118 |
| Total number of shootings | 9 |

As this table shows, there were few shootings during the period of operation of the Yonkers SNUG program. Of the shootings that did occur the staff was able to respond to approximately 56%, and on average 24 community members were present at shooting responses.

As part of their street intervention activities, program staff report that they canvass the target area on foot and conduct mediations in a variety of locations including on the street, at the YMCA, at respondents homes, or an agreed upon location where warring gangs agree to sit down and talk without resorting to violence. At the beginning of the program, they canvassed all together on the street but as they became known in the community they canvass together but not necessarily with the entire staff and individual program staff will also canvass by themselves. Not all conflicts are able to be mediated and staff report that they often contact each other to discuss whether or not a mediation will be possible. They claim that they cannot mediate all the conflicts that arise and state that at times mediation may actually escalate a particular situation therefore it is better to desist. Some mediations are rather precarious due to the fact that the parties to the mediation are armed. At times they request parties to the mediation to “drop the guns.” One of the main areas that the staff canvasses is Getty Square which serves as a central location where Yonkers school children are bussed. By canvassing this area, the staff is able to gather much street intelligence including see which individuals are flashing particular gang signs. Additionally, school principals have asked program staff to provide a periodic presence after school to “keep the peace.”

Interviews with community stakeholders reveal that the SNUG Yonkers program is viewed as effective in its efforts at street intervention. The following are excerpts from interviews that illustrate this point.

In response to a question regarding shooting responses one stakeholder relayed the following:

Their initial response tends to be they get there right away and then they back up because the police [have] to do their investigation. During that time they do...of the victim or whatever and kind-of gather their own information and make sure that things are quiet or they can kind-of cover things and calm them.

Another community stakeholder who has been actively involved in addressing issues of crime and violence in the Yonkers community for decades had the following to say about the SNUG program’s street intervention efforts:

I have been in this business longer than anybody in this community and most communities. This is dear to my heart in addition to all the other things that I do. I have not seen an organization in the last three decades that is as effective on the ground on helping to reduce crime outside of law enforcement in the projects outside of project SNUG. I think they have helped reduce crime in ways that you almost can't measure, quantify. At the same time, those of us who are on the ground and know the streets, know the mentality of those involved in that lifestyle know that they have done a yeoman's job of helping to reduce crime and stop fatal shootings and eliminate several gang wars that would have materialized or would have turned into gang war.

One community stakeholder relayed the following story of an actual case of street intervention in the target area where a shooting was averted:

Like, one of the stories I like best was a truck was blocking the streets in the neighborhood they were focused on and the lady is in a car trying to drive up the street and honks and the driver flips her the bird. One of Yonkers biggest shooters is in the car and this is his mom, so he starts walking toward the truck and the driver starts saying "go fuck yourself" and SNUG jumps in the middle and is calming them down going back and forth telling the driver, "you really got to move your truck, you got to move it now and apologize to this lady" and trying to keep the other guy calm and then he starts heading back to his car, so they knew he was trying to get a gun and so they basically got the truck out of there before he got killed for messing with the wrong lady. We were averaging about 11 murders a year and from...we only had 1. Its been unbelievable, SNUG has been able to persuade gang members who had...their honor to fight it out without guns, put the guns down and tell everybody to back off and instead let the two beat the shit out of each other with fists like real men and they have actually been able to do that.

Community stakeholders who have worked on violence prevention also relayed that the YMCA SNUG program has been able to persuade the gangs that the YMCA is a sacred space where violence is not tolerated and a number of gangs (15 to 20), including their leaders, have been able to participate in a "hoop it, don't shoot it" basketball event. Additionally they claim that the SNUG staff is the only violence prevention program where the staff actually interrupts violence by placing their bodies over and over again between people who are known shooters in their attempts to stop the shootings/homicides.

Client Outreach

The evaluation of Chicago Ceasefire by Skogan (2009) and his colleagues indicate that very often, the outreach workers viewed their work with Ceasefire as a means to pay back a debt to society for the behaviors in which they engaged when they were involved in a life of crime. This was definitely the case among the SNUG Yonkers staff. All the staff except the program manager, who had not engaged in any significant criminal activity as a youth, think of their work with SNUG as a way to give back to the community in which they had previously been gang members or otherwise engaged in crime. The following table consists of data from the CPVP database from the outreach reports of the Yonkers SNUG team covering the period January 1, 2010 through February 28, 2013:

| Yonkers SNUG Outreach Report | 1/1/2010-2/28/2013 |
|---|---------------------------|
| Number of Participants | 76 |
| Number of referrals to employment | 21 |
| Number of referrals to education | 81 |
| Number of referrals for substance abuse | 27 |

| | |
|---------------------------------|--------|
| Number of other referrals | 45 |
| Hours spent with participants | 1796.3 |
| Age (based on year 2011) | |
| More than 40 years | 1 |
| 36-40 years | 4 |
| 31-35 years | 4 |
| 26-30 years | 11 |
| 21-25 years | 20 |
| 16-20 years | 33 |
| Younger than 16 years | 3 |

Interviews with program staff and data submitted to the CPVP indicate that the outreach workers have more participants than what is required of them. The majority of the participants fall within the required age range, and interviews with program staff reveal that most are male with a few females. They also state that most of the participants are in high school but some are high school dropouts. Many of the participants also need help with educational services such as how to get a GED, help staying in school, or a certificate in a certain skill. A smaller proportion need help desisting from drug use, and help finding work in the formal labor market.

SNUG program staff described a few means by which they get participants into the program. One means is via canvassing the target area where they use their street knowledge to identify individuals who are good candidates for the program or where potential participants engage them and express interest in joining the program. Another primary means by which they get participants is via family members. Parents, aunts, uncles, and siblings call or otherwise contact the SNUG staff and indicate that they have a family member who is in need of the help that is provided by the program.

Clergy Involvement

The Yonkers SNUG program has a limited relationship with the faith community. When asked about the relationship that the program had with the faith community, the outreach supervisor stated that the program manager is the person who deals with clergy. The program manager reported that the program's relationship with faith-based organizations was not strong, but that there exists a faith based component of the gang and violence prevention coalition of which they are a part. Additionally SNUG Yonkers hosted an event with the coalition and representatives from faith based organizations were invited and did attend. One of the leaders of the gang and violence prevention coalition who recommended many of the staff for the SNUG program is also a member of the clergy and a long time campaigner against gun violence in Yonkers.

It is important to note however that even though the SNUG Yonkers program does not have a strong relationship with the faith based community, faith in a religious sense was personally very important among program staff and inevitably this influences how they go about doing their work. One staff member relayed that he thought by working for the SNUG program, he was doing god's work. Conversations with other staff members also reveal that all were men of faith. The program manager is very active in his church and worked for the Salvation Army for a number of years. Other staff members, especially those who were imprisoned, have a deep sense

of faith which seems to have been crucial in their transformation from individuals who were hurting themselves and their community to helping themselves and their community.

Community Mobilization

The Yonkers SNUG program engages in a variety of activities that seek to mobilize the local community around their mission. They sponsor, vigils and rallies in response to shootings, cookouts in the community to show community members that they care, basketball tournaments to get youth off the street and provide them with something to do, and reunions in the target where they distribute literature. They participate in community anti-violence rallies sponsored by local politicians, provide free security at parties, attend community meetings between police and citizens, and speak at schools and colleges about street life and gangs, in addition to attending gang coalition meetings. SNUG also worked to establish programs in the target area, such as GED classes for youth who cannot go to other areas in their community where these services are available without fear of being shot.

In Nodine Hill, there exists a coalition, Common Good, which is based at a Presbyterian church and seeks to be a central clearinghouse for services for people in the community. A representative of the YMCA is on the board of directors and one of the SNUG staff members works closely with this coalition. Common Good is a collaborative of approximately twenty service organizations. The YMCA sponsors an afterschool program at the church and SNUG program participants are also connected to services at the church.

An interview with a local politician is illustrative of the type of community mobilization sponsored by SNUG. This community stakeholder stated that:

They did a children's fun day at one of the housing projects in my district and there were probably about a 100 kids and parents there give or take. There were hamburgers and hotdogs and things of that nature. On a bad week I will get a phone call - on the worst week I will get a phone call about a shooting or some negative violent situation and they will just give me the update, what happened, if there were any fatalities and what the repercussions are, who the victims potentially were and who the suspects are and what kind-of goes around in this situation. They give me an outside look and then...that allows for me when I speak to the police department about the situation to have a little bit of back-up information.

The SNUG team also participates in the Yonkers Violence and Gang Prevention Coalition. This coalition was founded in 2007 and is comprised of six agencies, churches, governmental institutions including the police, that meet monthly to come up with strategies to prevent violence through interventions, education, mediation, and workshops that facilitate the aforementioned activities. SNUG staff also participates in the Yonkers Coalition for Youth, formerly the Yonkers Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalition, which was formed as a DCJS requirement. Lastly, data from the CPVP database indicate that for the period January 1, 2010 through February 28, 2013, the Yonkers SNUG program sponsored 105 community activities.

Educational Campaign

The Yonkers SNUG program staff indicates that they distribute printed material to a variety of people and organizations. When they canvass the neighborhood they hand out flyers to potential participants in addition to community residents. Printed materials with the message to stop shooting/killings are also distributed at the various community events sponsored by SNUG, and

other events sponsored by politicians or other groups that seek to decrease violence in the community.

In addition to the printed materials, the Yonkers SNUG program has a very good relationship with local educational institutions where they bring their message to stop shooting/killing. Program staff report that they have been to every middle and high school in Yonkers. They conduct empowerment classes in high schools, and in one case they report being asked by the principal to conduct intensive workshops with youth in in-school detention concerning alternatives to violence, social skills, cultural awareness, and life skills generally. Presentations regarding alternatives to violence are not limited to public schools in that they did the same in a group home where the youth are wards of the county. The documentary about the Chicago CeaseFire program, *The Interrupters*, was also screened for youth who were then able to ask questions of the program staff. The personal life stories of the staff are often recounted in their visits to schools. Many of the workshops in the schools include discussion about prison life, respect, bullying, cyber-bullying, and the drug life among other topics.

Police and Prosecution

At the administrative level, the Yonkers Police Department and the SNUG program have an excellent relationship and they deal directly with the Chief or the Deputy Chief. The police leadership is very supportive of the SNUG program and credit the program with helping to reduce the number of shootings and homicides in the community. The Deputy Chief was a member of the hiring panel, and he reports that shootings have plummeted approximately 70% since the advent of SNUG which he credits with contributing to this decrease. The Deputy Chief has spoken at a few meetings where he publicly acknowledges the value of the program. When the SNUG program manager or the Yonkers CEO requests information from the police, they are always forthcoming. The relationship is reciprocal in that SNUG participates in the National Night Out event where the police seek to present a better image to the community and the police have invited them to speak at the departments community council meetings. Two detective supervisors are designated liaisons with SNUG. One is the head of the narcotics unit which encompasses the gang unit, and the other is the head of the intelligence unit. The police also interact also with SNUG staff via the Yonkers Violence and Gang Prevention Coalition and with rank and file officers on the street.

Even though the Yonkers SNUG program has an excellent relationship with the Yonkers Police Department at the administrative level, there have been a few issues on the street. Program staff reports that some of the line officers do not appear to be as supportive of their work. The staff attributes this to some officers feeling as if the SNUG staff is trampling on their territory. Due to the excellent relationship between the police administration and the SNUG program manager and the YMCA's CEO however, a simple phone call to the Deputy Chief who then communicates with his rank and file officers usually resolves any issue that comes up.

Interviews with program staff indicate that they have no relationship with the District Attorney's office. The CEO of the YMCA however, has a good working relationship with the District Attorney.

Relationship with Ceasefire Chicago

Program staff report that they have an excellent relationship with the CeaseFire Chicago staff and speak very highly of them. The SNUG program originated with the State Senate and the Chicago CeaseFire model was chosen by them. As such, the program manager and the outreach supervisor were chosen before they had any interaction with CeaseFire Chicago staff. They met the staff after they flew to Chicago for a three day seminar to find out how the CeasFire model works, and what it would mean for the community. As the program manger states, CeaseFire Chicago became the “parent to everything they do” and the Chicago staff regularly comes out and trains the Yonkers Staff.

SNUG Yonkers: Impact on Violence

Methodology

The purpose of this research is to evaluate what impact, if there is any, SNUG has had on gun-related offending and violence within Yonkers, NY. Our data source is the New York Division of Criminal Justice Services, which collates monthly incident data from police departments across New York State.

Ideally, in order to limit problems with internal validity, program evaluations would employ a true or classic experimental design with random assignment of cities and locations into experimental and control groups. As is often the case with evaluation research, however, practical concerns precluded randomly assigning SNUG to some cities and not to others. Rather, SNUG sites were selected based on need and other considerations. Consequently, the sites receiving the SNUG program may differ systematically from those sites that did not receive the program, which could account for differences in levels of violence before and after implication of SNUG. Furthermore, SNUG was implemented in two geographically distinct areas within Yonkers—Nodine Hill and Schlobaum. The data we had available for the evaluation, however, were for the entire Yonkers area and therefore any results at best should only be interpreted as suggestive.

Given the above constraints, for this evaluation we employed an interrupted time-series quasi-experimental design for our evaluation. This design features numerous observations before and after the implementation of SNUG. To assess the impact of SNUG, we employ seasonally adjusted autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) analysis to estimate projected levels of violence. We then contrast the projected and actual (or observed) violent incidents as a means of detecting whether SNUG reduced levels of gun-related violence.

Impact on Part I Index Crimes

We evaluated the impact of SNUG based on the four Part I index crimes: murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Since SNUG was primarily intended to impact firearm-related crimes, we examined counts of these four events where a firearm was involved. If SNUG was successful, it is also possible that there would be spillover effects into those crimes that were not committed with firearms. That is, it is possible that the number of non-firearm-related violent offenses may increase as disputes continue to be settled violently (albeit now without firearms) or else the SNUG violence interrupters may be responsible for higher levels of peaceful dispute

resolution, with consequently less violence of any type. The incident data span from January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2012. Since implementation started in September 2010, there are 56 months of pre-implementation data and 23 months of post-implementation data.

Table 1 reports the average monthly number of violent incidents across the four index crimes (both firearm-related and non-firearm related) during the period of the study. The average number of violent incidents in Yonkers, pre- and post-SNUG, declined in some measures but increased in others. The decreases were evident among both firearm-related and non-firearm-related homicides, firearm-related rape, and non-firearm-related robbery. For instance, across the entire study period there was an average of .68 homicide incidents each month in Yonkers (or an average of about seven homicides every ten months). Before SNUG, Yonkers averaged a firearm-related homicide every two months. After SNUG, that number decreased to about one every four months. Nonfirearm-related homicides also decreased after the implementation of SNUG.

The remaining index offenses occurred somewhat more frequently, however. After SNUG, the average number of firearm-related robberies each month increased by 1.64 incidents (or almost 20 extra firearm-related robberies over the span of a year). Firearm-related aggravated assaults and rapes increased modestly after SNUG, whereas there was a substantial increase in the number of nongun-related assaults (almost 7.2 more incidents per month, or 86 more reports every year).

Table 1.
Monthly Average of Violent Crimes for Yonkers 2006-12, Pre- and Post-SNUG

| Measure | Firearm-related | | Non firearm-related | | Total |
|---------------------|-----------------|--|---------------------|--|--------------|
| Overall Homicide | 0.40 | | 0.28 | | 0.68 |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.46 | | 0.32 | | 0.78 |
| Post-SNUG | 0.23 | | 0.18 | | 0.41 |
| D (Homicide) | -0.23 | | -0.14 | | -0.37 |
| Overall Rape | 0.03 | | 2.94 | | 2.97 |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.04 | | 2.91 | | 2.95 |
| Post-SNUG | 0.00 | | 3.00 | | 3.00 |
| D (Rape) | -0.04 | | 0.09 | | 0.05 |
| Overall Robbery | 5.91 | | 32.19 | | 38.10 |


| | | | | | |
|--------------------|-------------|--|--------------|--|--------------|
| Pre-SNUG | 5.45 | | 32.95 | | 38.40 |
| | | | | | |
| Post-SNUG | 7.09 | | 30.27 | | 37.36 |
| | | | | | |
| D (Robbery) | 1.64 | | -2.68 | | -1.04 |

| | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-------------|--|-------------|--|-------------|
| Overall Aggravated Assault | 3.03 | | 34.17 | | 37.20 |
| | | | | | |
| Pre-SNUG | 3.00 | | 32.14 | | 35.14 |
| | | | | | |
| Post-SNUG | 3.09 | | 39.32 | | 42.41 |
| | | | | | |
| D (Agg. Assault) | 0.09 | | 7.18 | | 7.27 |

These results are therefore decidedly mixed; however, most of the changes were not sufficiently large enough to achieve statistical significance. This means that we are unable to rule out chance as the reason that the average monthly number of murders with a firearm decreased after SNUG was implemented. The only exception was with aggravated assault without a firearm, which had increased in frequency (by 7.18 incidents per month post-SNUG). Table A3 shows the t-scores for each type of violence, pre- and post-SNUG intervention.

Impact on Firearm-Related Homicide

Chart 1 shows the actual and ARIMA-projected incidences of firearm-related homicide. During the period of active SNUG intervention, between September 2010 and June 2012, ARIMA forecast that Yonkers would average .68 firearm-related homicides per month. The actual monthly averages while the intervention was underway were fewer at .23 homicides per month. The difference between the actual and projected firearm-related homicides during SNUG, while consistent with a positive outcome for the program, is not statistically significant, however, owing to the relative rarity of homicide events. In fact, for none of the index offenses was there a statistically significant difference between actual and projected levels—except in the cases of nonfirearm-related aggravated assault and rape, which were significantly higher than projected. Table B3 reports the means and t-scores for the contrast between the actual and projected violent incidents.



