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Securely Deleting Files

SANS Tip of the Day - Tue, 01/05/2016 - 00:00
When you delete a file, that file is actually still on your computer. The only way you can truly and securely remove a file is by wiping it or using some type of secure deletion.

Social Networks – A Bonanza for Cybercriminals

Malware Alerts - Tue, 12/29/2015 - 05:46

What do you think when you receive yet another spam or phishing message on your mobile phone? Most likely it is: “Who are these people, and how on earth did they get my phone number?” Initially, suspicion usually falls on an unscrupulous employee at some organization that you gave your number to. However, it’s not uncommon for spammers and cybercriminals to use a database harvested from a social network using special software, rather than a “leaked” database of cellphone subscribers.

Information security experts, including us, have for years reiterated: cybercriminals can make use of any information that you publish about yourself on a social network. However, a huge amount of users still continue to share news and a plethora of personal information with their virtual friends as well as incidental onlookers. This may lead to unpleasant and, at times, unforeseen consequences. To show that this isn’t just scaremongering, let me offer an example from the recent activities of our cybercrime investigation team.

A run-of-the-mill cybercrime

This autumn, we helped law enforcement agencies halt the activities of a small Russian cybercriminal gang that specialized in distributing Android malware and stealing money from online banking accounts. The group’s plan of action was fairly straightforward: they used a database of cellphone numbers they already had to send short messages containing a link to a banking Trojan. If infected successfully, the mobile device became part of a botnet, and the Trojan began to search for information about any banking services used by the victim, collecting any data required to access them. The cybercriminals then had the relatively simple task of transferring the victim’s money to their own accounts.

It is interesting to note that none of the cybercriminals were professional programmers. When people talk about hackers and stealing money, an image springs to mind of some corrupt programmer who writes malicious code and then uses it to infect the devices of unwitting users. This time, however, we are not talking about professionals with the relevant education and experience. Instead, we assume they spent just enough time on public hacking forums to garner the information and tools required to commit cybercrimes.

One of the tools they employed is of particular interest: it is a parser program that harvests mobile phone numbers from public profiles on the popular Russian social network VKontakte. With the help of this tool, the cybercriminals have created a database of cellphone numbers that was later used to send malicious messages. As far as we know, the social network was the sole source of information from which the cybercriminals harvested their data.

A post on a popular Russian hacker forum advertising an app to harvest the phone numbers of social network users

Russian cybercriminal forums (especially the open forums frequented by amateur fraudsters) have loads of adverts offering this type of software for sale or rent. It is capable of collecting and structuring all valuable information about users, including their first and last names, all published contact data and profile settings – not just mobile phone numbers. The availability of this information offers cybercriminals plenty of opportunities for fraud. The most obvious ways the gathered data can be used are: sending spam (including both advertising and malicious spam), stealing money through premium SMS services, and creating fake SIM cards.

In less than a year the cybercriminals have managed to steal an estimated 600,000 RUR (approximately $8,500). This is a relatively small amount compared to the millions stolen by larger, more advanced cybercriminal groups. However, in this case it is not the amount of money stolen that defines the scope of the problem, but rather the number of similar non-professional cybercriminal groups that are conducting the same sort of activity. Judging by the user complaints that get posted on the support forums of online banks, dozens of these criminal groups appear to be operating.

Beyond Russia

The fact that these types of fraudulent activities mostly take place in Russia and neighboring countries does not mean there is nothing to fear for people living in other countries.

For instance, the early banking Trojans for PCs and mobile devices mostly targeted users living in Russia. However, with time the Russian-language cybercriminals behind those Trojans either radically changed their target “audience” and switched to residents of other countries, or expanded it by creating versions that targeted the residents of other countries.

The criminal group we are looking at used an application that collected the personal information of users from just one social network – VKontakte. However, there are offers on hacking forums for similar tools designed to collect data from other social networks, including Facebook and Instagram. So, it is quite possible that similar schemes exploiting data collected from public sources are already emerging in countries beyond the former Soviet Union, or are likely to emerge in the near future.

An advert posted on a popular Russian public hacking forum offering a parser program designed to harvest users’ mobile phone numbers and other information from Instagram

The countries at most risk include those where pre-paid phone contracts are prevalent and various SMS services are popular, including those that allow bank card operations via SMS.

What to do?

In summary, we would like once again to urge users to publish as little information about themselves in social networks as possible. In particular, do not publish your mobile phone number, or remove it if you already have. This will not completely eliminate the problem of cybercriminals harvesting users’ personal information from social networks, but at least it prevents the easiest ways of stealing your money.

If you or your family and friends use mobile banking services, you should also apply these basic security measures:

  • Block installation of apps from third-party sources on the Android device you use for mobile banking;
  • Set withdrawal limits for your bank account;
  • Restrict or disable the sending of text messages to premium-rate numbers;
  • Use a reliable security solution capable of protecting your device from infections.

If you should still fall victim to an attack and your money is stolen, contact the appropriate law enforcement agencies. It is important you do this, because we are seeing an ominous trend: the broad availability of various tools, including malicious ones, and the perceived anonymity of cybercrime create a false sense of security in cybercriminals, which is only exacerbated by the passive attitude of the victims. This encourages an increasing number of people to start acting as cybercriminals in the hope of easy gains. The more cybercriminals that are arrested for these illegal activities, the more obvious it will be that cybercrime doesn’t pay and those contemplating it will be less likely to start committing crimes on the web. This will help make the Web a safer place.

Shopping Online

SANS Tip of the Day - Mon, 12/28/2015 - 00:00
When shopping online, always use your credit cards instead of a debit card. If any fraud happens, it is far easier to recover your money from a credit card transaction. Gift cards and one-time-use credit card numbers are even more secure.

Tis the season for shipping and phishing

Malware Alerts - Wed, 12/23/2015 - 05:53

On the eve of major holidays such as Christmas and New Year, mail and delivery services face a dramatic increase in the amount of shipments they have to handle. People are buying far more goods online than usual, looking for bargains in the sales, and sending gifts by mail – both nationally and internationally – to friends and relatives. To ease their customers’ nerves, delivery services send email notifications and provide shipment tracking systems. However, this type of communication also creates the ideal conditions for cybercriminals to send phishing messages in the name of major delivery services, and we end up with an increase in the number of these messages.

The fraudsters have a clear aim: to trick unwitting users into downloading a malicious program or entering their confidential data on a phishing site. For example, one scam message detected by Kaspersky Lab asked the user to fill in and sign a delivery form in order to receive a shipment. The message had a DOC file attached to it containing the exploit, which allowed the cybercriminal to, among other things, gain remote access to the infected computer.

Phishing message containing

In another scam message the fraudsters write that the shipment is already at a DHL office, but the courier cannot deliver it because the delivery address is unclear. The recipient is asked to follow a link within 48 hours and enter the shipment number on the tracking page; otherwise, the shipment will be returned to the sender.

A closer inspection reveals that none of the links in the message lead to the DHL site; instead they all point to the same URL packed with the help of a URL shortening service. Another typical fraudster trick is also used in the email – the victim is warned there is a limited amount of time to react (in this case, 48 hours). If the user fails to follow the link in time, the shipment will be returned to the sender. The plan is simple – distract users with warnings about the urgency of doing something quickly rather than giving them time to think things through logically.

If unwitting users follow the link, they are taken to a specially crafted site in the corporate style of DHL, and are prompted to type in their login credentials to enter the shipment tracking system.

The data entered on sites like this is certain to end up in the hands of cybercriminals. The user will receive a message such as “Your account has been successfully updated”, and will be taken to the official DHL site, which will convince the victim that the operation was legitimate.

A similar situation exists around FedEx, another large delivery service provider. Kaspersky Lab has detected multiple phishing messages sent in the name of this company.

A fraudulent message sent in the name of FedEx

There’s nothing new about this scheme – the victim enters account credentials on a crafted site in order to view information about a shipment.

Phishing site masquerading as the FedEx site

The fact that this site is fraudulent and has nothing to do with FedEx is clear from the URL in the browser address bar.

The conclusion that can be made from the examples given above is that you shouldn’t be too trusting or inattentive while you are online. Never follow links in email messages; it’s safer if you manually type the URL of the required site in your browser address bar. Whenever a page prompts you to enter confidential data, always check the URL in the address bar first. If anything looks suspicious in the URL or in the website design, think twice before entering any personal data.

Last but not least, always keep your security software up to date; it should also include an anti-phishing tool that will help you keep your data confidential, and your money safe. That way, you will be in a good mood for the holidays.

You can’t be invulnerable, but you can be well protected

Malware Alerts - Wed, 12/23/2015 - 04:28

Software vulnerabilities are one of those problems that potentially affect all users. A vulnerability is a fault in a program’s implementation that can be used by attackers to gain unauthorized access to data, inject malicious code or put a system out of operation. In most cases, vulnerabilities arise from a lack of attention to fine details at the design stage rather than programming errors. Sometimes a system can seem virtually invulnerable at the design stage, but then, at some point, a new technology arises and hackers prove that the system can be successfully attacked. A notable example is DES – a symmetric-key encryption algorithm developed in 1975, which was considered bulletproof at the time. However, in 1990 it was successfully broken in 39 days using an enormous computer network. A supercomputer built in 1998 succeeded in breaking DES in less than three days.

Continually testing popular software to identify vulnerabilities and releasing patches to close any vulnerabilities found is part of a program’s normal lifecycle. The more sophisticated and popular the program the higher the chances of vulnerabilities being found in it.

Searching for vulnerabilities

Most developers try to close any vulnerabilities found in their products in a timely manner. They analyze their software independently or with the help of external experts. However, third-party researchers also hunt for vulnerabilities. Some do this to improve the overall level of security online. Others are paid to search for vulnerabilities. Still others prefer to sell information on any vulnerabilities they discover on the black market.

They can do this because information on new vulnerabilities is valuable for cybercriminals. If a researcher finds a flaw in a system and proves that it can be exploited in practice (that is, if he writes an exploit), he can make tens of thousands of dollars on the black market. There is an entire sector of the cybercriminal underworld that specializes in finding and selling vulnerabilities.

Luckily, this business does not operate on a mass scale. One reason for this is that not all vulnerabilities can be exploited in the real world. A combination of different conditions is often needed to be able to do real harm and the chances of these combinations arising are not very high. A second reason is that it takes a highly skilled programmer to write an effective exploit, and there are not many of them around.

One more option for making money on vulnerabilities is to sell them to third-party companies that, at first glance, seem to have nothing to do with crime. This is what some researchers do. However, these companies may be involved in creating spyware for governments or special services, so the vulnerabilities will still be used to illegitimately manipulate information systems. Moreover, it turns out that the security of such companies is not always as good as it ought to be, so occasionally external parties are able to gain access to their knowledge, with dire consequences.

Idealists, who search for vulnerabilities for the sake of universal security, face a dilemma. On the one hand, the later they publicly announce their discovery, the more time the developers have to fix the problem. On the other, the earlier they publish the information the sooner users will learn about the danger posed by the vulnerability. In theory, cybercriminals might also discover the vulnerability and immediately take advantage of it. It should also be kept in mind that disclosing the information will inevitably result in attempts to abuse the newly discovered vulnerability. Sometimes, attacks can start within an hour of making information about a vulnerability public. This is what happened, for example, after the Shellshock disclosure.

What are the dangers of vulnerabilities?

An exploit is a program or code fragment that uses vulnerabilities to attack a computing system. In some cases, an exploit is used on a mass scale – that is, cybercriminals try to use it to attack a broad range of systems. In such cases, vulnerabilities in popular software (such as the Adobe Flash Player) are exploited to deliver payloads to user machines. This is commonly done via so-called drive-by attacks that attempt to download malicious code to the computers of all users visiting an infected website.

Sometimes cybercriminals develop targeted attacks. They analyze the software used by a particular company and write targeted exploits for those specific programs. One such highly tailored attack was carried out as part of the Duqu 2.0 APT.

The ‘useful’ life of exploits can vary. Some are used for years, even though developers release patches that close the relevant vulnerabilities. This is because some users are in no hurry to install those patches.

According to Kaspersky Lab data, today cybercriminals extensively use exploits for the vulnerabilities listed below:

Software product Vulnerability Adobe Flash Player

CVE-2015-0310 CVE-2015-0311 CVE-2015-0313 CVE-2015-0336 CVE-2015-0359 CVE-2015-3090 CVE-2015-3104 CVE-2015-3105 CVE-2015-3113 CVE-2015-5119 CVE-2015-5122 CVE-2015-5560 CVE-2015-7645 Microsoft Internet Explorer

CVE-2014-6332 CVE-2015-2419 Microsoft Office CVE-2012-0158 Microsoft Windows CVE-2015-1701

It is easy to see from CVE identifiers that most of these vulnerabilities were discovered this year, but there are also some that date back to 2014 and even 2012. The fact that these vulnerabilities are still being exploited means that many users have not bothered to update the relevant software.

Defending against exploits

The main recommendations are really quite simple: remember to update your software regularly and do not use outdated software. The latter piece of advice can be hard to follow: it is sometimes difficult to find a new alternative to a familiar and convenient program that is outdated. While developers do not track vulnerabilities in obsolete software or release patches for them, cybercriminals continue to watch for an opportunity to exploit. The upshot is that you need additional protection to continue using such software.

There are dedicated tools designed to scan computers for known vulnerabilities and, if detected, automatically install updates. These tools include, for example, Kaspersky Systems Management components Vulnerability Assessment and Patch Management. Kaspersky Lab is also developing a similar solution for home users called Kaspersky Software Updater. The utility is currently in beta testing.

Kaspersky Lab uses a vulnerability naming system that is different from the codes used in the CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) system. While an identifier in CVE always corresponds to one vulnerability, a code in our system can match a group of vulnerabilities (in most cases, vulnerabilities closed with one patch or vulnerabilities in one version of a program) – sometimes dozens of vulnerabilities are covered by one code (depending on the patches released by software vendors). As a result, the 20 KLA vulnerabilities listed below actually match 375 CVE vulnerabilities.

According to Kaspersky Security Network statistics, vulnerability scanning most often identifies the following sets of vulnerabilities on our users’ machines:

KLA Number of users Date of discovery Description 1 KLA10680 308219 2015-10-14 Code execution vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player 2 KLA10036 256383 2014-07-08 Multiple vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash and Adobe AIR 3 KLA10492 228454 2013-10-16 Multiple vulnerabilities in Oracle products 4 KLA10670 182972 2015-09-21 Multiple vulnerabilities in Adobe products 5 KLA10650 176435 2015-08-11 Multiple vulnerabilities in Adobe products 6 KLA10653 150987 2015-05-18 Code execution vulnerability in QuickTime 7 KLA10682 150960 2015-10-13 Multiple vulnerabilities in Adobe Acrobat and Reader 8 KLA10628 138039 2015-07-14 Multiple vulnerabilities in Adobe Acrobat 9 KLA10651 135291 2015-08-17 Code injection vulnerability in VLC Media Player 10 KLA10655 134824 2015-09-01 Multiple vulnerabilities in Google Chrome 11 KLA10672 108722 2015-09-22 Multiple vulnerabilities in Mozilla Firefox 12 KLA10654 107661 2015-08-27 Multiple vulnerabilities in Mozilla Firefox 13 KLA10691 103880 2015-11-10 Multiple vulnerabilities in Google Chrome 14 KLA10344 100311 2009-11-05 Multiple vulnerabilities in Sun Java SE 15 KLA10669 92345 2015-09-16 Multiple vulnerabilities in Apple iTunes 16 KLA10684 91013 2015-10-22 Code execution vulnerability in Flash plugin for Google Chrome 17 KLA10663 87898 2015-09-08 Code execution vulnerability in Adobe Shockwave Player 18 KLA10690 87478 2015-11-10 Multiple vulnerabilities in Adobe products 19 KLA10569 86657 2015-04-28 Vulnerability in OpenOffice 20 KLA10671 84380 2015-09-21 Flash Player update for Google Chrome

Vulnerability sets KLA10680 and KLA10650 are particularly notable. The former includes, among others, CVE-2015-7645, the latter — CVE-2015-5560. These vulnerabilities are also present in the first table above, which lists the most commonly exploited software flaws.