Impact on Shootings

Concerning the number of shooting incidents and shooting victims, the average per month decreased pre- and post-SNUG. Yonkers averaged 3.13 shooting incidents each month before the implementation of SNUG; this dropped to 1.5 per month, which is a statistically significant decrease. A similar pattern held for the average number of individuals who were victims in these incidents—before SNUG, Yonkers averaged 3.84 shooting victims per month where after SNUG this number decreased to 1.77 per month. Over the course of a year, this amounts to approximately 19 fewer victims.

Comparison Cities

We should remind the reader that any significant decreases during the period of the study, although giving the impression that SNUG was efficacious, may in fact be due to factors unrelated to SNUG—i.e., threats to internal validity (such as historical events, statistical regression). One way to assess this possibility is to create comparison cities, which is to say locate other cities in New York that are as similar as possible to the test city except for the fact that they did not have SNUG. The creation of comparison groups is somewhat problematic insofar as few cities are comparable with Yonkers. Additionally, virtually all of the major cities in New York at some point had SNUG, contaminating the results to some degree. Readers should therefore be cautioned that these comparisons can only be suggestive and not conclusive.

With these caveats in mind, we obtained data from three cities that did not have SNUG for the full period of the evaluation: Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse. The control cities showed a mixed pattern of changes in their level of violent offense activity. Buffalo consistently showed declines across all of the crime types measured during the study period: non-gun-related murder and rape, and aggravated assault with and without a firearm. For Rochester, a scattering of these decreases was statistically significant: firearm-related murder, robbery with and without a firearm, aggravated assault with a firearm, shooting incidents, shooting victims, and individuals

killed. For Syracuse, the geographically nearest control city to Yonkers, only robberies without firearms decreased significantly after September 2010—the remaining crimes did not vary enough for us to rule out chance as the reason for the change. The significant changes in all three cities were in a downward direction, however, indicating that something statewide was occurring that possibly had nothing to do with SNUG. On the other hand, SNUG was briefly present in all three cities and therefore it is possible to argue that the decreases were the result of a lingering effect even after the removal of the program.

Conclusion

After the introduction of SNUG to Yonkers, some forms of violence increased while others decreased—a classic example of mixed findings. Most of these changes were not sufficiently large enough to achieve statistical significance, so it is not possible to rule out chance as the reason behind such changes. We nevertheless need to point out that the Yonkers data applies to the entire city, whereas SNUG was only implemented in two communities. As a result, changes in violence across the city may well have obscured programmatic effects for SNUG. To limit threats to internal validity, future evaluation efforts would need data specific to those geographic regions serviced by SNUG.

Table A3 A. T-Scores for Pre- and Post-SNUG Observations

| | Pre | Post | T Value |
|----------------------------------|-------|-------|---------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 0.32 | 0.18 | 1.09 |
| SD | 0.54 | 0.39 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 0.46 | 0.23 | 1.28 |
| SD | 0.69 | 0.75 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Rape w/o Firearm (mean) | 2.91 | 3 | -0.19 |
| SD | 1.83 | 2.07 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Rape with Firearm (mean) | 0.04 | 0 | 0.97 |
| SD | 0.19 | 0 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 32.95 | 30.27 | 1.20 |
| SD | 8.39 | 9.66 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 5.45 | 7.09 | -1.87 |
| SD | 3.42 | 3.51 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 32.14 | 39.32 | -2.95* |
| SD | 7.75 | 13.04 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault with Firearm (mean) | 3 | 3.09 | -0.17 |
| SD | 2.06 | 2.14 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |

(* denotes significant difference at $p < .05$)

Table B3. T-Scores for Actual and Projected Violent Incidents

| | Actual | Projected | T Value |
|----------------------------------|--------|-----------|---------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 0.18 | 0.36 | -1.07 |
| SD | 0.4 | 0.66 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 0.23 | 0.68 | -1.70 |
| SD | 0.75 | 0.95 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Rape w/o Firearm (mean) | 3 | 1.23 | 3.24* |
| SD | 2.07 | 1.41 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Rape with Firearm (mean) | 0 | 0 | 0.00 |
| SD | 0 | 0 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 30.27 | 31.32 | -0.40 |
| SD | 9.66 | 7.32 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 7.09 | 6.55 | 0.54 |
| SD | 3.52 | 2.96 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 39.32 | 27.36 | 3.58* |
| SD | 13.04 | 8 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault with Firearm (mean) | 3.09 | 2.86 | 0.36 |
| SD | 2.13 | 2.03 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |

(* denotes significant difference at $p < .05$)

Chapter 8: Central Harlem Findings

Context

According to 2010 Census data, the area covered by the 10030 zip code in Harlem has a total population of 26,999 people. Racial demographics indicate that the neighborhood is 13% White, 74.7% Black or African American, 1.9% American Indian or Alaska Native, 2.2% Asian, 0.3% Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander and 12.3% Some Other Race. Hispanic or Latino is an ethnic category as measured by the Census, and they comprise 22.5% of the total population with Other Hispanic or Latino (12.7%) and Puerto Rican (7.3%) making up the two largest origin groups. Within this community roughly 8% of the male population is between the ages of 15 and 24 years old. Roughly 8.6% of the female population is between the ages of 15 and 24 years old. Census data also reveal that 14.7% of female headed households had children under the age of 18 present. An astonishing 90% of occupied housing units are renter-occupied and 10% are owner occupied. This is potentially a function of the high poverty rate and the existence of large housing projects that tend to concentrate poverty. In the year before the Census, 26.2% of all families had incomes below the poverty level, 30.3% of families with children under 18 had incomes below the poverty level, and 36% of female headed families with children under 18 had incomes below the poverty level. Employment data indicate that 14% of the civilian labor force is unemployed, and in 2011, the median household income was \$29,063. The foreign born comprise 26% of the total population, with 60.8% of this group from Latin America, 25.1% from Africa, and 7.3% from Europe.

Neighborhood Context and Target Area Description

The target area is located in Central Harlem and is mostly contained within the 10030 zip code. New York City is very much a city of neighborhoods meaning that the lived experience in one neighborhood may be significantly different from another even if they are contiguous with each other or are separated by a short distance. The experience of living in Central Harlem may be quite different from living in East Harlem especially, as it pertains to crime and violence, therefore it is imperative that when examining the neighborhood context of the SNUG program that we focus on the zip code of the target area as opposed to the entire Harlem community.

The target area consists of a 72 block area of Harlem from 145th to 127th between Lenox and St. Nicholas avenues that is generally considered Central Harlem. The area was chosen via analysis of police data provided by the New York City police department. The target area is very large and even though the entire area is canvassed, program staff indicate that from the inception of the SNUG program in 2010 until 2011, the focus of their efforts was on “downtown” from 127th to 135th street. Since 2011 the focus has expanded to a bit more uptown, and with the recent addition of new staff, they have been able to focus their efforts more broadly into the area from 139th to 142nd street. Program staff indicates that the target area is populated mostly by Black and Latinos, and there are some whites in the area. They also report a significant African and Jamaican immigrant population. This is all consistent with 2010 Census data. SNUG staff report that there is some gentrification in the area and in recent years, Harlem in general has experienced significant gentrification. Major landmarks in the target area include the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, Sylvias restaurant and the Apollo Theatre. There are a number of elementary and middle schools in the target area including a school

affiliated with the Harlem Children's zone that is literally being built in the middle of the St. Nicholas housing project. Overall program staff report that there are five housing projects in the target area. These projects are generally very large complexes consisting of many buildings and apartments. The St. Nicholas housing project for example is made up of thirteen 14-story buildings.

Observations of the target area with program staff reveal much pedestrian and vehicular traffic, numerous businesses, churches (including a Mormon church with which the SNUG program has a relationship), schools, and the 32nd police precinct. Additionally program staff pointed out hot spots in the area where illegal activity occurs; where potential shooters congregate, including program participants; and the areas controlled by various crews. There are numerous gangs/crews in the target area that have ongoing conflicts, and at times it is so dangerous for a participant to leave their block, they have to call program staff to drive them to various places. Many of the crews are in very close proximity to each other, and only a few have good relations with each other. While viewing the target area with program staff, we were able to see participants on the streets including in hot spots. Some participants came and spoke with the staff, and introduced themselves to the evaluator. The manner in which the participants introduced themselves to the evaluator, who is a complete stranger to them, is indicative of the trust that participants have in the program staff. SNUG staff report that at times violence spills over and they canvass areas outside the target area such as the commercial strip on 125th street. Apparently crews target the area by robbing, shooting, or stabbing people who are shopping on the strip.

Program Description

Analysis of program documents and interviews with program staff reveal the mission of Harlem SNUG program is to essentially replicate the Ceasefire model as developed by the Chicago Violence Prevention Initiative housed within the School of Public Health at the University of Illinois at Chicago.

Discussions with the program manager indicate more specifically that the Harlem SNUG program seeks to service 90 high-risk individuals. High risk individuals are considered anyone connected to a gang, has been recently released prison, is known to carry a gun, or is a victim or perpetrator of violence. This number of participants was determined before the hiring of more staff therefore the number of participants currently in the program is probably larger. The program manager stated that the expected outcome is to stop the shooting but SNUG Harlem seeks to provide alternatives by directing participants on a path such that they may obtain schooling, vocational training, or jobs.

Funding

The State Senate awarded the Harlem SNUG program \$500,000 for the period August 2010 to November 30 2011. These monies originated from the State. A second round of funding was extended to five of the original SNUG programs and Harlem was fortunate to be one of these programs to receive some of these funds totaling \$150,000 from December 1, 2011 to July 2012. These funds did not originate from the State however, but via a grant to DCJS from the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance (JAG) Program. This grant program is the primary means by which the federal government disseminates monies to criminal justice agencies at the state and


local levels of government. Since the monies from the State and the Federal government via DCJS were no longer forthcoming, the Harlem SNUG program, specifically the interrupters and hospital responders, have been funded by monies from the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation with the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene serving as the distributor of these funds to the Mission Society and subsequently the SNUG program. Additionally Harlem SNUG received funding (\$167,000) via the office of City Council President Christine Quinn which was then filtered down through the office of City Councilwoman Inez Dickens whose district includes Central Harlem. They have also received private monies from the mayor's office. The New York Community Trust has offered monies specifically for one of the outreach workers to focus on a specific housing project in the target area, Drew Hamilton Houses. The outreach worker that is funded by these monies lives in the Drew Hamilton Houses.

Organizational Structure

The parent organization of the Harlem SNUG program is the New York City Mission Society. Their administrative operations are located at 105 East 22nd Street, however much of their services are offered via the Minisink building in Central Harlem. This building has a storied history in that it was the location of the Cotton Club, a famous jazz nightclub that had a white only clientele but featured some of the most famous African American jazz musicians. The Mission Society website indicate that they are a multi-service organization that “helps children, youth, and families in New York City’s poorest neighborhoods transcend the ills of poverty and create a cycle of success for generations to come.” Services offered by the Mission Society at the Minisink building include programs to prevent child abuse and foster care placement, provide summer youth employment, and to prevent teenage pregnancy.


The Harlem SNUG program is housed in a storefront directly across the street from the Minisink building on Malcolm X Boulevard. This storefront is located in the target area and as part of their educational campaign, posters on the front and inside the building clearly communicate the message to stop shooting/killing. The storefront serves as a safe space for participants to interact with SNUG staff and there are workspaces/computers for the staff to conduct their work especially the inputting of data into the CPVP database. It is open until midnight on weekdays and 2:00am on weekends. The walls of the storefront are decorated with material that pays homage to important figures in African American history, and there is a small “lounge” space for participants to relax.

The following organizational chart depicts the structure of the Yonkers SNUG program at its inception in 2010:



Interviews of program staff reveal that one of the original outreach workers also functioned as a violence interrupter /violence responder, and one outreach worker left the program to take a job working with the New York City Police Department. At the inception of SNUG Harlem, the program manager was also the director of the Mission Society’s Summer Youth Employment Program.

As of December 4th, 2012, more staff was hired and the following organization chart depicts the current structure of the program:



Even though the outreach worker supervisor, outreach workers, and violence interrupters have different roles within the program, they receive the same training from Chicago CeaseFire. As such, program staff reports that an absolute distinction does not exist in the work that is conducted by the outreach workers and the violence interrupter. Sometimes it is a participant who has a relationship with a particular outreach worker who is in need of mediation, and it is more prudent to have the mediation conducted by the outreach worker as opposed to the violence interrupter.

In the Ceasefire model, hospital responders provide on the spot support and alternatives in the hospital, mediate and resolve conflicts, in addition to linking shooting victims to outreach workers and other community services. The Harlem SNUG program has full-time violence interrupters that function as hospital responders in addition to part-time hospital responders who work in the hospital. It is important to note that the violence interrupters/hospital responders and hospital responders of the Harlem SNUG program respond to all shootings, stabbings and serious beatings at Harlem hospital, not just to incidents involving their participants, which is located a few blocks away from the storefront where the program is housed.

Staffing

The following is a description of the various staff positions within the Harlem SNUG program as outlined by Harlem SNUG. Discussions with the program manager indicate that the job descriptions are the same as those provided by Chicago Ceasefire. The following positions were held by Central Harlem SNUG staff:

- Program Manager
- Outreach Supervisor
- Outreach Worker
- Violence Interrupter

Hiring Panel

Consistent with the Ceasefire model, a hiring panel was used to select, program staff other than the program manager and the recently hired hospital responders. The hiring panel consisted of the following individuals: Frank Perez, CeaseFire Chicago; Jenessa N. Calvo-Friedman, Program Director of New York State's SNUG initiative; Courtney Bennett, Director of the Mission Society's Minisink Townhouse; Robin L. Holmes, Program Manager of Harlem SNUG; Rev. Vernon Williams; and Former Lt. Kevin O'Conner of the New York City Police Department.

The recently hired part-time hospital responders were trained by CeaseFire, and interviews with one of these recent hires indicate that they perform the same function in Harlem hospital as that of a violence interrupter/hospital responder. This involves responding to anyone who is a victim of violence at Harlem Hospital, and being a liaison between hospital staff, victims and their families.

Staff Termination

As stated before, one of the original outreach workers resigned his position after being offered an opportunity to work for the New York City Police Department. The original program manager took an opportunity with the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene as the Operations Director of CureViolence New York City. In this capacity she provides support and monitors the SNUG programs in New York City that are funded by the City. There are monthly meetings every fourth Thursday of the month and there are bi-weekly conference calls with the former program manager, Chicago CeaseFire, and individual program staff. She also seeks to ensure uniformity across program sites, and coordinates with the various sites so that they are aware of the activities occurring at each site. Since her departure a new program manager has been hired who is also the Program Director, Preventive Services for the Mission Society housed at the Minisink building.

Staff Biographies and Daily Activities

The evaluators made three site visits to the Harlem SNUG program, but were not able to meet or interview all the current staff. The program manager was initially not forthcoming regarding the biographies of the program staff in her efforts to protect their privacy, but we were able to speak with some of the staff regarding why they are credible messengers. Of the staff that we met or interviewed, the majority were African American and one female member of the staff identifies

as Puerto Rican. This is particularly important because as previously noted, young black males are overrepresented among the shooters in the inner-city therefore they may be more able to relate to program staff from similar racial background and who have had similar experiences with crime and violence. We were able to gather that of all the current 13 staff members, 5 are females and 8 are males.

The following are brief biographies of some of the program staff and where available information on their daily activities is provided. Overall it is apparent from the available staff biographies that the staff selected for the program is consistent with the Ceasefire model in that they are all credible messengers. The majority of the staff that was interviewed either were born and raised in Harlem or moved there at some point in their life. Other than the program manager all the staff was at one point involved in a gang/crew that engaged in violence and many were incarcerated for some period of their lives.

The new program manager is a licensed social worker and is also the Director of Preventive Services for the Mission Society.

The outreach worker supervisor and is a former gang member of the Bloods organization. He was incarcerated in federal prison and since being released he has been doing well. He was the first person other than the original program manager to be hired by SNUG Harlem. He knew one of the violence interrupters while he was growing as they were both Bloods, and he knew of the other violence interrupter.

One of the outreach workers is 62 years old and he is the oldest worker on the SNUG Harlem team. He was born and raised in Harlem and is affiliated with the First Corinthians Baptist Church where he was formerly the sports director. In his capacity as the sports director he did much coaching of basketball/baseball in the Harlem community and worked with many young people. Additionally he established his credibility among high risk youth through his work with Perfect Peace Ministries Youth Outreach. This program sought to engage the same population targeted by the SNUG program.

Another person was hired as outreach worker but transitioned to a violence interrupter. He was involved in the "streets" at a very young age and was incarcerated at 14 years old.

One of the violence interrupter/hospital responders was in the military. He was incarcerated in the military and was also imprisoned in civilian life.

Another violence interrupter/hospital responder was born in Long Island but moved to Harlem at a young age. While growing up in Harlem he was known as bad news and was part of a local crew. He was a founding member of another crew and as a SNUG worker, he now works with this very crew. He was incarcerated for a total of eight years in three different prisons in New York, once for gun possession and once for robbery.

Another worker is 40 years old, and considers herself a credible messenger because, as she states, "the streets know me." She has been in the streets since she was 11 years old partly due to her friendship with boys who were involved in crime and delinquency. She was born and raised

in Harlem and when she was younger she was founding member of a Harlem crew. She also relays that at a young age she was very much into guns and had many. She was jailed twice but never went to prison.

One of the female outreach workers has been with SNUG Harlem since its inception. She considers herself a credible messenger because she claims to understand the lifestyle of individuals involved in crime. She grew up in Harlem and as she states she has been in the game and was incarcerated at a Correctional Facility for Women. In her day to day activities as a SNUG worker, her activities include entering data in the CPVP database, visiting participants unless they come to the SNUG storefront, visiting schools, homes, and connecting with participants via telephone.

A newer outreach worker is 37 years old and hired by SNUG Harlem in December of 2012. As a young man he “ran the streets” and was a member of the Bloods organization. He refers to himself as an African Nationalist who desires to teach the youth about their culture, and he is a published poet and author. He has a close relationship with the President and CEO of the Harlem Children’s zone, and refers to himself as the Governor of Harlem.

Another recent outreach worker hired is 37 years old and a former leader in the Bloods organization. He was convicted and incarcerated for 12 years for manslaughter. For 5 ½ of those years he was in solitary confinement. He claims to come from a good family where his mother was a single parent responsible for five children. His mother passed away while he was incarcerated – two months before he was released-- and his brother was killed during a dice game in 2003. After release from prison he decided to do something productive and enrolled in a course to get his commercial driver’s license. He did well on the written portion of the test and someone at the driving school connected him to a local colleges. The college sent him to take a test which he passed and his is now a student at a local Community College earning a high GPA. He is very active on campus and is even President of an organization in the school.

Another the outreach worker is 32 years old and he, like many of the other staff, was born and raised in Harlem. At 12 years old he “got into the streets” as he was selling crack cocaine. His mother and father were addicted to crack cocaine when he was a younger, and his dad died from a beating in prison while he was still incarcerated. He claims to have been an enforcer or the Blue Top Mob and one of the first Bloods in New York City. At 16 he was arrested for attempted murder, gang assault, and intent to sell crack. He was imprisoned for 15 years. While in prison he converted to Islam. He was recently released and In addition to working for SNUG he is pursuing studies in human services.

A part-time hospital responder was recently hired by SNUG Harlem in December of 2012. At Harlem Hospital she is a liaison between the hospital staff, victims and their families. She is a credible messenger to SNUG participants in part because when she understand the world that they inhabit. When she was younger, she was involved with crews that were involved with the street life and she claims to be one of the girls that carried guns.

Data Collection and Reports

The Ceasefire model requires that program staff collect data about their activities and all sites that have adopted the model are required to enter data into the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention database. Based on the data that is submitted by program staff, the following reports can be generated: Monthly Outreach Report; Violence Interrupter Log Report; Conflict Mediation Report; Shooting/Homicide Report; Program Indicators Report; Shooting Responses Monthly Totals; Shootings and Conflicts Mediated Monthly Totals; and Outreach Work with Participants.

Interviews with SNUG Harlem staff indicate that all staff members have some responsibility for entering data into the CPVP database. The program manager inputs data monthly and the outreach workers input data on their participants on a daily basis. The outreach supervisor inputs data about shootings and responses to these events, while the interrupters input data on their everyday interactions. In addition to the data that is entered into the CPVP database, the Mission Society has an internal quality evaluation team that evaluates the SNUG program on a quarterly basis. Program staff did report a limitation of the CPVP database as there is no place to document stabbings. SNUG staff report that for every shooting that they respond to, there are approximately 20 stabbing victims that they respond to at Harlem Hospital.

Training

The following dates and locations indicate the when and where of Ceasefire training for the Yonkers SNUG Program. The locations of the trainings are indicative of the fact that some of the training sessions included staff from multiple SNUG sites, and is consistent with conversations with program staff who indicate that they know the staff from multiple sites.

- Management training 11/17/10 -11/19/10 (Training held in Manhattan)
- Full training on 01/18/11 – 01/22/11 (Training held in Harlem)
- Booster training on 01/11/12 -01/14/12 (Trainings held at each site independently for 1 day)
- Booster training on 07/27/12 – 07/30/12
- Full training on 10/16/12 – 10/20/12 (Training was held in Manhattan & Queens)

SNUG Operations Harlem

Storefront

As previously mentioned Harlem SNUG is housed in a storefront on Malcolm X Boulevard in Central Harlem, and much of their operations emanates from this location. When this storefront commenced operations in January, 2012 they had a private screening of “The Interrupters,” which is a documentary of the Chicago CeaseFire program. Individuals present at the opening include Senator Bill Perkins; the Executive Director of Harlem Hospital; the Assistant Commissioner of the NYPD Juvenile Justice Division; representatives from NYPD’s 32nd Precinct including 32 ranking police officers.

Street Intervention

Even though the violence interrupter is primarily responsible for interrupting violence, both they and the outreach workers are trained in interrupting violence and subsequently, both engage in interrupting violence. The following table consists of data from the CPVP database on conflicts mediated by the Yonkers SNUG team covering the period January 1st, 2110 through February 28th, 2013:

| Harlem SNUG Mediation Report | 1/10/2010-2/28/2013 |
|---|----------------------------|
| Number of Conflicts Mediated | 148 |
| Outcome: conflicts resolved | 50 |
| Outcome: conflicts resolved temporarily | 80 |
| Outcome: conflicts ongoing | 15 |
| Conflict led to shooting: very likely | 109 |
| Conflict led to shooting: likely | 19 |
| Conflict led to shooting: unlikely | 9 |

These data indicate that within this time period roughly 34% of the conflicts mediated were resolved and roughly 54% were temporarily resolved. Assuming that these data accurately reflect program activity, this is an impressive outcome whereby roughly 88% of conflicts mediated were either temporarily or permanently resolved. Most important however is what the data reveal regarding the likelihood that a shooting may have occurred if not for the intervention of the Harlem staff. The data indicate that 74% of the conflicts mediated were very likely to result in a shooting, and an additional 13% of conflicts mediated were like to have resulted in a shooting.

The following table consists of data from the CPVP database on shooting responses by the Harlem SNUG team covering the period January 1, 2010 through February 28, 2013:

| Harlem SNUG Shooting Response | 1/10/2010-2/28/2013 |
|--|----------------------------|
| Number of shooting responses | 37 |
| Number of community members present at the responses | 1134 |
| Total number of shootings | 41 |

As the table shows, there were 41 shootings in the target area during the period of operation of the Harlem SNUG program. Of the shootings that did occur, the staff was able to respond to approximately 90%, and on average 26 community members were present at shooting responses.

As part of their street intervention efforts, program staff report that they engage in a variety of activities. They canvass the target area on foot and engage youth by speaking with them and informing them of the SNUG program. Canvassing, according to the staff, is helpful because they can speak with various people about the SNUG program. While canvassing, they also hand out SNUG literature to businesses and community members including youth and adults. Program staff report that while canvassing they also seek to recruit people to become volunteers for the SNUG program. These volunteers help with community events or may offer services for the participants such as workshops on resume writing. The target area is very large and as such

much canvassing focused on the “downtown” area of central Harlem. With the addition of new staff, they are able to more effectively canvass a larger swath of the 72 block area. One important aspect of canvassing is that program staff gathers intelligence on which individuals or groups have conflicts with each other. While canvassing program staff are able to use their street knowledge to identify individuals who are involved with gangs either through conversation, or assessments of body language and “swag.”

Violence Interrupters/Hospital responders are the staff members primarily tasked with street intervention and mediations are a crucial aspect of their work. Staff interviews reveal that they conduct mediations at the SNUG storefront, in the street, at gyms, safe zones, restaurants, and if necessary they may even do mediation at a crack house. At Harlem hospital they are part of the Circle of Safety Coalition, and in addition to responding to all shootings, stabbings, vicious beatings and some domestic violence, they work with social workers, nurses, and doctors to defuse conflicts that may erupt between hospital staff and patients in the emergency room. Staff report that at times patients seek to fight nurses and doctors at Harlem Hospital and they intervene to calm the situation. By engaging individuals at the hospital who are victims of shootings they are able to refer them to an outreach worker and most importantly discourage the person or his or her friends from retaliating. Harlem SNUG violence interrupters/hospital responders report that they spend approximately 45 hours per week at the hospital. They are pm call and respond to shootings with 72 hours regardless of the time of day or night. Other activities related to street intervention include on the street panel discussions in the summertime, cook-outs/barbeques, and basketball games where they seek to provide a space for participants to be away from the streets.

Client Outreach

The evaluation of Chicago Ceasefire by Skogan (2009) and his colleagues indicate that very often, the outreach workers viewed their work with Ceasefire as a means to pay back a debt to society for the behaviors in which they engaged when they were involved in a life of crime. This was definitely the case among the SNUG Harlem staff. All the staff except the program manager, who had not engaged in any significant criminal activity as a youth, think of their work with SNUG as a way to give back to the community in which they had previously been gang members or otherwise engaged in crime. The following table consists of data from the CPVP database from the outreach reports of the Harlem SNUG team covering the period January 1, 2010 through February 28, 2013:

| Harlem SNUG Outreach Report | 1/10/2010-2/28/2013 |
|---|----------------------------|
| Number of Participants | 120 |
| Number of referrals to employment | 2278 |
| Number of referrals to education | 582 |
| Number of referrals for substance abuse | 90 |
| Number of other referrals | 37 |
| Hours spent with participants | 7310.8 |
| Age (based on year 2011) | |
| More than 40 years | 0 |
| 36-40 years | 0 |
| 31-35 years | 3 |

| | |
|-----------------------|----|
| 26-30 years | 2 |
| 21-25 years | 8 |
| 16-20 years | 92 |
| Younger than 16 years | 15 |

Interviews with program staff and data submitted to the CPVP indicate that outreach workers have more participants than what is required of them. The vast majority of the participants fall within the required age range, and interviews with program staff reveal that most are male with some females. As the CPVP data indicate, many of the participants are in need of substance abuse counseling, educational and employment services. It is apparent that Harlem SNUG invested many hours with their participants with approximately 61 hours invested per participant.

SNUG program staff indicate a few means by which they get participants into the program. One way is via canvassing the target area where they use their street knowledge to identify individuals who are good candidates for the program or where potential participants engage them and express interest in joining the program. Other means to recruit participants include references from the violence interrupter/hospital responder; family and friends of potential participants; old associates of the staff who still live in the neighborhood; and seeking out known members of crews. Specific attempts are made to recruit participants who want to change their lives, and once in the program, participants are empowered via a variety of wrap around services including job and soft skills training, and help with acquiring a General Equivalency Diploma.

Clergy Involvement

The Harlem SNUG program has a very good relationship with the faith community. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints - Harlem 1st Ward makes their gym available on Thursdays for program participants to play basketball, the First Corinthians Baptist Dream Center sponsors Freestyle Friday's where participants are welcome, and clergy have invited participants to perform or be part of a radio broadcast. The Thursday night basketball program attracts 50-60 mostly male youth, but females do attend and watch the males play. The staff claims that female gangs are on the rise, therefore even if they are simply watching the males play, it gives them an alternative to the street. They also work with a Reverend who is affiliated with Perfect Peace Ministries and was on the hiring panel. The Reverend is reported to be very knowledgeable about the streets. SNUG Harlem conducts a variety of events that are supported by the faith community such as vigils where homicide victims are remembered that are attended by clergy, marches and rallies to raise awareness of violence in the community where the faith community participate, mock funerals where members of the clergy will offer a sermon in addition to donating caskets, and clergy participation in street panels with SNUG staff and representatives of other organizations intent on reducing violence. Program staff indicate that they work with a variety of different faith communities, and at times they attend services where they address the congregation spreading the message to stop shooting/killing while mobilizing people simultaneously.

Community Mobilization

The Harlem SNUG program engages in a variety of activities that seek to mobilize the local community around their mission. They sponsor vigils and rallies in response to shootings with the participation of clergy, community members concerned about violence, and a cadre of at least

75 volunteers that they recruited. Other activities that mobilize the community include, casket walks, and street panels where SNUG staff, clergy, and representatives from other organizations concerned about gun violence engage the community in a conversation about gun violence while at the same time educating them about the problem. At times they collaborate with other organizations such as the Harlem Children's Zone, Al Sharpton's National Action Network, the Kennedy Center, and the Catholic Charities Lt. Joseph P. Kennedy Community Center.

One particularly important coalition with which the Harlem SNUG program works is the Harlem Hospital Circle of Safety Coalition. This coalition consists of organizations and government agencies concerned about reducing violence, including gun violence in Harlem. Coalition members include the Mission Society which is the umbrella organization for SNUG; the District Attorney's Office; New York Police Department; Harlem Mother Saves; and the Maysles Institute among others. The Director of Injury Prevention at Harlem Hospital is a member of the Circle of Safety Coalition and he indicates that:

The snug component of what we do in the Circle of Safety is a huge component [of the coalition] so almost all the departments in the hospital are mindful of who our SNUG workers and volunteers are. The hospital police, the emergency department, surgical department, social work department, department of psychology, all the areas where there are close contacts with stabbing or shooting victims.

He also indicates that he participates in SNUG sponsored activities such as panels, marches, and SNUG participates in activities sponsored by his office such as the opening of the office and town hall meetings against gun violence in the community. Within the Circle of Safety Coalition, SNUG also works closely with the Harlem Mother Saves organization. This organization has a mission similar to that of SNUG, namely, the prevention of gun violence and its social causes and costs. An interview with the Founder of this organization reveals in more detail the relationship with SNUG Harlem:

Every time there is a shooting, we go to the hospital, and that's where SNUG is. We do intervention and prevention with them and that is how we are able to interact with them. We do rallies with them, we meet with them. We are in this organization from Harlem hospital called Circle of Safety, we strategize with them, now we are in training with them, and we are first responders. We are very active with SNUG, we are on the street, on the ground 24 hours, so when there is a shooting they call us and we will be on the scene and that's how I know them.

As previously mentioned the Maysles Institute is part of the Circle of Safety Coalition and they work closely with SNUG. The Maysles Institute provides documentary education programming for young people and adults throughout Manhattan. One of their programs is the Teen Producers Academy, and within this program, they worked with SNUG in making a documentary about gun violence in Harlem. As part of the documentary making process they accompanied SNUG staff on some of their community outreach activities, and a few of the program staff are featured in the film.

SNUG Harlem also seeks to mobilize the community with their work with The City College of New York, specifically the Harlem Youth and Justice Center. This center seeks to educate youth about the Juvenile Justice system in New York City, their rights, how to effectively deal with the police, and conflict resolution when altercations arise. Additionally they engage youth,

including SNUG participants in discussions about the NYPD's Stop and Frisk policies, and how to make a report to the Civilian Complaints Board of New York City.

Educational Campaign

The Harlem SNUG program staff indicates that they distribute printed material to a variety of people and organizations. When they canvass the neighborhood they hand out flyers to potential participants in addition to community residents. Printed materials with the message to stop shooting/killings are also distributed at the various community events sponsored by SNUG, and other events sponsored by politicians or other groups that seek to decrease violence in the community.

In addition to the printed materials, and probably more important, the Harlem SNUG program has a very good relationship with local educational institutions where they bring their message to stop shootings/killings. They have conducted workshops at the Harlem Children's Zone, the Harlem Renaissance School, and various elementary, junior and high schools where they speak to the youth about gun violence, bullying, domestic violence, that its ok to walk away from a situation that may lead to violence, and the importance of remaining in school until graduation. Youth are also taught about violence via skits by the SNUG staff and in turn, the youth perform skits to demonstrate what they have learned.

As part of their education campaign, SNUG staff attends to the educational needs of program participants by helping some to earn their General Equivalency Diploma, or restart their high school education. Participants are also offered help with resume writing, and how to conduct themselves in a job interview.

Police and Prosecution

According to the CeaseFire model, the SNUG program is expected to work with local law enforcement to achieve their mission. At the administrative level, the New York Police Department, specifically the 32nd precinct in the target area, has a tenuous relationship with SNUG. The police provided the initial data that was used to determine the target area and administrators along with other officers were present on opening day of the storefront where the documentary "The Interrupters" -- a documentary about the CeaseFire program in Chicago -- was screened. After this initial help however, the SNUG had a difficult time accessing data on shootings and homicides from the precinct. However, in various meetings, the inspector of the 32nd precinct routinely mentioned the good work done by Harlem SNUG in various meetings.

Even though the relationship between Harlem SNUG and the NYPD via the administration of the 32nd precinct was not ideal, the program staff had a very good relationship with a crime prevention officer within the precinct. This officer sought to convince the police administration that the SNUG staff are good people who happen to have done bad things, and that they should be given a chance to redeem themselves. Apparently the administration was somewhat apprehensive about working with the SNUG program due in part to the criminal history of program staff. The aforementioned officer thinks that SNUG Harlem is a good resource and at times instead of referring situations to the police, would contact SNUG because they have a better relationship with the youth than the police. This officer also helped to introduce SNUG to other organizations such as Bothers on the New Direction (BOND) and Harlem Children's Zone.

Additionally this officer asked the commanding officer to allow new police officers to watch “The Interrupters” so that they would be aware of the staff and the work they do. The commanding officer agreed and had SNUG staff present periodically to new recruits.

During street work, the outreach workers and violence interrupters reported a somewhat negative relationship with beat officers. They cited a number of examples of these kinds of interactions. It seems that there may be a need to better educate both the line officers and SNUG staff in both what each other’s unique role as well as how to interact better out in the community.