Naturally, security products also include technologies designed to block attempts to exploit vulnerabilities. They closely track application behavior (particularly that of applications known to be prone to vulnerabilities), identify and block suspicious activity.

How is the security industry doing?

Vulnerabilities can be found in security solutions, just like in any other software products. The only difference is that security vendors have a much greater responsibility, because security software is essentially the last line of defense. That is why Internet security companies are especially careful and thorough when it comes to checking products for vulnerabilities.

We cannot speak for the industry as a whole, so we are going to use the only example we are familiar with – that is, our own. We keep the security of our products in mind at all stages of development, from defining the attack surface at the design stage to special testing procedures aimed at identifying possible vulnerabilities in products that are nearly ready to be released. In the process of development, R&D staff not only create the necessary product functionality but also make certain that the new features cannot be used to compromise the program’s integrity.

We believe that this approach is more effective than a dedicated team responsible for tracking vulnerabilities in all of the company’s products. Which is not to say that we do not have such a team. A group of security architects regularly checks newly developed code for vulnerabilities using fuzz testing (so-called fuzzing) and penetration testing.

Fuzzing essentially means checking a program for unintended operations by inputting incorrect or random data. In other words, products are tested on abnormal or distorted data sets.

Penetration testing is carried out both internally and by external experts. It should be noted at this point, however, that in our experience, few external experts are sufficiently knowledgeable about the way security products work and can therefore effectively search for vulnerabilities. Additionally, Kaspersky Lab has a special team that specializes in searching third-party code for vulnerabilities (its services are used, among others, by banks seeking to verify the security of their applications). Even though third-party applications are the team’s top priority, these experts also analyze code developed in-house.

We also value the opinions of independent researchers. Any person who has found a vulnerability in our technologies can report it using a special communication channel that can be found here. Kaspersky Lab experts will thoroughly analyze all data coming via the channel. The procedure is as follows: first, our analysts confirm that there really is a vulnerability. After confirming this, we contact the independent researcher and agree on a time when this information will be made public. Meanwhile, the data is provided to the R&D team responsible for developing the technology; we also check whether the vulnerability is present in any other Kaspersky Lab products. It should be noted that sometimes independent researchers do draw our attention to serious issues. We really appreciate this!

A few practical recommendations

Since only software developers can significantly improve the situation, here are some recommendations:

  • As we have said many times before, update your software. If the developer provides an update for its product, the chances are that it does so for a good reason.
  • Do not disable automatic updates. True, this can be a bit of a nuisance if you have lots of programs, but security is what really counts.
  • Remove the programs you no longer use. There is no reason for this dead weight to remain on your hard drive. One day such programs could do you a grave disservice.
  • Do not use obsolete software. If it is really such a handy, useful program, there must be other similar programs available. True, it can be hard to abandon a familiar interface, but it is better to spend a few days getting used to a new one than using vulnerable software.
  • Regularly scan your computer for known vulnerabilities using dedicated utilities.

Securely Disposing Mobile Devices

SANS Tip of the Day - Wed, 12/23/2015 - 00:00
Do you plan on giving away or selling one of your older mobile devices? Make sure you wipe or reset your device before disposing of it. If you don't, the next person who owns it will have access to all of your accounts and personal information.

Don't Trust Links Sent in Email Messages

SANS Tip of the Day - Fri, 12/18/2015 - 00:00
A common method cyber criminals use to hack into people's computers is to send them emails with malicious links. People are tricked into opening these links because they appear to come from someone or something they know and trust. If you click on a link, you may be taken to a site that attempts to harvest your information or tries to hack into your computer. Only click on links that you were expecting. Not sure about an email? Call the person to confirm they sent it.

Patch and Update

SANS Tip of the Day - Thu, 12/17/2015 - 00:00
One of the most effective ways you can protect your computer at home is to make sure both the operating system and your applications are patched and updated. Enable automatic updating whenever possible.

Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2015. Overall statistics for 2015

Malware Alerts - Tue, 12/15/2015 - 06:46

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  1. Top security stories
  2. Evolution of cyber threats in the corporate sector
  3. Overall statistics for 2015
  4. Predictions 2016
The year in figures
  • In 2015, there were 1,966,324 registered notifications about attempted malware infections that aimed to steal money via online access to bank accounts.
  • Ransomware programs were detected on 753,684 computers of unique users; 179,209 computers were targeted by encryption ransomware.
  • Kaspersky Lab’s web antivirus detected 121,262,075 unique malicious objects: scripts, exploits, executable files, etc.
  • Kaspersky Lab solutions repelled 798,113,087 attacks launched from online resources located all over the world.
  • 34.2% of user computers were subjected to at least one web attack over the year.
  • To carry out their attacks, cybercriminals used 6,563,145 unique hosts.
  • 24% of web attacks neutralized by Kaspersky Lab products were carried out using malicious web resources located in the US.
  • Kaspersky Lab’s antivirus solutions detected a total of 4,000,000 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.
Vulnerable applications used in cyberattacks

In 2015, we saw the use of new techniques for masking exploits, shellcodes and payloads to make detecting infections and analyzing malicious code more difficult. Specifically, cybercriminals:

The detection of two families of critical vulnerabilities for Android was one of the more remarkable events of the year. Exploiting Stagefright vulnerabilities enabled an attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code on a device by sending a specially crafted MMS to the victim’s number. Exploiting Stagefright 2 pursued the same purpose, but this time using a specially crafted media file.

In 2015, there were almost 2M attempts to steal money via online access to bank accounts #KLReport #banking


Exploits for Adobe Flash Player were popular among malware writers in 2015. This can be explained by the fact that a large number of vulnerabilities were identified in the product throughout the year. In addition, cybercriminals used the information about unknown Flash Player vulnerabilities that became public as a result of the Hacking Team data breach.

When new Adobe Flash Player vulnerabilities were discovered, developers of various exploit packs were quick to respond by adding new exploits to their products. Here is the ‘devil’s dozen’ of Adobe Flash Player vulnerabilities that gained popularity among cybercriminals and were added to common exploit packs:

  1. CVE-2015-0310
  2. CVE-2015-0311
  3. CVE-2015-0313
  4. CVE-2015-0336
  5. CVE-2015-0359
  6. CVE-2015-3090
  7. CVE-2015-3104
  8. CVE-2015-3105
  9. CVE-2015-3113
  10. CVE-2015-5119
  11. CVE-2015-5122
  12. CVE-2015-5560
  13. CVE-2015-7645

Some well-known exploit packs have traditionally included an exploit for an Internet Explorer vulnerability (CVE-2015-2419). We also saw a Microsoft Silverlight vulnerability (CVE-2015-1671) used in 2015 to infect users. It is worth noting, however, that this exploit is not popular with the main ‘players’ in the exploit market.

Distribution of exploits used in cyberattacks, by type of application attacked, 2015

Vulnerable applications were ranked based on data on exploits blocked by Kaspersky Lab products, used both for online attacks and to compromise local applications, including those on mobile devices.

Although the share of exploits for Adobe Flash Player in our ranking was only 4%, they are quite common in the wild. When looking at these statistics, it should be kept in mind that Kaspersky Lab technologies detect exploits at different stages. As a result, the Browsers category (62%) also includes the detection of landing pages that serve exploits. According to our observations, exploits for Adobe Flash Player are most commonly served by such pages.

We saw the number of cases which involved the use of Java exploits decrease over the year. In late 2014 their proportion of all the exploits blocked was 45%, but this proportion gradually diminished by 32 p.p. during the year, falling to 13%. Moreover, Java exploits have now been removed from all known exploit packs.

At the same time, the use of Microsoft Office exploits increased from 1% to 4%. Based on our observations, in 2015 these exploits were distributed via mass emailing.

Online threats in the banking sector

These statistics are based on the detection verdicts returned by the antivirus module, received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who have consented to provide their statistical data.

The annual statistics for 2015 are based on data received between November 2014 and October 2015.

In 2015, Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked attempts to launch malware capable of stealing money via online banking on 1,966,324 computers. This number is 2.8% higher than in 2014 (1,910,520).

The number of users attacked by financial malware, November 2014-October 2015

Number of users attacked by financial malware in 2014 and 2015

In 2015, the number of attacks grew steadily from February till April, with the peak in March-April. Another burst was recorded in June. In 2014, most users were targeted by financial malware in May and June. During the period between June and October in both 2014 and 2015 the number of users attacked fell gradually.

Geography of attacks

In order to evaluate the popularity of financial malware among cybercriminals and the risk of user computers around the world being infected by banking Trojans, we calculate the percentage of Kaspersky Lab users who encountered this type of threat during the reporting period in the country, relative to all users of our products in the county.

Geography of banking malware attacks in 2015 (users attacked by banking Trojans as a percentage of all users attacked by all types of malware)

TOP 10 countries by percentage of attacked users

Country* % attacked users** 1 Singapore 11.6 2 Austria 10.6 3 Switzerland 10.6 4 Australia 10.1 5 New Zealand 10.0 6 Brazil 9.8 7 Namibia 9.3 8 Hong Kong 9.0 9 Republic of South Africa 8.2 10 Lebanon 6.6

* We excluded those countries in which the number of Kaspersky Lab product users is relatively small (less than 10,000).
** Unique users whose computers have been targeted by web attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

Singapore leads this rating. Of all the Kaspersky Lab users attacked by malware in the country, 11.6% were targeted at least once by banking Trojans throughout the year. This reflects the popularity of financial threats in relation to all threats in the country.

5.4% of users attacked in Spain encountered a banking Trojan at least once in 2015. The figure for Italy was 5%; 5.1% in Britain; 3.8% in Germany; 2.9% in France; 3.2% in the US; and 2.5% in Japan.

2% of users attacked in Russia were targeted by banking Trojans.

The TOP 10 banking malware families

The table below shows the Top 10 malware families most commonly used in 2015 to attack online banking users (as a percentage of users attacked):

Name* % users attacked** 1 Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Upatre 42.36 2 Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot 26.38 3 Trojan-Banker.Win32.ChePro 9.22 4 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Shiotob 5.10 5 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Banbra 3.51 6 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Caphaw 3.14 7 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Faketoken 2.76 8 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Marcher 2.41 9 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Tinba 2.05 10 Trojan-Banker.JS.Agent 1.88

* These statistics are based on the detection verdicts returned by Kaspersky Lab’s products, received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who have consented to provide their statistical data.
** Unique users whose computers have been targeted by the malicious program, as a percentage of all unique users targeted by financial malware attacks.

The majority of the Top 10 malicious programs work by injecting random HTML code in the web page displayed by the browser and intercepting any payment data entered by the user in the original or inserted web forms.

The Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Upatre family of malicious programs remained at the top of the ranking throughout the year. The malware is no larger than 3.5 KB in size, and is limited to downloading the payload to the victim computer, most typically a banker Trojan from the Dyre/Dyzap/Dyreza family whose main aim is to steal the user’s payment details. Dyre does this by intercepting the data from a banking session between the victim’s browser and the online banking web app, in other words, by using a Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) technique. This malicious program is spread via specially created emails with an attachment containing a document with the downloader. In the summer of 2015, however, Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Upatre was spotted on compromised home routers, which is a testimony to how cybercriminals make use of this multi-purpose malware.

In 2015, #ransomware programs were detected on 753,684 computers of unique users #KLReport


Yet another permanent resident of this ranking is Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot (in second place) which consistently occupies one of the leading positions. The Trojans of the Zbot family were among the first to use web injections to compromise the payment details of online banking users and to modify the contents of banking web pages. They encrypt their configuration files at several levels; the decrypted configuration file is never stored in the memory in its entirety, but is instead loaded in parts.

Representatives of the Trojan-Banker.Win32.ChePro family were first detected in October 2012. At that time, these banking Trojans were mostly aimed at users in Brazil, Portugal and Russia. Now they are being used to attack the users worldwide. Most programs of this type are downloaders which need other files to successfully infect the system. Generally, they are malicious banking programs, allowing the fraudsters to take screenshots, to intercept keystrokes, and to read the content of the copy buffer, i.e. they possess functionality that allows a malicious program to be used for attacks on almost any online banking system.

Of particular interest is the fact that two families of mobile banking Trojans are present in this ranking: Faketoken and Marcher. The malicious programs belonging to the latter family steal payment details from Android devices.

The representatives of the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Faketoken family work in partnership with computer Trojans. To distribute this malware, cybercriminals use social engineering techniques. When a user visits his online banking account, the Trojan modifies the page, asking him to download an Android application which is allegedly required to securely confirm the transaction. In fact the link leads to the Faketoken application. Once Faketoken is on the user’s smartphone, the cybercriminals gain access to the user’s banking account via the computer infected with the banking Trojan and the compromised mobile device allows them to intercept the one-time confirmation code (mTAN).

The second family of mobile banking Trojans is Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Marcher. After infecting a device, the malware tracks the launch of just two apps – the mobile banking customer of a European bank and Google Play. If the user starts Google Play, Marcher displays a false window requesting credit card details which then go to the fraudsters. The same method is used by the Trojan if the user starts the banking application.

Tenth place in the 2015 ranking was occupied by the Trojan-Banker.JS.Agent family. This is the malicious JavaScript code that results from an injection into an online banking page. The aim of this code is to intercept payment details that the user enters into online banking forms.

2015 – an interesting year for ransomware

The Trojan-Ransom class represents malware intended for the unauthorized modification of user data that renders a computer inoperable (for example, encryptors), or for blocking the normal operation of a computer. In order to decrypt files and unblock a computer the malware owners usually demand a ransom from the victims.

Since its emergence with CryptoLocker in 2013, ransomware has come a long way. For example, in 2014 we spotted the first version of ransomware for Android. Just a year later, 17% of the infections we saw were on Android devices.

2015 also saw the first ransomware for Linux, which can be found in the Trojan-Ransom.Linux class. On the positive side, the malware authors made a small implementation error, which makes it possible to decrypt the files without paying a ransom.

Unfortunately, these implementation errors are occurring less and less. This prompted the FBI to state: “The ransomware is that good… To be honest, we often advise people just to pay the ransom”. That this is not always a good idea was also shown this year, when the Dutch police were able to apprehend two suspects behind the CoinVault malware. A little later we received all 14,000 encryption keys, which we added to a new decryption tool. All the CoinVault victims were then able to decrypt their files for free.

In 2015, 179,209 computers were targeted by encryption #ransomware #KLReport


2015 was also the year that marked the birth of TeslaCrypt. TeslaCrypt has a history of using graphical interfaces from other ransomware families. Initially it was CryptoLocker, but this later changed to CryptoWall. This time they copied the HTML page in full from CryptoWall 3.0, only changing the URLs.

Number of users attacked

The following graph shows the rise in users with detected Trojan-Ransom within the last year:

Number of users attacked by Trojan-Ransom malware (Q4 2014 – Q3 2015)

Overall in 2015, Trojan-Ransom was detected on 753,684 computers. Ransomware is thus becoming more and more of a problem.

TOP 10 Trojan-Ransom families

The Top 10 most prevalent ransomware families are represented here. The list consists of browser-based extortion or blocker families and some notorious encryptors. So-called Windows blockers that restrict access to a system (for example, the Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Blocker family) and demand a ransom were very popular a few years ago – starting off in Russia then moving west – but are not as widespread anymore and are not represented in the Top 10.

Name* Users percentage** 1 Trojan-Ransom.HTML.Agent 38.0 2 Trojan-Ransom.JS.Blocker 20.7 3 Trojan-Ransom.JS.InstallExtension 8.0 4 Trojan-Ransom.NSIS.Onion 5.8 5 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryakl 4.3 6 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryptodef 3.1 7 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Snocry 3.0 8 Trojan-Ransom.BAT.Scatter 3.0 9 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod 1.8 10 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Shade 1.8

*These statistics are based on the detection verdicts returned by Kaspersky Lab products, received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who have consented to provide their statistical data.
** Percentage of users attacked by a Trojan-Ransom family relative to all users attacked with Trojan-Ransom malware.