Relationship with Ceasefire Chicago

SNUG Harlem report that they have an excellent relationship with the Chicago CeaseFire staff and speak very highly of them. Program staff refer to the trainers as “big brothers.” They also report that they can call CeaseFire Chicago at any time to discuss any issue that may arise in the process of doing their work. There are bi-weekly phone calls with Chicago CeaseFire and other SNUG sites to discuss issues, concerns, and program events that are about to occur. As the program manager states, there is “continuous support from Chicago.”

SNUG Central Harlem: Impact on Violence

Methodology

The purpose of this research is to evaluate what impact, if there is any, SNUG has had on gun-related offending and violence within its area of operation in Harlem, NY. Our data source is the New York Police Department, who collated reports made to city police from January 2007 through December 2012. The SNUG site is located within the 32nd precinct, specifically all or most of the following Census tracts: 224, 226, 228, 230, and 232. The total population within those census tracts is 31,295. The data included in this evaluation is thus from incidents within these tracts and not the entire precinct.

Ideally, in order to limit problems with internal validity, program evaluations would employ a true or classic experimental design with random assignment of cities and locations into experimental and control groups. As is often the case with evaluation research, however, practical concerns precluded randomly assigning SNUG to some cities and not to others. Rather, SNUG sites were selected based on need and other considerations. Consequently, the sites receiving the SNUG program may differ systematically from those sites that did not receive the program, which could account for differences in levels of violence before and after implication of SNUG.

Since a true experimental design was not feasible, we employed an interrupted time-series quasi-experimental design for our evaluation. This design features numerous observations before and after the implementation of SNUG. To assess the impact of SNUG, we employ seasonally adjusted autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) analysis to estimate projected levels of violence. We then contrast the projected and actual (or observed) violent incidents as a means of detecting whether SNUG reduced levels of gun-related violence.

Impact on Select Violent Crime

We evaluated the impact of SNUG based on: murder, criminal possession of a dangerous weapon (CPW), robbery, and aggravated assault. Since SNUG was primarily intended to impact firearm-related crimes, we examined counts of these four events where a firearm was involved. If SNUG was successful, it is also possible that there would be spillover effects into those crimes that were not committed with firearms. That is, it is possible that the number of non-firearm-related violent offenses may increase as disputes continue to be settled violently (albeit now without firearms) or else the SNUG violence interrupters may be responsible for higher levels of peaceful dispute resolution, with consequently less violence of any type. Since the implementation of SNUG started in September 2010, there are 44 months of pre-implementation data and 28 months of post-implementation data.

Table 1 reports the average monthly count of violent incidents across the four crimes (both firearm-related and non-firearm related) during the period of the study. The average number of violent incidents in Harlem, pre- and post-SNUG, declined for some crime types but increased for others. The decreases were evident among non-gun homicide, gun- and non-gun-related dangerous weapon incidents, non-gun felony assault, shooting victims (see Appendix A; note, however, that this crime is precinct-wide and not confined to the SNUG areas), and both gun-related and non-gun robbery.

However, some crimes became somewhat more frequent—these were gun- and non-gun-related homicide and gun-related felony assault. Taking a closer look at homicide, the Harlem SNUG area experienced an overall average of .53 homicide incidents each month (or about one homicide every two months) during the entire evaluation period. Before SNUG, there were .50 homicide incidents per month (with .34 firearm-related incidents). After SNUG began in Harlem, the monthly averages increased to .57 homicides each month. Gun-related homicide ticked upward from .34 to .39 incidents per month, where non-gun homicides showed a miniscule (.16 to .18) increase. Thus, homicide increased slightly post SNUG.

Table 1.
Monthly Average of Violent Crimes for Harlem, 2007-2012, Pre- and Post-SNUG

| Measure | Firearm-related | | Non firearm-related | | Total |
|-------------------|-----------------|--|---------------------|--|-------------|
| Murder | 0.36 | | 0.17 | | 0.53 |
| | | | | | |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.34 | | 0.16 | | 0.50 |
| | | | | | |
| Post-SNUG | 0.39 | | 0.18 | | 0.57 |
| | | | | | |
| D (Murder) | 0.05 | | 0.02 | | 0.07 |
| | | | | | |
| Dangerous Weapon | 0.07 | | 5.82 | | 5.89 |
| | | | | | |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.11 | | 6.48 | | 6.59 |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------|--|--------------|--------------|
| | | | | |
| Post-SNUG | 0.00 | | 4.79 | 4.79 |
| D (Dangerous Weapon) | -0.11 | | -1.69 | -1.80 |

| | | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------|--|--------------|-------------|
| Felony Assault | 0.06 | | 6.58 | 6.64 |
| | | | | |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.00 | | 6.59 | 6.59 |
| | | | | |
| Post-SNUG | 0.14 | | 6.57 | 6.71 |
| | | | | |
| D (Felony Assault) | 0.14 | | -0.02 | 0.12 |

| | | | | |
|--------------------|--------------|--|--------------|--------------|
| Robbery | 1.51 | | 10.29 | 11.80 |
| | | | | |
| Pre-SNUG | 1.52 | | 11.75 | 13.27 |
| | | | | |
| Post-SNUG | 1.50 | | 8.00 | 9.50 |
| | | | | |
| D (Robbery) | -0.02 | | -3.75 | -3.77 |

This simple comparison suggests that SNUG was not consistently effective at reducing violence among gun-related offenses; however, these results need to be interpreted with caution. Given the statistical infrequency of serious violent crime reports across the SNUG sites, particularly those that are gun-related, the changes that followed after the intervention were quite small in magnitude. In fact, only one of the changes in violence was great enough to achieve statistical significance at the .05 level. Felony assault with a firearm, the lone exception, had a statistically significant increase from 0 to .14 incidents per month. For the remainder, we cannot rule out chance fluctuation as the reason for most of the changes. Table A4 shows the t-scores for each type of violence, pre- and post-SNUG intervention. The question turns to whether any decreases were augmented by the presence of SNUG.

Impact on Firearm-Related Homicide

Chart 1 shows the actual and ARIMA-projected incidences of firearm-related homicide. During the SNUG intervention, between September 2010 and October 2012, ARIMA forecast that Harlem SNUG areas would average .36 firearm-related homicides per month. The actual monthly averages while the intervention was underway were slightly greater at .39 homicides per month. Although firearm-related homicides thus were above projections during this period, the difference is not statistically significant.


Impact on Non Firearm-Related Dangerous Weapons

There were only two contrasts between projected and actual incidents to achieve statistical significance: non-firearm-related reports of dangerous weapons and reported shooting victims. In the former case, ARIMA projected that reports during the SNUG period would average 4.62 per

month; however, the actual monthly average was greater at 6.48 per month—a difference substantial enough that chance is unlikely to account for it.

Impact on Shootings

The actual number of shooting victims, on the other hand, fell significantly below projections (3.55 incidents were projected each month; however, there were only 2.21 actual victims of shootings). These results must be viewed with caution, however, because shooting victim data was for the entire 32nd precinct and not specific to the SNUG area of operation. Table B4 reports the means and t-scores for the contrast between the actual and projected violent incidents.



Discussion

We should remind the reader that any significant changes during the period of the study, although possibly attributable to SNUG, may in fact be due to factors unrelated, such as changes to policing in the area—i.e., threats to internal validity (such as historical events, statistical regression). One way to assess this possibility is to create comparison sites, in particular census tracts in other New York City precincts that are as similar as possible to the Harlem SNUG sites except for the fact that they did not have SNUG. The creation of comparison groups is somewhat problematic insofar as we lacked data from other precincts. Readers should therefore be cautioned that these results can only be suggestive and not conclusive.

Conclusion

The implementation of SNUG in specific areas of Harlem was followed by an inconsistent pattern of changes, particularly for gun-related offenses, although overall six of the nine violent crimes lessened after SNUG was implemented. The degree of change was very modest, however, and most of these changes in violence did not reach statistical significance, where we can safely

rule out chance as the reason for any apparent variation. Note that violent crime in the Harlem SNUG area is generally low in frequency to begin with. Some crime types had barely any activity at all (such as firearm-related felony assault) or had very small amounts of activity, thus precluding the possibility of dramatic reductions. Notwithstanding the lack of statistically significant results, the pattern of the results does not appear to be strongly consistent with a successful outcome.

Table A4. T-Scores for Pre- and Post-SNUG Observations

| | Pre | Post | Difference | T Value |
|--------------------------------------|-------|-------|------------|---------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.01 | 0.11 |
| SD | 0.37 | 0.39 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 0.34 | 0.39 | -0.05 | -0.31 |
| SD | 0.57 | 0.79 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Dangerous Weapon w/o Firearm (mean) | 5.82 | 6.48 | -0.66 | -0.89 |
| SD | 3.32 | 2.5 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Dangerous Weapon with Firearm (mean) | 0.11 | 0 | 0.11 | 1.30 |
| SD | 0.44 | 0 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Felony Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 6.58 | 6.59 | -0.01 | -0.01 |
| SD | 5.61 | 3.02 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Felony Assault with Firearm (mean) | 0 | 0.14 | -0.14 | -2.03* |
| SD | 0 | 0.45 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 10.29 | 11.75 | -1.46 | -1.29 |
| SD | 5.33 | 3.21 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 1.52 | 1.5 | 0.02 | 0.06 |
| SD | 1.52 | 1.35 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Shooting Victims (mean) | 2.89 | 2.21 | 0.68 | 1.31 |
| SD | 1.97 | 1.66 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |

(* denotes significant difference at $p < .05$)

Table B4. T-Scores for Actual and Projected Violent Incidents

| | Actual | Projected | Difference | T Value |
|--------------------------------------|--------|-----------|------------|---------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 0.16 | 0.17 | -0.01 | -0.11 |
| SD | 0.39 | 0.21 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 0.39 | 0.36 | 0.03 | 0.17 |
| SD | 0.79 | 0.33 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Dangerous Weapon w/o Firearm (mean) | 6.48 | 4.62 | 1.86 | 2.50* |
| SD | 2.5 | 2.76 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Dangerous Weapon with Firearm (mean) | 0 | 0.13 | -0.13 | 0.00 |
| SD | 0 | 0.46 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Felony Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 6.59 | 7.49 | -0.90 | -1.17 |
| SD | 3.02 | 2.29 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Felony Assault with Firearm (mean) | 0.14 | 0 | 0.14 | 1.49 |
| SD | 0.45 | 0 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 11.75 | 11.82 | -0.07 | -0.08 |
| SD | 3.21 | 3.2 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 1.5 | 1.57 | -0.07 | -0.21 |
| SD | 1.35 | 0.88 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Shooting Victims (mean) | 2.21 | 3.55 | -1.34 | -3.10* |
| SD | 1.66 | 1.35 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |

(* denotes significant difference at $p < .05$)

Chapter 9: ENY/Brooklyn Findings

Context

According to 2010 Census data, the area covered by the 11207 zip code in East New York, Brooklyn, has a total population of 93,386 people. Racial demographics indicate that the neighborhood is 13.3% White, 69.3% Black or African American, 1.7% American Indian and Alaska Native, 1.65 Asian, 0.5% Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, and 17.9% Some Other Race. Hispanic or Latino is an ethnic category as measured by the Census, and they comprise 34.6% of the total population with Other Hispanic or Latino (18.5%) and Puerto Rican (13.7%) making up the two largest origin groups. Within this community roughly 8.7% of the male population is between the ages of 15 and 24 years old. Roughly 9.1% of the female population is between the ages of 15 to 24 years old. Census data also reveal that 21.6% of female-headed households had children under the age of 18 present. An astonishing 75.8% of occupied housing units are renter-occupied and 24.2% are owner occupied. This is potentially a function of the high poverty rate and the existence of large housing projects that tend to concentrate poverty. In the year before the Census, 30.9% of all families had incomes below the poverty level, 38.4% of families with children under 18 had incomes below the poverty level, and 49.3% of female headed families with children under 18 had incomes below the poverty level. Employment data indicate that 14.7% of the civilian labor force is unemployed, and in 2011, the median household income was \$33,127. The foreign born comprise 31.2% of the total population, with 93.7% of this group from Latin America, 2.7% from Asia, and 1.9% from Africa.

Neighborhood Context and Target Areas Description

At the inception of the SNUG program the target area was a 72 block area that was narrowed to a more manageable size and is serviced by the 75th precinct of the New York Police Department. Pursuant to the second round of funding from the state, a new target area was chosen in consultation with the police. This new area encompasses 17 blocks and includes two housing projects, the Linden Houses and the Boulevard Houses. This area is also served by the 75th precinct and both target areas are within the 11207 zip code.

The first target area of SNUG ENY was an approximately 72 block area that was reduced to smaller area about half way through the first cycle of funding from the State. The 75th precinct of the NYPD services the area and this area was chosen in consultation with the police who indicated that the area had the highest amount of shootings. Observations of the target area reveal that it is densely populated and interviews with program staff reveal that there are 7 or 8 housing projects in the area. There were very few visible signs of severe urban decay in that very few boarded up buildings and litter were observed, and there were no apparent brown fields. On certain streets there was considerable commercial activity primarily in the form of corner store and other small businesses. While observing the target area, program staff indicated the various hot spots in the area. Additionally staff report that several crews inhabit the target area who have ongoing conflicts with each other and who prey on junior and high school students, especially after school. In one instance the predatory behavior led to the re-routing of a school bus. The ranks of the three letter crews were somewhat depleted however due to federal law enforcement arrests of crew members. SNUG ENY staff report that community residents know

them and come out and speak with them when they canvass the area. In 2011 while working the target area, staff report that there was a 101 day period without a shooting or killing in one of the most violent areas of all of New York City.

In July of 2012 when SNUG ENY received the second round of funding from the State, the target area was changed to a 17 block area that encompasses two large housing projects, the Linden Houses and the Boulevard Houses. The Linden Houses is a complex of 19 buildings either 8 or 14 stories tall, with 1,586 apartments and 4,023 residents. The Boulevard Houses is a complex of 18 buildings, either 6 or 14 stories tall, with 1,436 apartments and 3,104 residents. The new target area was chosen in consultation with the police, and it was partly chosen due to the presence of serious conflicts between two rival gangs in the housing projects. Program staff report that while working in the target area, there was a period of 232 days without a shooting. Observation of the target area with program staff reveals that they are known by community residents.

Program Description

Analysis of program documents and interviews with program staff reveal that the mission of SNUG ENY program is to essentially replicate the Ceasefire model as developed by the Chicago Violence Prevention Initiative housed within the School of Public Health at the University of Illinois at Chicago.

Discussions with program staff indicate more specifically that SNUG ENY seeks to serve high risk individuals. High risk individuals are considered anyone connected to a gang, has been recently released from prison, is known to carry a gun, or is a victim or perpetrator of violence. The expected program outcome is to stop shootings but SNUG ENY also seeks to provide alternatives by directing participants on a path such that they may obtain schooling, vocational training, or jobs.

Funding

The State Senate awarded the SNUG ENY program \$500,000 for the period August, 2010 to October, 2011. These monies originated from the State. A second round of funding was extended to five of the original SNUG programs and SNUG ENY was fortunate to be one of these programs to receive some of these funds totaling \$150,000 from July, 2012 to February, 2013. These funds did not originate from the State however, but by funding to DCJS from the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance (JAG) Program. This grant program is the primary means by which the federal government disseminates monies to criminal justice agencies at the state and local levels of government. During the period between the first and second round of funding, January, 2012 through June, 2012, the program was funded by monies (\$117,250) from the Young Men's Initiative (YMI) and the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH). A second round of funding was forthcoming from YMI/DOHMH for the period July, 2012 through June, 2013 totaling \$174,990. SNUG ENY's most recent source of funding is from the Mayor's private fund for the period January, 2013 through December, 2013 for \$425,000. To keep the program going, funding was secured via different agencies, and subsequently, there is some overlap in the funding allocated for the program.


The program manager relayed that the variation in funding of SNUG ENY has been a serious problem. Inconsistent funding led to staff turnover and more importantly gaps in their work with participants. He stated that the target population for the program often does not have much trust in many people. As such, when SNUG staff have to cease working with participants due to funding issues, it potentially negatively impacts the trust the participants have in the program and the staff.

Organizational Structure

ManUp! Inc. is the parent organization of SNUG ENY and the executive director of ManUp! also serves as the program manager. The parent organization has been in existence for eight years and has fifteen employees. The organization was founded after the murder of an eight year old boy in the East New York neighborhood in 2003. At the time of the young boy's murder, the program manager was a community activist and he responded to the shooting by visiting the crime scene. This particular episode increased his frustration with crime in the neighborhood and he sought to organize the community to fight crime from a "community perspective." More specifically he sought to organize and listen to young people in an effort to understand how some of them rationalize their violent behavior. The first space occupied by the organization was a donated basement and they have since expanded to three locations: the administrative office at 821 Van Siclen Avenue, a multi-service center at 530 Sutter Avenue, and a youth/community center at 11-21 New Lots Avenue. In 2005 ManUp! began to receive funding for their programs via local businesses, local officials and churches. Since then the organization has received millions of dollars in funding for its programs. Programs offered by ManUp! include a summer day camp; tutoring services; after school programs that help youth with homework in addition to providing cultural enrichment; youth recreation activities and mentoring; employment services for the unemployed; and there is a teen center for youth ranging from 12-19 years old.

The SNUG program operates out of the administrative office on Van Siclen Avenue. This storefront is located in the second target area, and as part of their educational campaign, there are posters on the front and inside the building that communicate the message to stop killing/shooting. The storefront serves as a safe space for participants to interact with SNUG staff, and there are workspaces with computers where the staff input data into the CPVP database. The walls of the storefront are decorated with materials that pay homage to important figures in African American history and there is a meeting place in the basement for staff and program meetings.