First place is occupied by Trojan-Ransom.HTML.Agent (38%) with the Trojan-Ransom.JS.Blocker family (20.7%) in second. They represent browser-blocking web pages with various unwanted content usually containing the extortion message (for example, a “warning” from a law enforcement agency) or containing JavaScript code that blocks the browser along with a message.

In third place is Trojan-Ransom.JS.InstallExtension (8%), a browser-blocking web page that imposes a Chrome extension installation on the user. When attempting to close the page a voice mp3 file is often played: “In order to close the page, press the ‘Add’ button”. The extensions involved are not harmful, but the offer is very obtrusive and difficult for the user to reject. This kind of extension propagation is used by a partnership program. These three families are particularly prevalent in Russia and almost as prevalent in some post-Soviet countries.

When we look at where ransomware is most prevalent (not just the three families mentioned above), we see that the top three consists of Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine.

Cryakl became relatively active in Q3 2015, when we saw peaks of up to 2300 attempted infections a day. An interesting aspect of Cryakl is its encryption scheme. Rather than encrypting the whole file, Cryakl encrypts the first 29 bytes plus three other blocks located randomly in the file. This is done to evade behavioral detection, while encrypting the first 29 bytes destroys the header.

In 2015, @kaspersky web antivirus detected 121,262,075 unique malicious objects #KLReport


Cryptodef is the infamous Cryptowall ransomware. Cryptowall is found most often, in contrast to the other families discussed here, in the US. In fact, there are three times as many infections in the US than there are in Russia. Cryptowall is spread through spam emails, where the user receives a zipped JavaScript. Once executed, the JavaScript downloads Сryptowall and it starts encrypting files. A change in the ransom message is also observed: victims are now congratulated by the malware authors on “becoming part of the large Cryptowall community”.

Encryptors can be implemented not only as executables but also using simple scripting languages, as in the case of the Trojan-Ransom.BAT.Scatter family. The Scatter family appeared in 2014 and quickly evolved, providing itself with the functionality of Email-Worm and Trojan-PSW. Encryption makes use of two pairs of assymetric keys, making it possible to encrypt the user’s files without revealing their private key. It employs renamed legitimate utilities to encrypt files.

The Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Shade encryptor, which is also very prevalent in Russia, is able to request a list from the C&C server containing the URLs of additional malware. It then downloads that malware and installs it in the system. All its C&C servers are located in the Tor network. Shade is also suspected of propagating via a partnership program.

TOP 10 countries attacked by Trojan-Ransom malware Country* % of users attacked by Trojan-Ransom** 1 Kazakhstan 5.47 2 Ukraine 3.75 3 Russian Federation 3.72 4 Netherlands 1.26 5 Belgium 1.08 6 Belarus 0.94 7 Kyrgyzstan 0.76 8 Uzbekistan 0.69 9 Tajikistan 0.69 10 Italy 0.57

* We excluded those countries in which the number of Kaspersky Lab product users is relatively small (less than 10,000).
**Unique users whose computers have been targeted by Trojan-Ransom as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.


Even if today’s encryptors are not as popular among cybercriminals as blockers were, they inflict more damage on users. So it’s worth investigating them separately.

The number of new Trojan-Ransom encryptors

The following graph represents the rise of newly created encryptor modifications per year.

Number of Trojan-Ransom encryptor modifications in Kaspersky Lab’s Virus Collection (2013 – 2015)

The overall number of encryptor modifications in our Virus Collection to date is at least 11,000. Ten new encryptor families were created in 2015.

The number of users attacked by encryptors

Number of users attacked by Trojan-Ransom encryptor malware (2012 – 2015)

In 2015, 179,209 unique users were attacked by encryptors. About 20% of those attacked were in the corporate sector.

It is important to keep in mind that the real number of incidents is several times higher: the statistics reflect only the results of signature-based and heuristic detections, while in most cases Kaspersky Lab products detect encryption Trojans based on behavior recognition models.

Top 10 countries attacked by encryptors Country* % of users attacked by encryptors 1 Netherlands 1.06 2 Belgium 1.00 3 Russian Federation 0.65 4 Brazil 0.44 5 Kazakhstan 0.42 6 Italy 0.36 7 Latvia 0.34 8 Turkey 0.31 9 Ukraine 0.31 10 Austria 0.30

* We excluded those countries in which the number of Kaspersky Lab product users is relatively small (less than 10,000).
**Unique users whose computers have been targeted by Trojan-Ransom encryptor malware as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

First place is occupied by the Netherlands. The most widespread encryptor family is CTB-Locker (Trojan-Ransom.Win32/NSIS.Onion). In 2015 an affiliate program utilizing CTB-Locker was launched and new languages were added including Dutch. Users are mainly infected by emails with malicious attachments. It appears there may be a native Dutch speaker involved in the infection campaign, as the emails are written in relatively good Dutch.

A similar situation exists in Belgium: CTB-Locker is the most widespread encryptor there, too.

In Russia, Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryakl tops the list of encryptors targeting users.

Online threats (Web-based attacks)

The statistics in this section were derived from web antivirus components that protect users from attempts to download malicious objects from a malicious/infected website. Malicious websites are deliberately created by malicious users; infected sites include those with user-contributed content (such as forums), as well as compromised legitimate resources.

The TOP 20 malicious objects detected online

Throughout 2015, Kaspersky Lab’s web antivirus detected 121,262,075 unique malicious objects: scripts, exploits, executable files, etc.

We identified the 20 malicious programs most actively involved in online attacks launched against computers in 2015. As in the previous year, advertising programs and their components occupy 12 positions in that Top 20. During the year, advertising programs and their components were registered on 26.1% of all user computers where our web antivirus is installed. The increase in the number of advertising programs, their aggressive distribution methods and their efforts to counteract anti-virus detection, continue the trend of 2014.

In 2015, @kaspersky solutions repelled ~800M attacks launched from online resources around the world #KLReport


Although aggressive advertising does annoy users, it does not harm computers. That is why we have compiled another rating of exclusively malicious objects detected online that does not include the Adware or Riskware classes of program. These 20 programs accounted for 96.6% of all online attacks.

Name* % of all attacks** 1 Malicious URL 75.76 2 Trojan.Script.Generic 8.19 3 Trojan.Script.Iframer 8.08 4 Trojan.Win32.Generic 1.01 5 Expoit.Script.Blocker 0.79 6 Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Generic 0.69 7 Trojan-Downloader.Script.Generic 0.36 8 0.31 9 Trojan-Ransom.JS.Blocker.a 0.19 10 Trojan-Clicker.JS.Agent.pq 0.14 11 Trojan-Downloader.JS.Iframe.diq 0.13 12 Trojan.JS.Iframe.ajh 0.12 13 Exploit.Script.Generic 0.10 14 Packed.Multi.MultiPacked.gen 0.09 15 Exploit.Script.Blocker.u 0.09 16 Trojan.Script.Iframer.a 0.09 17 Trojan-Clicker.HTML.Iframe.ev 0.09 18 Hoax.HTML.ExtInstall.a 0.06 19 Trojan-Downloader.JS.Agent.hbs 0.06 20 Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Genome.qhcr 0.05

* These statistics represent detection verdicts from the web antivirus module. Information was provided by users of Kaspersky Lab products who consented to share their local data.
** The percentage of all malware web attacks recorded on the computers of unique users.

As is often the case, the TOP 20 is largely made up of objects used in drive-by attacks. They are heuristically detected as Trojan.Script.Generic, Expoit.Script.Blocker, Trojan-Downloader.Script.Generic, etc. These objects occupy seven positions in the ranking.

Malicious URL in first place is the verdict identifying links from our black list (links to web pages containing redirects to exploits, sites with exploits and other malicious programs, botnet control centers, extortion websites, etc.).

The verdict (8th place) is assigned to script that cybercriminals place on infected web resources. It redirects users to other websites, such as those of online casinos. The fact that this verdict is included in the rating should serve as a reminder to web administrators of how easily their sites can be automatically infected by programs – even those that are not very complex.

In 2015, 34.2% of user computers were subjected to at least one web attack #KLReport


The Trojan-Ransom.JS.Blocker.a verdict (9th place) is a script that tries to block the browser by means of a cyclic update of the page, and displays a message stating that a “fine” needs to be paid for viewing inappropriate materials. The user is told to transfer the money to a specified digital wallet. This script is mostly found on pornographic sites and is detected in Russia and CIS countries.

The script with the Trojan-Downloader.JS.Iframe.djq verdict (11th place) is found on infected sites running under WordPress, Joomla and Drupal. The campaign launched to infect sites with this script began on a massive scale in August 2015. First, it sends information about the header of the infected page, the current domain, and the address from which the user landed on the page with the script to the fraudsters’ server. Then, by using iframe, another script is downloaded in the user’s browser. It collects information about the system on the user’s computer, the time zone and the availability of Adobe Flash Player. After this and a series of redirects, the user ends up on sites that prompt him to install an update for Adobe Flash Player that is actually adware, or to install browser plugins.

The TOP 10 countries where online resources are seeded with malware

The following statistics are based on the physical location of the online resources that were used in attacks and blocked by our antivirus components (web pages containing redirects to exploits, sites containing exploits and other malware, botnet command centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web attacks. The statistics do not include sources used for distributing advertising programs or hosts linked to advertising program activity.

In order to determine the geographical source of web-based attacks, domain names are matched up against their actual domain IP addresses, and then the geographical location of a specific IP address (GEOIP) is established.

In 2015, Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked 798,113,087 attacks launched from web resources located in various countries around the world. To carry out their attacks, the fraudsters used 6,563,145 unique hosts.

80% of notifications about attacks blocked by antivirus components were received from online resources located in 10 countries.

The distribution of online resources seeded with malicious programs in 2015

The top four countries where online resources are seeded with malware remained unchanged from the previous year. France moved up from 7th to 5th place (5.07%) while Ukraine dropped from 5th to 7th position (4.16%). Canada and Vietnam left the Top 20. This year’s newcomers, China and Sweden, were in 9th and 10th places respectively.

This rating demonstrates that cybercriminals prefer to operate and use hosting services in different countries where the hosting market is well-developed.

Countries where users face the greatest risk of online infection

In order to assess the countries in which users most often face cyber threats, we calculated how often Kaspersky Lab users encountered detection verdicts on their machines in each country. The resulting data characterizes the risk of infection that computers are exposed to in different countries across the globe, providing an indicator of the aggressiveness of the environment facing computers in different parts of the world.

The TOP 20 countries where users face the greatest risk of online infection

Country* % of unique users** 1 Russia 48.90 2 Kazakhstan 46.27 3 Azerbaijan 43.23 4 Ukraine 40.40 5 Vietnam 39.55 6 Mongolia 38.27 7 Belarus 37.91 8 Armenia 36.63 9 Algeria 35.64 10 Qatar 35.55 11 Latvia 34.20 12 Nepal 33.94 13 Brazil 33.66 14 Kyrgyzstan 33.37 15 Moldova 33.28 16 China 33.12 17 Thailand 32.92 18 Lithuania 32.80 19 UAE 32.58 20 Portugal 32.31

These statistics are based on the detection verdicts returned by the web antivirus module, received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who have consented to provide their statistical data.

* We excluded those countries in which the number of Kaspersky Lab product users is relatively small (less than 10,000).
** Unique users whose computers have been targeted by web attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

In 2015, cybercriminals used 6,563,145 unique hosts to carry out their attacks #KLReport


In 2015, the top three saw no change from the previous year. Russia remained in first place although the percentage of unique users in the country decreased by 4.9 p.p.

Germany, Tajikistan, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Austria, Sri Lanka and Turkey left the Top 20. Among the newcomers are Latvia, Nepal, Brazil, China, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates and Portugal.

The countries can be divided into three groups that reflect the different levels of infection risk.

  1. The high risk group (over 41%)
    In 2015, this group includes the first three countries from the Top 20 – Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

  2. The medium risk group (21-40.9%)
    This group includes 109 countries; among them are France (32.1%), Germany (32.0%), India (31.6%), Spain (31.4%), Turkey (31.0%), Greece (30.3%), Canada (30.2%), Italy (29.4%), Switzerland (28.6%), Australia (28.0%), Bulgaria (27.0%), USA (26.4%), Georgia (26, 2%), Israel (25.8%), Mexico (24.3%), Egypt (23.9%), Romania (23.4%), UK (22.4%), Czech Republic (22.0% ), Ireland (21.6%), and Japan (21.1%).

  3. The low risk group (0-20.9%)
    The 52 countries with the safest online surfing environments include Kenya (20.8%), Hungary (20.7%), Malta (19.4%), the Netherlands (18.7%), Norway (18.3%), Argentina (18.3%), Singapore (18,2%), Sweden (18%), South Korea (17.2%), Finland (16.5%), and Denmark (15, 2%).

In 2015, 34.2% of computers were attacked at least once while their owners were online.

On average, the risk of being infected while surfing the Internet decreased by 4.1 p.p. over the year. This could be due to several factors:

  • Firstly, developers of browsers and search engines realized the necessity of securing their users and started to contribute to the fight against malicious sites
  • Secondly, users are using more and more mobile devices and tablets to surf the Internet.
  • Thirdly, many exploit packs have started to check if Kaspersky Lab’s product is installed on the user’s computer. If it is, the exploits do not even try to attack the computer.
Local threats

Local infection statistics for user computers are a very important indicator: they reflect threats that have penetrated computer systems by infecting files or removable media, or initially got on the computer in an encrypted format (for example, programs integrated in complex installers, encrypted files, etc.). In addition, these statistics include objects detected on user computers after the first scan of the system by Kaspersky Lab’s file antivirus.

This section contains an analysis of the statistical data obtained based on antivirus scans of files on the hard drive at the moment they are created or accessed, and the results of scanning various removable data storages.

In 2015, 24% of web attacks neutralized by @kaspersky were carried out using malicious sites located in US #KLReport


In 2015, Kaspersky Lab’s antivirus solutions detected 4 million unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects, a twofold increase from the previous year.

The TOP 20 malicious objects detected on user computers

For this rating we identified the 20 most frequently detected threats on user computers in 2015. This rating does not include the Adware and Riskware classes of program.

Name* % of unique attacked users** 1 DangerousObject.Multi.Generic 39.70 2 Trojan.Win32.Generic 27.30 3 Trojan.WinLNK.StartPage.gena 17.19 4 Trojan.Win32.AutoRun.gen 6.29 5 Virus.Win32.Sality.gen 5.53 6 Worm.VBS.Dinihou.r 5.40 7 Trojan.Script.Generic 5.01 8 DangerousPattern.Multi.Generic 4.93 9 Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Generic 4.36 10 Trojan.WinLNK.Agent.ew 3.42 11 Worm.Win32.Debris.a 3.24 12 Trojan.VBS.Agent.ue 2.79 13 Trojan.Win32.Autoit.cfo 2.61 14 Virus.Win32.Nimnul.a 2.37 15 Worm.Script.Generic 2.23 16 Trojan.Win32.Starter.lgb 2.04 17 Worm.Win32.Autoit.aiy 1.97 18 Worm.Win32.Generic 1.94 19 HiddenObject.Multi.Generic 1.66 20 Trojan-Dropper.VBS.Agent.bp 1.55

These statistics are compiled from malware detection verdicts generated by the on-access and on-demand scanner modules on the computers of those users running Kaspersky Lab products who consented to submit their statistical data.

* Malware detection verdicts generated by the on-access and on-demand scanner modules on the computers of those users running Kaspersky Lab products who consented to submit their statistical data.
** The proportion of individual users on whose computers the antivirus module detected these objects as a percentage of all individual users of Kaspersky Lab products on whose computers a malicious program was detected.

The DangerousObject.Multi.Generic verdict, which is used for malware detected with the help of cloud technologies, is in 1st place (39.7%). Cloud technologies work when the antivirus databases do not yet contain either signatures or heuristics to detect a malicious program but the company’s cloud antivirus database already has information about the object. In fact, this is how the very latest malware is detected.

In 2015, @kaspersky solutions detected a total of 4M unique malicious & potentially unwanted objects #KLReport


The proportion of viruses continues to decrease: for example, last year Virus.Win32.Sality.gen affected 6.69% of users while in 2015 – only 5.53%. For Virus.Win32.Nimnul these figures are 2.8% in 2014 and 2.37% in 2015. The Trojan-Dropper.VBS.Agent.bp verdict, which is 20th in the rating, is a VBS script that extracts Virus.Win32.Nimnul from itself and saves in to the disk.

In addition to heuristic verdicts and viruses the Top 20 includes verdicts for worms spread on removable media and their components. Their presence in this rating is due to the nature of their distribution and creation of multiple copies. A worm can continue to self-proliferate for a long time even if its management servers are no longer active.

Countries where users face the highest risk of local infection

For each country we calculated the number of file antivirus detections the users faced during the year. The data includes detected objects located on user computers or on removable media connected to the computers, such as flash drives, camera and phone memory cards, or external hard drives. This statistic reflects the level of infected personal computers in different countries around the world.

The TOP 20 countries by the level of infection

Country* % of unique users** 1 Vietnam 70.83 2 Bangladesh 69.55 3 Russia 68.81 4 Mongolia 66.30 5 Armenia 65.61 6 Somali 65.22 7 Georgia 65.20 8 Nepal 65.10 9 Yemen 64.65 10 Kazakhstan 63.71 11 Iraq 63.37 12 Iran 63.14 13 Laos 62.75 14 Algeria 62.68 15 Cambodia 61.66 16 Rwanda 61.37 17 Pakistan 61.36 18 Syria 61.00 19 Palestine 60.95 20 Ukraine 60.78

These statistics are based on the detection verdicts returned by the antivirus module, received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who have consented to provide their statistical data.

* When calculating, we excluded countries where there are fewer than 10,000 Kaspersky Lab users.
** The percentage of unique users in the country with computers that blocked local threats as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products.

For the third year in a row Vietnam topped the rating. Mongolia and Bangladesh swapped places – Bangladesh climbed from 4th to 2nd, while Mongolia moved from 2nd to 4th. Russia, which was not in last year’s Top 20, came third in 2015.

India, Afghanistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Turkey all left the Top 20. The newcomers were Russia, Armenia, Somalia, Georgia, Iran, Rwanda, the Palestinian territories, and Ukraine.

In the Top 20 countries at least one malicious object was found on an average of 67.7% of computers, hard drives or removable media belonging to KSN users. The 2014 the figure was 58.7%.

The countries can be divided into several risk categories reflecting the level of local threats.

  1. Maximum risk (over 60%): 22 countries, including Kyrgyzstan (60.77%), Afghanistan (60.54%)

  2. High risk (41-60%): 98 countries including India (59.7%), Egypt (57.3%), Belarus (56.7%), Turkey (56.2%), Brazil (53.9%), China (53.4%), UAE (52.7%), Serbia (50.1%), Bulgaria (47.7%), Argentina (47.4%), Israel (47.3%), Latvia (45.9%), Spain (44.6%), Poland (44.3%), Germany (44%), Greece (42.8%), France (42.6%), Korea (41.7%), Austria (41.7%).

  3. Moderate local infection rate (21-40.99%): 45 countries including Romania (40%), Italy (39.3%), Canada (39.2%), Australia (38.5%), Hungary (38.2%), Switzerland (37.2%), USA (36.7%), UK (34.7%), Ireland (32.7%), Netherlands (32.1%), Czech Republic (31.5%), Singapore (31.4%), Norway (30.5%), Finland (27.4%), Sweden (27.4%), Denmark (25.8%), Japan (25.6%).

The 10 safest countries were:

Country % of unique users* 1 Cuba 20.8 2 Seychelles 25.3 3 Japan 25.6 4 Denmark 25.8 5 Sweden 27.4 6 Finland 27.4 7 Andorra 28.7 8 Norway 30.5 9 Singapore 31.4 10 Czech Republic 31.5

* The percentage of unique users in the country with computers that blocked local threats as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products.

The appearance of Andorra, replacing Martinique, was the only change to this rating in 2015 compared to the previous year.

On average, 26.9% of user computers were attacked at least once during the year in the 10 safest countries. This is an increase of 3.9 p.p. compared to 2014.


Based on analysis of the statistics, we can highlight the main trends in cybercriminal activity:

  • Some of those involved in cybercrime are looking to minimize the risk of criminal prosecution and switching from malware attacks to the aggressive distribution of adware.
  • The proportion of relatively simple programs used in mass attacks is growing. This approach allows the attackers to quickly update malware which enhances the effectiveness of attacks.
  • Attackers have mastered non-Windows platforms – Android and Linux: almost all types of malicious programs are created and used for these platforms.
  • Cybercriminals are making active use of Tor anonymization technology to hide command servers, and Bitcoins for making transactions.

An increasing proportion of antivirus detections fall into a ‘gray zone’. This applies primarily to a variety of advertising programs and their modules. In our 2015 ranking of web-based threats, the representatives of this class of program occupy 12 places in the Top 20. During the year, advertising programs and their components were registered on 26.1% of all user computers where our web antivirus is installed. The growth in the volume of advertising programs, along with their aggressive distribution methods and attempts to counteract anti-virus detection, continues the trend of 2014. Spreading adware earns good money, and in the pursuit of profit the authors sometimes use the tricks and technologies typical of malicious programs.

In 2015, virus writers demonstrated a particular interest in exploits for Adobe Flash Player. According to our observations, landing pages with exploits are often downloaded by exploits for Adobe Flash Player. There are two factors at play here: firstly, a large number of vulnerabilities were detected in the product over the year; secondly, as a result of a data leak by Hacking Team, information about previously unknown vulnerabilities in Flash Player were made public, and attackers wasted no time in taking advantage.

The banking Trojan sphere witnessed an interesting development in 2015. The numerous modifications of ZeuS, which had continuously topped the ranking of the most commonly used malware families for several years, were dethroned by Trojan-Banker.Win32.Dyreza. Throughout the year, the rating for malicious programs designed to steal money via Internet banking systems was headed by Upatre, which downloads banking Trojans from the family known as Dyre/Dyzap/Dyreza to victims’ computers. In the banking Trojan sector as a whole, the share of users attacked by Dyreza exceeded 40%. The banker uses an effective of web injection method in order to steal data to access the online banking system.

Also of note is the fact that two families of mobile banking Trojans – Faketoken and Marcher – were included in the Top 10 banking Trojans most commonly used in 2015. Based on current trends, we can assume that next year mobile bankers will account for a much greater percentage in the rating.

In 2015, there were a number of changes in the ransomware camp:

  1. While the popularity of blockers is gradually falling, the number of users attacked by encryption ransomware increased by 48.3% in 2015. Encrypting files instead of simply blocking the computer is a method that in most cases makes it very difficult for the victims to regain access to their information. The attackers are especially active in utilizing encryption ransomware for attacks on business users, who are more likely to pay a ransom than ordinary home users. This is confirmed by the appearance in 2015 of the first ransomware for Linux, targeting web servers.
  2. At the same time, encryptors are becoming multi-module and, in addition to encryption, include functionality designed to steal data from user computers.
  3. While Linux may only now have attracted the attention of fraudsters, the first ransomware Trojan for Android was detected back in 2014. In 2015, the number of attacks aimed at the Android OS grew rapidly, and by the end of the year 17% of attacks involving ransomware were blocked on Android devices.
  4. The threat is actively spreading all over the planet: Kaspersky Lab products detected ransomware Trojans in 200 countries and territories, which is practically everywhere.

We expect that in 2016 cybercriminals will continue to develop encryption ransomware that targets non-Windows platforms: the proportion of encryptors targeting Android will increase, while others will emerge for Mac. Given that Android is widely used in consumer electronics, the first ransomware attack on ‘smart’ devices may occur.

Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2015. Evolution of cyber threats in the corporate sector

Malware Alerts - Thu, 12/10/2015 - 05:52

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In late 2014, we published predictions for how the world of cyber threats may evolve in 2015. Four of the nine predictions we made were directly connected with threats to businesses. Our predictions proved accurate – three of the four business-related threats have already been fulfilled:

  • Cybercriminals embrace APT tactics for targeted attacks – yes.
  • APT groups fragment, diversify attacks – yes.
  • Escalation of ATM and PoS attacks – yes.
  • Attacks against virtual payment systems – no.

Let’s have a look back at the major incidents of 2015 and at the new trends we have observed in information security within the business environment.

The year in figures
  • In 2015 one or more malware attacks were blocked on 58% of corporate computers. This is a 3 p.p. rise on the previous year.
  • 29% of computers – i.e. almost every third business-owned computer – were subjected to one or more web-based attacks.
  • Malware exploiting vulnerabilities in office applications were used 3 times more often than in attacks against home users.
  • File antivirus detection was triggered on 41% of corporate computers (objects were detected on computers or on removable media connected to computers: flash drives, memory cards, telephones, external hard drives, or network disks).
Targeted attacks on businesses: APT and cybercriminals

2015 saw a number of APT attacks launched against businesses. The toolkits and methods used were very similar to those we observed when analyzing earlier APT attacks, but it was cybercriminals rather than state-sponsored groups who were behind the attacks. The methods used may not be characteristic of cybercriminals, but the main aim of their attacks remained the same: financial gain.

In 2015, one or more #malware attacks were blocked on 58% of corporate computers #KLReport


The Carbanak campaign became a vivid example of how APT-class targeted attacks have shifted focus to financial organizations. The campaign was one of bona fide bank robberies in the digital age: the cybercriminals penetrated a bank’s network looking for a critical system, which they then used to siphon off money. After stealing a hefty sum (anywhere between $2.5 million and $10 million) from a bank, they moved on to the next victim.

Most of the organizations targeted were located in Eastern Europe. However, the Carbanak campaign has also targeted victims in the US, Germany and China. Up to 100 financial institutions have been affected across the globe, and the total losses could be as a high as $1 billion.

It shouldn’t be forgotten that information can also be of great value, especially if it can be used when making deals or trading on the stock exchange, be it in commodities, securities or currency markets, including cryptocurrency markets. One example of a targeted attack that may have been hunting for such information is Wild Neutron (aka Jripbot and Morpho). This cyber-espionage campaign first hit the headlines in 2013 when it affected several reputable companies, including Apple, Facebook, Twitter and Microsoft. After these incidents received widespread publicity the actors behind the cyberespionage campaign suspended their activities. However, about a year later Kaspersky Lab observed that Wild Neutron had resumed operations.

Our research has shown that the cyberespionage campaign caused infections on user computers in 11 countries and territories, namely Russia, France, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Palestine, the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, Algeria and the US. The victims included law firms, investment companies, bitcoin-related companies, enterprises and business groups involved in M&A deals, IT companies, healthcare companies, real estate companies, as well as individual users.

It should be noted that Wild Neutron used a code signing certificate stolen from Acer.

Stolen Acer certificate in the Wild Neutron installer

The trend towards the diversification of APT attacks is well illustrated by the change in targets attacked by the Chinese cybercriminal group Winnti. It was a long-held belief that Winnti only attacked computer gaming companies. However, in autumn 2015 evidence began to emerge that showed the group had performed a test run of their tools and methods and were trying to make money by attacking new targets. Their attention is no longer limited to the entertainment industry, with recent targets including pharmaceutical and telecom companies. Analysis of the new wave of Winnti attacks has revealed that (as with Wild Neutron) the Winnti rootkit was signed with a stolen certificate that belonged to a division at a major Japanese conglomerate.

Another development in 2015 was the expanding geographies of both the attacks and the attackers. For example, when Kaspersky Lab experts were investigating a Middle East incident, they came across activity by a previously unknown group conducting targeted attacks. The group, dubbed the Desert Falcons, is the first Arab actor to conduct full-blown cyberespionage attacks. At the time the group was detected, its victims numbered around 300, including financial organizations.

Another group named Blue Termite attacked organizations and companies in Japan:

Information about targeted attacks on businesses is available in the following Kaspersky Lab reports: Carbanak, Wild Neutron, Winnti, DarkHotel 2015, Desert Falcons, Blue Termit, Grabit. More detailed research results are provided to subscribers of the Kaspersky Intelligence Service.

Analysis of these attacks has identified several trends in the evolution of targeted attacks on businesses:

  • Financial organizations such as banks, funds and exchange-related companies, including cryptocurrency exchanges, have been subjected to attacks by cybercriminals.
  • The attacks are meticulously planned. The cybercriminals scrutinize the interests of potential victims (employees at the targeted company), and identify the websites they are most likely to visit; they examine the targeted company’s contacts, equipment and service providers.
  • The information collected at the preparation stage is then put to use. The attackers hack legitimate websites that have been identified and the business contact accounts of the targeted company’s employees. The sites and accounts are used for several hours to distribute malicious code, after which the infection is deactivated. This means the cybercriminals can re-use the compromised resources again later.
  • Signed files and legitimate software is used to collect information from the attacked network.
  • Attacks are diversifying to include small and medium-sized businesses.
  • The geography of attacks on businesses is expanding: a massive attack occurred in Japan, the emergence of new APT groups in Arab countries.

In 2015, 29% of business-owned computers were subjected to one or more web-based attacks #KLReport


Although there are relatively few APT attacks launched by cybercriminals, the way they are developing will undoubtedly influence the methods and approaches employed by other cybercriminals in their operations against businesses.


The statistics for corporate users (including the geography of attacks and ratings for detected objects) tend to coincide with those for home users. This is unsurprising because business users do not exist in an isolated environment and their computers are targeted by cybercriminals who spread malware irrespective of the nature of the target. These types of attacks and malware constitute the majority, while attacks specifically targeting business users have little impact on the overall statistics.

In 2015, one or more malware attack was blocked on 58% of corporate user computers, which is a 3 p.p. rise on last year.

Online threats (Web-based attacks)

In 2015, almost every third (29%) computer in a business environment was subjected to one or more web-based attacks.

TOP 10 web-based malicious programs

Please note that this ranking includes malicious programs only, and no adware. Although intrusive and annoying for users, adware does not cause any damage to a computer.

Name* % of unique users attacked** 1 Malicious URL 57.0 2 Trojan.Script.Generic 24.7 3 Trojan.Script.Iframer 16.0 4 Exploit.Script.Blocker 4.1 5 Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Generic 2.5 6 Trojan.Win32.Generic 2.3 7 Trojan-Downloader.JS.Iframe.diq 2.0 8 Exploit.Script.Generic 1.2 9 Packed.Multi.MultiPacked.gen 1.0 10 Trojan-Downloader.Script.Generic 0.9

*These statistics represent the detection verdicts of the web antivirus module. Information was provided by users of Kaspersky Lab products who consented to share their local statistical data.
**The percentage of all web attacks recorded on the computers of unique users.

This Top 10 consists almost exclusively of verdicts assigned to malicious objects that are used in drive-by attacks – Trojan downloaders and exploits.

Geography of web-based attacks

Geography of web-based attacks in 2015
(percentage of attacked corporate users in each country)

Local threats

The file antivirus detection was triggered on 41% of corporate user computers. The detected objects were located on computers or on removable media connected to the computers, such as flash drives, memory cards, telephones, external hard drives and network drives.

TOP 10 malicious programs detected on user computers

This ranking includes malicious programs only, and no adware. Although intrusive and annoying for users, adware does not cause any damage to a computer.

Name* % of unique users attacked** 1 DangerousObject.Multi.Generic 23.1 2 Trojan.Win32.Generic 18.8 3 Trojan.WinLNK.StartPage.gena 7.2 4 Trojan.Win32.AutoRun.gen 4.8 5 Worm.VBS.Dinihou.r 4.6 6 Net-Worm.Win32.Kido.ih 4.0 7 Virus.Win32.Sality.gen 4.0 8 Trojan.Script.Generic 2.9 9 DangerousPattern.Multi.Generic 2.7 10 Worm.Win32.Debris.a 2.6

* These statistics are compiled from malware detection verdicts generated by the on-access and on-demand scanner modules on the computers of those users running Kaspersky Lab products who have consented to submit their statistical data.
** The proportion of individual users on whose computers the antivirus module detected these objects as a percentage of all attacked individual users.