The following organizational chart depicts the structure of SNUG ENY at its inception in 2010:




Outreach workers and violence interrupters receive the same training from CeaseFire Chicago, but their duties are different especially as it pertains to case management. Outreach workers engage in case management with participants who are often referred to them by the Violence Interrupters, while Violence Interrupters do not have a caseload. In the initial iteration of the SNUG ENY program, some of the outreach workers also functioned as violence interrupters. Subsequent iterations of the program however, are consistent with the CeaseFire model in that outreach workers do not also function as violence interrupters in an official sense even though the nature of their work at times require them to interrupt violence. It is also important to note that the position of Assistant Program Manager is unique to SNUG ENY. Interview with program staff reveal however, that this position is essentially that of an outreach worker

supervisor who has more administrative duties. Throughout the history of the program, there has been two outreach supervisors for the program. One outreach worker works more directly with the other outreach workers and the violence interrupters while the assistant program manager is an outreach worker supervisor who is involved with more administrative duties.


After the initial funding from the state commenced in October 2011, SNUG ENY did not receive funding from the state until July of 2012. During a portion of the time between the first and second round of funding from the state (January 2012 to June 2012), the program was funded by the Young Men’s Initiative and the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. The following organizational chart reflects the staffing of the program during this period.




A second round of funding was extended to SNUG ENY from the State Division of Criminal Justice Services for the period July 2012 to February 2013. The following organizational chart reflects the staffing of the program during this period.



During the operation of SNUG ENY, there was some overlap in funding for the program. The following organizational chart corresponds to funding from the Young Men’s Initiative and the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (July 2012 through June 2013) and overlaps with funding from DCJS from July 2012 through February 2013.



The following organizational chart corresponds to funding from the Mayor’s Fund (\$425,000) from January 2013 through December 2013, and once again overlaps with funding from the Young Men’s Initiative and the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.



The history of the organizational structure SNUG ENY reflects significant amount of change over time. According to program staff, this is change over time is a function of the funding limitations.

Staffing

The following is a description of the various staff positions within the SNUG ENY program. Discussions with the program manager indicate that the job descriptions are the same as those provided by Chicago Ceasefire. The following positions were held by SNUG ENY staff:

- Program Manager
- Outreach Supervisor
- Outreach Worker
- Violence Interrupter

Hiring Panel

Consistent with the CeaseFire model, a hiring panel was used to select the program staff. The panel consisted of community members, clergy, police, organizational staff and staff from CeaseFire Chicago. All the members of SNUG ENY including the program manager went through the hiring panel process.

Working Hours

The program manager indicates that the staff generally works Tuesday through Saturday after 3:00pm because according to the NYPD this is when shootings are likely to occur in the target area. Violence Interrupters work from either of the following hours; 4:00pm to 12:00am, 5:00pm to 1:00am, or 6:00pm to 2:00am. There is an on-call aspect to the program in that all program staff are required to be on call in case a shooting occurs and they need to respond to prevent retaliation.

Staff Biographies and Daily Activities

The evaluators were not able to meet all the staff members of the SNUG program, due in part to staff turnover and that some staff were not available when the evaluators were present. Of the staff members that we were able to meet, all are African American males except for a female outreach supervisor. The fact that many of the workers are African American is particularly important because as previously noted, young black males are overrepresented among the shooters in the inner-city therefore they may be more able to relate to program staff from a similar racial background and who have had similar experiences with crime and violence. Interviews with program staff also reveal that some of them grew up together or met each other in prison, and some have lived in the target area. The following are brief biographies of the program staff that the evaluators were able to interview. The biographies are of individuals who have worked for the SNUG program at various iterations of the program staff. Overall it is apparent from the staff biographies that the staff selected for the program is consistent with the Ceasefire model in that they are all credible messengers.

The program manager of SNUG ENY is also the founder and Executive founder of ManUp! Inc. He was born in Brownsville, NY and grew up in the Brownsville and East NY neighborhoods. At a young age he turned to the streets in order to help out at home where he lived with his mother who was on public assistance and seven siblings. At sixteen he became a father and

became even more involved with life on the streets which resulted in him being convicted and sentenced to 5 years in prison and 10 years on parole for a crime which he claims he did not commit. In prison he states that he decided to change his life around and worked in the pre-release program to help inmates who were about to be released adjust to live on the outside. Due in part to his transformation while incarcerated, he was granted early release via a work release program. After he was released, youth in the community approached him and were interested in his past involvement in crime and his imprisonment. This attention was not welcomed by him and he began working at community center where he taught about the ill effects of involvement in crime. Eventually he was hired at various not for profits, and worked his way up program developer. After a shooting of a young child in his neighborhood, he tried to organize to stop the violence and founded ManUp! Inc in part to offer young people a safe space. As part of his work, he seeks to help individuals who are stigmatized as a consequence of their incarceration. The program manager reports that he is responsible for hiring, including establishing the hiring panels, firing, supervising the outreach worker supervisors, and management in general. Additionally he is primarily responsible for organizing shooting responses, and community activities.

The assistant program manager functions as an outreach supervisor and was born and raised in Brownsville and grew up in East NY. As he states, he made some poor decisions while he was younger and was subsequently incarcerated at various times for a period totaling 17 years. He met the program manager while incarcerated and as soon as he was released from prison he started work as a volunteer with ManUp! Inc. Eventually he was hired as a staff member of ManUp! and is currently the associate executive director. One of his primary goals is to give back to the community and his work with ManUp! is one means to accomplish this goal.

Another worker is a 43 year old African American female and is the outreach supervisor for SNUG ENY. She was born in Brooklyn and grew up in the Brownsville and ENY neighborhoods. When growing up she did not know of organizations such as ManUp! that seek to help individuals in the community. As she states, she and her family could have used some help to cope with the murders of her brothers who were killed in July of 1987 and June of 1991. Both brothers were 18 years old when they were killed. Her parents turned to drugs and alcohol following the deaths of her brothers and she became the pillar of strength in the family who helped both her parents and her brother. When she was younger, she was involved in activities that if they came to the attention of the authorities would have led to serious consequences. As a adult, she saw people in the neighborhood who were experiencing the same problems which she had and she subsequently assumed the role of nurturer to these individuals regardless of their age. In 2005 she started to volunteer at ManUp! and in addition to her work with the SNUG program, she is also the Director of Employment services for the organization. She attended what was then known as the East NY Tech High School and also earned an associate's degree from the college of New Rochelle.

Another worker is a 38 year old African American male who has worked for ManUp! Inc. for seven years. He was born in Queens, NY but has lived in the East New York neighborhood since his kindergarten years. In the past he was involved in drug selling, robbery, theft, and was convicted and imprisoned for seven years on a charge of armed robbery. When he was younger, he lived with his mother and two brothers. She received welfare benefits from the state and

eventually went on to earn a master's degree and is currently the head daycare worker at a childcare facility. His father however, was involved in a life of crime. The aforementioned experiences are consistent with the recommendations of the CeaseFire model and this outreach worker/ Violence Interrupter credits his past involvement in crime as a reason why he is able to reach troubled youth.

A younger member of the team is a 27 year old African American male who grew up in East New York. At some point he moved to the South where he graduated high school, and earned a basketball scholarship for college. He was arrested for drugs and was subsequently placed on probation. This outreach worker/Violence Interrupter states that he is not a "street person" but gained the respect of people in the neighborhood due to his involvement with basketball. He was hired in part due to his experience living in a part of East New York where other staff members are not from which is essential in resolving disputes between individuals or groups of individuals who live in different areas of the neighborhood.

One of the outreach worker/Violence Interrupters is an African American male who was born and raised in Brooklyn and he is also a United States Army Veteran. He has lived in East New York for his entire life except for two bouts of incarceration. He is also a self-published author, and nursing student.

A Violence Interrupter grew up in East New York and has known the assistant program manager of the SNUG program since he was seven years old. When he was 18 years old, he was incarcerated for 8 months. He graduated from PACE University and was working as a software developer when he decided that he wanted to give back to the community.

One of the Violence Interrupters is a 25 year old African American male who grew up in East New York and has lived there his entire life. Both of his parents are disabled. He is a longtime member of the Bloods organization and sought the help of the assistant program manager when he after he was having legal troubles. He was rehabilitated and subsequently hired as a violence interrupter for SNUG ENY.

Another of the Violence Interrupters is a 40 year old African American male, born and raised in New York City where he lived in Lower East Side of Manhattan and Brooklyn, East NY. At around 22 he started working with the SNUG program director who was in the beginnings of formalizing his work for social change in the community. In his youth, this worker was part of a crew that sold drugs and engaged in robberies. Even though he was involved in crime, he was never incarcerated. He did however lose a number of friends to drug use and the violence that often is associated with involvement in street crime. He attended Borough of Manhattan Community College, and Monroe College where he studied Criminal Justice. At Monroe, he was interested in the "social work aspect" of the criminal justice system. He enjoys working with marginalized youth who have much stacked against them and blames the lack of education, and equal opportunity for the problems encountered by these youth. SNUG ENY he believes helps to creates more opportunities for program participants. In July 2012, he was hired as a Hospital responder after receiving training from Chicago CeaseFire. At the time of the interview, he had yet to work in the hospital in an official capacity but he volunteers on the overnight in the emergency room where he speaks with gang members or others about SNUG

ENY and programs that are offered by ManUp! Inc. In addition to being a member of the SNUG staff, he is also the Director of Employment for ManUp! where he helps program participants with things such as soft skills, interviews, and writing resumes.

Program staff report that they conduct the various responsibilities associated with their particular positions, such as canvassing the neighborhood, contacting participants, or responding to shootings, but there is variability in the specific tasks of which they engage in depending on the time of the week. There are weekly meetings in the earlier part of the week attended by the program staff where they assess the needs of the target area, plan special activities or conduct any shooting responses. Toward the end of the week however, they brace themselves for the weekend where most incidents occur and adjust their activities accordingly. Program staff usually work Tuesdays through Saturdays during the later portion of the day, and there are daily de-briefings.

Both outreach workers and violence interrupters go out on the streets. Their training is exactly the same. If one is called in to handle another person's area, whether its mediation or support for youth, they are able to do that. The outreach supervisor will sometimes serve as an outreach worker as well. This is in order to bridge gaps, and to keep youth connected. Outreach workers themselves each have caseloads of 15 high profile youth. The outreach workers are like social workers in that they do a significant amount of case management. They also bring the credibility of the streets with them, and that helps them relate to the participants. As case managers they help participants with relationships, jobs, poor living conditions, or to change their negative attitude toward life.

Data Collection and Reports

The Ceasefire model requires that program staff collect data about their activities and all sites that have adopted the model are required to enter data into the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention database. Based on the data that is submitted by program staff, the following reports can be generated: Monthly Outreach Report; Violence Interrupter Log Report; Conflict Mediation Report; Shooting/Homicide Report; Program Indicators Report; Shooting Responses Monthly Totals; Shootings and Conflicts Mediated Monthly Totals; and Outreach Work with Participants.

Interviews with program staff indicate that they input data into the CPVP database and all the staff members input their own data. Data submitted include the number visits with clients, number of community executed and number of people who participated, and involvement with the police. The program manager reviews the inputted data to see if he needs to intervene, or if he needs to make sure that program staff are consistently entering data. Additionally, a copy of data is then sent to DCJS along with a summary qualitative report. The CPVP database is the only means of data collection for the SNUG program. Since most of the participants in the program have a criminal history, or are engaging in criminal behavior, detailed information that can lead to their identification is not recorded. The names of all program participants are coded and other information about the participants is rather basic ensuring that it is almost impossible to trace the data back to a particular program participant.

Training

The following dates and locations indicate the when and where of Ceasefire training for the SNUG ENY Program. The locations of the trainings are indicative of the fact that some of the training sessions included staff from multiple SNUG sites, and is consistent with conversations with program staff who indicate that they know the staff from multiple sites.

- Full training on 10/19/10 – 10/23/10
- Management training 11/17/10 - 11/19/10 (Training was held in Manhattan)
- Full training on 05/17/11 – 05/21/11 (Training held in Brooklyn)
- Booster training on 01/11/12 - 01/14/12 (Trainings held at each site independently for 1 day)
- Partial training on 09/06/12 – 09/07/12
- Full training on 10/16/12 – 10/20/12 (Training was held in Manhattan and Queens)

Interviews with program staff reveal other important aspects of their training. First violence interrupters and outreach workers receive the same training. In addition, every other Monday there is a state call-in where all the SNUG programs in New York State and CeaseFire discuss ongoing issues in their respective programs. The entire SNUG ENY team was trained and certified in CPR and First-Aid in case they encounter an emergency in their work with program participants, or a member of the community. Lastly, the program manager and some of the original outreach workers were trained by the National Gang Institute in Orlando Florida.

SNUG Operations East New York/Brooklyn

Street Intervention

According to the CeaseFire model, street intervention is the primary responsibility of the violence interrupter. In the SNUG ENY program, both the outreach workers and the violence interrupters were trained to interrupt violence and they all engaged in street intervention. The biographies of the program staff indicate that the violence interrupters meet the aforementioned CeaseFire criteria. Even if other staff members were not previously members of a gang, some of them went to the National Gang Institute in Florida and are subsequently equipped with the necessary tools to establish relationships with current gang members and intervene in conflicts. The following table consists of data from the CPVP database on conflicts mediated by the SNUG ENY team covering the period January 1, 2010 through February 28, 2013.

| SNUG ENY Mediation Report | 1/1/2010-2/28/2013 |
|---|---------------------------|
| Number of Conflicts Mediated | 6 |
| Outcome: conflicts resolved | 5 |
| Outcome: conflicts resolved temporarily | 1 |
| Outcome: conflicts ongoing | 0 |
| Conflict led to shooting: very likely | 6 |
| Conflict led to shooting: likely | 0 |
| Conflict led to shooting: unlikely | 0 |

These data indicate that something is amiss regarding the inputting of data into the CeaseFire database by the SNUG ENY staff. It seems implausible, for example, that in a three-year period only 6 conflicts were mediated. Conversations with program staff reveal that throughout the history of the program they have consistently reported data but there have been problems with the CPVP database. CeaseFire explained that any issues would have been resolved and that it is more likely that there were issues with inputting into the database from ENY’s end.

The following table consists of data from the CPVP database on shooting responses by the SNUG ENY team covering the period January 1, 2010 through February 28, 2013.

| SNUG ENY Shooting Responses | 1/1/2010-2/28/2013 |
|--|---------------------------|
| Number of shooting responses | 7 |
| Number of community members present at the responses | 219 |
| Total number of shootings | 8 |

As part of their street intervention activities, program staff report that they canvass the target area on foot and conduct mediations in a variety of locations including the street, ManUp! facilities, or wherever seems most appropriate at the time. In addition to mediating conflicts between individuals they also mediate conflicts between “warring” groups. These groups tend to three letter crews/gangs of young men. After SNUG ENY was established, staff members report mediating conflicts between warring groups for eight months. When funding from the state ceased, they report that seven individuals were killed from these warring groups, and some of them were program participants. Much of the street intervention work conducted by program staff involves preventing people from retaliating when they have been shot or feel wronged in some manner. Program staff also report that when they canvass on the street, they speak with family members of youth and this in turn affects the behaviors of the youth in a positive manner.

Interviews with community stakeholders reveal that the SNUG ENY program is effective in its efforts at street intervention. One elected official reports that SNUG ENY is very good at working to prevent retaliatory violence when shootings occur in the community, and that they conduct daily patrols where they speak with young people and offer them alternatives to violence as a means to solve conflicts as they arise. When asked for a specific example of SNUG ENY’s street intervention another community stakeholder offered the following:

Yea, there was an issue where there was a shooting in the East NY area and I remember being out with them around the shooting where you heard people just basically saying they are going to get the gentlemen back. A lot of threats and accusations were made about who they thought did the shootings. You know, normally as a former police officer we know there are 24 hours after a shooting for retaliatory action and ManUp! responded to the scene. After a series of conversations they stayed there throughout the night and there was no retaliatory action. They were able to really calm the individuals down, they went to the hospital to visit the family members that were involved, they met them at the hospital and they really just did a professional job deescalating the situation.

As part of their street intervention activities, program staff have been able to establish safe spaces for youth not only in their facilities but also in the community. For example, while canvassing the neighborhood, they speak with local business owners who provide

them with valuable intelligence, and allow for their businesses to be used as a safe space by youth who may need such a space.

Client Outreach

Client outreach in the CeaseFire model is the primary responsibility of the outreach workers. The evaluation of Chicago Ceasefire by Skogan (2009) and his colleagues indicate that very often, the outreach workers viewed their work with Ceasefire as a means to pay back a debt to society for the behaviors in which they engaged when they were involved in a life of crime. This was definitely the case among the SNUG ENY staff. All the staff think of their work with SNUG as a way to give back to the community in which they had previously been gang members or otherwise engaged in crime. The following table consists of data from the CPVP database from the outreach reports of the SNUG ENY team covering the period January 1, 2010 through February 28, 2013:

| SNUG ENY Outreach Report | 1/1/2010-2/28/2013 |
|---|---------------------------|
| Number of Participants | 104 |
| Number of referrals to employment | 207 |
| Number of referrals to education | 7 |
| Number of referrals for substance abuse | 2 |
| Number of other referrals | 4 |
| Hours spent with participants | 745.8 |
| | |
| Age (based on year 2011) | |
| more than 40 yrs old | 3 |
| 36-40 years | 7 |
| 31-35 years | 5 |
| 26-30 years | 15 |
| 21-25 years | 36 |
| 16-20 years | 34 |
| younger than 16 years | 4 |

SNUG ENY program staff indicate that most of the participants in the program were acquired via canvassing. They report that being from the neighborhood which contains the target area is helpful in identifying participants because they know the various places where people engage in crime such as “weed spots” and “crack spots.” Additionally they know all the key players in crime from the community due to their past involvement in these same activities. Even when they do not know a potential participant, staff report that they can “size up” an individual and make a judgment of their potential suitability for the program. At other times, parents call and refer their children to the program and seek to have them become participants. Once a particular person becomes a participant, their needs are ascertained by the assigned outreach worker and the outreach worker supervisor helps to contact said participant with available services.