First place is occupied by various malicious programs that were detected with the help of cloud technologies, and assigned the umbrella verdict of ‘DangerousObject.Multi.Generic’. Cloud technologies work when antivirus databases do not yet contain signatures or heuristics to detect a malicious program but the company’s cloud antivirus database already includes information about the object. When a client company cannot send statistics to the cloud, Kaspersky Private Security Network is used instead, meaning that network computers receive protection from the cloud.

In 2015, file @antivirus detection was triggered on 41% of corporate computers #KLReport


Most of the remaining positions in the ranking are occupied by self-propagating malware programs and their components.

Geography of local threats

Geography of local threat detections in 2015
(percentage of attacked corporate users in each country)

Characteristics of attacks on businesses

The overall statistics for corporate users do not reflect the specific attributes of attacks launched against businesses; the stats are influenced more by the probability of a computer infection in a country, or by how popular a specific malware program is with cybercriminals.

However, a more detailed analysis reveals the peculiarities of attacks on corporate users:

  • exploits for vulnerabilities found in office applications are used three times more often than in attacks on home users;
  • use of malicious files signed with valid digital certificates;
  • use of legitimate programs in attacks, allowing the attackers to go undetected for longer.

We have also observed a rapid growth in the number of corporate user computers attacked by encryptor programs.

In this particular context, the majority of cases are not APT attacks: “standard” cybercriminals are simply focusing on corporate users, and sometimes on a particular company that is of interest to them.

Use of exploits in attacks on businesses

The ranking of vulnerable applications is compiled based on information about exploits blocked by Kaspersky Lab products and used by cybercriminals, both in web- and email-based attacks, as well as attempts to compromise local applications, including those on mobile devices.

Distribution of exploits used in cybercriminal attacks by type of attacked application
(corporate users, 2015)

Distribution of exploits used in cybercriminal attacks by type of attacked application
(home users, 2015)

If we compare the use of exploits by cybercriminals to attack home and corporate users, the first obvious difference is that exploits for office software vulnerabilities are used much more often in attacks launched against businesses. They are only used in 4% of attacks on home users, but when it comes to attacks on corporate users, they make up 12% of all exploits detected throughout the year.

Web browsers are the applications targeted most often by exploits in attacks on both home and corporate users. When viewing these statistics, it should be noted that Kaspersky Lab technologies detect exploits at various stages. Detection of landing pages from which exploits are distributed are also counted in the ‘Browsers’ category. We have observed that most often these are exploits for vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player.

Distribution of exploits used in cybercriminal attacks by type of attacked application in 2014 and 2015

The proportions of Java and PDF exploits have declined significantly compared to 2014, by 14 p.p. and 8 p.p., respectively. Java exploits have lost some of their popularity in spite of the fact that several zero-day vulnerabilities that been found during the year. The proportion of attacks launched using vulnerabilities in office software (+8 p.p.), browsers (+9 p.p.), Adobe Flash Player (+9 p.p), and Android software (+3 p.p.) have risen.

In 2015, @Kaspersky solutions detected ransomware on more than 50K computers in corporate networks #KLReport


Investigations of security incidents have shown that even in targeted attacks on corporations, cybercriminals often use exploits for known vulnerabilities. This is because corporate environments are slow to install appropriate security patches. The proportion of exploits that target vulnerabilities in Android applications has risen to 7%, which suggests cybercriminals have a growing interest in corporate data stored on employees’ mobile devices.


Encryption Trojans were long considered to be a threat to home users only. Nowadays, however, we see ransomware actors paying more attention to organizations as targets.

In 2015, Kaspersky Lab solutions detected ransomware on more than 50,000 computers in corporate networks, which is double the figure for 2014. It is important to keep in mind that the real number of incidents is several times higher: the statistics reflect only the results of signature-based and heuristic detections, while in most cases Kaspersky Lab products detect encryption Trojans based on behavior recognition models.

The number of unique corporate users attacked by encryption Trojans in 2014 and 2015

There are two reasons for the surge in interest in businesses by ransomware actors. Firstly, they can receive much bigger ransoms from organizations than from individual users. Secondly, there is a better chance the ransom will be paid: some companies simply cannot continue their operations if information has been encrypted and is unavailable on critical computers and/or servers.

One of the most interesting developments of 2015 in this realm has been the emergence of the first Linux encryption malware (Kaspersky Lab products detect it as the verdict ‘Trojan-Ransom.Linux.Cryptor’), which targets websites, including online stores. The cybercriminals exploited vulnerabilities in web applications to gain access to websites, and then uploaded a malicious program to the sites that encrypted the server data. In the majority of cases, this brought the site down. The cybercriminals demanded a ransom of one bitcoin to restore the site. Around 2,000 websites are estimated to have been infected. Given the popularity of *nix servers in the business environment, it is reasonable to assume that next year there may be more ransomware attacks against non-Windows platforms.

TOP 10 encryptor Trojan families

Family % attacked users* 1 Scatter 21 2 Onion 16 3 Cryakl 15 4 Snocry 11 5 Cryptodef 8 6 Rakhni 7 7 Crypmod 6 8 Shade 5 9 Mor 3 10 Crypren 2

*The proportion of users attacked by malicious programs from this family, as a percentage of all attacked users.

Virtually all the ransomware families in the Top 10 demand ransoms in bitcoins.

The Scatter family of Trojans occupies first place. They encrypt files on the hard drive and leave encrypted files with the extension .vault. Scatter Trojans are multi-module, multi-purpose script-based malicious programs. This malware family has quickly evolved over a short period, developing new Email-Worm and Trojan-PSW capabilities on top of file encryption.

In second place is the Onion family of encryptors, known for the fact that their C&C servers are located within the Tor network. In third place is the Cryakl family of encryptors, which are written in Delphi and emerged back in April 2014.

In some cases, it may be possible to restore the data encrypted by these ransomware programs, usually when there are mistakes of some kind in their algorithms. However, it is currently impossible to decrypt data that has been encrypted by the latest versions of the malicious programs in the Top 10.

It is important for companies to understand that an infection by malware of this kind can interfere with business operations if critical business data is lost or a critical server operation is blocked due to encryption. Attacks like this can lead to huge losses, comparable to those caused by the Wiper malware attacks that destroyed data in corporate networks.

To address this threat, a number of measures should be taken:

  • deploy protection against exploits;
  • ensure behavioral detection methods are enabled in your security product (in Kaspersky Lab products, this is done in the System Watcher component);
  • configure a data backup procedure.
Attacks on PoS terminals

The security of point-of-sale (PoS) terminals has turned into another pressing issue for businesses, especially those involved in trading activities. Any computer with a special card reader device connected to it and the right software installed can be used as a PoS terminal. Cybercriminals hunt for these computers and infect them with malicious programs that allow them to steal the details of bank cards used to pay at the terminals.

Kaspersky Lab’s security products have blocked over 11,500 such attacks across the world. To date, there are 10 malware families in our collection that are designed to steal data from PoS terminals. Seven of these emerged this year. Despite the small number of attacks that are attempted, this risk should not be underestimated, because just one successful attack could compromise the details of tens of thousands of credit cards. Such a large number of potential victims is possible because business owners and system administrators do not see PoS terminals as devices that require protection. As a result, an infected terminal could go unnoticed for a long time, during which the malicious program sends the details of all the credit cards passing through the terminal to cybercriminals.

This problem is especially relevant in those countries where cards with EMV chips are not used. The adoption of EMV chip cards should make it far more difficult to obtain the data required to clone banking cards, although the adoption process could take a long time. In the meantime, there are some minimum measures that should be taken to protect PoS devices. Fortunately, for these devices it is fairly easy to configure the ‘default deny’ security policy, which blocks unknown programs from launching by default.

We expect that in the future cybercriminals will start targeting mobile PoS devices running under Android.


The data collected from Kaspersky Lab products shows that the tools used to attack businesses differ from those used against home users. In attacks on corporate users, exploits for office application vulnerabilities are used much more often, malicious files are often signed with valid digital certificates, and cybercriminals try to use legitimate software for their purposes, so they can go unnoticed for longer. We have also observed strong growth in the numbers of corporate user computers targeted by ransomware. This also applies to incidents not classified as APT attacks, where cybercriminals merely focus on corporate users, and sometimes on employees of specific companies.

The fact that cybercriminal groups use APT methods and programs to attack businesses takes them to a different level and makes them much more dangerous. Cybercriminals have begun to use these methods primarily to steal large sums of money from banks. They can use the same methods to steal a company’s money from bank accounts by gaining access to its corporate network.

@Kaspersky security products have blocked over 11.5K attacks on PoS terminals across the world #KLReport


Cybercriminals rely on exploiting known vulnerabilities to conduct their attacks – this is due to the fact that many organizations are slow to implement software updates on their corporate computers. In addition, cybercriminals make use of signed malicious files and legitimate tools to create channels for extracting information: these tools include popular remote administration software, SSH clients, password restoration software, etc.

More and more frequently, corporate servers are being targeted by cybercriminals. Besides stealing data, there have been cases when the attacked servers were used to launch DDoS attacks, or the data on the servers was encrypted for ransom. Recent developments have shown that this is true for both Windows and Linux servers.

Many of the organizations that suffered attacks have received ransom demands asking for payments in return for halting an ongoing DDoS attack, unblocking encrypted data, or for not disclosing stolen information. When an organization faces such demands, the first thing they should do is contact law enforcement agencies and computer security specialists. Even if a ransom is paid, the cybercriminals may still not fulfil their promise, as was the case with the ProtonMail DDoS attack that continued after a ransom was paid.


Growing numbers of attacks against financial organizations, financial fraud on exchange markets

In the coming year, we expect to see growing numbers of attacks launched against financial organizations, as well as a difference in the quality of these attacks. Besides transferring money to their own accounts and converting it to cash, we may also see cybercriminals employing some new techniques. These could include data manipulation on trading platforms where both traditional and new financial instruments, such as cryptocurrencies, are traded.

Attacks on infrastructure

Even if an organization is difficult to penetrate, it is now typical for organizations to store their valuable data on servers located in data centers rather than on the infrastructure located on their own premises. Attempts to gain unauthorized access to these outsourced components of a company’s infrastructure will become an important attack vector in 2016.

Exploiting IoT vulnerabilities to penetrate corporate networks

IoT (Internet of Things) devices can be found in almost every corporate network. Research conducted in 2015 has shown that there are a number of security problems with these devices and cybercriminals are likely to exploit them because they offer a convenient foothold at the initial stage of penetrating a corporate network.

More rigid security standards, cooperation with law enforcement agencies

In response to the growing number of computer incidents in business environments and the changes to the overall cyber-threat landscape, regulatory authorities will develop new security standards and update those already in effect. Organizations that are interested in the integrity and security of their digital values will cooperate more actively with law enforcement agencies, or find themselves obliged to do so by the standards mentioned above. This may lead to more concerted efforts to catch cybercriminals, so expect to hear about new arrests in 2016.

What to do?

In 2015, we have seen cybercriminals begin to actively use APT attack methods to penetrate company networks. We are talking here about reconnaissance that aims to identify weak spots in a corporate infrastructure and gathering information about employees. There is also the use of spear phishing and waterhole attacks, the active use of exploits to execute code and gain administrator rights, the use of legitimate software along with Trojans for remote administration, research of the targeted network and abuse of password restoration software. All this requires the development of methods and techniques to protect corporate networks.

As for specific recommendations, the TOP 35 cyber-intrusion mitigation strategies developed by the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) should be consulted first of all. Through comprehensive, detailed analysis of local attacks and threats, ASD has found that at least 85% of targeted cyber intrusions could be mitigated by four basic strategies. Three of them are related to specialized security solutions. Kaspersky Lab products include technological solutions to cover the first three major strategies.

Below is a list of the four basic strategies that reduce the possibility of a successful targeted attack:

  • Use application whitelisting to help prevent malicious software and unapproved programs from running
  • Patch applications such as Java, PDF viewers, Flash, web browsers and Microsoft Office
  • Patch operating system vulnerabilities
  • Restrict administrative privileges to operating systems and applications, based on user duties.

For detailed information about the ASD mitigation strategies, consult the threat mitigation article in the Securelist encyclopedia.

Another important factor is the use of the latest threat data, i.e. threat intelligence services (Kaspersky Lab, for example, provides its own Kaspersky Intelligence Service ). A timely configuration and checkup of the corporate network using this data will help protect against attacks or detect an attack at an early stage.

The basic principles of ensuring security in corporate networks remain unchanged:

  • Train staff. Maintaining information security is not only the job of the corporate security service but also the responsibility of every employee.
  • Organize security procedures. The corporate security system must provide an adequate response to evolving threats.
  • Use new technologies and methods. Each added layer of protection helps reduce the risk of intrusion.



If You Are a Victim of Identity Theft

SANS Tip of the Day - Tue, 12/08/2015 - 00:00
Report any identity theft immediately by following these steps:

Stepping out of the dark: Hashcat went OpenSource

Malware Alerts - Mon, 12/07/2015 - 11:17

While passwords are still an essential topic in IT-Security, the recovery and cracking of those is as well. There are several tools focusing on password recovery while two of them stand out of the crowd: Hashcat/oclHashcat and John-the-Ripper (JtR).

  • We already mentioned Hashcat in our blog on account password security here.
  • Jens Steube – the mind behind Hashcat -also supported our research on the Gauss malware by creating the oclGaussCrack.
  • Beginning of this year we also asked for help on the Equationgroup MD5 “e6d290a03b70cfa5d4451da444bdea39”. Jens Steube and Philipp Schmidt solved it as arabic word for “unregistered”.

Last Friday, a “cryptic” message was posted on Twitter by @hashcat

The MD5 revealed a major step for Hashcat: “hashcat open source” – Jens ‘atom’ Steube decided to go OpenSource with his well-known Password recovering/cracking tool Hashcat/oclHashcat. Over this weekend, the github repository of Hashcat was among the top trending and collected already more than 1,000 “stars“.

Screenshot by

Repository Official Announcement

Hashcat and oclHashcat

This project implements a rich set of features of attacks against a long list of algorithms. Hashcat is for CPU-based hash cracking while oclHashcat uses GPUs.

Why Password cracking tools and OpenSource?

There are many reasons why such tools are needed. One of the main user-groups are penetration-testers. Their job is to evaluate the security in given areas including evaluation of password security. Also forensic-examiners use these tools in order to gain access to required evidence. These cases and tasks are often highly sensitive and apply to strict rules. OpenSource offers the possibility of developing customized extensions without leaking any potential sensitive information to external developers of such tools. This applies if different hash-algorithms are required to be audited while pentesting or specific requirements are set in forensic cases e.g.  criminal evidence collection for an upcoming lawsuit.

The implemented functionalities also try to push for stronger security by revealing unsecure hash-algorithms or vulnerabilities and weak passwords. This is must not be underestimated, as driving the evolution and development of new secure algorithms is an important and necessary step. [see Collision Vulnerabilities in MD5SHA1 and SHA2.

Hashcat as OpenSource under the MIT License will now open possibilities of integrating other libraries and porting the software to other platforms. Hashcat may now also be integrated into Linux distributions and thereby opening up for a broader audience, since it’s even easier to use.

It’s difficult to foresee the future, but for sure we’ll see more development in this area – for a good reason.

Arabian tales by ‘Nigerians’

Malware Alerts - Mon, 12/07/2015 - 05:57

The war in Syria, which began several years ago, has recently become one of the most widely reported events in the media. Along with the growing interest of the international community in Middle East events, “Nigerian” scammers have also jumped on the bandwagon. Over the last few months, we have recorded an increase in the number of fraudulent emails utilizing the Syrian theme.

The authors of most of the emails introduced themselves as Syrian citizens seeking asylum in Europe, and requested assistance in investing large sums of money. The messages were either short, with just enough info to arouse the recipient’s interest, or provide a detailed description of the offer.

Fraudsters often send out emails on behalf of women whose husbands have supposedly been killed or died. This theme was exploited with little or no changes in the Syria-related emails. A “widow” writes that her husbands had been killed and now she has a large sum of money that she wants to transfer to another country – she usually wants to get out of Syria too.

Fraudsters can also distribute emails on behalf of employees or owners of companies. To make the email more convincing, the text may include the names of real organizations. The authors of the emails provide a variety of stories to hook the recipient. For example, one of them says he has successfully transferred his assets to France but could not get a visa, so he is asking for help in case he cannot get to Europe.

The scammers are trying not only to get recipients interested by promising financial rewards but to evoke pity and compassion. In particular, the pseudo-Syrian citizens complain of harassment by the president and ask for help transferring and preserving their money.

English is the most popular language with the “Nigerian” scammers; however, we have come across emails in other languages: German, French and Arabic. The author of a German-language email introduced himself as an officer of the Syrian army fighting against ISIS; he writes that he wants to move $16 million earned by selling oil out of the country, and asks the recipient to contact him for more information. In particular, the fact that the citizens of Syria and other Arab countries have large amounts of money is often explained by various stories related to oil deals.

An email in French is written on behalf of a young Syrian refugee whose relatives were killed in the war in Syria and who is now staying in Germany. She complains about the unbearable cold in the tent she lives in, and about the promises of the authorities to improve the living conditions which are never fulfilled. She asks the recipient to take her in in exchange for a large sum of money.

Finally, the emails in Arabic, the official language of Syria, tell a sad story about a widow from Damascus, whose husband and children were killed during a bombardment using chemical weapons. The tale of the unhappy woman is intended to evoke the recipient’s sympathy while also mentioning a large sum of money that should tempt the recipient to help.

“Nigerian” scammers are trying to make their stories believable so they are using a standard set of tricks: links to legitimate news sources, detailed emotive stories where real events are mentioned, including well-known personalities, etc. However, it is worth remembering that emails from unknown senders offering you millions of dollars cannot be genuine. Therefore, the best solution is to simply delete the email and not enter into correspondence with the scammers.

Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset

Malware Alerts - Fri, 12/04/2015 - 05:59

Sofacy (also known as “Fancy Bear”, “Sednit”, “STRONTIUM” and “APT28”) is an advanced threat group that has been active since around 2008, targeting mostly military and government entities worldwide, with a focus on NATO countries. More recently, we have also seen an increase in activity targeting Ukraine.

Back in 2011-2012, the group used a relatively tiny implant (known as “Sofacy” or SOURFACE) as its first stage malware. The implant shared certain similarities with the old Miniduke implants. This led us to believe the two groups were connected, at least to begin with, although it appears they parted ways in 2014, with the original Miniduke group switching to the CosmicDuke implant.

At some point during 2013, the Sofacy group expanded its arsenal and added more backdoors and tools, including CORESHELL, SPLM (aka Xagent, aka CHOPSTICK), JHUHUGIT (which is built with code from the Carberp sources), AZZY (aka ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, EVILTOSS, and spans across four to five generations) and a few others. We’ve seen quite a few versions of these implants and they were relatively widespread for a time.

#Sofacy group has been active since 2008, targeting mostly military and government entities in NATO countries


Earlier this year, we noticed a new release of the AZZY implant which, at the time, was largely undetected by anti-malware products. We observed several waves of attacks using this version, most recently in October. The new waves of attacks also included a new generation of USB stealers deployed by the Sofacy actor, with the first versions dating back to February 2015, and which appear to be geared exclusively towards high profile targets.

Sofacy’s August 2015 attack wave

In the months leading up to August, the Sofacy group launched several waves of attacks relying on zero-day exploits in Microsoft Office, Oracle Sun Java, Adobe Flash Player and Windows itself. For instance, its JHUHUGIT implant was delivered through a Flash zero-day and used a Windows EoP exploit to break out of the sandbox. The JHUHUGIT implant became a relatively popular first stage for the Sofacy attacks and was used again with a Java zero-day (CVE-2015-2590) in July 2015.

While the JHUHUGIT (and more recently, “JKEYSKW”) implant used in most of the Sofacy attacks, high profile victims are being targeted with another first level implant, representing the latest evolution of their AZZYTrojan.

Two recurring characteristics of the #Sofacy group are speed and the use of multi-backdoor packages


The first versions of the new AZZY implant appeared in August of this year. During a high profile incident we investigated, our products successfully detected and blocked a “standard” Sofacy “AZZY” sample that was used to target a range of defense contractors. The sample used in this attack (md5 A96F4B8AC7AA9DBF4624424B7602D4F7, compiled July 29th, 2015) was a pretty standard Sofacy x64 AZZY implant, which has the internal name “advshellstore.dll”.

Interestingly, the fact that the attack was blocked didn’t appear to stop the Sofacy team. Just an hour and a half later they had compiled and delivered another AZZY x64 backdoor (md5: 9D2F9E19DB8C20DC0D20D50869C7A373, compiled August 4th, 2015). This was no longer detectable with static signatures by our product. However, it was detected dynamically by the host intrusion prevention subsystem when it appeared in the system and was executed.

This recurring, blindingly-fast Sofacy attack attracted our attention as neither sample was delivered through a zero-day vulnerability — instead, they appeared to be downloaded and installed by another malware. This separate malware was installed by an unknown attack as “AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\msdeltemp.dll” (md5: CE8B99DF8642C065B6AF43FDE1F786A3).

The top level malware, CE8B99DF8642C065B6AF43FDE1F786A3 (named by its authors “msdeltemp.dll” according to internal strings, and compiled July 28th, 2015) is a rare type of the Sofacy AZZY implant. It has been modified to drop a separate C&C helper, (md5: 8C4D896957C36EC4ABEB07B2802268B9) as “tf394kv.dll“.

The dropped “tf394kv.dll” file is an external C&C communications library, compiled on July 24th, 2015 and used by the main backdoor for all Internet-based communications.

Decrypted configuration block of the C&C helper library “tf394kv.dll

This code modification marks an unusual departure from the typical AZZY backdoors, with its C&C communication functions moved to an external DLL file. In the past, the Sofacy developers modified earlier AZZY backdoors to use a C&C server encoded in the registry, instead of storing it in the malware itself, so this code modularisation follows the same line of thinking.

In addition to the new AZZY backdoors with side-DLL for C&C, we observed a new set of data-theft modules deployed against victims by the Sofacy group. Among the most popular modern defense mechanisms against APTs are air-gaps — isolated network segments without Internet access, where sensitive data is stored. In the past, we’ve seen groups such as Equation and Flame use malware to steal data from air-gapped networks. The Sofacy group uses such tools as well.

The first versions of these new USB stealer modules appeared around February 2015 and the latest appear to have been compiled in May 2015. Older versions of these USBSTEALER modules were previously described by our colleagues from ESET.

One example of the new Sofacy USBSTEALER modules is 8b238931a7f64fddcad3057a96855f6c, which is named internally as msdetltemp.dll.

This data theft module appears to have been compiled in May 2015 and is designed to watch removable drives and collect files from them, depending on a set of rules defined by the attackers. The stolen data is copied into a hidden directory as “%MYPICTURES%\%volume serial number%“, from where it can be exfiltrated by the attackers using one of the AZZY implants. More details on the new USB stealers are available in the section on technical analysis.


Over the last year, the Sofacy group has increased its activity almost tenfold when compared to previous years, becoming one of the most prolific, agile and dynamic threat actors in the arena. This activity spiked in July 2015, when the group dropped two completely new exploits, an Office and Java zero-day.

At the beginning of August, Sofacy began a new wave of attacks, focusing on defense-related targets. As of November 2015, this wave of attacks is ongoing. The attackers deploy a rare modification of the AZZY backdoor, which is used for the initial reconnaissance. Once a foothold is established, they try to upload more backdoors, USB stealers as well as other hacking tools such as “Mimikatz” for lateral movement.

Over the last year, the #Sofacy group has increased its activity almost tenfold, that spiked in July 2015


Two recurring characteristics of the Sofacy group that we keep seeing in its attacks are speed and the use of multi-backdoor packages for extreme resilience. In the past, the group used droppers that installed both the SPLM and AZZY backdoors on the same machine. If one of them was detected, the other one provided the attacker with continued access.

As usual, the best defense against targeted attacks is a multi-layered approach. Combine traditional anti-malware technologies with patch management, host intrusion detection and, ideally, whitelisting and default-deny strategies. According to a study by the Australian DSD, 85% of the targeted attacks analysed could have been stopped by four simple defense strategies. While it’s impossible to achieve 100% protection, in practice and most cases all you have to do is increase your defenses to the point where it becomes too expensive for the attacker – who will just give up and move on to other targets.

More information about the Sofacy group is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligent Services.

Is there a ‘silver bullet’ to protect yourself against Sofacy? Learn more on Kaspersky Business blog.

Technical analysis

Internal name: DWN_DLL_MAIN.dll
File format: PE32 DLL
MD5: ce8b99df8642c065b6af43fde1f786a3
Linker version: 11.0, Microsoft Visual Studio
Linker timestamp: 2015.07.28 13:05:20 (GMT)
Exported functions:

  • 10003F30: ?Applicate@@YGHXZ
  • 10004270: ?SendDataToServer_2@@YGHPAEKEPAPAEPAK@Z
  • 10003F60: ?k@@YGPAUHINSTANCE__@@PBD@Z

The library starts its main worker thread from the DllMain function.

Most of the strings inside the module are encrypted with a homebrew XOR-based algorithm. In addition to that, API function names are reversed, presumably to avoid detection in memory.

Once started, the code in the main thread resolves the basic API functions it needs and loads an additional library from the following location: “%TEMP%\tf394kv.dll”. If this file is not present, it is recreated from a hardcoded encrypted array inside the body of the DLL.

Next, the module enters an infinite loop. Every five minutes it collects basic system information and sends it to the C2 server:

  • Windows version number
  • Hardcoded string “4.3” (the backdoor’s internal version number)
  • List of running processes

The main thread also spawns a separate thread for receiving new commands from the C2 servers. Every 10 minutes, it sends a new request to the server. The server is expected to send back executable code and one of the following commands:

  • Write a new file “%LOCAL_APPDATA%\dllhost.exe” or “%TEMP%\dllhost.exe” and execute it, then delete the file
  • Write a new file “%LOCAL_APPDATA%\sechost.dll” or “%TEMP%\sechost.dll” and call its first exported function using “rundll32.exe” or Windows API, then delete the file
  • Run shellcode provided by the server in a new thread

While processing the commands, the backdoor logs all errors and execution results. The module also reads the contents of the file “%APPDATA%\chkdbg.log” and appends it to the results. It then sends the aggregated log back to the C2 server.

The module aborts the thread receiving C2 command after it fails to correctly execute commands more than six times in a row, i.e. if file or process creation fails.

The export called “k” is a wrapper for the “LoadLibraryA” API function.

The export called “SendDataToServer_2” does exactly what the name means: it encrypts all collected data, encodes it using Base64 encoding and calls its additional library to send the data to the C2 server. The names of the C2 servers are hardcoded.

Hardcoded C&C servers in the main module

The two C&C’s hardcoded in the configuration block of the main binary are:

  • intelnetservice[.]com
  • intelsupport[.]net

The export called “Applicate” runs a standard Windows application message loop until a “WM_ENDSESSION” message is received. It then terminates the main thread.

Internal name: snd.dll
File format: PE32 DLL
MD5: 8c4d896957c36ec4abeb07b2802268b9
Linker version: 11.0, Microsoft Visual Studio
Linker timestamp: 2015.07.24 12:07:27 (GMT)
Exported functions:

  • 10001580: Init
  • 10001620: InternetExchange
  • 10001650: SendData

This external library implements a simple Wininet-based transport for the main module.

The strings inside the binary are encrypted using 3DES and XOR and reversed.

The DllMain function initializes the library and resolves all required Windows API functions.

The “Init” export establishes connection to port 80 of a C2 server using Wininet API. The user agent string employed is “MSIE 8.0”.

The “SendData” export sends a HTTP POST request using a hardcoded URI “/store/“. The reply, if its length is not equal to six and its contents do not contain “OK” is returned back to the caller.

The “InternetExchange” export closes the established connection and frees associated handles.

Sofacy AZZY 4.3 dropper analysis

File format: PE32 EXE
File size: 142,336 bytes
MD5: c3ae4a37094ecfe95c2badecf40bf5bb
Linker version: 11.0, Microsoft Visual Studio
Linker timestamp: 2015.02.10 10:01:59 (GMT)

Most of the strings and data in the file are encrypted using 3DES and XOR.

The code makes use of the Windows Crypto API for 3DES and the decryption key is stored as a standard Windows PUBLICKEYSTRUC structure:

Part of the decryption algorithm

Header of one encrypted data buffer containing the hardcoded 3DES key

First, it creates a new directory: “%LOCAL_APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows”. If the directory creation fails it tries to install into “%TEMP%” directory instead.

Next it writes a hardcoded binary from its body to “msdeltemp.dll” into the target directory. If the file exists it then moves it to “__tmpdt.tmp” in the same directory and continues the installation. Sets file creation timestamp to that of “%SYSTEM%\sfc.dll”

To ensure the dropped payload starts automatically on user log-in it creates the following registry key:


StartUpChekTemp=RUNDLL32.EXE “%path to msdeltemp.dll%”,#1

Next, it starts the dropped dll using the same command line:

RUNDLL32.EXE “%path to msdeltemp.dll%“,#1

Finally, the program removes itself by starting the following command: “cmd /c DEL %path to self%

The MD5 of the dropped file is f6f88caf49a3e32174387cacfa144a89

Dropper payload – downloader DLL

Internal name: msdetltemp.dll
File format: PE32 DLL
File size: 73 728 bytes
MD5: f6f88caf49a3e32174387cacfa144a89
Linker version: 11.0, Microsoft Visual Studio
Linker timestamp: 2015.02.10 07:20:02 (GMT)
Exported functions:
10002B55: Applicate

Most of the strings inside the binary are encrypted using a homebrew XOR-based algorithm and reversed.

The library is an older version of the “DWN_DLL_MAIN.dll” (md5: ce8b99df8642c065b6af43fde1f786a3).

The DllMain function is identical and starts the main thread; the “Applicate” function is identical to the one in the newer library. This version of the module does not rely on an external transport DLL for communicating with its C2 servers; instead it directly uses Wininet API functions.

The module contains the following hardcoded C2 server names:

  • drivres-update[.]info
  • softupdates[.]info

The module uses a hardcoded URL (“/check/“) for sending HTTP POST requests to its C2 servers.

The server is expected to send back executable code and one of the following commands:

  • Write a new file “%LOCAL_APPDATA%\svchost.exe” or “%TEMP%\svchost.exe” and execute it, then delete the file
  • Write a new file “%LOCAL_APPDATA%\conhost.dll” or “%TEMP%\conhost.dll” and call its first exported function using “rundll32.exe” or Windows API, then delete the file
  • Run shellcode provided by the server in a new thread
File collection module (“USB Stealer”)

Internal name: msdetltemp.dll (from resources)
File size: 50,176 bytes
File format: PE32 EXE
MD5: 0369620eb139c3875a62e36bb7abdae8
Linker version: 10.0, Microsoft Visual Studio
Linker timestamp: 2015.02.09 11:48:01 (GMT)

Most of the strings inside the binary are encrypted using 3DES and XOR and reversed.

The program creates the mutex “mtx” and an event named “WerTyQ34C”.

Upon start, it creates a window with the class name “Hello” and title “Program”, subscribes for device arrival notifications for that window and enters a standard Windows message processing loop. The message processing function waits for the WM_DEVICECHANGE event and starts a new thread on its arrival.