Site visit

Clergy Involvement

In the evaluation of the Chicago-CeaseFire program led by Skogan (2009) and his colleagues, the local faith community played a crucial role. As they argue, many mainstream institutions have abandoned inner-city communities and the plethora of small churches that exist in these neighborhoods fill the void left by these institutions. SNUG ENY has a good relationship with the faith based community. Program staff report that they are in contact with clergy both locally and city-wide and they work with clergy irrespective of their particular beliefs. As one staff member states, they work with “all houses of God.” As such, they work with Muslim leaders including those associated with the Nation of Islam, and a variety of other local churches in the community of the target area, such as the Saint Paul’s Community Baptist Church. Some of these various faith based organizations have agreed to be safe spaces for youth in the community and some have agreed to have mediations conducted in these spaces. SNUG ENY has a relationship of mutual respect with prominent clergy such as Reverend Al Sharpton and report that his National Action Network is a close ally. They also have a relationship with the Brooklyn Clergy Task Force.

The Brooklyn Clergy – NYPD Task Force was established in September of 2010 and consists of a group of clergy and law enforcement whose primary objective is to improve cooperation and understanding between the police and the community. They are however tasked with other responsibilities such as “intervention with gang leaders and members to discourage criminal activity” which is closely related to the work conducted by SNUG ENY. Program staff report that they work with this task-force and have a close relationship with a member of the task-force, a Bishop of Power Up Faith Fellowship. This Bishop reports that he has contact with the program manager one to three times per week where they discuss what is happening in the community as it pertains to crime. Additionally he reports that the “program is amazing and people respect him [program manager].” He also notes that SNUG ENY is able to “bring a bunch of gang members together and create a dialogue.”

Community Mobilization

Community mobilization is a vital aspect of the CeaseFire model. The SNUG ENY program engages in a variety of activities that seek to mobilize the local community around their mission. They sponsor, vigils and rallies in response to shootings that are often in collaboration with other community organizations and clergy, barbeques in the community to show community members that they care, basketball tournaments to get youth off the street and provide them with something to do, and at times when a shooting occurs, they get a bullhorn and go out at night spreading the message to stop violence.

Much of the work of the SNUG program that focusses on community mobilization involves working with other non-profit organizations, anti-violence coalitions and elected officials. An elected city-wide official informed the evaluators that he regularly has contact with the SNUG program staff and has participated in program events such as community ant-violence events, events where they try and get people employed, cultural events, and street events where they take over a block and “recapture” the space if even for a short period of time. A community stakeholder who is the founder of an organization that engages in similar work as ManUp, reports that he has been on the streets with SNUG ENY and they in turn come to his community when there is a shooting and the need to mobilize their community to stop the violence.

Additionally SNUG staff have organized peace walks in which his organization sometimes participates. Lastly SNUG ENY staff report that annually they organize a casket walks where they march over the Brooklyn bridge to city hall with five caskets to represent the five boroughs, or to downtown Brooklyn where they send the powerful message to community residents that violence often leads to death.

Educational Campaign

The CeaseFire model calls for a public education campaign aimed at changing community norms around violence and in particular a campaign that highlights the risk of engaging in violence, especially gun violence. As part of their educational campaign, SNUG ENY staff indicate that they distribute printed material – they also distribute pens, buttons, and palm cards -- with the message “DON’T SHOOT! to a wide variety of people and organizations. When canvassing the neighborhood, they hand out flyers to potential participants in addition to community residents. Printed materials with the message to stop shooting/killing are also distributed at the various community events sponsored by the program, and at other events sponsored by politicians or other groups with which they work that seek to decrease violence in the community. Local businesses, churches, and mosques have been provided with SNUG ENY literature and they too display them for community members to see and be reminded of the program’s message.

In addition to the materials, and probably a more important aspect of their educational campaign, is the work that SNUG ENY conducts with schools, both middle and high, and the Crossroads Juvenile Detention Center in Brooklyn, NY. At the detention facility, SNUG staff share the Ceasefire message that crime is a disease, and listen to the stories of the youth who are detained with the aim to have these youth desist from involvement in crime and delinquency. In schools they conduct workshops on violence, work with students are considered to be at high risk for involvement in crime, and the at times help the school by offering anti-bullying workshops. SNUG staff also conducts skits in the schools about violence in addition to mentoring at-risk youth in schools.

Police and Prosecution

According to the CeaseFire model, the SNUG program is tasked with working with local law enforcement to achieve their mission.

Program staff at SNUG ENY report that they have a relationship of mutual respect and understanding with the police at the administrative level and among the rank and file. More specifically they report that they have a good relationship with the precinct commander of the 75th precinct, the borough-wide commander and the NYPD Chief of Community Affairs who speaks highly of the program. The staff report that police supervisors were supportive of the program from its inception, with rank and file officers offering their support after the SNUG staff was invited to and attended several roll calls.

The evaluators were not able to speak directly with law enforcement officials regarding the SNUG ENY program therefore the aforementioned assessment reflects only the view of program staff.

Relationship with Ceasefire Chicago

Program staff report that they have an excellent relationship with the CeaseFire Chicago staff and speak very highly of them. SNUG staff report that the CeaseFire model is easy to implement, and the trainers are very effective. At first the program manager reports that he was skeptical of the model because he did not believe that a program developed in Chicago would work in New York City. He claims that he was totally wrong and is particularly impressed with how the program uses people from the community especially people who used to be in the streets to great effect. After being flown to Chicago and receiving training, program staff were convinced of the model's applicability to New York City and adopted the "don't shoot" aspect of the model for their program's educational campaign. One criticism that they do offer regarding the program however, is that it does not adequately account for the wrap around services needed by program participants such as help finding housing, or an apprentice.

SNUG ENY: Impact on Violence

Methodology

The purpose of this research is to evaluate what impact, if there is any, SNUG has had on gun-related offending and violence within its area of operation in Brooklyn, NY. Our data source is the New York Police Department, who collated reports made to city police from January 2007 through December 2012. The SNUG site is located within the 75th precinct, occupying portions of the following Census tracts: 1126, 1130, 1132, 1134, and 1156. The total population within those census tracts is 17,174. The data included in this evaluation is thus from incidents within these tracts and not the entire precinct.

Ideally, in order to limit problems with internal validity, program evaluations would employ a true or classic experimental design with random assignment of cities and locations into experimental and control groups. As is often the case with evaluation research, however, practical concerns precluded randomly assigning SNUG to some cities and not to others. Rather, SNUG sites were selected based on need and other considerations. Consequently, the sites receiving the SNUG program may differ systematically from those sites that did not receive the program, which could account for differences in levels of violence before and after implementation of SNUG.

Since a true experimental design was not feasible, we employed an interrupted time-series quasi-experimental design for our evaluation. This design features numerous observations before and after the implementation of SNUG. To assess the impact of SNUG, we employ seasonally adjusted autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) analysis to estimate projected levels of violence. We then contrast the projected and actual (or observed) violent incidents as a means of detecting whether SNUG reduced levels of gun-related violence.

Impact on Select Violent Crimes

We evaluated the impact of SNUG based on: murder, criminal possession of a dangerous weapon (CPW), robbery, and aggravated assault. Since SNUG was primarily intended to impact firearm-related crimes, we examined counts of these four events where a firearm was involved. If SNUG was successful, it is also possible that there would be spillover effects into those crimes

that were not committed with firearms. That is, it is possible that the number of non-firearm-related violent offenses may increase as disputes continue to be settled violently (albeit now without firearms) or else the SNUG violence interrupters may be responsible for higher levels of peaceful dispute resolution, with consequently less violence of any type. Since the implementation of SNUG started in September 2010, there are 44 months of pre-implementation data and 28 months of post-implementation data.

Table 1 reports the average monthly count of violent incidents across the four crimes (both firearm-related and non-firearm related) during the period of the study. The average number of violent incidents in Brooklyn, pre- and post-SNUG, declined for some crime types but increased for others. The decreases were evident among non-gun homicide, gun-related dangerous weapon incidents, non-gun felony assault, and both gun-related and non-gun robbery. Some crimes became somewhat more frequent, however. In particular, gun-related homicide, non-gun dangerous weapon incidents, and firearm-related felony assault. Taking a closer look at homicide, the Brooklyn SNUG area experienced an overall average of .21 homicide incidents each month (or about one homicide every five months) during the entire evaluation period. Before SNUG, there were .18 homicide incidents per month (with .11 firearm-related incidents). After SNUG began in Brooklyn, the monthly averages increased to .25 homicides each month. Gun-related homicide ticked upward from .11 to .21 incidents per month, where non-gun homicides showed a miniscule (.03 incidents per month) decline.

Table 1.
Monthly Average of Violent Crimes for Brooklyn, 2007-2012, Pre- and Post-SNUG

| Measure | Firearm-related | | Non firearm-related | | Total |
|-------------------|-----------------|--|---------------------|--|-------------|
| Murder | 0.15 | | 0.06 | | 0.21 |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.11 | | 0.07 | | 0.18 |
| Post-SNUG | 0.21 | | 0.04 | | 0.25 |
| D (Murder) | 0.10 | | -0.03 | | 0.07 |

| | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------|--|-------------|--|-------------|
| Dangerous Weapon | 0.07 | | 2.56 | | 2.63 |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.09 | | 2.02 | | 2.11 |
| Post-SNUG | 0.04 | | 3.39 | | 3.43 |
| D (Dangerous Weapon) | -0.05 | | 1.37 | | 1.32 |

| | | | | | |
|----------------|------|--|------|--|------|
| Felony Assault | 0.28 | | 4.78 | | 3.19 |
|----------------|------|--|------|--|------|

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------|--|--------------|--|--------------|
| Pre-SNUG | 0.05 | | 5.14 | | 5.19 |
| | | | | | |
| Post-SNUG | 0.14 | | 4.21 | | 4.35 |
| | | | | | |
| D (Felony Assault) | 0.09 | | -0.93 | | -0.84 |

| | | | | | |
|--------------------|--------------|--|--------------|--|--------------|
| Robbery | 1.59 | | 7.19 | | 8.78 |
| | | | | | |
| Pre-SNUG | 1.93 | | 7.61 | | 9.54 |
| | | | | | |
| Post-SNUG | 1.39 | | 6.54 | | 7.93 |
| | | | | | |
| D (Robbery) | -0.54 | | -1.07 | | -1.61 |

This simple comparison suggests that SNUG was not consistently effective at reducing violence; however, these results need to be interpreted with caution. Given the statistical infrequency of serious violent crime reports across the five census tracts, particularly those that are gun-related, the changes that followed after the intervention were quite small in magnitude. In fact, none of the changes in violence were great enough to achieve statistical significance at the .05 level except for increased reporting of non-firearm-related dangerous weapons after the implementation of SNUG. This means that we cannot rule out chance fluctuation as the reason for most of the changes. Table A5 shows the t-scores for each type of violence, pre- and post-SNUG intervention. The question turns to whether these decreases were augmented by the presence of SNUG.

Impact on Shootings

Data on shooting victims are shown below. As can be seen, there was only a slight increase in the monthly averages pre- and post-SNUG. Note, also, that shooting victim data is for the entire 75th precinct and not just the area of SNUG operation.


Table 2. Shooting Victims T-Scores for Pre- and Post-SNUG Observations

| | Pre | Post | Difference | T Value |
|-------------------------|------|------|------------|---------|
| Shooting Victims (mean) | 7.18 | 7.25 | -0.07 | -0.08 |
| Standard Deviation | 3.41 | 3.42 | | |
| Number of Observations | 44 | 28 | | |

Impact on Firearm-Related Homicide

Chart 1 shows the actual and ARIMA-projected incidences of firearm-related homicide. During the SNUG intervention, between September 2010 and October 2012, ARIMA forecast that Brooklyn SNUG areas would average .30 firearm-related homicides per month. The actual monthly averages while the intervention was underway were slightly less at .21 homicides per month. Although firearm-related homicides thus fell below projections during this period, the difference unfortunately is not statistically significant. The only contrast between projected and actual incidents to achieve significance is for non-firearm-related reports of dangerous weapons.

In this case, ARIMA projected that reports during the SNUG period would average 2.32 per month; however, the actual monthly average was 3.39—a difference great enough that chance is unlikely to account for it. Table B5 reports the means and t-scores for the contrast between the actual and projected violent incidents.



Discussion

We should remind the reader that any significant changes during the period of the study, although possibly attributable to SNUG, may in fact be due to factors unrelated, such as changes to policing in the area—i.e., threats to internal validity (such as historical events, statistical regression). One way to assess this possibility is to create comparison sites, in particular census tracts in other New York City precincts that are as similar as possible to the Brooklyn SNUG sites except for the fact that they did not have SNUG. The creation of comparison groups is somewhat problematic insofar as we lacked data from other precincts. Readers should therefore be cautioned that these results can only be suggestive and not conclusive.

Conclusion

The implementation of SNUG in specific areas of Brooklyn was followed by an inconsistent pattern of changes. Among the firearm-related crimes as many of these increased as decreased. The degree of change was generally modest, however, and most of these changes in violence did not reach statistical significance, where we can safely rule out chance as the reason for any apparent variation. Note that violent crime in the Brooklyn SNUG area is generally low in frequency to begin with. Some crime types had barely any activity at all (such as non-firearm-related murder) or had very small amounts of activity, thus precluding the possibility of dramatic reductions. Notwithstanding the lack of statistically significant results, the inconsistent pattern does not appear to be consistent with a successful outcome.

Table A5. T-Scores for Pre- and Post-SNUG ENY Observations

| | Pre | Post | D | T Value |
|--------------------------------------|------|------|-------|---------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.52 |
| SD | 0.26 | 0.19 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 0.11 | 0.21 | -0.10 | -1.02 |
| SD | 0.32 | 0.5 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Dangerous Weapon w/o Firearm (mean) | 2.02 | 3.39 | -1.37 | -3.25* |
| SD | 1.32 | 2.2 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Dangerous Weapon with Firearm (mean) | 0.09 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.80 |
| SD | 0.29 | 0.19 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Felony Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 5.14 | 4.21 | 0.93 | 1.31 |
| SD | 2.92 | 2.85 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Felony Assault with Firearm (mean) | 0.05 | 0.14 | -0.09 | -1.32 |
| SD | 0.21 | 0.36 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 7.61 | 6.54 | 1.07 | 1.17 |
| SD | 3.91 | 3.42 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 1.93 | 1.39 | 0.54 | 1.39 |
| SD | 1.8 | 1.17 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |
| Shooting Victims (mean) | 7.18 | 7.25 | -0.07 | -0.08 |
| SD | 3.41 | 3.42 | | |
| N. Observations | 44 | 28 | | |

(* denotes significant difference at $p < .05$)

Table A5. T-Scores for Actual and Projected Violent Incidents

| | Actual | Projected | Difference | T Value |
|--------------------------------------|--------|-----------|------------|---------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 0.04 | 0.09 | -0.05 | -1.00 |
| SD | 0.19 | 0.16 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 0.21 | 0.3 | -0.09 | -0.83 |
| SD | 0.5 | 0.15 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Dangerous Weapon w/o Firearm (mean) | 3.39 | 2.32 | 1.07 | 2.02* |
| SD | 2.2 | 1.38 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Dangerous Weapon with Firearm (mean) | 0.04 | 0.44 | -0.40 | 0.00 |
| SD | 0.19 | 0.42 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Felony Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 4.21 | 4.74 | -0.53 | -0.82 |
| SD | 2.85 | 1.36 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Felony Assault with Firearm (mean) | 0.14 | 0.04 | 0.10 | 1.23 |
| SD | 0.36 | 0.16 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 6.54 | 7.39 | -0.85 | -0.81 |
| SD | 3.42 | 4.03 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 1.39 | 1.98 | -0.59 | -1.66 |
| SD | 1.17 | 1.34 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |
| Shooting Victims (mean) | 7.25 | 5.96 | 1.29 | 1.52 |
| SD | 3.42 | 2.4 | | |
| N. Observations | 28 | 24 | | |

(* denotes significant difference at $p < .05$)

Chapter 10: Conclusions and Implications

The following general issues were identified as affecting the evaluation and outcomes and should be considered in any additional implementation of the program.

1. Model Fidelity
2. Low level of gun violence in target neighborhoods
3. Meaningful data analysis at small geographic levels
4. Data collection at the sites
5. The need to debrief with SNUG staff due to the work that is being done
6. Relationships with law enforcement
7. Impact of funding lapses on programs

There were a number of anecdotal findings that are noteworthy. The first is that at every site the workers discussed how in the first few months of program implementation the neighborhood did not trust the work and thought that they were connected to the police. However, again at every site, after continuous educational campaigning, canvassing, and community mobilization they were able to get the buy-in from the community. Not one site reported that the community disliked them or any that they received any backlash for the work that they do. Staff at every site explained that once the community recognized they were not the police and that they were there to work, they were embraced by the residents.