The module inspects every new disk volume attached to the system. For every disk it creates a “stash” directory in “%root stash directory location%\%volume serial number in hex%” with attributes FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN and FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM. The root stash directory location may be read from the configuration file or set to the default location which is “%MYPICTURES%”.

Then, it traverses the filesystem of the volume looking for files. Depending on the settings read from the configuration file, the scope may be narrowed to files with particular extensions and/or files created after a specified date.

It is worth noting that if the source file location contains the string “System Volume Information\S-1-5-21-1315235578-283289242\”, then the file is deleted after copying to the “stash” directory. There are known related samples that are able to create such directories on removable drives, i.e. the sample with md5: 8cb08140ddb00ac373d29d37657a03cc.

The configuration file is loaded from the same directory as the module and is expected to have a name “NvCpld.dat“. It is a text file that may contain the following configuration parameters:

  • Path – location of the root “stash” directory
  • Ext – search for files with one of these extensions only
  • Date – search for files not earlier than this date

Internal name: NvCpld.dll (from export table), msdetltemp.dll (from resources), IGFSRVC.dll (from resources)
File format: PE32 DLL
File size: 76,288 bytes
MD5s: 8b238931a7f64fddcad3057a96855f6c, ce151285e8f0e7b2b90162ba171a4b90
Linker version: 11.0, Microsoft Visual Studio
Linker timestamps: 2015.05.29 11:20:32 (GMT), 2006.11.25 04:39:15 (GMT)
Exported functions:
10002500: NvMswt
10002860: NvReg
10002880: NvStart
10002A80: NvStop

This library is a newer version of the file collection module (md5: 0369620eb139c3875a62e36bb7abdae8) wrapped in a DLL file.

There are two known variants of this module; they only differ in timestamp values and version information in the resource section.

The DllMain function only decrypts the data structures and initializes Windows API pointers.

The function “NvMswt” is a wrapper for the API function MsgWaitForMultipleObjects.

The function “NvReg” is a wrapper for the API function RegisterClassW.

The function “NvStart” is similar to the main function of the older module; it creates a window and enters the message loop waiting for device arrival notifications. The only difference introduced is that an event named “WerTyQ34C” can be signalled by the function “NvStop” to terminate the message loop and stop processing.

Indicators of compromise: AZZY 4.3 installer:


New generation (4.3) AZZY implants:


Dropped C&C helper DLL for AZZY 4.3:


File collectors / USB stealers:


Stand-alone AZZY backdoors:


C&C hostnames:
  • drivres-update[.]info
  • intelnetservice[.]com
  • intelsupport[.]net
  • softupdates[.]info
Kaspersky Lab products detect the malware mentioned here with the following names:
  • Trojan.Win64.Sofacy.q
  • Trojan.Win64.Sofacy.s
  • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic

Social Media Privacy Settings

SANS Tip of the Day - Fri, 12/04/2015 - 00:00
Privacy settings on social networks have limited value. They are confusing to configure and change often. Ultimately, if you do not want your parents or boss reading it, do not post it.

Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2015. Top security stories

Malware Alerts - Thu, 12/03/2015 - 05:59

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Targeted attacks and malware campaigns

Targeted attacks are now an established part of the threat landscape, so it’s no surprise to see such attacks feature in our yearly review. Last year, in our security forecast, we outlined what we saw as the likely future APT developments.

  • The merger of cybercrime and APT
  • Fragmentation of bigger APT groups
  • Evolving malware techniques
  • New methods of data exfiltration
  • APT arms race

Here are the major APT campaigns that we reported this year.

Carbanak combined cybercrime – in this case, stealing money from financial institutions – with the infiltration techniques typical of a targeted attack. The campaign was uncovered in spring 2015: Kaspersky Lab was invited to conduct a forensic investigation of a bank’s systems after some of its ATMs started to dispense cash ‘randomly’. It turned out that the bank was infected. Carbanak is a backdoor designed to carry out espionage, data exfiltration and remote control of infected computers. The attackers used APT-style methods to compromise their victims – sending spear-phishing e-mails to bank employees. Once installed on a bank’s computer, the attackers carried out reconnaissance to identify systems related to processing, accounting and ATMs and simply mimicked the activities of legitimate employees. Carbanak used three methods to steal money: (1) dispensing cash from ATMs, (2) transferring money to cybercriminals using the SWIFT network and (3) creating fake accounts and using mule services to collect the money. The attackers targeted around 100 financial institutions, with total losses amounting to almost $1 billion.

One of most talked-about news stories of Q1 2015 surrounded the Equation cyber-espionage group. The attackers behind Equation successfully infected the computers of thousands of victims in Iran, Russia, Syria, Afghanistan, the United States and elsewhere – victims included government and diplomatic institutions, telecommunications companies and energy firms. This is one of the most sophisticated APT campaigns we’ve seen: one of the many modules developed by the group modifies the firmware of hard drives – providing a level of stealth and persistence beyond other targeted attacks. It’s clear that development of the code stretches back to 2001 or earlier. It’s also related to other notorious attacks, Stuxnet and Flame – for example, its arsenal included two zero-day vulnerabilities that were later to be used in Stuxnet.

While investigating an incident in the Middle East, we uncovered the activity of a previously unknown group conducting targeted attacks. Desert Falcons is the first Arabic-speaking group that has been seen conducting full-scale cyber-espionage operations – apparently connected with the political situation in the region. The first signs of this campaign date back to 2011. The first infections took place in 2013, although the peak of activity was in late 2014 and early 2015. The group has stolen over 1 million files from more than 3,000 victims. The victims include political activists and leaders, government and military organizations, mass media and financial institutions – located primarily in Palestine, Egypt, Israel and Jordan. It’s clear that members of the Desert Falcons group aren’t beginners: they developed Windows and Android malware from scratch, and skillfully organized attacks that relied on phishing e-mails, fake web sites and fake social network accounts.

#Carbanak combined stealing from financial institutions with techniques typical of a targeted attack #KLReport


In March 2015, we published our report on the Animal Farm APT, although information on the tools used in this campaign started appearing in the previous year. In March 2014, the French newspaper, Le Monde, published an article on a cyber-espionage toolset that had been identified by Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC): this toolset had been used in the ‘Snowglobe’ operation that targeted French-speaking media in Canada, as well as Greece, France, Norway and some African countries. CSEC believed that the operation might have been initiated by French intelligence agencies. A year later, security researchers published analyses (here, here and here) of malicious programs that had much in common with ‘Snowglobe’: in particular, the research included samples with the internal name ‘Babar’ – the name of the program mentioned by CSEC. Following analysis of the malicious programs, and the connections between them, Kaspersky Lab named the group behind the attacks as Animal Farm. The group’s arsenal included two of the three zero-day vulnerabilities that we had found in 2014 and that had been used by cybercriminals: for example, an attack from the compromised web site of the Syrian Ministry of Justice using CVE-2014-0515 exploits led to the download of an Animal Farm tool called ‘Casper’. One curious feature of this campaign is that one of its programs, ‘NBOT’, is designed to conduct DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks. This is rare for APT groups. One of the malicious ‘animals’ in the farm has the strange name ‘Tafacalou’ – possibly an Occitan word (a language spoken in France and some other places).

In April 2015, we reported the appearance of a new member of a growing ‘Duke’ family that already includes MiniDuke, CosmicDuke and OnionDuke. The CozyDuke APT (also known as ‘CozyBear’, ‘CozyCat’ and ‘Office Monkeys’) targets government organisations and businesses in the United States, Germany, South Korea and Uzbekistan. The attack implements a number of sophisticated techniques, including the use of encryption, anti-detection capabilities and a well-developed set of components that are structurally similar to earlier threats within the ‘Duke’ family. However, one of its most notable features is its use of social engineering. Some of the attackers’ spear-phishing e-mails contain a link to hacked web sites – including high-profile, legitimate sites – that host a ZIP archive. This archive contains a RAR SFX that installs the malware while showing an empty PDF as a decoy. Another approach is to send out fake flash videos as e-mail attachments. A notable example (one that gives the malware one of its names) is ‘OfficeMonkeys LOL’. When run, this drops a CozyDuke executable on to the computer, while playing a ‘fun’ decoy video showing monkeys working in an office. This encourages victims to pass the video around the office, increasing the number of compromised computers. The successful use of social engineering to trick staff into doing something that jeopardises corporate security – by CozyDuke and so many other targeted attackers – underlines the need to make staff education a core component of any business security strategy.

The Naikon APT focused on sensitive targets in south-eastern Asia and around the South China Sea. The attackers, who seem to be Chinese-speaking and have been active for at least five years, target top-level government agencies and civil and military organisations in the Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Singapore, Nepal, Thailand, Laos and China. Like so many targeted attack campaigns, Naikon makes extensive use of social engineering to trick employees of target organizations into installing the malware. The main module is a remote administration tool that supports 48 commands designed to exercise control over infected computers: these include commands to take a complete inventory, download and upload data, install add-on modules and the use of keyloggers to obtain employees’ credentials. The attackers assigned an operator to each target country, able to take advantage of local cultural features – for example, the tendency to use personal e-mail accounts for work. They also made use of a specific proxy server within a country’s borders, to manage connections to infected computers and transfer of data to the attackers’ Command-and-Control (C2) servers. You can find our main report and follow-up report on our web site

One of the many modules developed by the #Equation group modifies the firmware of hard drives #KLReport


While researching Naikon, we also uncovered the activities of the Hellsing APT group. This group focused mainly on government and diplomatic organisations in Asia: most victims are located in Malaysia and the Philippines, although we have also seen victims in India, Indonesia and the US. In itself, Hellsing is a small and technically unremarkable cyber-espionage group (around 20 organisations have been targeted by Hellsing). What makes it interesting is that the group found itself on the receiving end of a spear-phishing attack by the Naikon APT group – and decided to strike back! The target of the e-mail questioned the authenticity of the e-mail with the sender. They subsequently received a response from the attacker, but didn’t open the attachment. Instead, shortly afterwards they sent an e-mail back to the attackers that contained their own malware. It’s clear that, having detected that they were being targeted, the Hellsing group was intent on identifying the attackers and gathering intelligence on their activities. In the past, we’ve seen APT groups accidentally treading on each other’s toes – for example, stealing address books from victims and then mass-mailing everyone on each of the lists. But an ATP-on-APT attack is unusual

Many targeted attack campaigns focus on large enterprises, government agencies and other high-profile organisations. So it’s easy to read the headlines and imagine that such organisations are the only ones on the radar of those behind targeted attacks. However, one of the campaigns we reported last quarter showed clearly that it’s not only ‘big fish’ that attackers are interested in. The Grabit cyber-espionage campaign is designed to steal data from small- and medium-sized organisations – mainly based in Thailand, Vietnam and India, although we have also seen victims in the US, UAE, Turkey, Russia, China, Germany and elsewhere. The targeted sectors include chemicals, nanotechnology, education, agriculture, media and construction. We estimate that the group behind the attacks has been able to steal around 10,000 files. There’s no question that every business is a potential target – for its own assets, or as a way of infiltrating another organisation

In spring 2015, during a security sweep, Kaspersky Lab detected a cyber-intrusion affecting several internal systems. The full-scale investigation that followed uncovered the development of a new malware platform from one of the most skilled, mysterious and powerful groups in the APT world – Duqu, sometimes referred to as the step-brother of Stuxnet. We named this new platform ‘Duqu 2.0’. In the case of Kaspersky Lab, the attack took advantage of a zero-day vulnerability in the Windows kernel (patched by Microsoft on 9 June 2015) and possibly up to two others (now patched) that were also zero-day vulnerabilities at the time. The main goal of the attackers was to spy on Kaspersky Lab technologies, ongoing research and internal processes. However, Kaspersky Lab was not the only target. Some Duqu 2.0 infections were linked to the P5+1 events related to negotiations with Iran about a nuclear deal: the attackers appear to have launched attacks at the venues for some of these high-level talks. In addition, the group launched a similar attack related to the 70th anniversary event of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau. One of the most notable features of Duqu 2.0 was its lack of persistence, leaving almost no traces in the system. The malware made no changes to the disk or system settings: the malware platform was designed in such a way that it survives almost exclusively in the memory of infected systems. This suggests that the attackers were confident that they could maintain their presence in the system even if an individual victim’s computer was re-booted and the malware was cleared from memory. The Duqu 2.0 technical paper and analysis of the persistence module can be found on our web site

In August, we reported on the Blue Termite APT, a targeted attack campaign focused on stealing information from organisations in Japan. These include government agencies, local government bodies, public interest groups, universities, banks, financial services, energy, communication, heavy industry, chemical, automotive, electrical, news media, information services sector, health care, real estate, food, semiconductor, robotics, construction, insurance, transportation and more. One of the most high profile targets was the Japan Pension Service. The malware is customized according to the specific victim. The Blue Termite backdoor stores data about itself – including C2, API name, strings for anti-analysis, values of mutexes, as well as the MD5 checksum of backdoor commands and the internal proxy information. The data is stored in encrypted form, making analysis of the malware more difficult – a unique decryption key is required for each sample. The main method of infection, as with so many targeted attack campaigns, is via spear-phishing e-mails. However, we have other methods of infection. These include drive-by downloads using a Flash exploit (CVE-2015-5119) – one of the exploits leaked following the Hacking Team security breach – several Japanese web sites were compromised this way. We also found some watering-hole attacks, including one on a web site belonging to a prominent member of the Japanese government

#Hellsing group found itself on the receiving end of a spear-phishing attack by #Naikon group & strike back #KLReport


The group behind the Turla cyber-espionage campaign has been active for more than eight years now (our initial report, follow-up analysis and campaign overview can be found on, infecting hundreds of computers in more than 45 countries. The attackers profile their victims using watering-hole attacks in the initial stages. However, as outlined in our latest report, for subsequent operations the group makes use of satellite communications to manage its C2 traffic. The method used by Turla to hijack downstream satellite links does not require a valid satellite Internet subscription. The key benefit is that it’s anonymous – it’s very hard to identify the attackers. The satellite receivers can be located anywhere within the area covered by the satellite (typically a wide area) and the true location and hardware of the C2 server can’t be identified easily or physically seized. It’s also cheaper than purchasing a satellite-based link and easier than hijacking traffic between the victim and the satellite operator and injecting packets along the way. The Turla group tends to focus on satellite Internet providers located in the Middle East and Africa, including Congo, Lebanon, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia and the UAE. Satellite broadcasts from these countries don’t normally cover European and North American countries, making it very hard for security researchers to investigate such attacks. The use of satellite-based Internet links is an interesting development. The hijacking of downstream bandwidth is cheap (around $1,000 for the initial investment and around $1,000 per year in maintenance), easy to do and offers a high degree of anonymity. On the other hand, it is not always as reliable as more traditional methods (bullet-proof hosting, multiple proxy levels and hacked web sites) – all of which Turla also uses. This makes it less likely that it will be used to maintain extensive botnets. Nevertheless, if this method becomes widespread among APT groups or cybercriminals, it will pose a serious problem for the IT security industry and law enforcement agencies

In August 2015, we published an update on the Darkhotel APT. These attacks were originally characterised by the misuse of stolen certificates, the deployment of HTA files using multiple methods and the infiltration of hotel Wi-Fi to place backdoors on targets’ computers

The #Turla group makes use of satellite communications to manage its C2 traffic #KLReport


While the attackers behind this APT continue to use these methods, they have supplemented their armoury, shifting their attention more towards spear-phishing of their chosen victims. As well as using HTA files, they are also deploying infected RAR files, using the RTLO (right to left override) mechanism to mask the real extension of the file. The attackers also use Flash exploits, including a zero-day exploit leaked as a result of the Hacking Team security breach. The group has also extended its geographic reach to include victims in North Korea, Russia, South Korea, Japan, Bangladesh, Thailand, India, Mozambique and Germany

Data breaches

There has been a steady stream of security breaches this year. That such incidents have become routine is hardly surprising: personal information is a valuable commodity – not just for legitimate companies, but for cybercriminals too. Among the biggest incidents this year were attacks on Anthem, LastPass, Hacking Team, the United States Office of Personnel Management, Ashley Madison, Carphone Warehouse, Experian and TalkTalk. Some of these attacks resulted in the theft of huge amounts of data, highlighting the fact that many companies are failing to take adequate steps to defend themselves. It’s not simply a matter of defending the corporate perimeter. There’s no such thing as 100 per cent security, so it’s not possible to guarantee that systems can’t be breached, especially where someone on the inside is tricked into doing something that jeopardises corporate security. But any organisation that holds personal data has a duty of care to secure it effectively. This includes hashing and salting customer passwords and encrypting other sensitive data

On the other hand, consumers can limit the damage of a security breach at an online provider by ensuring that they choose passwords that are unique and complex: an ideal password is at least 15 characters long and consists of a mixture of letters, numbers and symbols from the entire keyboard. As an alternative, people can use a password manager application to handle all this for them automatically.

The issue of passwords is one that keeps surfacing. If we choose a password that is too easy to guess, we leave ourselves wide open to identify theft. The problem is compounded if we recycle the same password across multiple online accounts – if one accounts is compromised, they’re all at risk! This is why many providers, including Apple, Google and Microsoft, now offer two-factor authentication – i.e. requiring customers to enter a code generated by a hardware token, or one sent to a mobile device, in order to access a site, or at least in order to make changes to account settings. Two-factor authentication certainly enhances security – but only if it’s required, rather than just being an option

In 2015, there has been a steady stream of security breaches #KLReport


The theft of personal data can have serious consequences for those affected. However, sometimes there can be serious knock-on effects. The Hacking Team breach resulted in the publication of 400GB of data: this included exploits used by the Italian company in its surveillance software. Some of the exploits were used in APT attacks – Darkhotel and Blue Termite. Unsurprisingly, the breach was followed by a scramble to patch the vulnerabilities exposed by the attackers

Smart (but not necessarily secure) devices

The Internet is woven into the fabric of our lives – literally in the case of the growing number of everyday objects used in the modern home – smart TVs, smart meters, baby monitors, kettles and more. You may remember that last year one of our security researchers investigated his own home, to determine whether it was really cyber-secure. You can find a follow-up to this research here. However, the ‘Internet of Things’ encompasses more than household devices.

Researchers have been investigating the potential security risks associated with connected cars for some years. In July 2014 Kaspersky Lab and IAB published a study looking at the potential problem areas of connected cars. Until this year, the focus was on accessing the car’s systems by means of a physical connection to the vehicle. This changed when researchers Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek found a way to gain wireless access to the critical systems of a Jeep Cherokee – successfully taking control and driving it off the road! (You can read the story here)

This story underlines some of the problems with connected devices that extend beyond the car industry – to any connected device. Unfortunately, security features are hard to sell; and in a competitive marketplace, things that make customers’ lives easier tend to take precedence. In addition, connectivity is often added to a pre-existing communication network that wasn’t created with security in mind. Finally, history shows that security tends to be retro-fitted only after something bad happens to demonstrate the impact of a security weakness. You can read more on these issues in a blog post written by Eugene Kaspersky published in the aftermath of the above research

Some of the problems with connected devices apply also to ‘smart cities’ #KLReport


Such problems apply also to ‘smart cities‘. For example, the use of CCTV systems by governments and law enforcement agencies to monitor public places has grown enormously in recent years. Many CCTV cameras are connected wirelessly to the Internet, enabling police to monitor them remotely. However, they are not necessarily secure: there’s the potential for cybercriminals to passively monitor security camera feeds, to inject code into the network – thereby replacing a camera feed with fake footage – or to take systems offline. Two security researchers (Vasilios Hioureas from Kaspersky Lab and Thomas Kinsey from Exigent Systems) recently conducted research into the potential security weaknesses in CCTV systems in one city. You can read Vasilios’s report on our web site)

Unfortunately, there had been no attempt to mask the cameras, so it was easy to determine the makes and models of the cameras being used, examine at the relevant specifications and create their own scaled model in the lab. The equipment being used provided effective security controls, but these controls were not being implemented. Data packets passing across the mesh network were not being encrypted, so an attacker would be able to create their own version of the software and manipulate data travelling across it. One way this could potentially be used by attackers would be to spoof footage sent to a police station, making it appear as if there is an incident in one location, thereby distracting police from a real attack occurring somewhere else in the city

The researchers reported the issues to those in charge of the real world city surveillance system and they are in the process of fixing the security problems. In general, it’s important that WPA encryption, protected by a strong password, is implemented in such networks; that labelling is removed from hardware, to make it harder for would-be attackers to find out how the equipment operates; and to encrypt footage as it travels through the network

The wider issue here is that more and more aspects of everyday life are being made digital: if security isn’t considered at the design stage, the potential dangers could be far-reaching – and retro-fitting security might not be straightforward. The Securing Smart Cities initiative, supported by Kaspersky Lab, is designed to help those responsible for developing smart cities to do so with cyber-security in mind

International co-operation against cybercriminals

Cybercrime is now an established part of life, on the back of the ever-increasing online activities we engage in. This is now being reflected in official statistics. In the UK, for example, the Office for National Statistics now includes cybercrime among its estimates of the scale of crime, reflecting the fact that nature of crime in society is changing. While there’s no question that cybercrime can be lucrative, cybercriminals aren’t always able to act with impunity; and the actions of law enforcement agencies around the world can have a significant impact. International co-operation is particularly important, given the global nature of cybercrime. This year there have been some notable police operations

In April, Kaspersky Lab was involved in the take-down of the Simda botnet, co-ordinated by the Interpol Global Complex for Innovation. The investigation was started by Microsoft and expanded to other participants, including Trend Micro, the Cyber Defense Institute, officers from the Dutch National High Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU), the FBI, the Police Grand-Ducale Section Nouvelles Technologies in Luxembourg, and the Russian Ministry of the Interior’s Cybercrime Department ‘K’ supported by the INTERPOL National Central Bureau in Moscow. As a result of the operation, 14 servers in the Netherlands, the US, Luxembourg, Poland and Russia were taken down. Preliminary analysis of some of the sink-holed server logs revealed that 190 countries had been affected by the botnet

In 2015, there have been some notable international police operations #KLReport


In September, the Dutch police arrested two men for suspected involvement in CoinVault ransomware attacks, following a joint effort by Kaspersky Lab, Panda Security and the Dutch National High Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU). This malware campaign started in May 2014 and continued into this year, targeting victims in more than 20 countries, with the majority of victims in the Netherlands, Germany, the United States, France and Great Britain. They successfully encrypted files on more than 1,500 Windows-based computers, demanding payment in bitcoin to decrypt data. The cybercriminals responsible for this ransomware campaign modified their creations several times to keep on targeting new victims. In November 2014, Kaspersky Lab and the Dutch NHTCU launched a web site to act as a repository of decryption keys; and we also made available online a decryption tool to help victims recover their data without having to pay the ransom. You can find our analysis of the twists and turns employed by the CoinVault authors here. Ransomware has become a notable fixture of the threat landscape. While this case shows that collaboration between researchers and law enforcement agencies can lead to positive results, it’s essential for consumers and businesses alike to take steps to mitigate the risks of this type of malware. Ransomware operations rely on their victims paying up. In September, an FBI agent caused controversy by suggesting that victims should pay the ransom in order to recover their data. While this might seem to be a pragmatic solution (not least because there are situations where recovery of data is not possible), it’s a dangerous strategy. First, there’s no guarantee that the cybercriminals will provide the necessary mechanism to decrypt the data. Second, it reinforces their business model and makes the further development of ransomware more likely. We would recommend that businesses and individuals alike make regular backups of data, to avoid being put in this invidious position

Attacks on industrial objects

Incidents caused by cybersecurity problems are a fairly regular occurrence at industrial objects. For example, according to US ICS CERT data, 245 such incidents were recorded in the US during the 2014 fiscal year, and 22 incidents in July and August 2015. However, we believe these numbers do not reflect the actual situation: there are many more cyber incidents than this. And while enterprise operators and owners prefer to keep quiet about some of these incidents, they are simply unaware of others

Let’s have a look at two cases that caught our attention in 2015

One is an incident that took place at a steel mill in Germany. Towards the end of 2014, the German Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI) published a report (see Appendix on English) which mentioned a cyber incident at a German steel mill. The incident resulted in physical damage to a blast furnace

This is the second cyberattack that we know of, after Stuxnet, to cause physical damage to industrial facilities. According to BSI, the attackers first used phishing emails to infect the enterprise’s office network, after which the hackers managed to infect a SCADA computer and attack the physical equipment. Unfortunately, BSI did not provide any additional information, so we do not know which malware was used and how it operated

This secrecy is bad for everybody: operators of other similar enterprises (with the possible exception of German facilities) will not be able to analyze the attack and implement countermeasures; cybersecurity experts are also in the dark and are unable to suggest security measures to their customers

Incident in Germany – the second cyberattack, after Stuxnet, to cause physical damage to facilities #KLReport


Another curious incident was an attack against the Frederic Chopin Airport in Warsaw in June 2015., The computer system responsible for preparing flight plans for LOT, Poland’s national airline, was taken down for about five hours one Sunday. According to Reuters, this caused delays to a dozen flights

The airport management provided no details and experts had to form their opinions based on their experience. Ruben Santamarta, Principal Security Consultant at IOActive, has previously called attention to IT security issues in aviation. Based on what the LOT representatives said, he suggested that the company had fallen victim to a targeted attack: the system couldn’t generate flight plans because key nodes in the back office were compromised, or perhaps the attack targeted ground communication devices, resulting in the inability to perform or validate data loading on aircraft (including flight plans)

Our experts also responded to the incident, suggesting there could be two possible scenarios. The incident may have been the result of human error or equipment malfunction. Alternatively, the incident at the relatively small Warsaw airport could be a precursor of larger-scale attacks in other, much larger, airports

It was later announced that a DDoS attack had taken place and that no penetration had actually taken place. Once again, no detailed information about the incident was disclosed and we can either believe the official information or guess at the real reasons and goals of the attack

Whoever was behind the attacks described above and whatever goals they pursued, these incidents clearly demonstrate how significant a part of our lives computers have become and how vulnerable infrastructure objects have become in recent years

Unfortunately, today many governments and regulators resort to a policy of secrecy. We believe that transparency and the exchange of information about cyberattacks is an important part of providing adequate protection for industrial objects. Without this knowledge, it is very hard to protect these objects against future threats

In conclusion, we would like to mention one more trend that is already relevant and will continue to affect us all in the coming years: the hardware used by industrial enterprises is being actively connected to the Web. The Internet may have appeared quite a long time ago, but it is only now that it is being introduced to industrial processes. It is no exaggeration to say that this represents a new industrial revolution: we are witnessing the birth of the ‘Industrial Internet of Things’ or Enterprise 4.0. As a result, enterprises receive a whole host of additional benefits and can improve their manufacturing efficiency

We are witnessing the birth of a new industrial revolution – the ‘Industrial Internet of Things’ #KLReport


In order to keep up with this trend, equipment manufacturers simply add sensors and controllers to proven, safe and reliable equipment originally developed for the ‘offline’ world, provide Internet connectivity for their devices and then offer this ‘new equipment’ to customers. They forget, however, that when online features are added to any device, this gives rise to new cybersecurity-related risks and threats. This is no longer a ‘physical’ device, but a ‘cyber-physical’ one

In the world of physical devices, all industrial devices, instruments, communication protocols, etc. were designed with safety in mind – in other words, they were built to be foolproof. This meant that if a device was designed to meet functional safety requirements, operating it without violating the safety rules would not result in any failures or damage to people or the environment

Enterprise 4.0 brings with it a new security dimension: IT security or protection against intentional external manipulation. You cannot simply connect an object or device from the pre-Internet era to the Internet: the consequences of this can be – and often are – disastrous

Engineers who embrace old ‘pre-revolutionary’ design principles often fail to realize that their devices can now be ‘operated’ not only by engineers, who know which actions are admissible and which are not, but also by hackers for whom there is no such thing as inadmissible remote object operations. This is one of the main reasons why today some well-established companies with many years of experience offer hardware that may be reliable from the point of view of functional safety, but which does not provide an adequate level of cybersecurity

In the world of cyber-physical devices, physical and cyber components are tightly integrated. A cyberattack can disrupt an industrial process, damage equipment or cause a technogenic disaster. Hackers are a real threat and anything that is connected to the Internet can be attacked. This is why equipment manufacturers, when designing new connected industrial equipment, should be as careful about implementing protection against cyberthreats as they are about designing functional safety features.


In 2015, perhaps for the first time in the entire history of the Internet, issues related to protecting networks and being protected online were discussed in connection with every sector of the economy and with people’s everyday life. Choose any sector of modern civilization – finances, industrial production, cars, planes, wearable devices, healthcare and many others – and you will be sure to find publications this year on incidents or cybersecurity problems related to that sector.

Regrettably, cybersecurity has now become inseparably linked with terrorism. Defensive, as well as offensive, methods used online are attracting lots of interest from various illegal organizations and groups.

Cybersecurity issues have risen to the level of top diplomats and government officials. In 2015, cybersecurity agreements were signed between Russia and China, China and the US, China and the UK. In these documents, governments not only agree to cooperate, but also accept the responsibility to refrain from any attacks on each other. At the same time, there was extensive discussion of recent changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement restricting spyware exports. A recurring theme of the year was the use of insecure email services by various political figures across the globe, including the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

All this has led to a huge surge in interest in cybersecurity issues, not only from the mass media but also from the entertainment industry. There were feature films and TV series produced, some of them starring cybersecurity experts, sometimes as themselves.

The word cybersecurity became fashionable in 2015, but this does not mean the problem has been solved. We are seeing what amounts to exponential growth in everything related to cybercrime, including increases in the number of attacks and attackers, the number of victims, defense and protection related costs, laws and agreements that regulate cybersecurity or establish new standards. For us, this is primarily about the sophistication of the attacks we detect. The confrontation is now in the active stage, with the final stage not even on the horizon.

To find out what to expect in the nearest future, read our predictions for 2016.

Kids and Mobile Devices

SANS Tip of the Day - Thu, 12/03/2015 - 00:00
If you have kids with mobile devices, create a central home charging station in your bedroom. Before the kids go to bed at night, have them put their mobile devices there so they are not tempted to play with them when they should be sleeping.

Never Respond to Emails Asking for Personal Information

SANS Tip of the Day - Wed, 12/02/2015 - 00:00
Companies you do business with should never ask for your account information, credit card numbers or password in an email. If you have any questions about an email you receive that supposedly came from your financial institution or service provider, find their number on their website and call them.

Trust Your Instincts

SANS Tip of the Day - Thu, 11/26/2015 - 00:00
Ultimately, common sense is your best protection. If an email, phone call or online message seems odd, suspicious or too good to be true, it may be an attack.

Wake up! You’ve been p0wned

Malware Alerts - Tue, 11/24/2015 - 07:11

Today I came across a popular app that is usually paid but just for today it was absolutely free for iOS users. It is a kind of “smart alarm clock” app which basically monitors your sleeping and wakes you up exclusively during your light sleeping cycle. Wow!

How does it do it? Well, the app enables your embedded mic and uses it during the night to monitor your sleeping cycles. In other words, it records your environment while you’re sleeping. When I read about it I just could not believe it. And that’s because of the variety of potential scenarios a threat actor could exploit with people who use similar apps.

Imagine if the company behind the app gets hacked and the app then transmits data, it will provide access to the private offline life of the people using the app. Or how about another scenario where no data is transmitted – what if the company gets hacked and the attackers edit the original code and then push a new version that does actually transmit recordings to a remote server?

In reality there are several scenarios an attacker could use. Worst of all, since this is a legit app available on AppStore, the attackers don’t even have to invest in expensive exploits for this OS.

Be careful when selecting apps and do not be too trusting when it comes to your much-loved devices. It’s hard to believe that something you trust with your personal life – your digital friend – can become your digital frenemy. But it does happen – and more often than you might think.