There is also the notion that the SNUG programs be considered re-entry initiatives, as the staff are almost always ex-offenders who have served time in either prison or jail. Employing these workers give them marketable skills, provides a paycheck, and gives them incredible work experience. Further, as many are now aware of the limited job opportunities for offenders, this is one of the few human services positions that ex-offenders are not disqualified from or require a higher educational level than a high school diploma or equivalent.

The sites that seemed to do very well were sites that were connected to a social service agency that was familiar with working with high-risk clients. These sites were familiar with this population's needs and access issues. Having a storefront in the target area was important, but the connection to services was even more critical, as the clients needed something to do and someone to help them access it. An example is the Yonkers YMCA that was able to connect clients to boxing lessons, open gym, and even technology classes.

In terms of data measurement issues, there may be other ways to measure program effectiveness, such as the days in between shooting incidents, whether a shooting was retaliatory or not, or even CPW arrests in the target area. While measuring program impact through violent crime data is useful, in cases where the incidence is too little to find significance, there needs to be other ways to measure the impact. Alternative measurements should be considered.

Appendices

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Appendix A

Protocol for Initial Contact with Ceasefire

**Goal of “initial contact” is to set an appointment for a longer conversation and identify who best to speak with.

1. Introduce self – name, state that we were awarded a contract to evaluate their Ceasefire program, where we work, we are planning to visit each site – probably twice; refer to prior contact from Lorraine Hogan
2. Describe the evaluation plan in limited terms- we will look at the program activities and structure and impact on violence
3. Who is the contact person for the Ceasefire program, and is this person the contact person for information on the program or is someone else who is assigned this task?

Protocol for Long interview phone call:

Date:

Time:

Person and title spoke with:

Let’s talk first about your parent organization -Do you have any information about the history of your organization, such as goals, number of employees, and kinds of programs offered?

CeaseFire Program questions:

1. Program Description
 - a. the original proposal for the Ceasefire project
 - b. an actual program description, including goals and expected outcomes
 - c. information on the geographic area that is covered by the program (map)
 - d. relationship with Chicago Ceasefire program
 - e. information on funding (is it all from the state senate, or did you get funding for the program from elsewhere)
 - f. Program budget
 - g. Start and end dates of program
2. Staffing
 - a. organizational chart
 - b. the number of staff working on ceasefire and their titles:
 - c. Job descriptions (i.e. outreach worker, violence interrupter)
 - d. information on the staff backgrounds
 - e. hours the staff works
 - f. on-call aspect to program
 - g. utilize hiring panel
3. Program activities

- a. What activities do they engage in
 - b. How many and what types (clients cases, interactions, referrals, etc)
 - c. How do they get them
 - d. What information do they keep
 - e. Are there specific program meetings consistently and with who
 - f. Components of supervision
 - g. Space – building location and description
4. Training
- a. Is there training provided? For whom? By whom?
 - b. How often is training?
 - c. Training documents
 - d. Relationship with Chicago Ceasefire regarding training
5. Data and evaluation
- a. What data is collected for the program
 - b. How is the data collected
 - c. Where is the data inputted
 - d. Is there a designated data input person
 - e. Is another organization evaluating your program
 - f. Data on the number of shootings and homicides and crimes involving a firearm in program area
6. Community/FBOs/Law enforcement
- a. Relationship between your Ceasefire program and local police
 - b. Relationship with the community (specific names that work with)
 - c. Meeting notes and dates from community coalition
 - d. Relationship with faith-based organizations (specific names that work with)
 - e. Educational campaign: what are the components, frequency, lead person,
 - f. Not necessarily part of CeaseFire model – but what is the relationship with the Schools and/or School district
7. Are there any issues that we should be aware of as we are conducting the evaluation, anything that would be really important to know?
8. Are there documents you could send me via email?

Appendix B

Program Manager On-Site Questionnaire

1. When did you become the Program Manager? _____

2. Have you had other jobs at Trinity Alliance? _____

If yes, then please specify your title and briefly specify job description.

3. Do you have another position in this organization or within any other organization?

_____ Yes

_____ No

If yes, what position and with what organization? _____

4. Do you have any participants? (This question does not apply to the program manager)

_____ Yes

_____ No

5. Do you work:

_____ Part-time

_____ Full-time

6. How many workers do you supervise? _____

7. What is your typical work schedule (outside of on-call hours)? (please provide days and hours worked)

8. How often do you respond to an on-call response?

A. everyday,

B. several times a week,

C. several times a month,

D. about once a month,

E. do it but not often,

F. not at all

9. How do you spend your work time?

9a. walk or just hang out in the neighborhood

A. everyday,

B. several times a week,

C. several times a month,

D. about once a month,

E. do it but not often,

F. not at all

9b. recruit and manage volunteer base

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

9c. talk to businesses about contributing to events

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

9d. distribute posters and signs to stores, offices and the community

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

9e. other _____
how often?

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

10. How often do you participate in shooting-related things? (please circle the answer)

10a. plan and implement shooting response

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

10b. visit victim or victim's family home after a shooting

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,

- C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,
 - E. do it but not often,
 - F. not at all
- 10c. go door to door to pass out flyers and talk to neighbors
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,
 - E. do it but not often,
 - F. not at all
- 10d attend a march or prayer vigil following a shooting
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,
 - E. do it but not often,
 - F. not at all
- 10e. visit a hospital right after a shooting
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,
 - E. do it but not often,
 - F. not at all
- 10f. investigate the causes of the shooting
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,
 - E. do it but not often,
 - F. not at all
- 10g. identify hot spots for violence and document these spots
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,
 - E. do it but not often,
 - F. not at all
- 10h. prevent shootings and/or violence
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,

- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

11. Is there a violence prevention plan in place in your community that you created?
 _____ Yes _____ No

12a. How often do you meet with community members in a coalition forum aimed at reducing and preventing violence? (weekly, several times a month, once a month, I do this but not often, not at all).

12b. What is the name of the coalition: _____

13. How often do you plan and execute a community activity? (weekly, several times a month, once a month, I do this but not often, not at all).

14. What percentage of your time is spent?

| | |
|--------------------------------|---------|
| Attending meetings | _____ % |
| Filling out paperwork | _____ % |
| Working on the Phone/In Person | _____ % |

15. How often do you do these things on the job? (circle the most accurate response)

Provide an after-school presence

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

Meet with principals or counselors

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

Make presentations or talk to groups of students in school

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

15b. **How often do you...**

attend funerals as part of the job

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

attend church events as part of the job

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

meet individually with clergy

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

15c. how often do you.....

get stopped or harassed by the police as a suspect

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

talk with police on the street as part of the job

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

attend a police roll call

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

meet at a police station

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

attend a beat meeting

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

16. How often do you formally meet with the following (circle your response)

16a. District Attorney's Office

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

16b. Probation

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

16c. Police

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

16d. Service Providers

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,

- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

16e. clergy/faith leaders

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

16f. community stakeholders

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

17. How satisfied are you with “CeaseFire Chicago” when it comes to training? (very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not satisfied)

17a. how prepared I was before I first went out on the job _____

17b. how prepared I am for my job now _____

17c. how frequently we have training sessions _____

17d. how useful our training is in the real world _____

18. How often do you have internal (SNUG Trinity Alliance) training meetings/events? (more than once a month, once a month, once every 6 months, less than every six months, not at all)

18a. staff meetings _____

18b. Outreach Supervisor supervision _____

19. How do you document data (check all that apply):

- ___ CeaseFire provided forms
- ___ forms I created
- ___ only in the electronic database
- ___ other _____

20. How often do you meet with the following: (circle your response)

20a. violence interrupters

- A. daily
- B. weekly
- C. monthly,
- D. less than once a month

20b. outreach worker supervisor

- A. daily

- B. weekly
- C. monthly,
- D. less than once a month

20c. outreach worker

- A. daily
- B. weekly
- C. monthly,
- D. less than once a month

21. Are there documents available from community meetings that you attend, such as minutes?

- Yes
- No

22. What changes have you made to the program that diverge from the Chicago CeaseFire model?

Ok is there anything that we did not address in these questions that you think is important for us to know?

Appendix C

Outreach Worker On-Site Questionnaire

1. When did you become an outreach worker? _____

2. Have you had other jobs at Trinity Alliance? _____

If yes, then please specify your title and briefly specify job description.

3. Did you know any of your participants before you became an Outreach Worker?
(please check)

_____ Yes

_____ No

4. Are any of your participants relatives of yours (cousins, by marriage, etc.)?
(please check)

_____ Yes

_____ No

4a. Did you or have you ever lived in the target area?

(please check)

_____ Yes

_____ No

4b. if you live or have lived in the target area, how long were you there? _____

5. What are the issues your participants face? (please check all that apply)

a. _____ anger management

b. _____ mental illness

c. _____ physical disability

d. _____ homelessness

e. _____ drug use

f. _____ alcohol abuse

g. _____ HIV/AIDS

h. _____ job readiness

i. _____ never had a job

j. _____ lost their job

k. _____ have no high school degree

l. _____ have no GED

m. _____ parents on drugs

n. _____ targets of abuse at home

o. _____ have children to support

p. _____ have a felony record

q. _____ have been a shooting victim

r. _____ have been a shooter

s. _____ have been a leader of a gang

t. _____ formal member of a gang

u. _____ hang with gangs but not formal members

v. _____ was a gang hit man/woman

6. What is your typical work schedule (outside of on-call hours)? (please provide days and hours worked)

7. How often do you respond to an on-call response? (several times a week, several times a month, about once a month, I do this but not often, not at all).

8. How do you spend your street work time? (circle your response)

8a. walk or just hang out in the neighborhood

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

8b. talk to current or potential participants on the street

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

8c. talk to businesses about contributing to events

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

8d. distribute posters and signs to stores, offices and the community

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

8e. other _____
how often?

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,

- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

9. How often do shooting-related things happen? (Circle the response):

9a. visit victim or victim's family home after a shooting

- A. several times a week,
- B. several times a month,
- C. about once a month,
- D. do it but not often,
- E. not at all

9b. go door to door to pass out flyers and talk to neighbors

- A. several times a week,
- B. several times a month,
- C. about once a month,
- D. do it but not often,
- E. not at all

9c. attend a march or prayer vigil following a shooting

- A. several times a week,
- B. several times a month,
- C. about once a month,
- D. do it but not often,
- E. not at all

9d. visit a hospital right after a shooting

- A. several times a week,
- B. several times a month,
- C. about once a month,
- D. do it but not often,
- E. not at all

9e. investigate the causes of the shooting

- A. several times a week,
- B. several times a month,
- C. about once a month,
- D. do it but not often,
- E. not at all

9f. identify hot spots for violence and document these spots

- A. several times a week,
- B. several times a month,
- C. about once a month,
- D. do it but not often,

E. not at all

9g. prevent shootings and/or violence

- A. several times a week,
- B. several times a month,
- C. about once a month,
- D. do it but not often,
- E. not at all

10a. Have you responded to shootings in other communities outside the target area?

(please check)

Yes

No

10b. If yes, how often? _____

10c. If yes, were these shootings in neighborhoods that are next to the target area?

(please check)

Yes

No

11. How frequently do you . . . ? (circle your response)

11a. talk to participants in the office

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

11b. talk to participants on the phone

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

11c. take participants to lunch, dinner or coffee

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

- 11d. make a home visit
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,
 - E. do it but not often,
 - F. not at all
- 11e. take participants to an event (bowling, sports game, etc.)
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,
 - E. do it but not often,
 - F. not at all
- 11f. participate in sports with participants, or play cards or games with participants
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,
 - E. do it but not often,
 - F. not at all
- 11g. prepare participants for job interviews
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,
 - E. do it but not often,
 - F. not at all
- 11h. take participants to job referrals or help participants fill out job applications
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,
 - E. do it but not often,
 - F. not at all
- 11i. take participants to court or talk with their lawyers
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,

- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

11j. talk with their probation or parole officers

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

11k. take participants to church events

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

11l. just hang out with participants on the street

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

11m. advocate for a participant through court testimony

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

11n. other _____
how often?

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

12. How many of your current participants *hang out* (but do not live) in your official target areas?

(please check one)

- all or almost all
- more than half
- about half
- less than half

13. How many of your current participants *live* in your official target areas? (please check one)

- all or almost all
- more than half
- about half
- less than half

14. How important are the following issues to you? (circle your answer)

14a. I do my street work only in our official target areas

- A. very important,
- B. somewhat important,
- C. not important

14b. I only have participants that live in our official target areas

- A. very important,
- B. somewhat important,
- C. not important

14c. I only have participants who hang out in our official target areas

- A. very important,
- B. somewhat important,
- C. not important

14d. I go into schools to give presentations and meet classes

- A. very important,
- B. somewhat important,
- C. not important

14e. I am around school when it lets out, to keep order

- A. very important,
- B. somewhat important,
- C. not important

14f. My caseload includes only the highest risk people in the area

- A. very important,
- B. somewhat important,
- C. not important

15. How frequently are you able to refer or connect your participants to these services or opportunities? (circle your response)

15a. a GED program

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

15b. an alternative school

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

15c. college

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

15d. drug rehab (including NA)

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

15e. alcohol /rehab (including AA)

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

15f. anger management programs

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

15g. mental health services

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

15h. job training or job readiness program

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,

- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

15i. a job interview

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

15k. HIV/AIDS testing

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

15l. pregnancy and parenthood services

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

15m. housing assistance

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

15n. food assistance or WIC

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

15o. places to get driver's licenses, social security cards or state IDs

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

15p. daycare for participants' children

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

16. Do you provide participants' parents with assistance?

(please check one)

Yes

No

17. Do you provide participants' relatives (other than parents), girlfriends or boyfriends with assistance?

(please check one)

Yes

No

18. What percentage of your time is spent?

Attending meetings %

Filling out paperwork %

Working on the Phone/In Person %

19. How often do you do these things on the job? (circle your response)

19a. **How often do you....**

provide an after-school presence

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

meet with principals or counselors

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

make presentations or talk to groups of students in school

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

19b. **How often do you.....**

attend funerals as part of the job

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

attend church events as part of the job

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

meet individually with clergy

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

19c. **How often do you.....**

get stopped or harassed by the police as a suspect

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

talk with police on the street as part of the job

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

attend a police roll call

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,

- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

meet at a police station

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

Attend a beat meeting

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

20. How satisfied are you with “CeaseFire Chicago” when it comes to training? (very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not satisfied)

20a. how prepared I was before I first went out on the job _____

20b. how prepared I am for my job now _____

20c. how frequently we have training sessions _____

20d. how useful our training is in the real world _____

20. How often do you have internal (SNUG Trinity Alliance) training meetings/events? (more than once a month, once a month, once every 6 months, less than every six months, not at all)

21. How do you document data (check all that apply):

- ___ CeaseFire provided forms
- ___ forms I created
- ___ only in the electronic database
- ___ other _____

22. How often do you communicate with your supervisor? (daily, weekly, monthly, once every 6 months, less than every six months, not at all).

Ok is there anything that we did not address in these questions that you think is important for us to know?

Appendix D

Violence Interrupter On-Site Questionnaire

1. When did you become a violence interrupter? _____
2. Do you work on a part time or full time basis? _____
3. Have you had other jobs at Trinity Alliance? _____
4. How many conflicts are you currently mediating? _____

5. Do you have any participants? (This question may not apply to violence interrupters)
____ yes
____ no

6. Did you know any of those you have mediated conflict with before you became a Violence Interrupter?
(please check)
____ Yes
____ No

7. Did you or have you ever lived in a target area?
____ Yes
____ No

8. If you have lived or currently live in the target area, how long did you live or have lived there?

9. Are any of the people you have mediated conflict with, relatives of yours (cousins, by marriage, etc.)?
(please check)
____ Yes
____ No

10. What is your typical work schedule (outside of on-call hours)? (please provide days and hours worked)

11. How often do you respond to an on-call response? (several times a week, several times a month, about once a month, I do this but not often, not at all).

12. How many hours each month do you typically work? (please check)
____ less than 10
____ 10-20
____ 20-30
____ 30-40

____ 40-50
____ more than 50

13. How do you spend your street work time? (circle your answer)

13a. walk or just hang out in the neighborhood

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

13b. talk to high-risk individuals on the street

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

13c. talk to businesses about contributing to events

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

13d. distribute posters and signs to stores, offices and the community

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

13f. other _____
how often?

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

15. How often do shooting-related things happen? (circle your answer)

15a. visit victim or victim's family home after a shooting

- A. several times a month,
- B. about once a month,
- C. do it but not often,
- E. not at all

15b. go door to door to pass out flyers and talk to neighbors

- A. several times a month,
- B. about once a month,
- C. do it but not often,
- E. not at all

15c. attend a march or prayer vigil following a shooting

- A. several times a month,
- B. about once a month,
- C. do it but not often,
- E. not at all

15d. visit a hospital right after a shooting

- A. several times a month,
- B. about once a month,
- C. do it but not often,
- E. not at all

15e. investigate the causes of the shooting

- A. several times a month,
- B. about once a month,
- C. do it but not often,
- E. not at all

15f. identify hot spots for violence and document these spots

- A. several times a month,
- B. about once a month,
- C. do it but not often,
- E. not at all

15g. prevent shootings and/or violence

- A. several times a month,
- B. about once a month,
- C. do it but not often,
- E. not at all

16. Have you responded to shootings in other communities outside the target area?

Yes

No

17. If yes how often?

18. If you have responded to shootings outside the target area, were these shootings in neighborhoods that are next to the target area?

Yes

No

19. How do you find out about a shooting incident?(please check all those that apply)

police

clergy

business owners

neighborhood residents

participant

another staff member

other _____

20. How many of your mediated conflicts occurred in your official target areas with people who **hang out (but do not live)** in your official target area?

(please check one)

all or almost all

more than half

about half

less than half

21. How many of your mediated conflicts occurred in your target areas with people who **live** in your official target areas?

(please check one)

all or almost all

more than half

about half

less than half

22. How many of your mediated conflicts occurred outside of the target area?

(please check one)

all or almost all

more than half

about half

less than half

23. How important are the following issues to you? (very important, somewhat important, not important)

23a. I do my interrupting only in our official target areas _____

23b. I interact with high risk individuals _____

23c. I go into schools to give presentations and meet classes _____

23. I attend community meetings _____

24. How often do you (circle your answer):

24a. Meet with key leaders in the community

A. more than once a month,

B. once a month,

C. less than once a month,

D. not at all

24b. Prevent retaliatory shootings

A. more than once a month,

B. once a month,

C. less than once a month,

D. not at all

24c. Meet with high risk individuals

A. more than once a month,

B. once a month,

C. less than once a month,

D. not at all

24d. Formulate action plans with gang mediation task force

A. more than once a month,

B. once a month,

C. less than once a month,

D. not at all

24e. attend gang mediation meetings

A. more than once a month,

B. once a month,

C. less than once a month,

D. not at all

24f. distribute public educational materials in the target area

A. more than once a month,

B. once a month,

C. less than once a month,

D. not at all

25. How frequently are you able to refer or connect those who you mediate conflict with to an outreach worker?

- A. more than once a month,
- B. once a month,
- C. less than once a month,
- D. not at all

26. Has anyone been injured after a conflict was mediated by you?

_____ yes, or no _____

28. Has anyone been injured while you were in the process of mediating a conflict?

_____ yes, or no _____

29. Do you interact with the parents of those who you mediate conflict with?

(please check one)

- _____ Yes, always
- _____ Yes, sometimes
- _____ No, never

30. What percentage of your time is spent?

| | |
|-----------------------|---------|
| Attending meetings | _____ % |
| Filling out paperwork | _____ % |
| Mediating conflict | _____ % |

31. How often do you do these things on the job? (circle your response).

31a. **How often do you....**

provide an after-school presence

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

meet with principals or counselors

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

make presentations or talk to groups of students in school

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,

- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

19b. How often do you.....

attend funerals as part of the job

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

attend church events as part of the job

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

meet individually with clergy

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

19c. How often do you.....

get stopped or harassed by the police as a suspect

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

talk with police on the street as part of the job

- A. everyday,
- B. several times a week,
- C. several times a month,
- D. about once a month,
- E. do it but not often,
- F. not at all

- attend a police roll call
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,
 - E. do it but not often,
 - F. not at all

- meet at a police station
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,
 - E. do it but not often,
 - F. not at all

- Attend a beat meeting
- A. everyday,
 - B. several times a week,
 - C. several times a month,
 - D. about once a month,
 - E. do it but not often,
 - F. not at all

32. Please list the community organizations of the community leaders with which you meet?

33. How satisfied are you with “CeaseFire Chicago” when it comes to training? (very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not satisfied)

33a. how prepared I was before I first went out on the job _____

33b. how prepared I am for my job now _____

33c. how frequently we have training sessions _____

33d. how useful our training is in the real world _____

34. How often do you have internal (SNUG Trinity Alliance) training meetings/events? (more than once a month, once a month, once every 6 months, less than every six months, not at all)

35. How do you document data (check all that apply):

- CeaseFire provided forms
- forms that I created
- only in the electronic database
- other _____

Ok is there anything that we did not address in these questions that you think is important for us to know?

Appendix E

Target Area On-Site Questionnaire

Target Area

- Who determined the target area?
- How was it determined?
- Specifically – how were the boundaries determined?
- Is there work done outside the target area?

Describe the target area:

- Crime level
- Specific intersections
- Housing projects
- Housing – description
- Open-air drug markets
- Nighttime description
- Types of crime in specific blocks, corners, parks, etc
- Geographic space
- Types of disputes – within neighborhoods? With other neighborhoods
- Gang activity, membership
- Time of day illegal activity occurs
- Vacant housing rate
- Households on public assistance
- Female headed households
- Border areas
- Neighborhood nicknames
- History?
- Violence – how occur, over what, disputes, drugs, gangs, other?
- Businesses, retail, bars,
- Length of blocks
- Social service organizations
- Schools
- Medical facilities - hospitals

Map of target area

SNUG physical space

- SNUG storefront
- Who determined this space?
- Why was it decided?
- What are the business hours – is it always open during these hours, is there always someone in there or is there a phone number to reach someone at?
- How develop hours of operation? Have they changed?
- What is done in the storefront (meet with clients, media, community meetings, etc)

Appendix F

Control Group Data

Data Tables for Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse

Average Number of Violent Crimes for Buffalo 2006-12, Pre- and Post-SNUG

| <u>Measure</u> | <u>F/A related</u> | <u>Non F/A</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| Overall Homicide | 3.40 | 0.91 | 4.31 |
| Pre-SNUG | 3.68 | 1.07 | 4.75 |
| Post-SNUG | 2.68 | 0.50 | 3.18 |
| D (Homicide) | -1.00 | -0.57 | -1.57 |
| Overall Rape | 0.51 | 12.41 | 12.92 |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.59 | 13.07 | 13.66 |
| Post-SNUG | 0.32 | 10.72 | 11.04 |
| D (Rape) | -2.35 | -2.35 | -4.70 |
| Overall Robbery | 50.05 | 78.24 | 128.29 |
| Pre-SNUG | 51.04 | 80.41 | 131.45 |
| Post-SNUG | 47.45 | 72.73 | 120.18 |
| D (Robbery) | -3.59 | -7.68 | -11.27 |
| Overall Aggravated Assault | 40.42 | 12.30 | 52.72 |
| Pre-SNUG | 42.36 | 121.45 | 163.81 |
| Post-SNUG | 35.50 | 102.68 | 138.18 |
| D (Agg. Assault) | -6.86 | -18.77 | -25.63 |

T-Scores for Pre- and Post-SNUG Observations (Buffalo)

| | <u>Pre</u> | <u>Post</u> | <u>T</u> <u>Value</u> |
|----------------------------------|------------|-------------|--------------------------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 1.07 | 0.5 | 2.19* |
| SD | 1.11 | 0.74 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 3.68 | 2.68 | 1.79 |
| SD | 2.26 | 2.03 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Rape w/o Firearm (mean) | 13.07 | 10.72 | 2.16* |
| SD | 4.25 | 4.31 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Rape with Firearm (mean) | 0.59 | 0.32 | 1.46 |
| SD | 0.78 | 0.57 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 80.41 | 72.73 | 1.97 |
| SD | 15.41 | 14.96 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 51.04 | 47.45 | 1.00 |
| SD | 14.08 | 14 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 121.45 | 102.68 | 2.78* |
| SD | 28.83 | 19.12 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault with Firearm (mean) | 42.36 | 35.5 | 2.25* |
| SD | 12.82 | 9.44 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Shooting Incidents | 18.98 | 18.91 | 0.04 |
| SD | 7.02 | 7.09 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Shooting Victims | 21.38 | 21.77 | -0.18 |
| SD | 8.19 | 9.24 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Individuals Killed | 3.68 | 2.68 | 1.79 |
| SD | 2.26 | 2.03 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Guns Recovered | 59.09 | 52.86 | 0.83 |
| SD | 33.31 | 16.68 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |

(* denotes significant difference at $p < .05$)

T-Scores for Actual versus Projected Violent Incidents (Buffalo)

| | <u>Actual</u> | <u>Projected</u> | <u>T</u> <u>Value</u> |
|----------------------------------|---------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 0.5 | 0.1 | 2.43* |
| SD | 0.74 | 0.15 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 2.68 | 0.35 | 5.14* |
| SD | 2.03 | 0.44 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Rape w/o Firearm (mean) | 10.72 | 2.28 | 8.70 |
| SD | 4.31 | 1.08 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Rape with Firearm (mean) | 0.32 | 0 | 0.00 |
| SD | 0.57 | 0 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 72.73 | 10.44 | 18.85* |
| SD | 14.96 | 2.36 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 47.45 | 3.7 | 14.26* |
| SD | 14 | 1.24 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 102.68 | 27.58 | 17.34* |
| SD | 19.12 | 5.32 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault with Firearm (mean) | 35.5 | 4.66 | 14.66* |
| SD | 9.44 | 1.94 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Shooting Incidents | 18.91 | 17.92 | 0.53 |
| SD | 7.09 | 4.9 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Shooting Victims | 21.77 | 20.93 | 0.36 |
| SD | 9.24 | 5.41 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Individuals Killed | 2.68 | 3.46 | -1.42 |
| SD | 2.03 | 1.49 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Guns Recovered | 52.86 | 61.03 | -1.49 |
| SD | 16.68 | 18.74 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |

(* denotes significant difference at $p < .05$)

Violent Crimes for Rochester 2006-12, Pre- and Post-SNUG

| <u>Measure</u> | <u>F/A related</u> | <u>Non F/A</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------|
| Overall Homicide | 2.36 | 1.00 | 3.36 |
| Pre-SNUG | 2.70 | 0.93 | 3.63 |
| Post-SNUG | 1.50 | 1.18 | 2.68 |
| D (Homicide) | -1.20 | 0.25 | -0.95 |
| Overall Rape | 0.37 | 8.09 | 8.46 |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.34 | 8.18 | 8.52 |
| Post-SNUG | 0.46 | 7.86 | 8.32 |
| D (Rape) | 0.12 | -0.32 | -0.20 |
| Overall Robbery | 36.90 | 42.64 | 79.54 |
| Pre-SNUG | 40.64 | 45.01 | 85.65 |
| Post-SNUG | 27.36 | 36.59 | 63.95 |
| D (Robbery) | -13.28 | -8.42 | 21.70 |
| Overall Aggravated Assault | 26.41 | 69.60 | 96.01 |
| Pre-SNUG | 28.55 | 68.38 | 96.93 |
| Post-SNUG | 20.95 | 72.73 | 93.68 |
| D (Agg. Assault) | -7.60 | 4.35 | -3.25 |

T-Scores for Pre- and Post-SNUG Observations (Rochester)

| | <u>Pre</u> | <u>Post</u> | <u>T</u> <u>Value</u> |
|----------------------------------|------------|-------------|--------------------------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 0.93 | 1.18 | -0.82 |
| SD | 0.97 | 1.65 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 2.7 | 1.5 | 2.77* |
| SD | 1.76 | 1.54 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Rape w/o Firearm (mean) | 8.18 | 7.86 | 0.36 |
| SD | 3.37 | 3.8 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Rape with Firearm (mean) | 0.34 | 0.46 | -0.78 |
| SD | 0.58 | 0.67 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 45.01 | 36.59 | 3.19* |
| SD | 11.28 | 7.43 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 40.64 | 27.36 | 3.85* |
| SD | 14.51 | 10.58 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 68.38 | 72.73 | -1.00 |
| SD | 18.15 | 13.94 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault with Firearm (mean) | 28.55 | 20.95 | 2.96* |
| SD | 11.26 | 6.08 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Shooting Incidents | 14.79 | 11.18 | 2.22* |
| SD | 6.82 | 5.12 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Shooting Victims | 16.71 | 12.68 | 2.30* |
| SD | 7.28 | 5.75 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Individuals Killed | 2.7 | 1.5 | 2.77* |
| SD | 1.76 | 1.54 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Guns Recovered | 40.68 | 56.96 | -2.20* |
| SD | 29.17 | 28.65 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |

(* denotes significant difference at $p < .05$)

T-Scores for Actual and Projected Violent Incidents
(Rochester)

| | <u>Actual</u> | <u>Projected</u> | <u>T</u> <u>Value</u> |
|----------------------------------|---------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| | | | - |
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 1.18 | 3.39 | 5.32* |
| SD | 1.65 | 0.95 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| | | | - |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 1.5 | 2.47 | 2.56* |
| SD | 1.54 | 0.8 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Rape w/o Firearm (mean) | 7.86 | 7.94 | -0.09 |
| SD | 3.8 | 1.6 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Rape with Firearm (mean) | 0.46 | 0.3 | 0.00 |
| SD | 0.67 | 0.43 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 36.59 | 37.65 | -0.35 |
| SD | 7.43 | 11.8 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 27.36 | 28.59 | -0.40 |
| SD | 10.58 | 9.47 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| | | | - |
| Agg. Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 72.73 | 81.75 | 2.18* |
| SD | 13.94 | 12.83 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| | | | - |
| Agg. Assault with Firearm (mean) | 20.95 | 26.88 | 2.97* |
| SD | 6.08 | 6.85 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| | | | - |
| Shooting Incidents | 11.18 | 14.42 | 2.36* |
| SD | 5.12 | 3.67 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Shooting Victims | 12.68 | 15.47 | -1.84 |
| SD | 5.75 | 3.93 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| | | | - |
| Individuals Killed | 1.5 | 2.47 | 2.56* |
| SD | 1.54 | 0.8 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |

| | | | |
|-----------------|-------|-------|------|
| Guns Recovered | 56.96 | 45.07 | 1.74 |
| SD | 28.65 | 12.56 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |

(* denotes *significant* difference at $p < .05$)

Violent Crimes for Syracuse 2006-12, Pre- and Post-SNUG

| <u>Measure</u> | <u>F/A related</u> | <u>Non F/A</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------|
| Overall Homicide | 0.78 | 0.55 | 1.33 |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.86 | 0.61 | 1.47 |
| Post-SNUG | 0.59 | 0.41 | 1.00 |
| D (Homicide) | -0.27 | -0.20 | -0.47 |
| Overall Rape | 0.12 | 5.56 | 5.68 |
| Pre-SNUG | 0.16 | 5.57 | 5.73 |
| Post-SNUG | 0 | 5.54 | 5.54 |
| D (Rape) | -0.16 | -0.03 | -0.19 |
| Overall Robbery | 10.87 | 24.64 | 35.51 |
| Pre-SNUG | 11.04 | 25.68 | 36.72 |
| Post-SNUG | 10.46 | 22.00 | 32.46 |
| D (Robbery) | -0.58 | -3.68 | -4.26 |
| Overall Aggravated Assault | 12.58 | 58.91 | 71.49 |
| Pre-SNUG | 12.61 | 59.70 | 72.31 |
| Post-SNUG | 12.50 | 56.91 | 69.41 |
| D (Agg. Assault) | -0.11 | -2.79 | -2.90 |

T-Scores for Pre- and Post-SNUG Observations (Syracuse)

| | <u>Pre</u> | <u>Post</u> | <u>T</u> <u>Value</u> |
|----------------------------------|------------|-------------|--------------------------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 0.61 | 0.41 | 1.10 |
| SD | 0.78 | 0.5 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 0.86 | 0.59 | 1.07 |
| SD | 0.94 | 1.1 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Rape w/o Firearm (mean) | 5.57 | 5.54 | 0.05 |
| SD | 2.35 | 2.09 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Rape with Firearm (mean) | 0.16 | 0 | 1.76 |
| SD | 0.42 | 0 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 25.68 | 22 | 2.24* |
| SD | 6.86 | 5.29 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 11.04 | 10.46 | 0.52 |
| SD | 4.62 | 3.81 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 59.7 | 56.91 | 0.80 |
| SD | 14.36 | 11.9 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault with Firearm (mean) | 12.61 | 12.5 | 0.09 |
| SD | 4.66 | 5.6 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Shooting Incidents | 6.94 | 6.91 | 0.04 |
| SD | 3.49 | 2.72 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Shooting Victims | 7.98 | 8.36 | -0.38 |
| SD | 4.03 | 3.77 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Individuals Killed | 0.86 | 0.59 | 1.07 |
| SD | 0.94 | 1.1 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |
| Guns Recovered | 24.57 | 14 | 2.93* |
| SD | 14.24 | 13.89 | |
| N. Observations | 56 | 22 | |

(* denotes significant difference at $p < .05$)

T-Scores for Actual and Projected Violent Incidents (Syracuse)

| | <u>Actual</u> | <u>Projected</u> | <u>T</u> <u>Value</u> |
|----------------------------------|---------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| Murder w/o Firearm (mean) | 0.41 | 0.61 | -1.52 |
| SD | 0.5 | 0.34 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Murder w. Firearm (mean) | 0.59 | 0.89 | -1.20 |
| SD | 1.1 | 0.31 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Rape w/o Firearm (mean) | 5.54 | 5.65 | -0.19 |
| SD | 2.09 | 1.72 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| | | | - |
| Rape with Firearm (mean) | 0 | 0.17 | 4.10* |
| SD | 0 | 0.19 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Robbery w/o Firearm (mean) | 22 | 21.92 | 0.05 |
| SD | 5.29 | 5.58 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Robbery with Firearm (mean) | 10.46 | 9.46 | 1.01 |
| SD | 3.81 | 2.44 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault w/o Firearm (mean) | 56.91 | 53.89 | 0.79 |
| SD | 11.9 | 12.78 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Agg. Assault with Firearm (mean) | 12.5 | 12.05 | 0.31 |
| SD | 5.6 | 3.45 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Shooting Incidents | 6.91 | 6.51 | 0.56 |
| SD | 2.72 | 1.84 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Shooting Victims | 8.36 | 7.44 | 0.97 |
| SD | 3.77 | 2.19 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| Individuals Killed | 0.59 | 0.89 | -1.20 |
| SD | 1.1 | 0.32 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |
| | | | - |
| Guns Recovered | 14 | 24.68 | 3.12* |
| SD | 13.89 | 7.27 | |
| N. Observations | 22 | 22 | |

(* denotes significant difference at $p < .05$)

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